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Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles: Third Report 6 Outstanding Program Issues Five primary aspects of the PNGV program are considered in this chapter: (1) the government's efforts to anticipate infrastructure issues; (2) the downselect process and post-downselect issues; (3) leverage of foreign technology developments; (4) major achievements and technical barriers; and (5) the balance and adequacy of the PNGV program. INFRASTRUCTURE The committee's second report cited the importance of considering the impact of the PNGV program on the nation's infrastructure (NRC, 1996). For example, adoption of alternative PNGV power plants that use fuels such as methanol, DME, or hydrogen would require significant modification of the entire fuel production, transportation, storage, and retail-distribution infrastructure. There are significant infrastructure issues in almost all aspects of bringing a PNGV product to market. These range from supplies of raw materials to manufacturing capability to production to environmental impact to ancillary support, such as highway systems and vehicle service and maintenance. In its second report, the committee made three recommendations relative to the issues of infrastructure (NRC, 1996): The PNGV must continue to address infrastructure issues as an integral part of its program. A careful assessment of infrastructure issues associated with alternative technologies should be an essential part of the technology-selection process scheduled for 1997. The PNGV should perform a study to establish the energy balance, in-use environmental effects, and resource requirements, as well as the production
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Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles: Third Report and distribution costs, for fuels other than gasoline or diesel fuel being considered for use in Goal 3 vehicles. The PNGV should immediately involve the Department of Transportation's National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in identifying, addressing, and resolving the safety issues raised by Goal 3 vehicles. During the past year a research team from the Energy Systems Divisions of the Argonne National Laboratory continued its study of infrastructure issues. This was a continuation of the work reported to the committee during its second review in August 1995. The work involved further developing and running their life-cycle energy and emissions model, GREET (greenhouse gases, regulated emissions, and energy use in transportation). The GREET program is a documented and peer-reviewed simulation (Wang, 1996). In fact, the results of the first phase of the GREET study have been accepted for presentation at the 29th International Symposium on Automotive Technology and Automation to be held in Florence, Italy (Wang and Johnson, 1996). Documentation of the work presented to the committee at its November 1996 meeting will be available in January 1997. A necessity for the infrastructure studies, and also a significant challenge, is to include in the analysis the impact of all processes associated with changes in the vehicle system. For example, petroleum-based fuel may be displaced by using electric vehicles; however to correctly assess the impact this would have on air quality requires that any pollution from the power station used to recharge the electric vehicle also be taken into account. That is, the environmental impact of manufacturing the electric vehicle and pollution from its power source must be included in the analysis. The basis of all comparisons in these infrastructure studies must be made on a "well-to-wheels" or "cradle-to-grave" framework. All of the infrastructure study results presented to the review committee by the Energy Systems Division were on a total system, or process, basis. In exercising a life-cycle energy and emission predictive simulation, it is important to realize that the results are sensitive to the process-energy and emission assumptions used in the submodels of the simulation. In the results presented to the committee, it was assumed that the PNGV Goal 3 fuel economy and emission targets had been met. Two different PNGV market penetration scenarios were hypothesized: a low market share (approximately 30 percent of new vehicles being sold in the year 2030 being PNGV vehicles) and a high market share (approximately 60 percent of new vehicles being sold in the year 2030 being PNGV vehicles). Even though the PNGV vehicles in the model were assumed to meet the PNGV fuel economy and emissions goals, the accounting of different power plants and manufacturing processes yielded different mixes and quantities of exhaust emissions. For example, a hydrogen fuel cell will have lower NOx emissions than a CIDI engine, even though the CIDI meets the NOx emission standards; or different fuels may have different propensities for evaporative emissions.
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Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles: Third Report If the hydrogen in the fuel cell were to be obtained from photovoltaic processes, the impact of the fuel on air quality would be low, but the financial cost would be high. In addition, it was assumed that non-PNGV vehicles being sold during the simulated time interval were also improving because they were meeting increasingly stringent air quality emission standards. The predictions include all processing, that is, the entire fuel cycle from "well-to-wheels"; therefore, the model includes many assumptions about processing efficiency, emissions release, and manufacturing capabilities. In the infrastructure analysis there was also an implicit assumption that the new, more efficient vehicles were being purchased by the general public, as opposed to being restricted to corporate or government fleet operations. In this case, replenishing the stored energy of the vehicle by refueling must be as convenient as it is now with conventional gasoline-fueled vehicles. This has significant infrastructure implications. Whereas there may be current programs with alternate fuels in controlled fleet tests that show great potential, there could be significant infrastructure issues in making such power plants available to the public at large before there are "refueling capabilities" nationwide. There is a strong desire to implement the transition to more fuel efficient and environmentally friendly vehicles on a timeline and via a process that avoids dislocations. One purpose of the infrastructure studies is to assess the best way to implement changes and to identify processes that may cause undue hardship to the public so that dislocations can be kept to a minimum. In an attempt to assess the viability of the model's underlying assumptions and evaluate the results of the model's predictions, representative from Amoco Oil Company were asked to act as informal advisors and offer feedback as the work progressed. In addition, where possible, the results of the simulation were compared to other publicly available infrastructure models. This was challenging because each such study had its own specific focus, which differed from the focus of this assessment. For example, a study by Exxon focused on performance, energy security, domestic production, fuel costs, and consumer receptiveness for four specified fuels. The results from the Exxon study were quite different from what is required of this PNGV infrastructure analysis. However, where sufficient data were presented, it was possible to check for consistency in underlying assumptions within the different models. Two studies conducted by Arthur D. Little, Inc., were sufficiently similar to the PNGV infrastructure analysis to allow specific comparisons to be made between assumptions of the submodels. The assumptions about energy efficiencies of upstream production activities and the capital cost of production and distribution between the PNGV assessment and those of Arthur D. Little, Inc. were consistent. The results of the simulation enabled assessments to be made of the capital investments for fuel production and distribution facilities, the impact of fuel-cycle energy and emissions, and the manufacturing effects of substituting lightweight materials. To date, the impact of PNGV Goal 3 vehicles on infrastructure
