5

The International Security Environment: 2000–2035

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY TRENDS

Many conflicts during the Cold War originated in the Soviet drive to expand communism and Soviet influence throughout the world, and the efforts of the United States and its allies to contain that drive. Complicating factors derived from the struggles attending the disengagement of the European powers from their pre-World War II colonial empires and the playing out of the Chinese communist revolution. These motivations for international conflict and fights within nations have gone, to be replaced by conflicts over resources, ethnicity, and national or regional dominance.

The nature of conflict has also changed. In so-called conventional warfare it has become important to distinguish national governments and leadership—those responsible for initiating wars or crises leading to war—from populations, whom we do not wish to harm physically for humanitarian and political reasons. This leads to a sustained trend toward precision in targeting and weapon delivery, to attack only the war makers and their ability to make war, and to avoid producing casualties and random destruction among local populations. Targets will therefore include not only those that would be on attack lists during any military conflict—critical command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) nodes, transportation hubs, airfields, logistic centers, storage sites for weapons of mass destruction, and fielded forces—but also those that are components of the adversary's civil and governmental infrastructure. The latter include public utilities, telecommunications networks, banking systems, mass media, civil transport, and law enforcement centers—in short, anything that supports the opponent's ability to prosecute modern warfare. To attack the infrastructure targets



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Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force 5 The International Security Environment: 2000–2035 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY TRENDS Many conflicts during the Cold War originated in the Soviet drive to expand communism and Soviet influence throughout the world, and the efforts of the United States and its allies to contain that drive. Complicating factors derived from the struggles attending the disengagement of the European powers from their pre-World War II colonial empires and the playing out of the Chinese communist revolution. These motivations for international conflict and fights within nations have gone, to be replaced by conflicts over resources, ethnicity, and national or regional dominance. The nature of conflict has also changed. In so-called conventional warfare it has become important to distinguish national governments and leadership—those responsible for initiating wars or crises leading to war—from populations, whom we do not wish to harm physically for humanitarian and political reasons. This leads to a sustained trend toward precision in targeting and weapon delivery, to attack only the war makers and their ability to make war, and to avoid producing casualties and random destruction among local populations. Targets will therefore include not only those that would be on attack lists during any military conflict—critical command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) nodes, transportation hubs, airfields, logistic centers, storage sites for weapons of mass destruction, and fielded forces—but also those that are components of the adversary's civil and governmental infrastructure. The latter include public utilities, telecommunications networks, banking systems, mass media, civil transport, and law enforcement centers—in short, anything that supports the opponent's ability to prosecute modern warfare. To attack the infrastructure targets

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Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force without indiscriminately harming the civilian population of the area, new kinds of forces, precision weapons, and tailored modes of attack are required. While warfare between national armed forces or the threat of such warfare continues, the world has also seen the rise of mob violence, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism as a means to disrupt and to destroy established governments. The international drug trade, rife with violence and technical measures and countermeasures, has assumed the dimensions of an international struggle of major proportions. Dependence on computer databases and their intercommunication has opened the possibility of attacks on national and corporate information infrastructures that, if successful, can seriously disorient and weaken the very foundations of modern technological societies. All of these modes of conflict and threats to the peace cross national boundaries as we have known them, although in many cases national entities aid and abet them. The transnational groups and their mentoring countries also have it in their power to acquire weapons of mass destruction—nuclear weapons, and especially chemical and biological weapons that are difficult to deny to the wouldbe users and difficult to detect. Small groups and countries can threaten both their neighbors and major nations far from their borders. The developing transnational threat to order and peace in the world is not amenable to solution by traditional diplomatic and military means. During the Cold War the play of events was subject to the “virtual discipline” of fitting in some way into the major two-sided competition between the free and the communist worlds. As a consequence of the new developments on the international scene, it might be said that we have entered a new, different, and more complex period of cold war characterized by unfocused but incessant world conflict. Many of the key action areas—vis-à-vis terrorism, drugs, and information warfare—are not primary naval force responsibilities, although at various times and places the naval forces must deal with them. They will demand new connections and working relationships among U.S. military, intelligence, and civilian agencies. The expansion of the transnational threats to our security has received increasing attention in the absence of a major threat of global warfare. We must remain aware, however, that the post-Cold War world is also seeing the gradual emergence of regional national power centers that will be in a position either to threaten or to reinforce regional security and our own interests in various parts of the world. In the Middle East, beyond Iraq's continuing hostility, the warlike activity of religious fundamentalists in the broad arc from Algeria through Afghanistan, encouraged and in some cases actively aided by Iran, signals a movement in much of the region toward hostility to the United States and its interests that may be hard to counter in the long run. Iran is also building its conventional armed forces and is reaching out for closer relationships with other Muslim countries along Russia's southern boundary from Turkey to Kazakhstan. Russian economic and political development remains unstable. There could

