effective BMD system would give them a destabilizing combination of a shield and a potential nuclear sword.

14.  

International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1996/97 (London: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), p. 179.

15.  

The text of Article VI reads as follows: ''Each of the parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control" (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations, U.S. ACDA, Washington, D.C., 1990, p.100).

16.  

At the same time, however, an administration spokesman said that Protocol I of the treaty "will not limit options available to the United States in response to an attack by an [African nuclear free zone] party using weapons of mass destruction," which suggests a major reservation to the nonuse component of the treaty (White House, Text of Daily Press Briefing, April 11, 1996). The issue of using nuclear weapons to deter the use of chemical and biological weapons is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

17.  

National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1994).

18.  

Warren Christopher, "Statement Regarding A Declaration by the President on Security Assurances for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., Office of the Spokesman, April 5, 1995.

19.  

As legal justification for such a position some U.S. government officials cite the international law doctrine of "belligerent reprisal," which under certain circumstances justifies a "proportionate" military response that violates a treaty if the enemy has violated another treaty. Since first use of biological or chemical weapons is forbidden by the 1925 Geneva Protocol, a first use of chemical weapons by a country such as Libya might, under this argument, justify a response that violates another legal obligation—that is, the negative security assurances protocol of the African NWFZ. For a critical discussion of this issue, see George Bunn, "Expanding Nuclear Options: Is the U.S. Negating Its Non-Use Pledges?," Arms Control Today, May/June 1996, pp. 7-10.

20.  

William J. Perry, Annual Report to the President and Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, March 1996), pp. 53-62. The 1993 Defense Counterproliferation Initiative was part of the effort to reorganize the Defense Department's forces and plans in the wake of the Cold War. To date, most of the department's effort has focused on increasing active and passive defenses for military forces subject to nuclear, chemical, or biological attacks.



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