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Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles: Third Report related to production, maintenance, repair, recycling and insurance of the actual vehicles, or road and vehicle noise, and safety have not yet been addressed. A total of 12 combinations of fuels and power systems and four lightweight materials were evaluated. The 12 vehicle configurations considered were (1) reformulated gasoline—stand-alone spark-ignition engine and hybrid vehicle; (2) diesel—stand-alone compression ignition and hybrid vehicle; (3) dimethyl ether—stand-alone CIDI and hybrid vehicle; (4) methanol—stand-alone spark-ignition engine, hybrid vehicle, and fuel cell; (5) ethanol—stand-alone spark-ignition, hybrid vehicle, and hydrogen fuel cells. The four lightweight materials considered were ultralight steel, aluminum, magnesium, and polymer composites. The model predictions indicated that the oil industry would have time to adjust to the change in demand for fuel brought on by a growing fleet of vehicles with triple the fuel economy of today's vehicles.1 It also indicated that all of the fuel scenarios would entail moderate incremental capital costs in transition to the year 2015, with gradually increasing costs to the year 2030. Hydrogen was an exception in the 2030 time frame. The analysis predicted hydrogen would have a disproportionately large incremental cost by that year. The reason for the large increase in the projected cost is that it was assumed that hydrogen from the fuel cells would be obtained from photovoltaic devices by the year 2030. In terms of the impact of energy and carbon monoxide, the predictions indicated that petroleum and hydrogen require the least total energy use, that renewable fuels use the least fossil fuel, and that renewable fuels produce the least carbon dioxide. Summary The effects of various fuels and power plants on pollutant emissions are summarized below: Volatile Organic Compounds Fuel cells offer the greatest benefit. Diesel fuel is similar to alternative fuels. Carbon Monoxide Fuel cells offer the greatest benefit. Diesel fuel and dimethyl ether promise significant CO reductions. Alcohol fuels increase CO emissions. Oxides of Nitrogen Hydrogen fuel cells offer the greatest benefit. Diesel and DME fuels could increase emissions. 1 The committee notes that the transition of the nation's fuel infrastructure, if it occurred, would be gradual. It would be difficult for production and distribution facilities for alternative fuels to be widely available in the United States soon after production of the first alternative-fueled vehicles.
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Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles: Third Report Particulate Matter Fuel cells provide the most reduction. Emissions reductions also occur with reformulated gasoline, DME and methanol. Diesel fuel and ethanol fuel use increase particulate emissions. Sulfur Oxides Renewable fuels provide the greatest emissions reduction. Reformulated gasoline and diesel fuel provide some reductions, but not as much as dimethyl ether and methanol. The effects of incorporating lightweight materials into the vehicles is summarized below: Ultralight Steel Autobody Using the existing infrastructure is an advantage. Aluminum Foreign aluminum jobs would mostly replace U.S. steel jobs. New production capacity would be needed to use lower cost technologies. Vehicle ownership cost may increase due to potentially higher repair costs. Magnesium Production capacity would need to be doubled or tripled. Significant increase in energy is required for production. Polymer Composites Transition issues are significant because the carbon-fiber business is a small-volume specialty industry. Fabrication technologies are in their infancy. Low capital investment is needed, but a more highly skilled labor pool is required. Recycling This is a major issue for all alternatives to steel. The infrastructure analysis is an important tool for the PNGV program. As the PNGV continues to refine its technology knowledge base and push toward downselect scenarios, it is important for power plant configurations and fuel types to be accurately represented in an infrastructure scenario and evaluated with the infrastructure model. Infrastructure analysis should be an integral part of the downselect process. Also, for the simulation to remain a valuable tool, it is very important that the underlying assumptions of the model continually by re-evaluated
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Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles: Third Report and updated as new information becomes available. The model is only as good as its assumptions, and as new technologies emerge, the underlying assumptions of the model may change. Recommendation Based on its review of infrastructure issues, the committee makes the following recommendations. Recommendation. The infrastructure study should be continued. There should be a concerted effort to evaluate the GREET model relative to models developed for similar purposes by the oil industry and other government agencies. Recommendation. The GREET model should be used with specific engine and fuel configurations in various downselect scenarios. TECHNOLOGY DOWNSELECT PROCESS The PNGV program was launched in September 1993, with the first major milestone scheduled for the end of 1997. The program plan was for the PNGV to select technologies for the concept vehicles that will be designed, developed, and fabricated by the year 2000. In its second report, the committee stated that technical challenges were "daunting" and "inventions and breakthroughs" would be needed before certain technologies could be considered as viable options for selection in 1997. The committee also recognized the difficulty in anticipating inventions and breakthroughs and concluded that it would not be appropriate to try to classify technologies as "winners or losers" prior to 1997. The process of identifying the technologies that are considered to be viable options in 1997 has been referred to as the downselect process. Conceptually, the 1997 downselect process occurs after a three-year period of intense investigation of candidate technologies with potential winners emerging within the PNGV time frame. However, many factors enter into the determination of a potential winner, including the fact that individual technologies do not stand alone; each technology must interact with the rest of the system. Among the more obvious winning factors are the contributions towards meeting the fuel efficiency, emissions, and consumer-cost goals. However, other factors needed to meet Goal 3 vehicle requirements, such as packaging, weight contributions, and interactions with other components, have become more important as systems studies have finally begun to influence sub-system and component designs. In support of the downselect process, the PNGV should assure that its Technical Roadmap is current in all respects. Another major factor now being more seriously considered is market readiness. When all factors are considered, the result is that there will likely be no clear winners in all areas of importance. Indeed, the most important downselect