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Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force be a resurgence of Russian nationalism and xenophobia, and a consequent resumption of hostile confrontation with the United States and its allies. Or, given enough time and a run of good fortune, Russia could eventually grow into a friendly regional or, again, a world power. Russia's size, its resource base and industrial potential, and its residual stores of nuclear weapons and delivery systems make it a force to be reckoned with, now and in the future. The Pakistani-Indian conflict over Kashmir could result in another war in the area, with concerns expressed by many in the West that such a war could become nuclear, and therefore damaging to other parts of the world. The tensions generated by that conflict, and by earlier Indian closeness to the Soviet Union, caused “prickly” relationships between the United States and the nations on the South Asian subcontinent. Whether the tensions continue, while India tries to build its industrial and military strength and Pakistan pursues a nuclear deterrent, will depend on many unpredictable events of communication, miscommunication, and perception of real or imagined slights, threats, or assists to regional interests on both sides. China is growing as an economic and military power, pressing outward and becoming more assertive on the international scene while its government remains intransigently authoritarian. As part of its new assertiveness, it has signaled its interest in exercising sea control to significant distances—up to 2,500 km in some directions—from its coast. And, as we were reminded by a Chinese spokesman during the Taiwan crisis of 1996, China has the ability to launch nuclear-tipped ICBMs against the United States. While China has taken steps to ease tensions along its borders with Russia and India, it has taken a totally independent approach to foreign policy that has been consistently inimical to declared U.S. interests. This has included surface-to-surface missile sales to Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, and suspected assistance to Pakistan in the development of nuclear weapons. Clearly, China will be a major force to be dealt with in the coming years and decades. But other countries on the Pacific Rim will also loom large in future U.S. economic welfare and national security. Korea remains a potential flash point until there is some resolution of the deteriorating position in the North and some move toward peaceful reunification. Japan occupies a position in the Western Pacific not unlike that of Germany in Europe —an economic powerhouse having a xenophobic history that demands continual, friendly engagement on our part, lest some precipitating event cause it to assume an independent course that would surely lead to clashes we would much prefer to avoid. Growing economic power centers in Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia and Thailand, keep a wary eye on both China and Japan. They will be quick to note if the United States weakens its security commitment to the area, and their history suggests that they would then shift orientation accordingly. The prospective international situation is summarized from the naval forces' point of view in Table 5.1. The table includes specific projections of potential

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Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force TABLE 5.1 Future World Scene and Potential Naval Force Operations Where Projected Status (aside from unexpected alliances) Need for U.S. Naval Forces Likely Kinds of Actions Northwest and Central Europe; Western Mediterranean north shore Allied; friendly; economic rivalry Low Base area; freedom of sea; combined operations out of region Russia and environs Unpredictable—friendly Neutral, prickly ot hostile; economic rivalry later Low if friendly; medium high otherwise Any naval force operations possible (except amphibious) North Africa; Eastern Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea Unstable and changeable—some allies, some friendly, some hostile; internal conflicts and transnational terrorism High Presence; interposition; resupply; ATBM protection; blockade; could be full range of naval force operations Indian Ocean Neutral/friendly; Low Presence; freedom of seas Japan Friendly/prickly; Economic rivalry High Presence; freedom of seas in regional waters Korea Allied South, hostile North early; if unified,? High Full range of naval force operations China and Taiwan Prickly to hostile mainland, friendly island; High Full range of naval force operations Southeast Asia through Australia and New Zealand Allied through neutral/friendly; economic rivalry; China looms Medium high Presence; full range vs. external threat Africa south of Sahara; South America except Northern Andes Neutral/prickly to neutral/friendly Medium high in Africa; low in South America Mainly OOTW; very different in the two areas Northern Andes; Central America, Caribbean Friendly to neutral/hostile; includes transnational drug cartel High Counter-drug and other OOTW; U.S. border security U.S. relationships with nations and situations in specific geographic regions, as they appear in 1997. While the discussion above reviews the likely emergence of major regional powers as seen from current events, Table 5.1 is intended more as a review of the entire world situation that may face the nation and its need for naval forces in the future. Many of the relationships described in the table would appear to face the United States with less serious international security problems than could be entailed in relationships with the major emerging regional power centers, but, as we learned in Korea and Kuwait, less prominent concerns can become major ones very rapidly. The predictions in Table 5.1 may prove to be right or wrong in any particular area of the world. Some of the predictions will

