within reasonable resource expenditures without the use of modeling and simulation.

The force development described will have to proceed on many fronts simultaneously. Otherwise, delays in advancing some capabilities —such as failure to establish information superiority, or to develop the responsive firepower needed to support dispersed forces ashore, or to meet the threats of mines, submarines, and missiles, or to be able to dominate populated areas quickly, or to advance the logistic system together with the combat systems—can turn into “showstoppers” for the entire naval force.

The resulting “lean” forces will inevitably have vulnerabilities that must be accounted for. The most serious of these will emerge from disruption of operations due to enemy action and the well-known “fog” and “friction” of war, and from failure of key force elements to perform when expected and as expected, for unforeseen reasons. Prudent steps (detailed in Chapter 8 of this report) can be taken to mitigate the worst effects of the vulnerabilities. Such mitigation efforts must be built into the system and force design. The character and cost of such “insurance” programs must be considered an integral part of the effort in implementing the new naval force capabilities.

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