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Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles: Third Report conclusion that can be made at this time is that there are some promising technologies that simply cannot be ready for consideration in 1997. Thus, some of the technologies that still promise some very desirable characteristics must be considered as beneficial even though their development schedule stretches beyond 1997.2 Another important observation is that the combination of technologies that can meet the 1997 downselect time frame are likely to fall significantly short of Goal 3 fuel efficiency and cost targets unless substantial advances are made in the very near future. Even though the downselect will not occur in quite the fashion that it was initially envisioned, it will accomplish most of the original program objectives. Technologies have been successfully analyzed to determine, in much more detail than was previously possible, specific advances needed to meet PNGV goals, and important strides have been made towards these advances. This has resulted in a steady decrease in the number of "inventions" needed; however, in some cases, estimates of development time and effort needed to become viable concept- and production-vehicle candidate technologies have been increased. Thus, it is likely that the more nonconventional technologies, such as fuel cells, gas turbines, Stirling engines, flywheels, and ultracapacitors, will require development beyond the current program time frame. The 1997 downselect will probably encompass mostly substantially improved and advanced versions of internal-combustion engine and drivetrain technologies, vehicle structure, and manufacturing technologies. Although the visible focus of the PNGV has been and will continue to be on Goal 3, specifically a car with fuel economy of up to 80 miles per gallon, other important aspects of the program should be recognized. Clearly, the most positive results of the program achieved under the PNGV umbrella should be retained and nurtured. These positive results include both institutional and technological advances with the potential for yielding long-term benefits for American industry and for the public at large. POST-DOWNSELECT ISSUES Numerous and often impressive technological advances have been made in the areas of potential vehicle hardware (Goal 3) and potential improvements in manufacturing capabilities and national competitiveness (Goals 1 and 2). For example, with the exception of a very small group of people, very few of whom are in the automotive industry, the practical application of fuel-cell technology was virtually unknown when the PNGV began. Furthermore, some of the characteristics 2 For decisions on allocating resources, the candidate technologies might be categorized as (1) power plants that would meet technological goals at the end of 1997 with expectation that they would be used in a concept vehicle in year 2000; (2) power plants that will not reach concept engine status by the end of 1997 but are far enough along to recommend continued development; and (3) power plants with characteristics sufficiently attractive that a strong basic R&D program should be continued.
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Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles: Third Report of fuel cells, such as power density and projected costs, were far from PNGV requirements. However, recent advances in materials and stack technology have demonstrated high efficiency and emission advantages of fuel cells that might make them a more realistic longer-term option for automotive applications, but not in a time frame compatible with Goal 3. The PNGV has helped to focus automotive fuel cell development. This technology is in the category that has longer-term potential national benefits, maiing continued R&D clearly desirable. A similar statement can be made about gas turbines, partly as a result of progress towards achieving practical ceramic turbines and recuperators, oil-less bearings, and automotive-type electronic controls. Similar advances have been made in other technologies that might not make the Goal 3 time frame but that have demonstrated significant long-term potential benefits. These technologies include flywheels, ultracapacitors, and some of the advanced lithium batteries. Continuing the development of longer-term technologies also provides an insurance strategy in case the nearer-term technologies encounter significant development barriers or future societal needs change. Thus, it is clearly in the best interest of the nation to continue the R&D on many of the PNGV technologies that are longer term than the 1997 schedule. They have higher risk of failure, and development probably would not be continued without substantial government support. The institutional innovations and resulting technical organizations have advanced dramatically through the PNGV and appear to be extremely beneficial to the goals of the PNGV. The committee has observed a rapid increase in the number of technical teams, which involve a mix of OEMs, suppliers, government agencies, national laboratories, and universities. The result is an increase in the number of accomplishments. Many, if not most, of the technical issues being probed by these technical teams are high-risk areas that probably would not have been undertaken by a single OEM or supplier and that would have been very difficult to address in a national laboratory or other isolated environment. The formation of these technical teams has, therefore, made the best use of combined national laboratory, government agency, private industry, and, to a limited extent, university resources to help advance technologies, materials, and processes. These advances will not only make the American automotive industry more competitive, they will also be available for many other industries. It is the committee's view that many previously existing, but isolated, technology research programs have become much more focused and productive by uniting researchers and users and developing clear technology goals. This has resulted in rapid advances in potentially valuable new technologies and a more efficient use of public and private resources, which should be continued. In an effort to meet weight and cost goals, materials and manufacturing technical teams have been formed and are apparently making impressive strides in support of goals 1, 2, and 3. These efforts should also be continued.