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Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force come to pass, however, in the sense forecast or in some related way, and other relationships, currently unforeseen, will arise. The key point is that the trends portrayed bespeak an unstable and chaotic international situation, in which some eventualities can be foreseen with clarity, but in which small, unforeseen events can lead to big, unanticipated developments, like alliances between two major adversaries who may have been at odds with each other, or the outbreak of major war, that can affect our security profoundly. From this review, it appears that in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Far East, the need for a U.S. military presence, and especially a continuing naval force presence, will continue into the indefinite future. The naval force presence needed will be a mixture of friendly engagement, deterrence,1 and outright military action of many kinds reviewed in due course below. In addition, continuing naval force presence and operations of various kinds can be foreseen in the waters around Europe, Russia, Africa, and Latin America, and possibly in other areas currently unforeseen. ADDITIONAL FACTORS IN THE ENVIRONMENT Bases During the Cold War there was a clear justification for a worldwide U.S. military base structure, and such a structure was built and sustained with the welcome permission of the host nations. Since the end of the Cold War our overseas base posture has shrunk rapidly, out of budgetary and political necessity; the number of overseas installations, many of them aggregated in major base areas, that are occupied and used by the U.S. military has declined nearly 60 percent since 1990, from about 1,700 to 700. The decline has seen the growth of basing constraints that enhance the need for forward forces able to operate independently for significant periods. Virtually everywhere, U.S. use of bases on foreign soil is now contingent on host government approval of the purposes for which our forces will operate out of the bases. Within that constraint, there is a patchwork of mixed welcomes, in Europe, Japan, and the Arabian Peninsula, that provides but few opportunities for a sustained presence on the ground where we are free to act at will in our own perceived interest. The naval forces have a strong advantage in this situation because they can sustain operations at large distances from secure bases, maintaining a continuing, visible presence in a coastal zone without intruding on any nation's sovereignty in sensitive situations. Forward movement of naval forces at sea in times of crisis also creates less tension domestically regarding the advisability of U.S. 1   Naval Studies Board. 1997. Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.

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Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force involvement, and the naval forces can quietly leave the scene without creating a political furor. From a forward posture the naval forces can also move rapidly to secure base areas for the other Service forces to move into when needed, against opposition if necessary. Coalitions The regional interests of the United States must always involve other nations, on either side of quarrels that may well up. We will almost always have to operate in coalitions, with the consequence that our freedom of action will usually be constrained by competing interests of our coalition partners. Those interests will change, so that the coalitions themselves may change with local situations at any time. Submitting to coalition constraints may not sit well in the U.S. domestic political situation, but it is likely to be a continuing fact of life for the naval forces. The naval forces are, in fact, well positioned to help with coalition building, because they exercise frequently with other nations' navies, even in circumstances that make exercises involving land-based forces too sensitive to pursue. Such exercises help build and sustain readiness in the coalition context, as well. Resources The shrinkage of resources for the armed forces means that the tension between maintaining forces of a size and readiness to respond to crises that may arise quite rapidly somewhere in the world, and keeping the forces modern so that they can match or exceed improvements in foreign military capability, will continue indefinitely. Thus, unless one of the regional challenges described above grows into a major military threat of the kind that faced us in the Cold War, the tightness of the defense budget is unlikely to be relaxed. Incorporation of new and advanced military capabilities in the naval forces will have to be undertaken at the expense of forces in being or some other aspect of force posture, by shifting resources within fixed or shrinking budgets. There will be a premium on increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of forces of any size, to render them able to do more with less. “Jointness” A convergence of major financially, technically, and operationally driven trends will require that naval forces must increasingly be created and operate jointly with other Service and National2 agency forces and resources. Extensive 2   The term “National” refers to those systems, resources, and assets controlled by the U.S. government, but not limited to the Department of Defense (DOD).

