cited above indicate that the Clementine project's approach to organizing and staffing the operations phase of the mission enjoyed many essential strengths. The organization of the operations team was carefully designed by the project management to provide minimal sufficiency and, within the severe limits of schedule and budget, intense training and rehearsal. It would be very useful for some group, more appropriately constituted than COMPLEX, to undertake a study into the process by which the mission operations software was developed. Given Clementine's small budget, it seems likely that relatively little software was custom-designed; there are likely to be valuable lessons to be learned by Discovery program participants here.
To observers of recent space science programs, a curious aspect of Clementine's failure to achieve one of its primary objectives (namely, autonomous tracking of a cold target) was that BMDO suffered little public embarrassment over this loss. This was in sharp contrast to NASA's disgrace when Mars Observer was lost just 6 months prior to Clementine. The message may be that technology-demonstration missions are expected to be difficult undertakings, whereas even challenging space science missions, such as Galileo, are assumed by the public to be fail-safe because of their high cost.
The volume of data returned by Clementine was very large, about 10% of the amount returned by the Magellan mission from Venus. Thus the task of data management was a daunting one, given the limited budget available to the project. The project evidently succeeded in collecting the data, storing them in an orderly way, and making them available to the science team during real-time operations. Thus, to first order, the Clementine project has demonstrated that, despite tight budget constraints, large volumes of data can be managed. Full reduction and organization of the data set for inclusion in NASA' s Planetary Data System were not planned for, nor budgeted for, by the Clementine project. This responsibility devolved upon the scientists and was stated in NASA's Announcement of Opportunity7 to be the primary role for members of the science team. Nonetheless, funds to allow calibration of the returned data were not provided and are now coming from other sources in NASA's Office of Space Science.
An important concern about the ultimate value of the Clementine measurements remains the degree to which the data can be calibrated for quantitative analysis. This concern arises more from the way in which the sensors were selected and developed for flight than from inherent limitations in the Clementine data management process.
1. Space Studies Board, National Research Council, The Role of Small Missions in Planetary and Lunar Exploration, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1995.
2. Space Science Board, National Research Council, A Strategy for the Explorer Program for Solar and Space Physics, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1984.
3. Space Science Board, National Research Council, The Explorer Program for Astronomy and Astrophysics, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1986.
4. Space Science Board, National Research Council, Strategy for Earth Explorers in Global Earth Sciences, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1988.
5. Space Studies Board, National Research Council, The Role of Small Missions in Planetary and Lunar Exploration, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1995, page 28.
6. See, for example, Space Studies Board and Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board, National Research Council, Improving NASA's Technology for Space Science, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1993.
7. Office of Space Science and Applications, NASA, "Science Team for the Clementine Mission Deep Space Program Science Experiment (DSPSE)," NRA-93-OSSA-2, NASA, Washington, D.C., January 15, 1993.