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Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles: Third Report Summary The concept that a single downselect process can occur in 1997 to eliminate all but the winning technologies no longer appears to be tenable. The initial technology selections and decisions in the downselect process (especially by the government) on where to focus resources must be made on the basis of readiness in addition to performance and the likelihood of achieving program objectives (as they currently exist or are modified). However, impressive advances have been made in several of the technologies that may not make the initial downselect date but that appear to promise important benefits. Pursuing the more promising of these longer-term technologies through an extended period appears to be consistent with the original intent and goals (especially Goal 3) of a longer-term (initially defined as 10 years) PNGV program. Continuing to update systems studies on these technologies will provide a foundation for their continuing development. Recommendations Based on its review of the technology downselect process, the committee makes the following recommendations. Recommendation. The PNGV should continue to update systems studies and projections for longer-term technologies as new information becomes available to categorize their potential benefits more accurately. Recommendation. The PNGV should continue R&D on technologies that appear to have the potential for making important contributions towards meeting PNGV goals, even if they are beyond the 1997 downselect time frame. This recommendation is consistent with the committee's previous recommendations. Recommendation. The PNGV should continue to form cooperative R&D inter-institutional technology teams. LEVERAGE OF FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENTS3 In its first and second reports, the committee recommended that, as a matter of urgency, the PNGV should conduct more comprehensive assessments and benchmark foreign technology developments relevant to the program (NRC, 1994; 1996). In the response to this recommendation, the PNGV Operational Steering Group indicated that this effort is already under way (Appendix D). They responded, "Each of the members of USCAR and several government agencies 3 It was not the committee's task to analyze foreign technology developments. However, the committee summarized some foreign activities in Chapter 4, and comments on PNGV activities are included in this section.
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Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles: Third Report routinely evaluate worldwide automotive technology developments.'' However, only limited evidence of this type of activity was presented to the committee. Indeed, beyond anecdotal statements, no technology and competitiveness issue perceived by the committee to be important has received less apparent attention than evaluating, utilizing, and leveraging foreign technologies. The key word is "apparent." Not only do all of the OEMs, and many suppliers, have foreign operations and partners, but clearly it is in their best interests to monitor competitive foreign activities in relevant technologies. However, little information was presented to the committee to indicate that PNGV was receiving any substantial benefit from foreign technology developments. The TASC overview presentation to the committee at its November 1996 committee meeting was very superficial. Apparently, this was because of minimal funding (six man-months) (Hardy, 1996). The information presented was no more than information available in the automotive press or at international automobile shows. One area of foreign technology development is well known and will probably influence downselect decisions. This is the development of direct-injection internal-combustion piston engines. The CIDI engine, in particular, is receiving a lot of attention because of significant improvements in fuel economy as compared to the multiport fuel-injection (MPFI) spark-ignited engine. It is projected that use of CIDI engines will increase from 5 percent of all European automotive engines to about 25 percent by the year 2000 (Herzog, 1996). This is not surprising considering the high cost of fuel in Europe, the lower fuel tax for diesel oil in some countries, and the significant increase in fuel economy afforded by this engine. In addition, the major European automobile makers are either already producing the CIDI diesel engine or plan to do so in the very near future. However, the fuel-system costs of the CIDI are about three times those of MPFI gasoline systems, and overall engine costs are about 40 percent higher (Herzog, 1996). Furthermore, even though the advanced engines can meet current European and American standards, technologies have not yet been developed that can simultaneously meet both particulate and NOx emission requirements for Euro IV or California ULEV standards. Because of intense efforts to develop the CIDI engine in Europe, it is likely that the emission problems will be resolved, at least to the extent of meeting Euro IV requirements. In parallel with CIDI diesel engine developments, significant activity is being directed towards direct-injected, spark-ignited (DISI) gasoline engines, particularly in Japan. During its second PNGV review, the committee was advised by USCAR that "current and past efforts aimed at direct-injection (stratified charge) spark-ignition engines have demonstrated significant increases in thermal efficiency over homogeneous-charge counterparts; however, they will likely fall short of this target. Severe emissions and durability challenges have hampered implementation of this approach." (See Appendix E of the committee's second report [NRC, 1996]). The USCAR position was maintained in the current review.