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Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force equipment and mission sharing are implied, as are needs for multiway compatibility and interoperability, task sharing, and information sharing among all the elements of the joint and combined operating and warfighting system. Technology Coming out of World War II and early in the Cold War, the advance of technology throughout the U.S. economy was led by defense technology. With the growth of the world's economies, and with the revolution in solid-state circuitry, the armed forces have now come to represent too small a market to dominate the burgeoning commercial markets in many areas, such as computing, commercial aviation, and communications. Thus, the Defense Department and the military Services now depend for much of their technology base on developments in civilian markets. Exclusive military technology developments remain but are limited to specific areas that commercial goods and capabilities have no need to use. That the United States would have to maintain military technological superiority over our adversaries was an article of faith during the Cold War. A concomitant of the increasing dominance of civilian technology is the spread of the technological capability to much of the rest of the world. That, and our military's increased dependence on the civilian technological base, will make it increasingly difficult for our naval forces to achieve and sustain technological superiority over potential opposing forces. Moreover, discussion of “revolutions in military affairs” notwithstanding, it must be observed that technological change usually comes in small steps, even though those steps may come often. Even the computer revolution, based as it was on the development of integrated circuits on chips, has taken about 30 years to reach the stage that today we recognize as “revolutionary.” This poses the risk that in a tight budget environment it may be tempting for the U.S. naval forces to forego modest changes that have revolutionary potential, while others adopt them to our ultimate detriment. MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES One consequence of the spread of advanced technology is the growth of potentially very capable military opposition to any U.S. military operations.3 Even in situations of lesser conflict or operations short of war, opponents may 3   Much of the following description of opposing military capabilities draws heavily on the Naval Studies Board's report on regional conflict in the 21st century (Naval Studies Board. 1996. The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.). The anticipated capabilities described have changed little in the months since the earlier report was published. The discussion of the significance of the opposing capabilities of the future naval forces as they are being considered here is original in the present context and report.

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Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force field and be able to use some formidable military equipment and techniques. Such capabilities will be available to any opponent, however crude or advanced. There will be ready access to information from space-based observations, which may be obtained by sophisticated adversaries launching their own systems, or for others by purchase from any of the space data systems offered for sale in world markets. Such data will have resolutions as small as 1 meter, which will give the observers the ability to track ships of the fleet in most oceans and littoral zones with update intervals of fractions of a day, and to see major elements of ground forces and locate them with respect to known local ground features in a geodetic grid. Any regular or irregular force may be adept in the use of concealment, cover, and deception, and many have demonstrated exceptional ability to exploit the international news media for their purposes. All will have available capable low-altitude air defenses. These will include shoulder-fired, infrared-guided SAMs of Stinger or subsequent vintage that are very difficult to countermeasure, and advanced, vehicle-mounted antiaircraft machine guns of large caliber with lead computing sights and associated night-viewing devices. All will also have skill with small arms, explosives, and fusing, and all will be able to use diverse land and sea mines. Actual or potential opponents are very likely to have the knowledge and the ability to use the global information and communication infrastructure for their own internal purposes and for purposes of disruption and “info-terror” against the United States and nations friendly to us. Transnational terrorist and criminal groups have already displayed proficiency in using computers, the Internet, and modern communications media. Acquisition and enhancement of such proficiency are easy, inexpensive, and available on a worldwide scale. Many potential adversaries will also have broad arrays of modern weapons and military capabilities that are for sale in world markets today and that are being developed by several nations that have had or that have recently acquired advanced technological capability. These are likely to include: Modern tanks, combat aircraft with state-of-the-art air-to-air missiles, and artillery. Radar-based air defenses, including short-range systems like the French Crotale, medium-altitude systems like the Russian SA-6 and SA-8, and advanced, long-range, high-altitude systems like the SA-10 and SA-12 that may have some counter-stealth and counter-tactical ballistic missile capability. Tactical ballistic missiles with ranges from 200 to about 1,500 miles. Within a few years they can come to have advanced guidance systems achieving an accuracy of 50 meters or less, and maneuvering, radiation-seeking, guided warheads. Recent unclassified reports about growing ballistic missile capability outside Europe and the United States show that North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Pakistan, among the smaller nations, have ballistic missiles of Scud vintage and evolutionary advances from that point. Israel and India are develop-

