people for control. In addition, most future force plans accept the need to substitute quick response, reach, and precision for numbers, by using information, speed, range, responsiveness, and weapon guidance to require fewer engagements per target and thereby allow smaller forces to accomplish military missions that have been assigned to large forces in the past. Carried further, this implies substituting efficiency, precision, and effectiveness for brute force in military operations. Information warfare and what the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) “Vision 2010” calls “dominant maneuver” and “focused logistics” will have to be used to bring U.S. naval forces to points of decision to impose their will in crisis or conflict before they can be thwarted by any opposition. Assuming timely decision making by the appropriate government authorities, being at the right place at the right time with the right tools to eliminate the opponent 's ability to fight will be far better than taking on an opponent with massive accumulations of force in areas and circumstances where the opponent has had time to build great strength.

Finally, planning resource use to create the forces will require joining value with dollars in thinking about expenditures. The naval forces are already thinking in the direction of designing for smaller crews, systems needing less support, and utilization of commercial services for many functions, to get more value for the dollar. In the future, life-cycle costs rather than acquisition costs will have to govern decisions about expenditures, in recognition that reduction of system support costs will make more resources available for continual force modernization and recapitalization within given budgets. System acquisition costs will have to be viewed as investments in capability with payoff over the long term rather than as purchases of individual platforms or weapons. In this approach, “affordability” must come to mean purchasing needed value for the money the Navy Department is willing and able to spend for a capability within its allocated budget, rather than simply spending the least amount of money in any area, as the term has come to be used in many parts of the Defense Department.

PAYOFFS AND VULNERABILITIES

The restructured naval forces that would emerge after such changes in thinking about naval force design, and after integration of the new capabilities described in the previous chapter, would be leaner and more powerful than today's forces, and able to do more within a given budget. They would be capable of responding more rapidly to crises, a capability enabled by power projection from farther out at sea to deeper inland by a greater variety of forces. Moreover, they would be capable of accommodating their response to a wider variety of crises that may range from invasion of an ally's territory to containing and reversing the effects of civil disturbance or terrorist action that threatens U.S. interests. The restructured forces would enable a more precise focus on the critical aspects of crises requiring combat or other operations, leading to earlier success in ac-



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