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Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles: Third Report As noted in Chapter 4, automotive fuel cells are also receiving considerable attention worldwide, but they clearly represent a much longer-term technology option. Ballard, a Canadian company, and Daimler-Benz are working on the development of fuel cell vehicles, but most of their efforts have been directed towards hydrogen-fueled systems, and hydrogen still faces major obstacles to becoming an accepted automotive fuel. Many of the major automotive manufacturers in Europe and Japan have ongoing programs for fuel-cell vehicles that included demonstration vehicles. However, most use pressurized hydrogen, thus limiting both range (about 100 miles) and general acceptability. A major obstacle for foreign (as well as American) automotive fuel-cell-powered vehicles is the availability of an acceptable fuel-processing system that would permit the use of hydrocarbon fuels such as gasoline while retaining the major virtues of a hydrogen-fueled vehicle. Other vehicle technology programs worldwide have been initiated or expanded, especially in Europe, apparently in reaction to the existence to the PNGV program. The concern seems to be more about market competitiveness with the European "camps" of technological approaches that include electric and hybrid vehicles as well as those advancing more conventional technologies. Volvo, for example, has pursued gas turbine hybrids, especially for larger cars.4 BMW and Daimler-Benz are pursuing longer-term developments with the fuel cell. And others, such as Fiat, Renault, and Volkswagen are pursuing advances in more near-term technologies such as the CIDI engine and continuously variable transmissions. The Japanese are (1) making significant advances in batteries, especially lithium batteries; (2) continuing to be active in the development of fuel cells; and (3) developing several hybrid vehicle concepts. According to TASC, there has been no appreciable effect in Japan due to the PNGV (Hardy, 1996). In fact, TASC reported a drop-off in the level of advanced-vehicle development in the last year or so.5 Summary There is evidence of foreign technology development in essentially the same areas as in the United States, but there is no specific evidence of major 4 The committee believes it is likely there are major proprietary gas turbine and related ceramics programs in Japan, but little information was presented. 5 The committee did not conduct an analysis of efforts in Japan. However, it was recently reported in Automotive News that Toyota's president stated: "We haven't been able to determine which is better—trying to improve the current internal-combustion engine or developing alternative engines. So we're devoting efforts equally on both sides. Research spending used to be equal to 4 percent to 5 percent of sales, but recently it has been approaching 6 percent. That is related to our research efforts on alternative vehicles" (Treece, 1996). According to Automotive News, Toyota "devoting an additional 1 percent of sales to research on alternative engines would amount to $800 million" annually.
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Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles: Third Report breakthroughs that could significantly affect the PNGV. There is evidence, however, of considerable effort and continuing advances in the European CIDI programs. There is also evidence that the Japanese have made major strides in advanced battery development (especially lithium batteries) and commercialization (especially lithium-ion batteries for consumer applications, such as laptop computers, video cameras, and cellular phones). These significant advances could affect the development of a hybrid vehicle. Recommendations Based on its review of foreign technology developments, the committee makes the following recommendations. Recommendation. The committee again recommends that the PNGV should conduct and routinely update comprehensive assessments of foreign technology. These assessments should be used to determine which, if any, of the PNGV technologies of interest could benefit from more knowledge. In each important technology area, significant progress or significant barriers to development should be identified. The assessments and their evaluation should then be used to consider redirecting PNGV efforts, if appropriate. USCAR members and government agencies may already be doing this, but it is not clear to the committee that this information is being used in any meaningful way to benefit PNGV or that it is even accessible to the individual technology developers who might need it. Recommendation. Because the CIDI engine is a potential major technology in the PNGV, a special effort should be made to determine to what extent European and Japanese developments are available to members of the USCAR. MAJOR TECHNICAL ACHIEVEMENTS AND BARRIERS A number of significant achievements were realized by the PNGV in 1996. According to a presentation to the committee by PNGV, the most important technical accomplishments in 1996 include the following (Viergutz, 1996): demonstration of a prototype fuel-flexible processor for a fuel cell with an 80 percent efficiency for the processor demonstration of a subscale high-power lithium-ion battery cell for 100,000 cycles scale-up of a lean NOx catalyst demonstrating 30 percent NOx reduction fabrication of ceramic gas turbine scrolls and rotors through a process with high volume potential survival of a glass-fiber-reinforced composite front-end structure design in a 35 mph barrier crash test development and construction of advanced technology demonstration
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Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles: Third Report TABLE 6-1 Potential of PNGV Candidate Technologies and Assessment of Research Progress Major Subsystems Critical Technical Barriers Likelihood of Meeting Technical Objectivesa Likelihood of Meeting Costb Likelihood of Meeting Schedulec Overall Potential Regardless of Scheduled Basic Needs Overall Progress Since Last Review Hybrid Drivetrain Power Sources CIDI Combustion control NOx catalyst High Medium High High Resources Modest Fuel cell Fuel processor/reformer Low Low Low Medium Breakthroughs Modest to Good Turbine Structural ceramics Exhaust heat recovery Low Low Low Medium Resources focused R&D Modest Stirling Heat Exchangers Leakage Control Medium Low Low Medium Resources, focused R&D Small Energy Storage Lithium-ion battery Scale-up System safety High Medium Medium Medium Resources, focused R&D Good Nickel metal hydride battery Efficiency Power density Medium Medium Medium Medium Resources, focused R&D Modest Ultracapacitor Efficiency Self-discharge Safety Low Low Low Low Breakthroughs, resources Small Flywheel Safety Medium Medium Low High Resources, focused R&D Small Power electronics Efficiency Medium Medium High High Resources Small Note: This table represents a general committee judgment at an aggregate level of detail. The critical technical barriers are those that appear to be most challenging today and in many instances appear to require technical breakthroughs. See Chapter 4 for a more complete description of the key developments needed. a Regardless of cost or schedule. b Assuming the technical goals can be met. c In achieving the technical goals. d Overall potential over the long term of meeting the technical goals and cost.
