• attention. While the bilateral MPC&A programs should address some aspects of this issue, the U.S. intelligence services have not participated to the fullest possible extent and probably could provide additional perspectives on the problem.
  • Radiological weapons. The feasibility of terrorists acquiring radioactive material (e.g., spent fuel rods) and disseminating it through high-explosive weaponry or other means is of increasing concern. More serious assessment of this type of threat might suggest refinements in the overall strategy for MPC&A programs.
  • Sabotage at nuclear facilities. Deterring saboteurs from penetrating nuclear reactor sites or other sites containing dangerous materials and defining means to counter such penetrations are rapidly becoming important dimensions of international crime prevention. The MPC&A programs should provide useful insights on how to approach this problem.
  • Reducing the inventory of direct-use materials. The U.S. and Russian governments are implementing a program for American purchases of HEU and supporting studies of alternatives for permanent disposition of plutonium. These efforts should be vigorously pursued, since the smaller the inventory the less difficult the MPC&A problem. None of the likely disposition options could begin implementation in less than 10 years, however, so protecting the material remains an urgent security problem.

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