push complex issues and viewpoints into opposing ideological camps rendering subsequent discussion more polemical than enlightening. Therefore, the task force has chosen not to employ such terms.


Florida, ibid., p. 50.




Tonelson, op. cit.


Jean M. Johnson, The Science and Technology Resources of Japan: A Comparison with the United States (Arlington, Va.: National Science Foundation, 1997), p. 1.


Motivations and context for the Basic Law and Basic Plan are covered in "Constructing a New Global Partnership: Science and Technology as an Investment for the Future," address by Minister of State for Science and Technology Hidenao Nakagawa at the National Academy of Sciences, August 8, 1996.


Masahiro Hashimoto, "Desirable Form of Academia-Industry Cooperation," Journal of Japanese Trade and Industry, No. 2, 1998.


Michiyuki Uenohara has pointed out that although the Japanese government (MITI) protected the infant computer industry in the early stages, since the 1970s it has not provided a substantial amount of subsidies. From Michiyuki Uenohara, "Relevance of Government-Sponsored Corporate R&D Projects to Large Japanese Corporations," a presentation at the bilateral meeting of the U.S.-Japan Corporate Innovation Task Force, Makuhari, Japan, September 11-13, 1994. See also Branscomb and Kodama, op. cit., p. 4. On the other hand, the Japanese government has provided loans at very low rates to encourage new technologies and business alliances through such avenues as the Japan Key Technology Center which is funded through dividends derived from government-owned shares in Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Company (NTT) funneled through the Ministries of Posts and Telecommunications and International Trade and Industry. These funds, which are substantial, are not included in Japanese government budget figures. Also, the Japanese government has provided in-kind services to industry. For example, for years NTT designed the prototypes that later became the products of Hitachi, Fujitsu, and others.


See Nihon Keizai Shimbun (American Edition), "Kan-min Kyodo Kaihatsu e Shinkaisha," (New company for public-private joint development), January 14, 1995, p. 1.


The report paints a sobering picture of Japanese innovation. See Sangyo Kozo Shingikai Sogo Bukai Sangyo Gijutsu Shoiinkai (Industrial Structure Advisory Committee, Industrial Technology Subcommittee) and Sangyo Gijutsu Shingikai Sogo Bukai Kikaku Iinkai (Industrial Technology Advisory Committee, Planning Subcommittee), Kagaku Gijutsu Sozo Rikkoku e no Michi o Kirihiraku: Shiteki Shisan no Sozo, Katsuyo ni Mukete, (Clearing a Path Toward a Nation Based on Creative Science and Technology; Toward Creating and Utilizing Intellectual Assets), June 1995.


See Eamonn Fingleton, "Japan's Invisible Leviathan," Foreign Affairs , Volume 74, No. 2, March/April 1995, pp. 69-85.


The Clinton Administration's policy of encouraging greater government-industry cooperation and its intention to devote considerably more federal resources to pre-competitive projects of commercial relevance was first announced in William J. Clinton and Albert Gore, Technology for America's Economic Growth, A New Direction to Build Economic Strength, February 22, 1993.


Branscomb and Keller, op. cit.


John A. Alic, Lewis M. Branscomb, Harvey Brooks, Ashton B. Carter, and Gerald L. Epstein, Beyond Spinoff: Military and Commercial Technologies in a Changing World (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992).


National Research Council, Learning the R&D System: Industrial R&D in Japan and the United States, op. cit., p. 13.

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