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Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles: Third Report vehicles, some of which incorporated PNGV related requirements, such as Ford's Synergy 2010, Chrysler's ESX, and General Motors EV-1 Despite significant progress in a number of critical areas, there is still a gulf between the current status of system, subsystem, and component developments and the performance and cost requirements necessary to meet major PNGV milestones.6 Some of the technical barriers to achieving PNGV objectives can probably be overcome with sufficient funding and management attention; other require inventions and very significant technical breakthroughs. As reported in the committee's second report (NRC, 1996), the effort being expended on candidate technologies and systems is not consistent with the likelihood that they will meet performance goals within the program schedule. Funding for some critical systems is inadequate, and the work lacks integrated technical direction. The assessment of technical barriers to the development of major candidate PNGV subsystems presented in this report was used as a basis for constructing Table 6-1. In the committee's view, this table provides an approximate assessment of the broad potential for candidate PNGV elements and a gross indication of progress in the past year. The committee made a distinction between systems for which technical breakthroughs are needed to meet PNGV targets and those for which incremental development with adequate resources (funding and staff) is likely to lead to the required achievement. For each major subsystem, the committee identified critical barriers to meeting PNGV performance and cost requirements, as well as the likelihood of meeting PNGV schedules. These three factors were used to derive a first approximation of the overall PNGV potential regardless of the PNGV schedule and to highlight program priorities. At the committee's meeting in November 1996, PNGV provided a list of major barriers to success. The PNGV needs to overcome these barriers, which are delineated in Table 6-2. A number of technical, production cost, funding, schedule, and other issues need to be resolved. Based on the data provided, the committee believes that the following conclusions can be drawn: When incorporated into a vehicle, none of the energy converters will come close to meeting the cost objectives within the time frame of the PNGV program. The availability of fuel cells, Stirling engines, and gas turbines that meet the cost and performance requirements of the PNGV program is substantially beyond the current time frame of the program. The CIDI engine is the energy converter with the highest potential of meeting the PNGV program performance requirements. This may change 6 These milestones include technology selection in 1997, design and construction of concept vehicles by 2000, and the availability of production prototypes in 2004.
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Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles: Third Report TABLE 6-2 PNGV's Presentation to Committee on Assessment of Major Barriers and Program Needs Issue Challenges and Issues Recommendations by the PNGV Technical • control of particulates and NOx from CIDI engines • compact fuel-flexible fuel processor for PEM fuel cells • flywheel safety • thermal management of lithium battery systems • high yield fabrication of complex ceramic componentry Funding is required to support a sufficient level of effort for addressing the engineering research challenges. Production cost • low-cost lamination material and processing for electric motors rotors and stators • low-cost aluminum sheet, carbon fiber for structural applications and magnesium • low-cost power electronic building blocks and liquid coolants • low-cost high yield ceramic fabrication methods • low-cost high-pressure fuel injector and pump • low-cost electronic materials and fabrication processes for batteries and fuel cells • low-cost flywheel containment Appropriate levels of effort required for technical cost challenges. Funding • cost-share requirements of high-risk DOE programs • inability to mobilize supplier resources • long lead-time from identification of R&D need to contract initiation • administrative complexity of government programs • difficulty in redirecting/influencing existing government programs • non-strategic distribution of resources Policy change and active implementation needed by upper levels of government and industry management.
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Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles: Third Report Schedule • probability of meeting all performance and cost targets by 2004 is declining due to continued inadequate resource commitment • technology selection date broadened to pre-1997 and post-1997 data-driven events There should be an emphasis on schedule of technology development at component level with later demonstration at vehicle level. • recognition that concept vehicles pre-2000 and post-2000, with focus for 2000 on fuel economy benchmark demonstration • recognition that initial hybrid vehicle concept vehicles and design were introduced in 1996, for pre-1997, focus should be on: (a) lithium and NiMH battery systems (b) PEM gasoline-fueled fuel cell systems (c) double-layer capacitors would be eliminated For 1997, make decision on viability of current ceramic gas turbine designs. FOR 1988: (a) decide on viability of high-volume fabrication of ceramic components (b) decide on whether to proceed with next generation of ceramic gas turbine (c) decide on safety potential of lithium-ion battery system (d) resolve flywheel safety issue (e) assess CIDI emissions based on operating hardware Adequate funding levels are required to meet engineering research challenges. Other • potential change in emissions regulations • potential requirement for zero emission vehicle range Funding issues and regulatory environment need to be resolved. Source: Viergutz (1996).
