The following HTML text is provided to enhance online
readability. Many aspects of typography translate only awkwardly to HTML.
Please use the page image
as the authoritative form to ensure accuracy.
The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy
restore the strategic nuclear threat to the United States literally overnight. … The NPR called for an affordable hedge in which the approved force structure could support weapons levels greater that those called for under START should major geostrategic changes demand it." (William J. Perry, Annual Report to the President and Congress, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., February 1995, p. 86).
Russia is required to destroy its multiple-warhead SS-18s and SS-24s. It will retain many of its SS-19s, but they will be downloaded to carry only a single warhead.
Given the years required for a hypothetically hostile Russia to reconstitute conventional forces capable of challenging the United States and its allies, the time should be sufficient for compensating action.
For example, see Stephen J. Schwartz, "Four Trillion Dollars and Counting," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Nov.-Dec. 1995, pp. 32-52, which summarizes the work of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study project.