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Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force ing missiles with a range of more than 1,000 miles. China has sold long-range missiles to Saudi Arabia and demonstrated their use in the Taiwan Straits in 1996, and North Korea was dissuaded from firing a long-range test missile into the Sea of Japan in 1996. While some tactical and theater ballistic missile (TBM) technologies belong to friendly nations and may be protected under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), experience thus far has shown that in today 's world of spreading technology, leakage to actually or potentially hostile nations will be very difficult, if not impossible, to control. Especially troublesome is the possibility of disabling attacks against ships of the fleet, naval forces ashore, or friendly populations and installations along the littoral by such missiles carrying chemical or biological, if not nuclear, warheads, or even severely damaging conventional submunition warheads. Ballistic missile attacks can be made rapidly and with surprise because the weapon does not require much visible advanced preparation for launch. Under current arms control treaty constraints (discussed in Chapter 7 ), the United States would not be able to return a strike rapidly at the source of such missiles with a weapon in kind, making a fleet ATBM capability critically important. Antiship cruise missiles that either fly at subsonic speed but have stealth characteristics that significantly reduce engagement time, or are supersonic sea-skimmers that present similar difficulties. France and Norway have advertised such missiles for sale, emphasizing their stealth capability; China has transferred such missiles to Iran; Russia has well-developed capability and operational missiles of this kind, which could at some future time be sold to countries that might become hostile to the United States. Many means of surveillance and targeting, including space systems, aircraft, and UAVs that may provide some information-gathering capability even in the face of U.S. and allied air superiority. An array of sea surface combat capabilities, including surface combatants up to destroyer, cruiser, or even, in the future, aircraft carrier level; and small, fast speedboats that are difficult to sink and that can damage our own surface combatants with missile launches or suicide missions. Of special concern to the naval forces are the advanced quiet submarines, some nuclear-powered and some of advanced diesel or air-independent-propulsion design. Unclassified estimates show that among nations that are not currently U.S. allies, Russia has 120 submarines, 77 of them nuclear, and is still building vigorously; China has 70 submarines, 6 of them nuclear, with 2 under construction; North Korea has 40 submarines with possibly 6 more under construction; and 20 other nations have, among them, 74 submarines. Within the last group, there are 30 submarines owned by countries having Indian Ocean coasts—18 Indian, 6 Pakistani, 3 Iranian, and 3 South African. As the recent Iranian acquisition of Russian Kilo-class submarines showed, submarine sales are not always heralded in advance, so that we cannot know how these numbers will change for the smaller, currently hostile countries. Although some of those