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Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles: Third Report if EPA promulgates more stringent exhaust emissions standards for diesel engines. Flywheels appear to have potential for energy storage once the safety issues have been resolved. Their successful development is well beyond the time frame of the program. The successful development of ultracapacitors as storage devices is well beyond the time frame of the PNGV program. The committee is not suggesting that the development of the technologies listed above should be terminated. However, PNGV should reprogram development efforts and funding to be consistent with expected results within the current PNGV schedule through 2004. Investments in technology developments that may be successful beyond that schedule may be continued but should be more highly focused on solving specific problems. ADEQUACY AND BALANCE OF THE PNGV PROGRAM Because of a lack of specific data the committee requested from the PNGV, an evaluation of the adequacy and balance of this complex technology development was difficult. Evaluating the PNGV requires a specific understanding and knowledge of three major elements: (1) the selection of technologies to be developed to satisfy a set of delineated goals and objectives, (2) a detailed schedule of activities and needed accomplishments, and (3) the required resources and funding to accomplish the tasks in a timely manner. A measure of progress generally encompasses comparing accomplishment of individual tasks directed towards the goals and objectives with the resources expended. Complex technology programs involving and requiring technical breakthroughs and inventions are the most difficult to schedule, manage, and evaluate. The committee feels that the technologies selected for development are appropriate and that no major technology has been overlooked or omitted. The PNGV Technical Roadmap provides major technical objectives against a macro schedule within a specific time frame. The committee had great difficulty considering resources and funding, the third major element in an evaluation of adequacy and balance of the program. In general, PNGV presenters frequently stated that inadequate (and at times zero) resources were available to achieve program objectives. However, in the majority of cases the PNGV was unable when requested to inform the committee of current spending or to estimate underfunding. The committee has repeatedly requested this funding and resource information from the PNGV only to be informed that it is being compiled. As of the completion of this report, this information had still not been provided. The committee found it extremely difficult to evaluate the adequacy and balance of funding to accomplish the PNGV Goal 3 objectives. The ultimate proof, of course, will be in the 2000 concept demonstration vehicles and the 2004
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Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles: Third Report prototypes, but no clear criteria exist as to what should be expected at the end of the third year of PNGV. An evaluation is further obscured by several factors. The overall funding required to meet Goal 3 has not been presented to the committee and has not been defined. Detailed program and technology plans have been generated by USCAR for some candidate components, but none of the component plans identified specific resource and funding requirements. Consequently, there is no funding plan against which the PNGV program can be evaluated. The first three to four years of the PNGV provide time for technology development and risk reduction, leading to selection in 1997 of technologies with performance and risk levels consistent with concept vehicle demonstration in 2000. Most new and sophisticated power plant and materials technologies, such as those required by a vehicle with up to tripled fuel economy, generally require more than three or four years to develop. Consequently, it is necessary for the PNGV to use technologies that were developed before the PNGV was established. Most of the candidate technologies were under development and partly funded by the government prior to the PNGV (i.e., fuel cells, gas turbines, advanced batteries, advanced materials, low-emission combustion, advanced motor/generators, etc.); others were under development by the international automobile industry (e.g., CIDI). As technologies show promise toward contributing to the accomplishment of PNGV Goal 3, it is reasonable to expect that the PNGV will accelerate or modify their development to meet unique requirements or to reduce risks. The government has identified approximately $300 million for efforts that are "PNGV-related." These efforts were primarily directed toward energy conservation, materials, and research programs that had been planned and funded before the PNGV was initiated and were authorized for a variety of reasons under the mission statements of eight different U.S. government departments and agencies. Although "PNGV-related" funding deals with technologies being considered to meet PNGV goals, much of the funding is focused on technologies and time frames that do not coincide with the specific goals of the PNGV. Instead, funding is being directed to nearer-term or farther-term technologies or to technologies that address national needs other than the need to reduce light-duty vehicle fuel consumption. The committee was informed that some redirection of ongoing government R&D programs to meet PNGV requirements has taken place; however, numerous observers stated that no new money has been appropriated specifically for the PNGV in government budgets, and no line item has been established in the budget. USCAR stated at the committee's November meeting that they would like to see government funds available to PNGV-related technology doubled. The USCAR partners' company budgets attributable to the PNGV are vague and similarly subject to interpretation. The USCAR primarily reports their expenditures on jointly funded projects and committed cost-sharing against government programs. Many ongoing programs are described under the PNGV initiative and, although some new technology programs can be identified and a very substantial
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Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles: Third Report effort is being expended on PNGV technical management and system studies, it is not clear how much of the new funding has been motivated by improving vehicle fuel efficiency. Also, industries conduct independent technology programs that can contribute to meeting PNGV Goal 3 objectives but are in areas they consider to be proprietary. Because car companies generally do not report the accomplishments on these independent proprietary programs, their funding and impact cannot be assessed by the committee. Thus, the PNGV operates under two serious constraints: (1) insufficient access to data already known to USCAR principals regarding advanced technology, and (2) the nonexistence of a sufficient R&D database to guide reliable choices for the future. Summary Even if it is concluded that the formation of the PNGV has not resulted in major and appropriate increases in funding and a rapid acceleration in improved fuel efficiency-related R&D, the committee believes the PNGV has provided major benefits in focusing government and industry on a common objective. USCAR