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Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
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Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
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Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
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Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
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Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
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Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
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Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
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Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
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Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
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Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
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Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
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Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
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Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
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Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
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Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
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Page 66
Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
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Page 67
Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
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Page 68
Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
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Page 69
Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
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Page 70
Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
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Page 71
Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
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Page 72
Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
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Page 73
Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
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Page 74
Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
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Page 75
Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
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Page 76
Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
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Page 77
Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
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Page 78
Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
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Page 79
Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
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Page 80
Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
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Page 81
Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
×
Page 82
Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
×
Page 83
Suggested Citation:"4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material." National Research Council. 1997. Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5590.
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Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union 52 PROLIFERATION CONCERNS 4 Protection, Control, and Accountability of Direct-Use Material THE PROLIFERATION RISK FROM LEAKAGE OF DIRECT-USE MATERIAL Acquiring direct-use material—separated plutonium or unirradiated highly enriched uranium (HEU)—is a principal technical barrier for any nation or group seeking to develop nuclear weapons.1 Several kilograms of plutonium or several times that amount of HEU are sufficient to make a nuclear weapon, with the quantity depending on the composition of the material, type of weapon, and sophistication of the design.2 Estimates put the current inventory of direct-use material in the former Soviet Union (FSU) at about 200 tons of plutonium and about 1,200 tons of HEU, much of which is not incorporated into nuclear weap- ons.3 Almost all of this material is in Russia. Other FSU states have much smaller 1 Many other commodities and technologies are also required to construct a weapon, but most of these items probably can be more readily obtained than direct-use material. 2 For example, the exact amount of HEU depends on its level of enrichment. Much more HEU would be needed for a device if the material were only enriched to the level of 20 percent rather than 90 percent. Nonetheless, it is possible to fabricate a nuclear explosive device with 20 percent mate- rial. With natural uranium (0.7 percent) or with common reactor fuel (3 to 4 percent), a complex process would be required to reach an enrichment level for use in a weapon. The United States requires the highest level of security protection at buildings classified as Category I, that is, where 2 or more kilograms of plutonium or 5 or more kilograms of any type of HEU are located. 3 General Accounting Office, “Nuclear Proliferation: Status of U.S. Efforts to Improve Nuclear Material Controls in Newly Independent States,” GAO/NSLAD/RCED-96-89 (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, March 1996), p. 3. Estimates vary on the amount and enrichment level of HEU in the FSU. Throughout this report all references to tons are to metric tons. One metric ton is 2,205 pounds. 52 Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF DIRECT-USE MATERIAL 53 stocks, totaling less than one-half ton, but these quantities are still significant.4 Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, there is growing concern in the West that this material is increasingly vulnerable to theft or diversion. There is an urgent need to improve controls over direct-use material in the countries of the FSU. Acquiring substantial quantities of either HEU or pluto- nium could greatly simplify the efforts of a nation to obtain or augment a nuclear weapons capability. Kilogram quantities of HEU could be used by groups with relatively limited technical capability to construct a crude but effective nuclear device. And terrorists could disperse into the environment modest amounts of plutonium or other radioactive materials, which could cause substantial damage and societal disruption. In Russia direct-use material is found in many forms at a variety of military and civilian facilities5 that fall under the jurisdiction of several ministries, agen- cies, and institutes. For its purposes, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) considers that the material is distributed among five “sectors”:6 1. Nuclear weapons, which are largely under the custody of the Ministry of Defense (MOD). These weapons, which are not included in the scope of this study, are currently deployed or stored at fewer than 100 sites, down from over 500 in the late 1980s.7 2. Material in the Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) defense com- plex, such as the weapons design institutes at Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70. Like DOE in the United States, MINATOM is responsible for production, assem- bly, and disassembly of nuclear warheads. An estimated 2,000+ warheads are being dismantled each year as a result of U.S.-Russian arms reduction agree- ments. This sector thus has large amounts of direct-use material and its invento- ries are growing. One recent study estimates that 15 tons of plutonium and 45 4 Estimate based on committee discussions with officials at selected FSU institutes. Latvia, Uzbekistan, and Georgia also have small quantities of HEU. U.S. bilateral programs with these countries are beyond the scope of this report. 5 In this report the term “facility” is used to denote a collection of buildings and/or structures that serve a common purpose. A facility may contain more than one building, and in some cases two or more facilities may be grouped at one site, such as Tomsk-7, which has at least six. 6 “Unified US-Russian Plan for Cooperation on Nuclear Materials Protection, Control, and Ac- counting (MPC&A) Between the Department of Energy Laboratories and the Institutes and Enter- prises of the Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) Nuclear Defense Complex,” Department of Energy, September 1, 1995, pp. 7-8. 7 John Deutch, Director of Central Intelligence, “The Threat of Nuclear Diversion,” testimony to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Affairs, March 20, 1996, p. 8. The Soviet Union had withdrawn its tactical nuclear weapons from Eastern Europe by 1991, and, as a result of agreements reached in 1994, Russia has become the heir to all nuclear weapons on the territory of the FSU. All nuclear warheads were transferred to Russia from Kazakstan in 1995 and from Ukraine and Belarus in 1996. Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union 54 PROLIFERATION CONCERNS tons of HEU are now being transferred annually from MOD to MINATOM custody.8 3. Material in the MINATOM civilian institutions, such as the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering in Obninsk, the plutonium reprocessing facility at Mayak, and the Luch Scientific Production Association in Podolsk.9 Many of these facilities are devoted to research and development on nuclear power reac- tors, along with producing power reactor fuel and other nuclear materials for civilian applications. Although the amounts of direct-use material in this sector are smaller than in the defense sector, the quantities are still significant as a proliferation risk. 4. Material at civilian research facilities outside MINATOM, such as the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy, the Dubna Joint Institute of Nuclear Re- search, and the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute. In most cases the amounts of material at these facilities are relatively small, but Kurchatov has several tons. 5. Material for marine propulsion applications in submarines, surface ships, and civilian icebreakers. The facilities have stocks of HEU at various levels of enrichment. Outside Russia, all known stocks of direct-use material are in civilian facili- ties. Thus, in the four categories outside the Russian MOD, direct-use materials are stored at an estimated 80 to 100 facilities in the FSU.10 Both HEU and plutonium represent serious proliferation risks. HEU is of particular concern because, unlike plutonium, it can be used in a simple gun-type device.11 HEU can be blended down into low-enriched uranium (LEU) and used as fuel in nuclear power reactors.12 The United States has adopted this HEU-to- LEU approach, agreeing in 1992 to buy 500 tons of HEU from dismantled Rus- sian weapons which is being converted to LEU. During the Soviet Union era, the security over all direct-use material was not in question, reflecting the formidable police power of the state and the loyalty of 8 G. Allison, O. Cote, R. Falkenrath, and S. Miller, Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Materials (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1996), p. 21. 9 Unlike the United States, which now maintains a strict separation between military and commer- cial nuclear activities, in the Soviet Union the same facilities sometimes performed both kinds of work. Commercial nuclear research thus also takes place in facilities that are usually counted as part of the MINATOM defense sector. 10 “Report on Control and Accountability of Materials Related to Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Former Soviet Union,” Department of Defense, June 1, 1995, p. 2. The estimate of 80 to 100 facilities is used for both Russia and the entire FSU in different reports. 11 J. Carson Mark, “Explosive Properties of Reactor Grade Plutonium,” Science and Global Secu- rity, vol. 4, 1993, pp. 111-128. 12 In contrast, converting plutonium to a form that is unsuitable for weapons use is an economi- cally less attractive and technically more challenging task. Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF DIRECT-USE MATERIAL 55 the managers, soldiers, and workers in the Soviet nuclear complex. The security system focused on controlling people—relying on “closed borders, closed cities, a controlled society, and extensive surveillance of personnel by the KGB.”13 The very existence of many closed cities was considered a state secret, and they were surrounded by perimeter fences and numerous guard posts. “The physical protec- tion programs [relied] more on manpower than on technical systems. The secu- rity system ultimately depended on a responsible, competent, and well-disci- plined establishment, and well treated and loyal personnel.”14 The civilian portion of the Soviet nuclear complex was also subject to strict security, although not as exacting, and again it focused heavily on controlling personnel. The Soviets maintained accounting systems for material in MOD and MINATOM weapons inventories to complement the system of personnel secu- rity and physical protection, but the accounting efforts apparently did not extend beyond the maintenance of paper records that were not always complete or easily accessible. There is also anecdotal evidence that some facility managers main- tained stocks of material off the books to ensure that quotas for producing mate- rial would be met. In addition, as in the nuclear complex in the United States, the nature of the process of producing and handling direct-use materials results in uncertainty about the exact quantities of material that a facility actually pos- sesses. Measurements are particularly difficult when material is in process, held up in pipes and vessels, or otherwise inaccessible.15 According to DOE, there is no central inventory of all direct-use material in Russia.16 Although individual facilities do have inventory data, much of the infor- mation is reported to be incomplete or inadequate. Inventories of shipments of materials between facilities may also be complicated by differences in measuring instruments and sampling procedures among facilities. Not surprisingly, the best data are available on high-quality materials, while information on scrap, residues, or materials in process is generally poor. The U.S. intelligence community believes that “the Russians may not know where all their material is located.”17 13 John P. Holdren, Chairman, Panel on U.S.-FSU Cooperation to Protect, Control, and Account for Weapons-Usable Nuclear Materials, testimony to a joint hearing of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, and Subcommittee on Europe, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, August 23, 1995. 14 David Osias, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs, “Security of Nuclear Weap- ons and Weapons-Usable Material in FSU,” testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, August 22, 1995. 15 For example, in February 1996 DOE released estimates of cumulative inventory differences in the United States of 2.8 metric tons of plutonium over a 50-year period (U.S. Department of Energy, Plutonium: The First 50 Years, p. 52). 16 DOE responses to the committee’s questions, October 23, 1995. 17 John Deutch, Director of Central Intelligence, “The Threat of Nuclear Diversion,” testimony to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Affairs, March 20, 1996. Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union 56 PROLIFERATION CONCERNS Upon the breakup of the Soviet Union, the non-Russian states started essen- tially from scratch to create modern systems to protect their newly inherited nuclear materials. In some cases, senior officials of new ministries initially were not aware of the existence or amount of direct-use material in their keeping. In addition, and particularly in the case of Kazakstan, much of the experience in MPC&A was tied to Soviet requirements generated in Moscow. Responsibility for implementing MPC&A systems was largely in the hands of specialists from Russia, some of whom returned to Russia in the early 1990s. While some ele- ments of the old physical protection systems (e.g., fences, alarms), even if inad- equate, could be transferred to the new owners and operators of facilities, control and accountability systems at both the facility and the national levels had to be constructed. More generally, the future of the FSU nuclear research and production com- plex is uncertain. The end of the Cold War and the prospect of significant nuclear arms reductions have reduced the roles for many facilities. MINATOM has in- structed its defense-related and civilian facilities to become more self-supporting and find other sources of income beyond government funds. Some laboratories and storage buildings are deteriorating. There is little or no money for mainte- nance, purchase of equipment, or, sometimes, payment of salaries. Many workers are leaving to pursue other jobs. In such circumstances, the vulnerabilities of the security systems present temptations for disaffected or desperate workers and reduce the prospects that thefts will be detected. In March 1996, John Deutch, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, testified that a comprehensive examination revealed that none of these (non-MOD) facilities in Russia or other newly independent states had adequate safeguards or security measures by international standards for weapons-usable material. . . . The chill- ing reality is that nuclear materials and technologies are more accessible now than at any other time in history—due primarily to the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and the region’s worsening economic conditions.18 By most accounts, the nuclear weapons in the MOD system remain under good control, although concern for their security is growing among western governments. The farther one moves from intact warheads, in MOD and espe- cially in MINATOM and in the rest of the FSU, however, the more vulnerable the material appears to be.19 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. As noted, the MOD complex is outside the scope of this study. Deutch testified that: “We believe the likelihood of the loss of a nuclear weapon is still slight today. But the threat from within the Russian military and a deteriorating economy mean that this judgment could change rapidly.” Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF DIRECT-USE MATERIAL 57 To date, despite hundreds of reports, there are only a few known cases of thefts and/or illicit exports of direct-use material.20 The cases all involved quan- tities of material far smaller than what would be required to make a nuclear weapon. And none of the thefts was from a nuclear weapons storage facility. Nonetheless, after initial reluctance to acknowledge the shortcomings in MPC&A, Russian officials have now called for improvements in the systems to protect direct-use and other types of nuclear materials.21 COMPONENTS OF MPC&A MPC&A should be one of the core elements of a national system of safe- guards and security that the international community expects all countries pos- sessing nuclear materials to establish. Such systems are designed to protect the material against theft or diversion and to detect such events if they occur. Briefly, 1. Physical protection systems are “designed to detect any unauthorized penetration of barriers and portals, and to respond with immediate investigation and use of force if necessary.”22 The systems should delay perpetrators long enough for guards and, if necessary, additional forces to respond. Physical pro- tection measures are generally the most visible and pervasive components of a safeguards systems. Fences, multiple barriers to entry, limited access points, alarms, and motion detectors are all examples of elements of a physical protec- tion system in addition to guards. 2. Material control systems are designed to “prevent unauthorized move- ment of special nuclear materials and to detect promptly the theft or diversion of the material should it occur.”23 These systems may include portal monitors and other devices to control egress from storage sites; authorized flow paths, storage locations, and secure containers for material; and seals and identification codes that make it possible to readily verify the location and condition of material. Good material control may also assist with physical protection. 3. Material accountability systems are designed “to ensure that all material of interest is accounted for, or to measure the loss of any, and to provide informa- tion for follow-up investigation, within error limits imposed by the process and 20 In a meeting with the committee during its visit to Moscow in May 1996, a senior MINATOM official said that there had been 23 cases of thefts and attempted thefts of nuclear-related materials from MINATOM facilities during 1993 and 1994 but that only three were successful. According to the same official, there had been no thefts or attempted thefts in 1995 and 1996. 21 No theft of direct-use material is known to have occurred in 1995 or 1996, but it is not known if this is the result of improved security, more skillful thefts, or reluctance of officials to disclose thefts. 22 National Research Council, Material Control and Accounting in the Department of Energy’s Nuclear Fuel Complex (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1989), p. 38. 23 Ibid., p. 41. Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union 58 PROLIFERATION CONCERNS by instruments.”24 These include both traditional inventory systems and an array of equipment to measure the types and quantities of material in a given area. Integral to all three of the above systems is personnel reliability, which includes “security screening, indoctrination, training, and some personnel records functions. . . .”25 It may also include both procedures ensuring that no single worker is left alone in sensitive areas (the two-man rule) and limits on access to certain facilities, which can be part of material control procedures as well. The design of an MPC&A system rests on fundamental principles of “graded safeguards” and “defense in depth” against a spectrum of threats. The principle of graded safeguards reflects the belief that the effort and resources devoted to improving MPC&A must be commensurate with the particular risks to material at any given facility. Defense in depth incorporates redundant and diverse layers of defense to increase the difficulty of penetration and to guarantee that the failure of any single layer will not result in a major loss.26 In accordance with these principles, MPC&A systems should be designed to protect against a range of threats. The threats may be external—for example, break-ins or attacks by individuals or groups such as terrorists, or internal, such as thefts by one or more employees with access to the material. Insiders might also work with an outside group so that a facility could be subject to a combined internal and external threat. Table 1.4 in the Executive Summary outlines the basic features of an MPC&A system. During the time of the Soviet Union, external threats were the primary con- cern because officials were confident of their control over personnel.27 During the committee’s visits to Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus, a number of officials and facility managers remarked that they still see the largest threat as coming from outsiders, either from terrorists intent on theft or sabotage or, in the worst case, from large-scale civil unrest. Western experts and many in the FSU, however, consider the internal threat from employees who believe there is a market for nuclear material to be underestimated. The known thefts and attempted thefts to date have been carried out by insiders acting alone or in small groups. An effective MPC&A system must be able to cope with a range of threats, with each potential threat triggering an appropriate level of protection. 24 Ibid., p. 42. 25 Ibid., p. 38. 26 DOE answers to committee questions, October 23, 1995. 27 “Set up under Soviet rule for a strictly regimented closed society worried only about external threats, the security often amounts to little more than barbed wire fences and armed guards, provid- ing scant protection against insiders and their accomplices who hope to get rich by smuggling out nuclear materials for sale on the black market . . .” (testimony of Lawrence Gershwin, Central Intelligence Agency, before the House Committee on Appropriations, DOD Appropriations for 1993, Part 5, May 6, 1992, p. 498). Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF DIRECT-USE MATERIAL 59 Identification of relevant and appropriate threat scenarios is the first step in the creation of an effective system, particularly its physical protection compo- nents. The scenarios provide the “Design Basis Threat” for assessing, correcting, and monitoring the vulnerabilities of a facility. A critical aspect of this process is ensuring the security of information about vulnerabilities. Such details, which are considered classified information by governments, would provide an “instruction book” for terrorists. Control and accounting systems for direct-use material tend to be more generic and less affected by specific threat scenarios, although some material control equipment may also serve specific physical protection roles and the systems certainly contribute to the overall physical protection of the material. All nations in possession of nuclear materials have some form of national MPC&A system, although national programs and standards vary significantly. The parts of the system related to material control and accountability are also subject to international standards as part of a country’s nonproliferation obliga- tions. But these “safeguards” are intended to thwart undisclosed diversion by the state itself rather than prevent theft and to provide “timely warning” that such diversion has occurred. The standards provide a baseline against which to mea- sure national material control and accountability systems; and FSU governments seem to find it politically desirable to accept and work toward internationally accepted norms. INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT FOR MPC&A SYSTEMS National MPC&A programs take place in the context of a number of interna- tional treaties and agreements designed to control the proliferation risk posed by direct-use materials while still permitting peaceful nuclear activities. The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) divides nations into three groups: five nuclear weapons states (NWSs—China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States), the remaining nonnuclear weapons states (NNWSs), and non-signato- ries.28 NNWSs that are parties to the NPT are required to accept full-scope safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). “Full-scope” safeguards apply to “all nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclear activities within their territory or under their control.” They consist of “a system of procedures involving material control and accountancy, containment and surveillance, and verification (including on-site inspections at declared facilities) that are imple- mented through agreements between the IAEA and individual countries.” NNWSs that are not parties to the NPT may also enter into safeguards agreements with the 28 Three other countries, India, Pakistan, and Israel, are generally considered to have acquired nuclear weapons capability, but none has acknowledged this publicly. None of the three is a party to the NPT. A fourth, South Africa, acquired a few nuclear weapons but abandoned its program and destroyed its stockpile in the early 1990s. It became a party to the NPT in 1991. Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union 60 PROLIFERATION CONCERNS IAEA, and most have done so for at least some of their facilities, largely as a result of pressure by nuclear suppliers.29 By contrast, the NWSs are not required to accept IAEA safeguards, although all five have signed “voluntary offer” agreements under which they have agreed to subject some of their facilities to such safeguards. Currently, no facilities in Russia are under IAEA safeguards, although there are continuing discussions of possible monitoring for portions of the disposition of the excess fissile materials resulting from arms reduction agreements. In addition, Soviet/Russian specialists have worked for the IAEA and thus have acquired knowledge about and experi- ence with the international system. The other successor states with nuclear facilities and material, as NNWS parties to the NPT, are in various stages of developing safeguards agreements with the IAEA and implementing the associated accountability requirements to cover their entire nuclear programs, which are limited to peaceful activities. They also have cooperative programs with the United States and several other govern- ments to assist in this process. Kazakstan, for example, is working closely with the IAEA in creating its MPC&A system, in part because it wants to establish its credentials as a responsible nuclear trading partner so that it can continue to export uranium and beryllium. Unlike material control and accountability systems that are required for NNWSs by international agreements and that are aimed at detecting diversions of nuclear material by governments, the responsibility for physical protection of nuclear materials “rests entirely with the government of the State.”30 Recogniz- ing, however, that “it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility [for national physical protection] is being ful- filled,”31 the IAEA periodically issues updated guidelines for countries to follow in implementing their internal MPC&A programs. But the guidelines are purely advisory. The only relevant international accord concerning the physical protec- tion of nuclear materials against theft—the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material—covers nuclear material for peaceful purposes while in international transport. However, it has neither verification nor enforce- ment provisions.32 Thus, efforts to improve physical protection do not have a strong international standard against which to measure goals or progress. The United States and other industrialized states have detailed regulatory provisions establishing standards for MPC&A. These, together with the IAEA’s advisory 29 Office of Technology Assessment, Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), p. 27. 30 Hans Blix, “Preface,” in The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, INFCIRC/225/Rev. 3, (IAEA, Vienna, December 1989). 31 Ibid. 32 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. ACDA, 1990), pp. 301-313. Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF DIRECT-USE MATERIAL 61 guidelines, form a de facto benchmark for assessing the adequacy of controls in the Soviet successor states. Today, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan are undertaking efforts to improve protection of direct-use material at their principal facilities. But the task is enormous, and none of the countries has adequate funds or personnel to do the task on its own. Given the proliferation risks these materials represent, western and other governments have found it in their own national interests to offer assistance. The United States has undertaken a significant program of coopera- tion with Russia, as well as with Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine, to bring the level of security for their direct-use materials up to international standards. The IAEA and the G-7 governments are also engaged in the effort, although on a much smaller scale. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF U.S. COLLABORATION WITH RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND KAZAKSTAN Russia U.S.-Russian discussions on MPC&A cooperation began in late 1991, shortly after the U.S. Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar legislation. The primary focus of the Nunn-Lugar legislation and the activities of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) with Russia during the first years of cooperation was dismantlement, transportation, storage, and safeguarding of weapons themselves. But DOD rec- ognized the need for MPC&A upgrades as well and in 1993 finally signed an agreement with MINATOM on developing national MPC&A systems and im- proving controls over civilian nuclear material. In 1994, prompted by its success in scientific collaborations with Russian institutes in other areas, DOE initiated additional efforts to expand collaboration to MPC&A. The principal U.S. effort in Russia now consists of two complementary programs administered by DOE: government-to-government, which was funded by DOD under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program through fiscal year 1995 and thereafter by DOE; and lab-to-lab, initiated by DOE in 1994 and funded with DOE resources from the outset. Under a third related program on regulatory support, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and DOE are as- sisting Russia in developing and implementing a stronger national regulatory structure for MPC&A. Coordination of U.S. involvement in these programs is provided by an interagency group, established in 1994 and headed by the Na- tional Security Council. The government-to-government program in Russia is based on the 1993 U.S.-Russian agreement and several subsequent implementing agreements and amendments. Those agreements identify the facilities that will participate and establish the roles and responsibilities of the participating organizations. But the agreements did not immediately dispel fears and suspicions over Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union 62 PROLIFERATION CONCERNS motivations that had built up over many decades. While desiring collaboration, MINATOM nonetheless was reluctant to provide information and access to fa- cilities that the United States considered critical for cooperation.33 Other factors delaying implementation were the needs to establish a complicated array of bilat- eral agreements that could serve as the formal frameworks for activities in Rus- sia, to adjust organizational responsibilities and interagency procedures in the U.S. Government, and to adapt DOD financial regulations and procurement pro- cedures to these unique bilateral programs. “Buy America” requirements, and the attendant lengthy procurement process, also delayed the program. These condi- tions were to be met at a time when political turmoil abounded in Russia, with repercussions in Washington—problems that also would arise in the other suc- cessor states of concern. During the first few years, the effort was also compli- cated by the fact that, although the program was carried out by DOE, it was funded and managed by DOD. Progress was slow at the beginning, and there were few concrete results for the first two years. In part to circumvent the difficulties of implementation in the government- to-government program, and also to take advantage of the potential to build trust more readily through direct contacts among scientists who share common knowl- edge of and appreciation for nuclear security issues, DOE’s national laboratories and their counterpart Russian institutes initiated the lab-to-lab approach for MPC&A collaboration. Contacts between scientists from U.S. and Soviet weap- ons laboratories had begun in the waning days of the Cold War. Those contacts increased in 1992 and 1993 with reciprocal visits and discussions of possibilities for pursuing direct collaboration. In April 1994, DOE approved a proposal from Los Alamos National Laboratory to extend the successful U.S.-Russian scientific collaborations to include joint work on MPC&A. Los Alamos and Arzamas-16 signed the first umbrella contract laying out the administrative, financial, and legal arrangements necessary to expedite the implementation of subsequent spe- cific program-oriented contracts. Five other U.S. laboratories (Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and Brookhaven National Laboratory) soon joined in the lab-to-lab efforts. Each activity is conducted with DOE approval and in coordination with the U.S. Department of State, but the lab-to-lab program has offered more flexibility and has been spared some of the administrative hurdles to implementation that the government-to-government program encountered. Today, the two programs are proceeding on parallel tracks and are in many respects indistinguishable. 33 In a separate but related development, Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton agreed at their September 1994 summit to an exchange of information about aggregate stockpiles of nuclear weapons, stocks of fissile materials, and their safety and security. The negotiations to implement that exchange have not yet been completed. Certainly, the information provided by such an exchange would be a useful confidence-building measure for efforts to improve MPC&A in Russia and should also provide information relevant to a national inventory of direct-use material. Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF DIRECT-USE MATERIAL 63 However, DOE considers it important to keep both channels in place, lest admin- istrative complications arise in one. In addition to the lab-to-lab and government-to-government programs, the United States has sought to build other cooperative channels. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in close cooperation with DOE, has been working since 1993 to improve nuclear safeguards at the national and facility levels in the FSU. A 1995 agreement between DOE and Russia’s nuclear regulatory agency, Gosatom- nadzor (GAN), identified new areas for cooperation, including development of national regulations, a national nuclear material control and accountability system, and MPC&A assistance at GAN-regulated facilities. The first significant result of joint MPC&A efforts in the FSU under the lab-to- lab program was the work at Building 116 at the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy in 1994. At a time when U.S. specialists were still trying to gain access to other Russian facilities, major improvements were made at Building 116 in just five months. The upgrades were installed as a pilot project to demonstrate the MPC&A approach and to showcase the potential of Russian-built equipment. Many govern- ment officials in both countries view the success of that demonstration as the true beginning of the cooperative process. From the point of view of gaining full support from MINATOM, the joint MPC&A demonstration at Arzamas-16 early in 1995 was equally critical in giving the cooperative program momentum. In April 1995, the Minister of Atomic Energy ordered the entire demonstration moved to his office at MINATOM headquarters in Moscow, where he personally showed it to hun- dreds of Russian officials. The fundamental objective for the collaborative MPC&A program in Russia is “to apply the technical capabilities and expertise of the U.S. and Russian laborato- ries, institutes, and enterprises to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation, a problem that is vital to the national security of both countries.”34 The technical approaches in the various Russian institutions participating in the government-to-government and lab-to-lab programs are generally the same, with each activity modified as neces- sary to take into account the state of the concerned facility, the available funds from both sides, and the seriousness of the threat of leakage. The immediate objective is “to enhance, through U.S.-Russian technical cooperation, the effectiveness of MPC&A in Russian nuclear facilities that process or store highly enriched uranium and plutonium.”35 34 Joint US-Russian MPC&A Steering Group, “Unified U.S.-Russian Plan for Cooperation on Nuclear Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) Between Department of Energy Laboratories and the Institutes and Enterprises of the Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) Nuclear Defense Complex,” September 1, 1995, p. 5. 35 Ibid. These enhancements are directed primarily at three of the four components of an overall national system of safeguards and security—that is, physical protection, material protection, and material accounting. At present, DOE does not consider the fourth element—personnel reliability—a separate priority for the U.S. cooperative program. Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union 64 PROLIFERATION CONCERNS In making these enhancements, DOE utilizes both “horizontal” and “verti- cal” approaches to the problem. With a horizontal approach, a particular element of an MPC&A system is selected and then implemented at multiple facilities. For example, “radiation-based portal monitors might be chosen for implementation at many facilities as soon as possible, to fill a recognized need for enhanced entry/ exit control.”36 By contrast, a vertical approach would select a particular facility and then implement all the necessary elements of an MPC&A system there. In principle, the current program uses both approaches, although to date most of the efforts can best be described as horizontal. The specific goal of the current program in Russia is to have initial MPC&A upgrades completed at all non-MOD facilities with direct-use material by 2002.37 As mentioned earlier, as of summer 1996, agreements were in place for coopera- tive activities at many facilities. DOE estimates that the agreements cover about 90 percent of the Russian facilities known to contain direct-use material but not all of the buildings at those facilities.38 The six U.S. national laboratories involved in the programs, as well as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, have undertaken a wide variety of projects staffed by multilaboratory teams to implement these goals. For example, Sandia National Laboratories, which has principal responsibility for physical protection technology for the United States, has provided training in basic physical protec- tion system design that covers the technical aspects of detection, delay, and response.39 At the Machine Building Plant in Electrostal, the cooperative pro- gram is providing new portal monitors, metal detectors, cages, and other physical protection equipment. Upgrading physical protection at this and other facilities is difficult because under the Soviet system the integrity of individual buildings was not given a high priority. Hence, buildings often have many windows and other features consid- ered vulnerable by western physical protection standards. Officials at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering in Obninsk, for example, told committee members that a window overlooking a critical assembly area was much more vulnerable than they had previously thought. The viewing area will be redesigned as a result of the new assessment. To help facilities address such problems, Sandia and Lawrence Livermore national laboratories are training Russian per- sonnel to use a vulnerability assessment computer program called ASSESS. 36 Ibid., p. 9. 37 In most cases a full suite of initial upgrades will be in place. In some others, particularly in buildings where cooperation may be delayed for reasons of security or sensitivity, the upgrades should nevertheless be well on their way to completion. In all cases the Russian counterparts should be committed and should have the capability not only to ensure that the upgrades are complete but also to maintain their operation as designed. 38 Briefing of committee staff by DOE representative, August 1996. 39 “Delay” refers to slowing perpetrators until a response team arrives. (See also Table 1.4 in the Executive Summary.) Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF DIRECT-USE MATERIAL 65 Computerized material control and accountability systems are planned at most of the facilities where cooperative work is under way. For example, at the Kurchatov Institute, experts from Los Alamos are working with Russian com- puter programmers to implement a system by which the various measurement devices will feed data into a central system so that the information for keeping accurate material balances can be easily updated, collated, and maintained. Simi- larly, U.S. laboratories are working with the Luch Scientific Production Associa- tion to design a plan for undertaking a complete inventory of direct-use material. While institute officials claim they know the whereabouts of all direct-use mate- rial, a full inventory nonetheless is a difficult task because some material has been at the facility in uncertain conditions for decades. At Obninsk, the stocks include 70,000 to 80,000 small metal disks that contain a total of approximately seven tons of plutonium and HEU and are used for experimental work on critical assemblies. Oak Ridge National Laboratory is leading an effort to place bar codes and seals that can be read by the new comput- erized inventory system on the containers for the disks. The eventual goal is to have bar codes on each disk, but that task will take several years. Activities in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan In Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan, the United States has instituted coopera- tive approaches similar to those undertaken in Russia. Organizationally, the MPC&A programs in the other states are simpler, with the government-to-gov- ernment approach providing ready access to facilities and people. Also, in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan, a single civilian ministry or state committee has total responsibility for nuclear regulatory activities. As previously stated, these countries face a particular challenge as a result of the Soviet legacy. Under the Soviet system, much of the responsibility for MPC&A was in the hands of ministries and individuals in Moscow. Conse- quently, the dissolution of the Soviet Union left many facilities in Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine without the experience and expertise necessary to de- velop adequate MPC&A systems. Ukraine A small but significant portion of the Soviet nuclear program was located on Ukrainian territory. While Ukraine transferred the last of its nuclear weapons to Russia in June 1996, its nuclear power plants and research facilities continue to store spent fuel and direct-use material. Ukraine has no plutonium but has HEU at the following facilities: • Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology—The institute conducts nuclear research, although at present its accelerator is shut down because of a lack of funding. The institute stores about 70 kilograms of HEU. Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union 66 PROLIFERATION CONCERNS • Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research—The institute’s research reactor has been shut down since 1994, but the reactor building stores small quantities of fresh and spent fuel, including direct-use material up to 90 percent enrichment. • Sevastopol Institute of Nuclear Energy and Industry—The institute’s reac- tor has been shut down, but the institute stores both fresh and spent fuel. In addition, Ukraine has five nuclear power plant sites at Chernobyl, Khmelnitsky, Rovno, South Ukraine, and Zaporozhye, with a total of 15 operat- ing units at these sites. Most of the spent fuel from these plant sites is currently stored on-site. For reasons discussed below, the U.S. collaborative effort with Ukraine has been expanded beyond just those facilities with direct-use material to include one of the nuclear power plants. DOE and the Ukrainian State Committee on Nuclear and Radiation Safety signed an agreement for cooperation in MPC&A in December 1993, and shortly thereafter the two sides agreed to begin cooperative projects at the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant and the Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research. Subsequent agreements in 1995 with the Ukrainian Ministry for Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety (which absorbed the State Committee on Nuclear and Radia- tion Safety) expanded cooperation to the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Tech- nology and Sevastopol Institute of Nuclear Energy and Industry. Early in the discussions a dichotomy became apparent between the U.S. and Ukrainian views on security threats. The United States does not view nuclear power plants as a priority for MPC&A upgrades because their spent fuel, while containing plutonium, poses no immediate proliferation concern.40 Ukraine, how- ever, considers the security of nuclear plants vital to its national security because the plants supply heat and power that are essential for the country’s economy and well-being and could be vulnerable to sabotage. The U.S. MPC&A effort in Ukraine, therefore, has targeted both a nuclear power plant and the three research facilities. The United States and Ukraine agreed on the Design Basis Threat to be used at each Ukrainian nuclear facility and then proceeded with site surveys, including identification of equipment needs and specifications. Most of the effort is focused on major upgrades of physical protection, including repairing walls, building fences, providing equipment to detect intruders, and training guards. Work has begun on these upgrades, though at the Sevastopol facility a dispute between Ukraine and Russia over control of the Black Sea fleet and possibly the future of the city of Sevastopol and the institute delayed implementation of the U.S.- Ukrainian cooperative effort. This effort is now under way and assistance is being provided to safeguard the material. 40 Committee on International Security and Arms Control, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1994), pp. 150-151. Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF DIRECT-USE MATERIAL 67 Belarus Belarus has one research reactor, which has been deactivated, at the Institute of Nuclear Power Engineering in Sosny, outside Minsk. Fresh fuel containing direct-use material is stored at Sosny. In 1994, the United States joined Sweden and Japan in an international effort organized by the IAEA to upgrade the MPC&A system at the facility. Under that international effort, DOE, together with the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, assumed the lead responsibility for upgrading facility-level protection of nuclear materials. A bilateral implementing agreement, signed by the United States and Belarus in 1995, formally recognized cooperative efforts already under way. Following site surveys and discussions in 1995, physical protection upgrades were begun at two buildings. The U.S. contri- bution to that effort, which was completed in September 1996, had included improvements to the central alarm station, installation of tamper-indicating de- vices, and provision of other equipment and training.41 Kazakstan The Soviet republic of Kazakstan played a central role in nuclear weapons deployment and testing programs. While all nuclear weapons have been trans- ferred to Russia and nuclear testing has ceased, direct-use material remains at several facilities: • Aktau—A BN-350 fast breeder reactor, fueled by LEU and HEU, pro- vides power for both desalinization and residential electricity. Plutonium and other materials accumulated in the reactor’s blanket are stored in a pool adjacent to the reactor. This pool also is the storage site for spent fuel. Fresh HEU fuel rods also are present at the facility. • Semipalatinsk—The National Nuclear Center, located about 75 kilome- ters from the Semipalatinsk test site, conducts research at three reactors using HEU. The center has a total of approximately 200 kilograms of HEU, some of it unirradiated. • Alatau (near Almaty)—The Institute of Atomic Energy, part of the Na- tional Nuclear Center, has a VVR-K research reactor, which is not operating. It used 36 percent enriched uranium as fuel. Small stocks of direct-use material are present at the facility. • Ulba Metallurgy Plant—This facility fabricates uranium fuel and pro- duces LEU fuel pellets for reactors. The facility stored HEU until 1994, when the stocks were transferred to the United States under Project Sapphire.42 41 “DOE Secures Nuclear Material in Belarus and Uzbekistan, Reduces Risk of Nuclear Prolifera- tion,” DOE news press release, October 1, 1996. 42 Under Project Sapphire, approximately 600 kilograms of HEU was transferred to the United States in November 1994. Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union 68 PROLIFERATION CONCERNS DOD and the Ministry of Defense of Kazakstan signed an agreement in December 1993 on collaborative MPC&A upgrades. The implementing agree- ment committed the United States to provide assistance valued at $5 million; in June 1995 the level of assistance was increased to $8 million and in June 1996 to $23 million. The two sides selected the Ulba fuel fabrication facility as the first facility for collaborative MPC&A work. The collaboration has since been ex- panded to the other facilities listed above. At the facility level, DOE is providing MPC&A instrumentation and equip- ment and is cooperating on system design, installation, test and evaluation, and associated training. At the national level, the U.S. effort supports the Nuclear Regulatory Commission working with the Atomic Energy Agency of Kazakstan in developing regulations, associated guidance, and mechanisms for assuring regulatory compliance, including licensing and inspection programs. U.S. spe- cialists are also working with colleagues to develop a national system of materi- als control and accountability, including tracking the movement of material. While neither the Kazakstani Government nor directors of nuclear facilities consider MPC&A as important a priority as developing future nuclear power sources and ensuring the safety of existing reactors, Kazakstan is clearly prepared to participate energetically in upgrading its MPC&A programs as a step toward gaining the confidence of the West in the reliability of its civilian nuclear power and in its ability to protect its remaining stocks of direct-use material. Kazakstan has accepted the general standards for control and accountability of nuclear ma- terial developed under IAEA’s international safeguards program and is attempt- ing to ensure that its facilities comply with those guidelines. Ulba is now under IAEA safeguards, and the initial inventory verification by the IAEA at Semipalatinsk has been completed. MEASURES OF SUCCESS In approaching the task of evaluating the U.S. cooperative program, the committee considered but did not use highly structured criteria. The efforts and conditions in the FSU are evolving rapidly, making the U.S. program a work in progress; and, in any event, progress to date is not quantifiable. Moreover, the optimal near-term upgrade program against which to judge U.S. efforts cannot be easily framed, given the political and economic uncertainties of the FSU and incomplete knowledge of the status of Russian facilities. In the program’s early stages the United States measured progress in quantifiable items, in particular the number of facilities at which cooperative activities were under way. But this approach can lead to an exaggerated sense of success. Recognizing this, DOE has adopted the true standard for assessing progress: reduction in the vulnerability of direct-use material. By this standard, only a small fraction of the MPC&A job is complete. The measure of overall success of the MPC&A upgrades must be the extent Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF DIRECT-USE MATERIAL 69 to which the vulnerability of material is reduced by bringing it under adequate security. Achieving the ultimate goal of the highest-possible standards of security is the responsibility of the FSU governments themselves. The appropriate mea- sure of the effectiveness of the U.S. program is how well it contributes to achiev- ing that security. This includes emphasizing the importance internationally of MPC&A upgrades, thereby increasing the motivation of the host governments to make such upgrades, and providing the necessary technical and financial support to make the improvements possible in the near term. As the U.S. role in MPC&A upgrades in the FSU eventually diminishes and comes to an end, the cooperative program should be evaluated on such measures as: Did the United States take advantage of opportunities to increase cooperation? Were technical improvements appropriate to FSU needs? Did the cooperative program strike the right balance between breadth and depth of activity? In the interim the committee’s specific findings are largely qualitative in nature and are intended to provide an overall sense of the progress being made in MPC&A upgrades. The committee’s recommendations will help ensure that the answers to the above questions are positive. GENERAL FINDINGS CONCERNING U.S. COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS After initial delays of more than two years, primarily because of a lack of interest in Moscow in cooperative arrangements that the United States considered equitable and essential, progress attributable to the joint efforts of U.S. and coun- terpart specialists in MPC&A greatly accelerated in 1995 and 1996. As already mentioned, DOE estimates that U.S. specialists have gained access to some of the many buildings at approximately 90 percent of the sites where direct-use material is known to be located outside the MOD complex and has initiated cooperative interactions to address many of the most pressing MPC&A issues at those sites. This is a significant political and organizational achievement, considering (a) the complexity of the tasks in transforming the Soviet approach to MPC&A, which had relied primarily on controlling people, to an approach that relies increasingly on technical measures and (b) the history of secrecy throughout the Soviet nuclear complex. But while significant improvements have been made at selected facili- ties, the task has not been completed at any facility and has only begun at many. The DOE estimates that tons of direct-use material are contained in internation- ally acceptable MPC&A systems and that tens of tons are in partially acceptable systems; but adequate MPC&A systems for hundreds of tons must still be in- stalled. It is noteworthy that in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan cooperative efforts have already achieved discernable technical improvements. Of special interest, DOE announced in 1996 that it had completed MPC&A upgrades at the Institute Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union 70 PROLIFERATION CONCERNS of Nuclear Power Engineering in Belarus, the only known facility in Belarus with direct-use material. The cooperative program with Russia has been stimulated by high-level support from the U.S. and Russian Governments. President Clinton underscored the importance of the cooperative effort in September 1995, with a Presidential Decision Directive accelerating MPC&A cooperation with the successor states and formalizing responsibilities and assignments for the various agencies and departments.43 Also, the U.S.-Russian Commission on Economic and Techno- logical Cooperation, known as the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, has made MPC&A collaboration an important agenda item.44 President Yeltsin has under- scored Russia’s own attention to MPC&A with several decrees and executive orders aimed at improving the security of direct-use material. While actual tech- nical progress may fall short of the level of achievement implied by these politi- cal statements, the high-level attention to the importance of MPC&A upgrades is nonetheless noteworthy and important. The efforts to upgrade MPC&A in all four countries have also benefited from support from Japan and Europe. The efforts are gradually becoming more multilateral, with increasingly frequent coordination meetings held among repre- sentatives of other interested western countries. The Obninsk training center, which receives support from the European Union, is one example. However, the United States remains by far the largest supporter of activities in the region and is the most focused on direct-use materials. But while progress has been made, particularly in lessening bureaucratic and other barriers to cooperation and in demonstrating technical approaches, U.S. officials realize much remains to be done—at the technical level, as well as in changing attitudes and instilling a new philosophy that places higher value on individual initiative and responsibility. The need to continue the momentum of the MPC&A programs and make significant technical improvements as rapidly as possible until such time as MPC&A programs are internalized in the successor states and able to stand on their own is vital to world security. With the constraint of limited U.S. and FSU resources, the program must both encourage completion of work at the selected facilities to bring them up to international standards and move on to the other significant facilities at which upgrades have not yet begun. There is an inherent tension in the goals of the U.S. program between the temptation to initiate activi- ties at as many facilities as possible while the opportunities exist and the need to 43 U.S. Presidential Decision Directive 41, September 28, 1995. 44 For example, in July 1996, at the seventh meeting of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, the two sides signed a Joint Statement on Control, Accounting, and Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and a Joint Statement on Nuclear Material Protection, Control, and Accounting During Transportation. Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF DIRECT-USE MATERIAL 71 bring each facility, particularly those with substantial quantities of material, up to an acceptable level of security. Keeping a proper balance is one of the greatest challenges the program will face in the future. In their meetings and site visits in the United States and abroad, committee members recognized a significant level of commitment to improving the security for direct-use materials among government officials and institute personnel. But committee members realize the problem is immense and that solutions will re- quire significant time, effort, and support at all levels. One assessment underlies the committee’s general findings: Given the environment in which the coopera- tive programs must operate, the committee doubts that much more progress could have been made during the first few years even had significantly more U.S. funding been available. For example, as soon as opportunities arose, the re- sources rose dramatically from tens of millions to 100 million dollars per year. Having overcome political, cultural, and organizational hurdles, the chal- lenge now is to extend the program’s organizational and political achievements to significant technical improvements—a process that is at its early stages. As the program moves into the next stage of rapid implementation, certain overarching principles should guide the cooperative efforts. • For the near term it is essential that the United States sustain its involve- ment until counterpart institutions are in a position to assume the full burden of upgrading and maintaining MPC&A programs over the long term. • Emphasis should be on development and improvement of the capabilities of both officials and specialists in the four successor countries, reliance on local expertise and whenever possible local equipment, and establishment of viable funding sources—in short, actions to indigenize the activities. • The U.S. and cooperating governments and institutions should simplify the problem, by reducing and consolidating direct-use material of concern. • The program should include more concerted efforts to minimize the op- portunities to bypass the MPC&A systems that are installed. • The participating specialists should enhance their approaches in several program areas to increase the effectiveness of their joint efforts. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CONCERNING FUTURE COOPERATION IN MPC&A 1. Sustain the Program Finding: By mid-1995, projects at more than two dozen facilities were un- der way throughout the FSU, and by mid-1996 cooperation under both the lab-to- lab and government-to-government programs had expanded to other significant facilities. (The 44 sites at which DOE was working on MPC&A upgrades as of the end of fiscal year 1996 are listed in Table 4.1.) Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union 72 PROLIFERATION CONCERNS TABLE 4.1 Sites of MPC&A Cooperation (as of July 1996) MINATOM Civilian Complex 1. Scientific Research Institute of Atomic Reactors, Dimitrovgrad 2. Machine Building Plant, Electrostal 3. Institute of Physics and Power Engineering, Obninsk 4. Luch Scientific Production Association, Podolsk 5. Chemical Concentrates Plant, Novosibirsk 6. Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant, Zarechny 7. Branch of Scientific Research and Design Institute of Power Technology, Zarechny 8. Scientific Research and Design Institute of Power Technology, Moscow 9. Khlopin Radium Institute, St. Petersburg 10. Central Design Bureau of Machine Building, St. Petersburg 11. Institute of Theoretical and Experimental Physics, Moscow MINATOM Defense Complex 12. All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics, Arzamas-16 (Sarov) 13. Mining and Chemical Combine, Krasnoyarsk-26 (Zheleznogorsk) 14. Electrochemical Plant, Krasnoyarsk-45 (Zelenogorsk) 15. Mayak Production Association, Chelyabinsk-65 (Ozersk) 16. All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics, Chelyabinsk-70 (Snezhinsk) 17. Urals Electrochemical Integrated Plant, Sverdlovsk-44 (Novouralsk) 18. Siberian Chemical Combine, Tomsk-7 (Seversk) 19. Eleron (Special Scientific and Production State Enterprise), Moscow 20. All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Automatics, Moscow 21. Bochvar All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Inorganic Materials, Moscow Independent Civilian Sector 22. Russian Scientific Research Center, Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy, Moscow 23. Karpov Institute of Physical Chemistry, Obninsk 24. Scientific Research Institute of Nuclear Physics, Tomsk 25. Nikel Plant, Norilsk 26. Institute of Nuclear Physics, St. Petersburg 27. Joint Institute of Nuclear Research, Dubna 28. Moscow Engineering Physics Institute Naval Nuclear Fuel Sector 29. Northern Fleet 30. Pacific Fleet 31. Icebreaker Fleet (Murmansk Shipping Company) Non-Russian NIS Sector 32. Institute of Nuclear Power Engineering, Sosny, Belarus 33. Institute of Physics, Tbilisi, Georgia 34. Mangyshlak Power Generation Company, Aktau, Kazakstan 35. Institute of Atomic Energy, Alatau, Kazakstan 36. National Nuclear Center, Semipalatinsk, Kazakstan 37. Ulba Metallurgy Plant, Ust-Kamenogorsk, Kazakstan 38. Institute of Nuclear Physics, Salaspils, Latvia 39. Nuclear Power Plant, Ignalina, Lithuania 40. Kharkiv Institute for Physics and Technology, Ukraine 41. Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research, Ukraine 42. Sevastopol Institute of Nuclear Energy and Industry, Ukraine 43. South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant, Konstaninovsk, Ukraine 44. Institute of Nuclear Physics, Tashkent, Uzbekistan Source: U.S. Department of Energy. Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF DIRECT-USE MATERIAL 73 TABLE 4.2 Funds for MPC&A, Budgeted (Obligated) Defense Special Weapons Agency Fiscal Year Russia Belarus Kazakstan Ukraine 1992 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 1993 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 1994 0.8 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 3.3 (0.0) 2.4 (0.0) 1995 38.2 (0.8) 2.6 (2.6) 2.7 (3.3) 17.0 (2.4) 1996 0.0 (38.2) 0.3 (0.3) 15.0 (2.7) 0.0 (10.0) 1997 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Total 39.0 (39.0) 2.9 (2.9) 21.0 (6.0) 19.4 (12.4) Source: Defense Special Weapons Agency. Department of Energy Fiscal Year Russia Belarus Kazakstan Ukraine 1992 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 1993 2.5 (2.5) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 1994 3.0 (3.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 1995 9.6 (9.6) 0.2 (0.2) 0.3 (0.3) 0.3 (0.3) 1996 76.1 (61.1) 0.1 (0.1) 5.9 (5.9) 0.5 (0.5) 1997 88.9 0.1 4.5 0.5 Total 180.1 (76.2) 0.4 (0.3) 10.7 (6.2) 1.3 (0.8) Source: U.S. Department of Energy. To date, U.S. support for the program has grown steadily. Beginning in 1996, DOE took over funding responsibilities from DOD for management and implementation of the MPC&A program, including the government-to-govern- ment program, with considerable simplification of procedures. Funding for the overall U.S. effort has expanded in recent years from several million in fiscal year 1994 to over $100 million in fiscal year 1997. (Table 4.2 provides a sum- mary of funding for the U.S. MPC&A effort.) This increase reflects the fact that the cooperative program is moving beyond the organizational stage to that of implementing technical upgrades in the FSU. The continued flow of U.S. funds in the near term is essential because of the limited ability of the four governments to finance MPC&A upgrades.45 The next few years will be a critical period to take advantage of the new opportunities to cooperate in upgrading systems to an acceptable level. U.S. specialists are in a 45 The committee notes that multiyear funding for the bilateral programs would increase the stability and continuity of the cooperative efforts but acknowledges that U.S. congressional proce- dures make multiyear funding unlikely. Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union 74 PROLIFERATION CONCERNS unique position to help ensure that such upgrades are given high priority and installed in a prompt and effective manner. Recommendation: Continue to fund MPC&A efforts in the FSU at least at the level of fiscal year 1996 for several more years and be prepared to increase funding should particularly important high-impact opportunities arise. Continued funding will allow the U.S. and FSU governments to carry on cooperation at the technical level at important facilities. The present level of funding is satisfactory for the tasks recommended in this report, which can be achieved with a U.S. work force of about the same size as is currently engaged in the joint programs. In principle, additional funds could be used to increase the rate of implementation, but whether Russia and the other successor states will be able to absorb and use effectively the recent rapid increase in U.S. funding remains to be demonstrated. Another limitation on the size of the program in Russia, of course, is the readiness of MINATOM to expand efforts. If previously closed facilities unexpectedly become open for cooperative efforts, DOE should request additional funds. 2. Indigenize MPC&A Capabilities Finding: Once U.S. funding ends, the cooperating governments must be committed and able to assume full responsibility for funding and maintaining upgraded MPC&A systems. The challenge is great, as economic shortfalls even for basic program support limit the domestic funds available for MPC&A. Many nuclear facilities are in poor or deteriorating condition, and the economic situa- tion in the FSU makes any dramatic improvement unlikely in the near term. Shortages of funding for facility maintenance and basic program support make it difficult to give high priority to internal funds for MPC&A. In some cases, funding is not available even for installation and maintenance of equipment pro- vided by others. Ministries, institutes, and individuals will need access to income streams that will permit them to continue their efforts in the long term. DOE’s approach to MPC&A projects has appropriately stressed their col- laborative nature and the mutual benefits from increased security. Although keep- ing direct-use material out of countries of proliferation concern and terrorist groups is vital to U.S. national security, MPC&A is clearly a national responsibil- ity; and U.S. assistance should develop and strengthen indigenous MPC&A capa- bilities. Officials and specialists in the four successor countries will understand- ably undertake “cooperative activities” on sensitive issues such as MPC&A much more readily than they will accept “assistance.” It becomes even more important to define the program in terms of cooperative activities, looking to the day when U.S. funding scales down and the FSU governments and facility managers are expected to assume responsibility for MPC&A. Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF DIRECT-USE MATERIAL 75 Recommendation: Continue to emphasize the importance of MPC&A as a nonproliferation imperative at the highest political levels in the FSU. Many officials in the region do not attach great importance to proliferation as an inter- national security threat. Steps in MPC&A may sometimes be taken more to satisfy the U.S. and other western governments than out of serious concern over proliferation. Senior U.S. officials should continue to emphasize in interactions with their FSU counterparts the commonality of U.S. and FSU interests in the nonproliferation sphere. In addition, to help ensure that the United States is not alone in pressing the countries on the importance of nonproliferation, the United States must maintain diplomatic priority and appropriate support for the IAEA and other international approaches, particularly initiatives of the G-7 governments. Recommendation: Prior to initiating MPC&A projects at specific facili- ties, obtain assurances at both the ministry and the institute levels that the upgrade programs will be sustained after improvements have been made. Financial incentives, such as support for related research activities, should be considered as a means to stimulate long-term commitments. The U.S. program does not require institutes or governments to provide any assurance that they will sustain MPC&A upgrades after U.S. funding ends. In some facilities MPC&A equipment and technology might be used for other purposes after the cooperative efforts are completed. At the Kiev Institute for Nuclear Research, for example, the main interest of the staff is to restart the reactor, which they hope to do in 1997. But the dire financial situation of the institute suggests that computers and some other equipment provided by the United States for MPC&A could be diverted to support the reactor research program. At the Institute of Nuclear Power Engineering in Belarus, physical protection upgrades have been com- pleted, but there is no assurance that the government or institute will be able to maintain the newly installed system. Consequently, efforts should be made to assure that both ministries and facilities have the incentives to implement a sustained MPC&A program. Recommendation: Involve institute personnel to the fullest extent pos- sible in determining how to use available funds for upgrades. The U.S. pro- gram has sought to include working-level personnel in the FSU institutes in decisions on equipment needs, specifications, and installation. However, the strict decision-making hierarchy and centralization of authority in most institutes can make this difficult. Developing ways to maximize the involvement of working- level personnel in key decisions on MPC&A upgrades should encourage them to assume responsibility for the upgrades. Recommendation: Give greater emphasis to near-term training of local specialists. Developing indigenous capabilities in all aspects of MPC&A sys- Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union 76 PROLIFERATION CONCERNS tems is a key to having the FSU governments assume full responsibility for their installation and maintenance. The U.S. program should continue supporting the establishment of an MPC&A training facility at the Methodological Training Center in Obninsk, which will be managed by Russian specialists and provide an important means to “train the trainers” for future maintenance of the upgraded MPC&A systems. The European Union, through Euratom, is also contributing to the center, where training courses began in October 1995 and are gradually expanding. Effective courses were held in the spring and summer of 1996 on the overall design of MPC&A systems and on specific problems of software engi- neering for the design of control and accountability systems. As part of the effort to create a “safeguards culture” as well as to increase technical skills, coursework included studies of the international problems of proliferation and international cooperation to prevent it. The United States should also incorporate appropriate training programs at an early stage of bilateral activities at each facility where joint MPC&A programs are under way so as to ensure rapid transition from assistance to cooperation at these facilities. Recommendation: Reward those institutes that are making good progress in upgrading MPC&A systems by giving them preference for par- ticipation in other U.S.-financed cooperative programs. DOE and other U.S. government agencies have an array of cooperative programs under way in the FSU in addition to the work on MPC&A. DOE’s Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (formerly the Industrial Partnering Program), for example, uses U.S. laboratories as intermediaries to facilitate U.S. investments at FSU institutes. This and other cooperative programs involve work with the same facilities where DOE is helping to upgrade MPC&A. It should be a relatively easy task to give priority for such cooperation to institutes whose MPC&A performance is particu- larly strong. Recommendation: Encourage the establishment of new income streams that can provide adequate financial support for MPC&A programs in the long term, such as earmarking for MPC&A programs a portion of the rev- enues from Russian sales of HEU. Developing sustainable domestic funding sources in the FSU for any activity presents a significant challenge in the current economic climate of the region. The most feasible approach to ensure funding for MPC&A in the near term may be to use revenues that are becoming available to Russia or the other FSU countries from closely related activities, particularly other U.S. or western programs to reduce the risk posed by direct-use materials. The proceeds from the U.S. purchase of 500 tons of HEU from dismantled Rus- sian nuclear weapons is an example of a source that might be tapped. Recommendation: Rely increasingly on domestically produced and lo- cally available equipment for physical protection, detection, analysis, and Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF DIRECT-USE MATERIAL 77 related MPC&A tasks. The purchase and use of FSU equipment and technology can encourage local commitments to the program; stimulate a supply industry; and reduce acquisition, transportation, and maintenance costs. One example of successful use of Russian technology is the reliance on equipment produced by Eleron, a MINATOM enterprise that specializes in R&D and production of physi- cal protection equipment. Eleron provides important specialized services, opera- tion and maintenance, and training for security personnel. This practice should be expanded to the extent that appropriate equipment is available. Officials in Ukraine expressed concern to the committee that they have not been consulted on equipment purchases and that equipment comparable to that purchased from U.S. firms could be bought at a lower cost in Ukraine or Europe (saving transportation costs). Because the Ukrainians will have to operate as well as maintain the equipment after the U.S. program ends, using locally available equipment whenever possible is clearly a wise choice. 3. Simplify the Problem Finding: The amount of material and its dispersion in many buildings at many facilities increase the cost and complexity of MPC&A upgrades, as well as the risk of diversion. There are a number of cases in which upgrades are under way for selected buildings or for caches of material, while comparably important buildings or stocks of material at the same facility are not being addressed. The challenge of controlling small amounts of direct-use material located in hundreds of buildings, including many in a poor state of repair, seems overwhelming. If the amount of material and/or the number of storage areas could be substantially reduced, the time and costs involved in installing and maintaining MPC&A sys- tems also could be significantly decreased. Some initiatives in this direction will require strong efforts. The possession of direct-use material is viewed as essential to participation in some of the most cherished aspects of the FSU nuclear program. Thus, if the material is removed, the raison d’etre of the facility may suffer as a consequence. Holding direct-use material may also confer status on a facility or a laboratory director that would not otherwise be available. And if the material is removed, the flow of U.S. funds for MPC&A also could cease. Nonetheless, the security benefits of consolidation are significant enough that efforts to overcome these obstacles are a priority, particularly at facilities where there may be redundant stocks of especially proliferation-sensitive material. One possible approach would be to allow an institute to maintain ownership of material that is stored elsewhere. In any case, the proliferation benefits of consolidation will not be achieved if consolidation will deprive the institutes of funds they would otherwise expect to receive. Creative use of some of the incentives recommended in this chapter may be necessary to elicit support for consolidation. Related to the specific consolidation measures recommended below but out- Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union 78 PROLIFERATION CONCERNS side the scope of this study is the issue of continued production of plutonium in Russia. The United States is trying to encourage an end to plutonium production at the reactors in Krasnoyarsk and Tomsk. Also, closing the nuclear fuel rod reprocessing plant at the Mayak complex, where almost 30 tons of separated reactor-grade plutonium is already stored and more is being generated, has been strongly advocated by some U.S. specialists. Future use of the small stocks of direct-use material outside Russia is uncer- tain at best. Retaining these stocks even in a limited number of locations requires significant MPC&A expenditures and continued vigilance against the possibility of theft. Recommendation: In Russia, encourage consolidation of direct-use ma- terial in fewer buildings, at fewer facilities, and at fewer sites. Where eco- nomically feasible, consolidating the material could significantly simplify the task facing the cooperative program at a number of sites. Russian officials and facility managers recognize the problems posed by widespread stocks of direct- use material, and DOE has encouraged recent consolidations at a number of facilities. At Obninsk, for example, plans are in place to consolidate the current 30 material balance areas, all of which need improved MPC&A.46 The original plan was to consolidate the material to two major “nuclear islands,” one for the critical assemblies and one for the institute’s other activities. That approach has proved more costly than was anticipated. Obninsk officials now estimate that the task will take three to four years to complete and that they may have to settle for some smaller islands because of the diversified nature of the research activities. DOE states that it will encourage consolidation when it can but generally regards this approach as taking advantage of targets of opportunity rather than as a priority at the present time. Recommendation: Take steps to encourage the removal of all HEU at research facilities outside Russia, including the purchase of HEU when ap- propriate. One of the largest amounts of non-Russian direct-use material is the HEU at the Kharkiv Institute in Ukraine, where approximately 70 kilograms is stored. Purchase of this material should be considered. Some of the proceeds of the sale might be earmarked for MPC&A upgrades at the facility. The price would be a matter of negotiation, but there are precedents in both the ongoing U.S. purchase of 500 tons of HEU and the earlier purchase of almost 600 kilo- 46 Material balance areas are separate parts of a facility in whose boundaries reliable inventories of nuclear materials can be established and material flows in or out can be monitored (Office of Tech- nology Assessment, Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency, U.S. GPO, Washington, D.C., 1995, p. 114). Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF DIRECT-USE MATERIAL 79 grams of HEU from Kazakstan in Project Sapphire.47 Similar purchases should be considered for HEU at other FSU facilities outside Russia not encompassed by other recommendations. Recommendation: For research reactors outside Russia where impor- tant and adequately financed research programs are planned in the foresee- able future, support conversion of the reactors so that they can use LEU instead of HEU. U.S. policy has long favored conversion of research reactors using HEU to reactors using LEU as a nonproliferation measure. The United States has previously provided direct support to a number of countries for such conversions. Conversion assistance would include replacement of existing stocks of HEU fuel with LEU fuel and assistance to modify the reactors. The United States should not become involved in indefinitely subsidizing the operation of these reactors, but for several facilities conversion assistance offers the best near- term prospect for returning to active research while also reducing proliferation problems. 4. Minimize the Opportunities to Bypass MPC&A Systems Finding: If a national MPC&A program is to be effective, all relevant orga- nizations and all sources of direct-use material must be addressed. Large stocks of direct-use material are located at some Russian facilities that have not yet become active participants in the bilateral program. Also, there is uncertainty among both Russian and American specialists as to the precise amounts of direct- use material present at many facilities, given the history of maintaining stocks of material “off the books” and the weaknesses in past inventories. As more strin- gent MPC&A systems are being installed at the facility, temptations to hold material outside these systems may arise. During a period of political and eco- nomic turmoil and expanded criminal activities, efforts to remove material from the MPC&A systems as a first step to subsequent diversions may emerge. At the same time, an important oversight agency in Russia, the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee (Gosatomnadzor or GAN), suffers from a shortage of well-trained inspectors, qualified staff, and necessary analytical and related equipment. Also, GAN’s administrative authority in areas related to military activities is very uncertain. Recommendation: Ensure that all stocks of direct-use material are en- compassed in the program, including icebreaker nuclear fuel, supplies at naval facilities, and off-specification and scrap material. Some institutions with responsibility for direct-use material have been more reluctant than others to 47 Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy, pp. 102-106. Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union 80 PROLIFERATION CONCERNS open their facilities to U.S. specialists. For example, the U.S. collaborative pro- gram was not able to include fuel used by the Russian icebreaker fleet until 1996. In this case, both the Russian and the U.S. navies were concerned about the precedents that openness might create. In addition, scrap and off-specification materials from weapons production, some of which is direct-use, are not yet included in cooperative MPC&A programs. Recommendation: Encourage rapid development of a comprehensive national material control and accounting system in Russia and the prompt incorporation of all existing direct-use material into that system. All relevant agencies in Russia, including GAN, have agreed on the concept of such a system. The initial activity would be managed by Atominform, a MINATOM institute, and individual facilities are undertaking their own inventories, using a standard approach. The project is expected to proceed slowly, however. DOE is providing financial support and equipment but should elevate the priority it gives to a national system. Recommendation: In Russia, increase support of GAN as an important independent agency by assisting it in developing MPC&A methodologies, training inspectors, obtaining staff support from research institutions, and procuring necessary equipment for MPC&A inspections. The involvement of a competent independent regulatory agency will significantly bolster long-term MPC&A program development and maintenance and increase confidence that diversions would be detected in a timely manner. Such an organization will help deter attempts to elude MPC&A systems at facilities. At the moment, GAN has the potential to become such an agency in Russia but needs clarification of its administrative authority in military-related areas, enhanced technical capability, and more effective relationships with other government agencies. Recommendation: Encourage a system of incentives, possibly including monetary rewards, that will stimulate participants in MPC&A programs to report promptly to the central authorities any irregularities in the imple- mentation of MPC&A systems. An important part of developing an MPC&A culture in the FSU is conveying to workers and managers the importance of immediately reporting any indication of theft or diversion. Financial rewards for whistle blowers might be particularly effective in view of the economic problems there. Recommendation: Emphasize the importance of developing a culture among MPC&A specialists that does not tolerate shortcuts or exceptions in implementing MPC&A systems. Under the Soviet system, workers were gener- ally expected to subjugate their views and actions to their superiors, even if that meant breaking rules. To be effective, MPC&A upgrades must take place in a Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF DIRECT-USE MATERIAL 81 management atmosphere that stresses individual responsibility and places a high value on full implementation of rules and regulations. The U.S. cooperative program should continue to stress such non-technical aspects of MPC&A. 5. Enhance the Program Finding: A number of enhancements would increase the effectiveness of U.S. efforts. The threats of theft and diversion in the FSU differ significantly from threats in the United States. In addition to the general economic and crime situations, which may create specific threats, there are differences among the facilities that affect their susceptibility to loss of material. Many buildings where direct-use material is stored are in poor repair, long perimeters with inadequate protection characterize some sites where material is located, and old accounting systems of dubious reliability are used at some facilities. Some local specialists are not prepared to use sophisticated technologies effectively. Modest immediate enhancements at a large number of facilities may be more important than major investments at a limited number of storage locations. A second area of concern is the vulnerability of direct-use material during transport, which to date has not been a priority for the bilateral programs. Rela- tively large quantities of material move on a regular basis among the sites that comprise different parts of the MINATOM complex, and much of the hauling is done with ordinary trucks or vans rather than special armored vehicles. At Electrostal, for example, officials acknowledge that truck transport is a weak link of the MPC&A system. In particular, the accounting process to track material as it moves from one storage site or one facility to another may not be sufficiently developed and implemented. In addition, the continued isolation of some facilities where MPC&A up- grades are needed limits opportunities for specialists at one facility to learn from the experiences of their colleagues at other facilities. Finally, several agencies are usually involved in providing security for di- rect-use material, including responding to incidents and alarms. The Ministry of Interior and the Federal Intelligence Service do not appear to be seriously in- volved in designing MPC&A upgrades, which is the responsibility of specialists of MINATOM or other concerned research organizations. Recommendation: Emphasize MPC&A approaches that respond to threat scenarios that are appropriate for the FSU, recognizing that they may differ from the threat scenarios used in the United States. One of the sensitive issues in cooperating with Russia and other states in the design of MPC&A upgrades is the choice of threat scenarios that are the basis for the physical protection systems. The current U.S. approach is based largely on U.S. threat scenarios. A number of officials told the committee that the threat of sabotage is a matter of more serious concern in the FSU than the United States has recog- Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union 82 PROLIFERATION CONCERNS nized. The U.S. approach is intended to improve protection against theft or diver- sion, not against an attack intended to cause damage or contamination. A good U.S.-style MPC&A system would certainly impede a would-be saboteur from gaining access to a facility, but may not protect vulnerable areas inside the facil- ity that are sabotage targets. This difference in focus requires prompt attention. Recommendation: Recognize that in the near term it may be necessary to install systems that fall short of internationally accepted standards in anticipation of subsequent refinements. In this regard, use appropriate MPC&A measures, whether they involve high-tech or low-tech approaches. The physical protection systems being recommended by U.S. specialists reflect how a U.S. facility would respond to such problems. Comprehensive sophisti- cated systems may not be the most cost-effective use of funds or the fastest means of establishing protection, however. For example, replacing wax seals with mod- ern tamper-indicating devices could quickly provide an enhanced level of protec- tion at many storage sites. Replacing flimsy warehouse doors with sturdy doors and strong padlocks can be done quickly. Other low-tech investments in consoli- dation, vaults, and fencing might be appropriate first steps at many facilities. Also, hand-held radiation detectors could provide an interim step in providing some protection before the installation of portal monitoring equipment is com- pleted at all facilities. Recommendation: In Russia, give greater attention to MPC&A of di- rect-use material during transport within and between facilities. At an early stage, the DOD-MOD program addressed the vulnerability of railroad cars used to transport nuclear warheads, and this remains a priority in the cooperative effort on weapons control and accountability. But the DOE MPC&A program began to address transportation problems only in June 1996, when an agreement between MINATOM and DOE provided the framework for a new cooperative effort. Yet, as previously noted, transportation vulnerabilities were readily acknowledged by Russian officials to committee members. Recommendation: Promote greater communication and cooperation among ministries and facilities involved in MPC&A in each of the countries where bilateral programs are being implemented. Exchange of information among relevant officials at the facilities concerning approaches and successes will improve efficiency and the rate of progress of the overall MPC&A effort. The benefits of increased communication were evident at the week-long Confer- ence on Non-Proliferation and Safeguards of Nuclear Material held at the Kurchatov Institute in May 1996 and cosponsored by DOE, where officials from numerous Russian institutes and U.S. laboratories discussed MPC&A strategies and results. DOE is planning to co-sponsor with MINATOM a major interna- Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF DIRECT-USE MATERIAL 83 tional conference in 1997 on MPC&A that will bring together specialists from across Russia and the rest of the FSU. Recommendation: In Russia, encourage more active involvement of the Ministry of Interior in the planning, testing, and implementation of physical security systems. An important component of the physical protection system is the “response team”—the guards or police trained to respond if an incident oc- curs. Public and private facilities in the United States place great emphasis on the readiness of these teams, include them in the development of vulnerability as- sessments, and conduct regular exercises to test the effectiveness of the response. In Russia, the Ministry of Interior both supplies the guards for the perimeter of the sites and is responsible for responses. The division of labor is similar in the other three countries of concern. But the involvement of the Ministries of Interior in the new MPC&A systems being installed with U.S. cooperation is uncertain. Russian officials expressed concern about designing physical protection systems without the full participation of the agency charged with a major role in imple- menting them. Similarly, officials at the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Tech- nology in Ukraine expressed concern about whether troops stationed across the city would be able to respond in time to be of real assistance. To date, DOE has believed that the sensitivity of vulnerability assessments and threat scenarios would make the Ministries of Interior reluctant to cooperate openly with the U.S. agencies, and therefore DOE has not sought regular involve- ment from the ministries. In a few cases the cooperative programs have taken advantage of opportunities at individual facilities where cooperation could be established, but this piecemeal approach is not sufficient. In Russia, the success of the cooperation with MINATOM and other independent institutes suggests that, provided financial incentives are available, senior officers from the Ministry of Interior might be willing to participate more actively in efforts to improve physical protection. AREAS FOR ADDITIONAL STUDY Consideration of MPC&A activities touches on many related areas of na- tional security importance. Some of the areas beyond the scope of this report that deserve further study include the following: • Physical protection, control, and accountability of nuclear weapons in Russia. The bilateral program of cooperation between DOD and MOD is now beginning to focus more sharply on protection of nuclear weapons throughout the Russian military complex. Some of the approaches used in the MPC&A bilateral program may be relevant to these new efforts. • Nuclear smuggling. The interests and capabilities of organized crime to penetrate the nuclear establishments of the countries of the region need additional Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union 84 PROLIFERATION CONCERNS attention. While the bilateral MPC&A programs should address some aspects of this issue, the U.S. intelligence services have not participated to the fullest pos- sible extent and probably could provide additional perspectives on the problem. • Radiological weapons. The feasibility of terrorists acquiring radioactive material (e.g., spent fuel rods) and disseminating it through high-explosive weap- onry or other means is of increasing concern. More serious assessment of this type of threat might suggest refinements in the overall strategy for MPC&A programs. • Sabotage at nuclear facilities. Deterring saboteurs from penetrating nuclear reactor sites or other sites containing dangerous materials and defining means to counter such penetrations are rapidly becoming important dimensions of international crime prevention. The MPC&A programs should provide useful insights on how to approach this problem. • Reducing the inventory of direct-use materials. The U.S. and Russian governments are implementing a program for American purchases of HEU and supporting studies of alternatives for permanent disposition of plutonium. These efforts should be vigorously pursued, since the smaller the inventory the less difficult the MPC&A problem. None of the likely disposition options could begin implementation in less than 10 years, however, so protecting the material remains an urgent security problem. Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

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The successor states of the former Soviet Union have enormous stocks of weapons-usable nuclear material and other militarily significant commodities and technologies. Preventing the flow of such items to countries of proliferation concern and to terrorist groups is a major objective of U.S. national security policy. This book reviews the effectiveness of two U.S. programs directed to this objective. These programs have supported the efforts of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan in upgrading the physical protection, control, and accountability of highly enriched uranium and plutonium and strengthening systems to control the export of many types of militarily sensitive items.

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