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Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force countries may currently have only rudimentary proficiency in the operation of their submarines, it must be assumed that over the 35-to 40-year time horizon of this study any countries that want to use such capability against U.S. or allied naval forces can learn to do so effectively. This would present a major threat to our ability to initiate and sustain expeditionary military operations along the littoral, especially in view of evolving concepts for such warfare that call for extensive fire support and logistic support from the sea. The implication, also, is that past work on torpedo defense must continue, because (as is indicated in Chapter 7 ) antisubmarine warfare in the littoral environment will continue to be a difficult process with an uncertain outcome. Finally, over the period being considered by the study we may expect and plan for the eventuality that despite the constraints of arms control treaties, there will be a gradual proliferation of nuclear weapons in small numbers, and a more rapid proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, to hostile states, all of which might be associated with some of the delivery systems listed above— especially the tactical ballistic missiles—or with other, covert delivery systems that would be hard to detect in advance. This listing of military capabilities that the Navy and Marine Corps may meet in future military operations makes it clear that the Services cannot rest complacent. While the above capabilities in many quarters may not appear highly threatening today—either because the likelihood of hostilities appears low or because we believe that the countries that have or are acquiring the capability are not hostile—such conditions could change more rapidly than we could build the capability to counter them. Given the time it takes to field new military systems and to develop new tactics and operational techniques using them, especially in the expected tight budget environment, continuing effort will be necessary to meet the potentially demanding opposition that we can see being fielded today. STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FUTURE NAVAL FORCE ENVIRONMENT The United States in today's world does not perceive an immediate threat to its survival and that of its close allies, such as existed during the Cold War. Rather, we see threats of varying degrees of seriousness to diverse interests, distributed around the world. In our open society, the meaning of events and the appropriate response to them are subject to extensive public argument and, often, delayed response and foreign misinterpretation of both the delay and the response. The current perception, both at home and abroad, is that when we finally commit military forces in an international crisis our objectives are to minimize casualties, minimize costs, succeed rapidly according to time scales that may be prompted by domestic and political considerations rather than by the needs of

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Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force the situation, and bring our forces home as soon as possible. While these perceptions may not always be accurate, the perception leads to a pattern of response, as illustrated by the behavior of the Bosnian Serbs prior to the U.S.-led NATO intervention of 1995, that is inimical to our interests and our long-term security. Our opponents in international activities are concerned with matters of survival or dominance in their local areas, rather than simply with protecting “interests.” Their response to possible U.S. use of military force plays on the perceived limitations of our commitment, leading them to plan on longer staying power, and on being able to exact more casualties than they believe we will be willing to tolerate. They use elusiveness, surprise, and deception, and face us with the new kinds of warfare—irregular warfare, terrorism, drugs, and economic and social disruption—that they believe we are not well equipped to handle. They use their pockets of sophisticated military capability, such as mines, anti-aircraft weapons, or antiship missiles, to subject us to the “tyranny of the single hit” on major platforms, downing an aircraft or seriously damaging a major combat ship to discourage further presence in an area. They know how to exploit our media by continually posing for the American public the question of whether the price in casualties, dollar costs, and damage, even civilian damage to our opponents, is worth paying for the situation and the gains at hand. Over the long term, the emerging strategy of major regional challengers must be to enforce their own regional dominance while holding U.S. power at bay outside the domains they wish to dominate. They would intimidate their neighbors while building or acquiring what must now be viewed as today's decisive, strategic weapons: economic power; long-range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads; modern, quiet submarines; aviation armed with antiship missiles to threaten our naval forces; other weapons of mass destruction; and the capacity for massive but covert disruption of the information systems on which both our civilian economy and military forces depend. These weapons, and the new kinds of warfare listed previously, will ultimately threaten the United States at home—not by invasion, but by disruption and destruction. Thus, at some point what were threats to U.S. “interests” abroad can turn into threats to the survival of U.S. global power. These challenges will arise differently in different parts of the globe, at different times according to different plays of events. All of the rising regional powers and the hostile transnational organizations will have greatly differing political and military styles rooted in their histories and current circumstances, leading them to emphasize and to use various elements of the “decisive” weapons in different ways. We can expect any or all of these challenges to arise over the next 40 years—nearly half a century. None of this need imply that our relationships with the emerging power centers will necessarily be hostile, although the potential for hostility certainly does now and will in the future exist in varying degrees. But we must heed the lessons of the 20th century, which tell us that we must be one of the “big guys on

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Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force the block,” to paraphrase former Secretary of Defense William Perry, and preferably the biggest, to hold our place at the table, to deter threats and conflicts, and to achieve our strategic objectives, regardless of whether the interaction with the others is friendly or hostile. The naval forces will be expected to meet—successfully—any of the circumstances and weapons, conventional and unconventional, that international developments will impose. The forces must be adaptable, because the exact nature of any threats they will have to meet or missions they will have to carry out cannot be known a priori. And they must be readily expandable if need be, in a form that will meet major challenges as they develop.