personnel have conducted joint evaluations of the candidate technologies and placed themselves in a position to make informed decisions on which technologies to include in their concept vehicles. Government personnel—both laboratory researchers and project managers—have become more familiar with the real-world requirements of the automotive industry and, in many cases, have adjusted their programs to be more practical. The automotive industry, suppliers, government personnel, and academia have become more aware of the need for greater fuel efficiency in light vehicles, and everyone is committed to working toward the 10-year PNGV program objectives. Because applied resources have not increased significantly and the rate of development for relevant technologies has not increased sufficiently, a number of candidate technologies will not be able to meet the PNGV time schedule with acceptable risk. In the opinion of the committee, these are likely to include gas turbines, Stirling engines, fuel cells, some battery candidates, and flywheels. However, with appropriate focus and resources, the CIDI hybrid configuration, in combination with lightweight structures and loss reduction technologies, might come close to meeting the PNGV program goals and schedule. Has the balance of funding been appropriate? The committee believes that some useful redirection has been experienced in government programs, considering the constraints on rapid change to government-funded programs and the multiple constituencies and needs that these programs address. In many cases, major changes were precluded by the congressional appropriation language and/or government contracting commitments. The USCAR partners have decided to conduct independent vehicle demonstrations of the concept vehicles. The development and construction of demonstration vehicles is a normal OEM activity; each OEM is experienced in conducting complex programs in a disciplined fashion
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Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles: Third Report against a fixed schedule. To meet the schedule for 2000 with credible concept demonstration vehicles will require greatly increased efforts in 1997. Each company needs to select demonstration technologies and initiate development and risk-reduction efforts on the advanced components in the specific configurations and envelopes of each selected vehicle design. Assignment of project personnel, increased technical leadership, increased management attention, and increased funding will all be required. Decisions on these matters are expected to be made as part of the 1997 downselect process. In this regard, the committee has been particularly concerned that not enough system studies have been conducted. Currently, the committee is not aware of what PNGV would consider acceptable levels of performance for concept demonstration vehicles. The appropriate role of the government during the demonstration phase needs to be considered and defined. Government's role is normally expected to apply to longer-term objectives. There is no definable funding line in the Fiscal Year 1997 budget specifically to support PNGV R&D and no guarantee of funding in subsequent years. Thus, it is not clear to the committee at what level PNGV-related technology efforts being supported by the government will be continued in parallel with the industry's concept-vehicle demonstrations to provide a basis for future advancements in PNGV vehicle technology on a continuing basis, at least through the year 2004. It is the committee's view that relevant technology development specifically devoted to reducing risks identified in the PNGV demonstration configurations merit meaningful federal support, that is, support consistent with program needs and objectives. However, PNGV is experiencing severe funding and resource allocation problems that must be resolved immediately to achieve Goal 3 objectives and to keep the program on schedule. The committee requested that PNGV provide the priorities and required resource and funding levels. In the absence of an acceptable, sustained resolution of the PNGV-wide funding and resource problem, the committee recommends that PNGV's objectives be restructured to reflect more realistic performance, cost, and schedule objectives. In addition to the lack of sufficient funds for most of the PNGV program elements, there are also some serious technical hurdles that, even with adequate funding, may prevent the successful development and commercialization of the proposed systems within the PNGV time frame. Remaining technical hurdles are shown in Table 6-2. Recommendations Based on its review of the adequacy and balance of the PNGV program, the committee makes the following recommendations. Recommendation. The PNGV partners (USCAR and the federal government) should immediately develop a schedule of resource and funding requirements for each major technical task. This schedule should show the current level of resources and funding applied to each major technical task and current shortfalls.
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Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles: Third Report Upon completion of this schedule, the PNGV partners should provide a strategy to redirect R&D and to obtain the necessary resources and funding. Recommendation. In the event that PNGV (industry and government) does not obtain and/or chooses not to increase the resource levels and thereby accelerate the pace of development, the PNGV partners should reconsider the viability of current PNGV program objectives with regard to performance, schedule, and cost. REFERENCES Hardy, K. 1996. Assessment and Incorporation of Foreign Automotive Technology Developments in the PNGV Program. Presented to the Standing Committee to Review the Research Program of the PNGV at the National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., November 12, 1996. Herzog, P. 1996. Future High Speed Diesel Engines for Passenger Cars. Presented to the Standing Committee to Review the Research Program of the PNGV at the National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., November 11, 1996. NRC (National Research Council). 1994. Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles. Board on Energy and Environmental Systems and Transportation Research Board. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. NRC. 1996. Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles, Second Report. Board on Energy and Environmental Systems and Transportation Research Board. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. Treece, J.B. 1996. Automotive News, November 18, 1996. Toyota puts huge bet on alternate-fuel R&D: 1,48. Wang, M.Q. 1996. GREET 1.0—Transportation Fuel Cycles Model: Methodology and Use. Report ANL/ESD-33. Argonne, Illinois: Argonne National Laboratory for U.S. Department of Energy. Wang, M.Q., and Johnson, L.R. 1996. Potential Transportation Infrastructure Changes Resulting from Commercialization of 80 MPG Vehicles. Pp. 441–443 in 29th International Symposium on Automotive Technology and Automation held in Florence, Italy, June 3–6, 1996. Viergutz, O. 1996. Major Impediments to Program Success and Suggested Resolutions. Presented to the Standing Committee to Review the Research Program of the PNGV at the National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., November 12, 1996.
Representative terms from entire chapter: