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Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview (1997)

Chapter: 7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035

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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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7

Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035

Because the naval forces are built around major platforms that cost billions of dollars to acquire, the current view of the forces' prospects tends to emphasize the constraints, mainly fiscal constraints, that make it difficult to undertake major new directions of force evolution. However, in the spirit of the ongoing restructuring of all industry and government to enhance our competitiveness on the world scene, this can also be viewed as a time of opportunity for renewal and change to better meet the challenges we face. There are some similarities between the current period and the period before World War II, when a lack of resources and a lack of perceived need by the public and government officials kept the armed forces at a very low level.

Even in that constrained environment the “entering wedges” of essential military capability—prototype bombers and fighters, aircraft carriers, amphibious landing craft, radar, nuclear fission—were there to be fully developed and become the decisive systems in winning the war. So, too, in fiscally constrained times such as these, we can prepare the entering wedges of naval force capability to help the forces meet the challenges and hedge against the uncertainties of the future. In the current case, the beginnings of the key capabilities are already with us. The task is to bring these capabilities into a form and a level of operational competence within the naval forces that enables them to be exercised, used in action, proven, and become the basis for military success by forces in being and for force expansion should that become necessary.

In keeping with this philosophical approach, this study has identified the following entering wedges of capability as the most important for future naval force evolution:

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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  1. Making information systems and operations central to all others;

  2. Giving individual sailors and Marines more force-multiplying technical capability, more responsibility, and wider influence on the battlefield and in the battle area;

  3. Strengthening the combat fleet by:

    • Preparing a family of rocket-propelled attack missiles capable of fast response, a high rate of fire, long range, high accuracy, and low cost;

    • Changing surface combatant and submarine designs to use such missiles most effectively, and to capitalize on the technological opportunity to increase efficiency and effectiveness;

    • And concurrently, preparing new directions for naval aviation;

  4. Expanding the techniques of undersea warfare;

  5. Preparing new approaches to operations by military forces in populated areas;

  6. Reengineering the logistic system for Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS);

  7. Making modeling and simulation integral to all system acquisition, force preparation, and operational decisions; and

  8. Ensuring a focused, sustained research and development program to enable and support all of the other entering wedges of capability.

All of these entering wedges of capability are deemed critically important to shaping future naval forces. With one exception (a research and development program), they are listed in rough order of priority that would be accorded for allocation of resources, although preferably some useful level of resources could be applied to each.

The rationale for the priority order is straightforward.

In the first rank are information and people. Information is first, because without it, the forces will not know where to go, whom to engage, and how to fight. People are next, because it is people, with weapon and support systems at their disposal, who fight and win wars, or ensure that wars are deterred. To help ensure effective use of resources in the resource-constrained environment they face, the naval forces are planning for more effective use of people.

Next in order are the weapon systems that constitute the strength of the fighting forces; this capability includes, on roughly the same level of priority, the surface and air systems, the undersea systems, and the most important parts of the land combat systems that will allow implementation of the full force capability described above. Following—but not much lower in importance because strategy, schedules, and success in military operations are often driven by logistics—is the forces' essential support. Also at this level, attention is needed to modeling and simulation, the technology tool that is basic to the successful creation of all major systems and enterprises today.

Although ensuring focused, sustained levels of research and development is

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×

listed last, it in fact undergirds the list—without it, the others cannot be accomplished.

INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND OPERATIONS
The Centrality of Information in Warfare

The naval forces' environment includes U.S. military forces and others that may be allied, friendly, neutral, or antagonistic; military facilities with which the naval forces may have to interact in friendly or hostile fashion; surrounding and intermixed civilian activities and facilities; and factors in the physical environment, such as weather and ocean conditions, that can affect force operations. Information about all these elements is derived from thousands of sources— from human and technical intelligence, space-based observations, sensors deployed by the fleet and by troops ashore and other Services and civilian bodies, and stored or newly generated analyses that can give historical perspective and deeper insights than simple observations alone. The precision and timeliness of the information, used for purposes ranging from devising strategies and tactics to controlling operational force movements to precision targeting for weapon systems, are becoming ever more critical in modern crisis resolution, conflict, and other military operations.

Observation and processing capacities and the ability to communicate the results to multiple users are growing explosively with modern sensing, computing, and communications technologies. Today's military forces exist in a mass of information—an “infosphere”—that is essential to their existence and their effective functioning. All naval force elements must be designed to operate in this information environment. Only if they can capitalize on it to create a complete and accurate picture of their current and projected future situations—more complete, accurate, and timely than their opponents can assemble at any time— can our naval forces, limited in size but with worldwide responsibilities, carry out their tasks effectively.

This means that the information-in-warfare system must be considered and treated as one of the major combat systems, just as are the forces ' ships, aircraft, or weapon systems. Indeed, in addition to being an important element of all other combat systems, the information-in-warfare system is the fundamental combat system that integrates and propels all the others. The system design must therefore include the doctrine and the organizational capacity to ensure gathering and distribution of information where and when it is needed. Many of the data sources, and large portions of the communications networks, will be operated by others and therefore will not be under direct naval force control. The naval forces will have to work within this joint system, contribute their own system elements for others' use as well as their own, and integrate their own subsystems

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×

at purely Navy and Marine command levels to operate with the entire “system of systems.”

The Information-in-Warfare System

Information sources include proliferated sensors in all media—ultraviolet, visible, infrared, and acoustic—as well as radar and electronic intelligence (ELINT) receivers. The sensors are deployed in space, at high and low altitudes in the atmosphere on UAVs and manned aircraft, with the forces on the ground and on the sea, and under the sea—in and over friendly, neutral, or enemy territory. They are fielded and operated by many civilian and military agencies, including, among others:

  • The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),

  • The National Security Agency (NSA),

  • The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO),

  • The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),

  • The Defense Aerial Reconnaissance Office (DARO),

  • The National Image and Mapping Agency (NIMA), and

  • Various military Service agencies and elements, including but not limited to those of the naval forces, as well as

  • Information sources among our coalition partners, whose inputs must be integrated with those of U.S. agencies in reciprocal arrangements.

All have access to diverse resources and mission responsibilities under national, regional CINC, and local force command.

The flow of information to and from all these sensors must be networked so that data derived from the multiple sources can be correlated in time and space. The information the sensors gather must be processed, analyzed, and distributed to various nodes where it can be used directly or in further analysis to serve various users' specific needs. The networks of sensors and processing nodes must permit adaptive tasking, so that data from sensors and analysis of information can be combined effectively for specific purposes in specific areas, while surveillance is maintained in all other areas of interest. Indeed, surveillance, supported by appropriate processing, must be maintained in areas that might be of interest, and there must be alerting mechanisms to indicate when those areas merit attention.

The exchange of information among sensors that is entailed in netting them, and transmission of the raw or processed information to users will require sturdy communications networks that have enormous capacity, in both bandwidth and data rate. Although it is difficult to specify the information transmission capacity needed, because requirements are growing exponentially, two facts about the evolution of future communications technology are essential for the military forces, including the naval forces, to comprehend in planning their communica-

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×

tions: (1) civilian communications networks are rapidly surpassing military networks in bandwidth, capacity, and rate of growth; and (2) the attending technological developments will outstrip the evolution of military communications technology, except in specialized areas such as resistance to jamming, the need for special security, and hardening against nuclear effects.

Thus civilian communications technologies, including satellite, terrestrial fiber, and wireless communications, will play a dominant role in future military communications. Given its expanding needs, the military simply will not have the resources to establish parallel nodes and networks of the required capacity, but by adopting and adapting civilian communications technology and networks, the military needs for bandwidth and data rate, whatever they may become, will largely be met.

Using civilian communications technology to meet military needs and integrating it with military communications will not be as easy as connecting with the Internet, however. The most expeditious and economical approach will be to acquire commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment and subsystems for all but specialized applications. In adapting the forces and their procedures to use of COTS equipment and subsystems with their inherent characteristics, the military forces will have to create a seamless integration of terrestrial fiber, satellite, and tactical wireless communications composed of diverse commercial and military subsystems. They will have to ensure the availability of surge capacity and priority access when many of the available communication channels may be taken up with ongoing civilian business. They will have to come to terms with regulatory restrictions affecting civilian as well as military communication system users. They will have to ensure that they cannot be denied service by antagonistic or otherwise unaccommodating subnetwork operators (the military will constitute a relatively small subset of users, not commanding extremely high financial clout in commercial markets). They will have to provide for special needs, such as enabling antijam and low-probability-of-intercept (LPI) communications when large segments of their networks are not under their control; survivability and restoration of service in wartime or after natural disasters; and other problems not yet foreseen. Doctrines will have to be devised, often ad hoc, for integrating coalition partners into our own naval force information communications and information networks. Accommodating coalitions may complicate our own forces' operation and increase their vulnerability, but it will also make available combat forces, intelligence and logistic support, and external political support that may be essential to any ongoing operation. Special needs of military operations will require preparation of accurate maps of potential areas of operation, keyed to the WGS-84 common grid that is being developed. These maps and other information in extensive, militarily relevant geographic databases, such as population distribution or trafficability, will have to be prepared so that they can be accessed by military forces through any communica-

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×

tion systems, civilian or military, with appropriate security safeguards, on an asneeded and when-needed basis.

The complexity of the information system and the vast amount of everchanging information in it at any time eventually will make assimilation of information the primary challenge in system use. Concentration on technologies and other means that aid people in selecting and understanding information—recognition theory, digital agents, network appliances, image analysis, spatial decision support, targeted marketing, and others—will be essential. Also required will be decentralized system operation, much like the civilian World Wide Web, in which information is made available as it becomes available and can be acquired by query when needed by a user without placing rigid demands on user hardware and software system design and operation. Applying this concept to the military information system will present special challenges such as ensuring the timeliness of data; understanding time discrepancies among related data elements that can distort overall situational awareness, and therefore can distort mission planning, execution, and outcome; and alerting diverse users to new inputs that are of direct concern to them and require urgent action.

The “system of systems” that can provide such services will surely grow in size as its architecture evolves in the coming decades. In time it will become large and complex beyond easy comprehension by any one individual, group, or agency, leading to the possibility of unanticipated dynamic command-and-control instabilities that will have to be guarded against, thus making information warfare defense even more critical to reliable system operation. Other dangers include the risk of self-jamming or of confusion if conflicting information arrives from different sources thought to be equally reliable. The latter possibility raises the concern that if information from various sources acts as a sort of forcing function for command decisions, and if the timing of arrival of disparate information from diverse sources is in an unfortunate relationship with decision cycle times, then serious command-and-control instabilities could arise in which maneuvering and firing orders lose coherence and become incompatible with situations on the ground. The result could be malpositioning of forces or failure to move them as and where needed, leading to inability to achieve missions, or even to defeat. There are many historical examples of situations where poor information led to military failure. The risks in a plethora of information, poorly integrated, could be serious, especially with “lean” forces that depend on timely and accurate information and domination of enemy response time lines for military success.

The War for Information Advantage

Objects of observation and surveillance will take steps to disguise or mask their locations, installations, and activities. Beyond that, they will try to take advantage of the known characteristics of our sensors and systems to deceive

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×

them, to deny our forces information or to lead them astray or cause them to undertake actions that can lead to their defeat. Growing technical capability in sensors and data processing will permit penetration of concealment, cover, and deception, however. Concealment and cover may be penetrated by airborne hyperspectral and foliage-penetrating radar sensors, and deception can be detected through sufficiently sophisticated processing of information from diverse sources with sufficiently powerful computers.

Of even greater concern than the operational problems in mixing and using civilian facilities with the purely military communications, sensors, and computing networks will be defending against deliberate information warfare attack— reading, disrupting, confusing, and denying reliable information and the successful use of information-based systems, or planting false information that remains undetected. Such defense will need many components to create a balanced defense in keeping with the complexity of the information system. A balanced defense will include various steps to deny visibility into military and naval force use of the system; operation with concurrent backup always in place; preparation for degraded operations; and continuous monitoring, auditing, application of protective measures, and active defense against penetration. Perversely, there may be some safety in open use of multiple networks accessible to many users, some of whom will be opponents.

Electronic warfare, including ELINT, jamming of sensors, communications, and navigation systems including GPS, and steps to counter the jammers, as well as possible use of high-powered microwaves to destroy electronic circuits and defense against such weapons, will continue to be part of the war for information advantage. Every combat and support system design will have to account for vulnerability to electronic countermeasures, and will have to provide for counter-countermeasures. Electronic countermeasures will also have to be part of the offensive “kit of tools” that helps weapon systems and forces reach and attack their objectives against effective defenses in order to deny sensor information to the opposition.

Stealth and signature management in ships and aircraft will continue to be essential in denying unit and force movement and targeting information to an opponent. Even where it is difficult to reduce a platform signature to extremely low levels, some signature reduction will help other electronic warfare components to deny information about the platforms to the opposition.

The quest for information superiority is becoming so broad and complex that the aggregation of the various areas involved, such as surveillance, intelligence gathering, defense against information warfare, non-weapon-specific electronic warfare, and others, must be considered a major warfare area in its own right, of status comparable to ASW, ASUW, AAW, and the other recognized warfare areas. The implications of such a change in viewpoint are addressed below.

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×
Instituting the Information-in-Warfare System

It is clear from the above discussion that the commander's display screen— whether the commander is a CINC, a ship or battalion commander, or at some other level of unit command—together with the information on it, the links to sources of information, the sensors and processing nodes that acquire and develop the information, and the links to weapons and their guidance to targets, constitutes a warfighting system just as much as the ships, aircraft, and combat battalions of the Navy and Marine Corps. It is the operative “meta-system” of the information superiority warfare area. This system must be acquired and integrated into the forces by the same processes that govern the acquisition and integration of all the other major warfighting systems, with similar, integrated attention at the same command and executive levels in the Services and the Department of the Navy.

In particular, the information-in-warfare system must be managed in an integrated fashion, and the ultimate statement of requirements for the system, the descriptions of its characteristics, and the impetus to acquire and modernize it must come from the operational forces, as do the requirements for and characteristics of the other warfighting systems.

Some of the information sensors and processing nodes, as well as support systems such as GPS, are outside the Navy and Marine Corps, in other Service, Defense Agency, and National systems, including space systems. In these cases, compatibility and interoperability of the naval force systems and other systems must be ensured, and the naval forces must be assured that they will receive the needed utility from the systems. The originators and operators of the other systems, whether the systems are in space, in the atmosphere, or on land, must be kept aware of Navy and the Marine Corps information and information support needs, and the Navy and Marine Corps must be represented in joint forums with the other agencies at levels that would ensure attention to their needs. Department of the Navy senior leadership must be actively involved in this process. Future technology advances and fiscal constraints will heighten the need.

Specific Navy Department attention at high levels is especially needed in the area of space systems, where the Navy and Marine Corps field few systems but rely critically on many. They depend on space systems for environmental (weather and ocean condition) forecasting, navigation, communication, surveillance, reconnaissance, targeting, position fixing, and weapon guidance. In the past, they have been served well by systems that other Services and agencies have fielded with the requirements of the naval forces as well as other requirements in view. The effective liaison between the naval forces and the other Services and agencies that made this possible could come under severe pressure in the future in a fiscally constrained environment unless explicit attention is given to ensuring that the effective liaison continues.

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×

Finally, the information-in-warfare system has reached a level of importance that requires—like the ship, submarine, gunnery, aviation, infantry, and other operational communities before it—information operations and information warfare specialties in the Navy and the Marine Corps. Only with the attending incentives will the naval forces be assured of finding and retaining personnel with the high level of performance and capability the area demands.

ENHANCING THE CAPABILITIES OF INDIVIDUAL SAILORS AND MARINES
Using People Effectively

Because, short of a dire emergency threatening U.S. survival, we will continue to have volunteer armed forces, the naval forces will have to compete with the civilian economy for personnel. Among the many factors in this competition are compensation, the need to provide work and living experiences that will encourage personnel to make Service-oriented career decisions, and—different from most careers in the civilian world—the fact that armed forces' personnel will, at uncertain times, be asked to risk their lives, and consequently the welfare of their families, as part of their jobs. The future personnel pool will include both male and female sailors and Marines, who will come from a rich variety of cultural and educational backgrounds to which the recruiting and training systems will have to be sensitive and adaptive. At the same time, training technology and techniques are changing rapidly, in parallel with the technological evolution of the naval forces' hardware systems. The personnel system of the naval forces thus faces the prospect of complete revamping in the years ahead.

All major naval force systems are being designed to operate with fewer people who have more technical capability at their disposal. Technology, in the form of elaborate, networked instrumentation, automated controls, and integrated information, communication, and transportation systems that can generate fast response by forces far from crisis areas, is being used to streamline and consolidate functions at sea and to move many traditional shipboard maintenance and support functions ashore. The functions affected will vary from shipboard damage control and system maintenance to target acquisition and weapon firing, all of which will be performed with fewer personnel in future naval systems. Manning1major combat systems so as to optimize the mix of equipment and personnel thus becomes a parameter to be considered early in the system design process, along with the technical elements of a system. Gone are the days when major platforms such as ships could be built under the assumption that crew would be found to perform whatever functions were needed; personnel

1  

The term “manning” is used as a convenient, generic shorthand for assigning personnel, male or female, to organizational and technical tasks within major systems and support bases.

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×

must now be considered to be integral parts of the overall system, from its inception.

As a result, future force design will encourage more naval forces personnel to make the Service their profession.2 They will require more training and advanced education, and they will carry more responsibility for system operation, both in the narrow sense of making the system work, and in the broader sense of using the system in combat. In terms of both economics and force effectiveness, it will be important to keep the people in the forces longer. There will be advantages in recruiting people who are, on average, better qualified than today's recruits. Recruiting may have to tap people in the personnel pool, such as community college graduates or individuals in mid-career, who are not generally approached in recruiting today. Naval force personnel will thus become more expensive to recruit, train, and retain, with added expense for accommodating their outside responsibilities. These higher unit costs for personnel will offset the savings from technology-based reductions in personnel, putting a premium on achieving maximum productivity from the force.

Aside from using technology to help fewer personnel operate major systems, thus making the assigned personnel inherently more productive, known technology can be applied to speed training and improve job performance, and the naval forces must move ahead rapidly to capitalize on technology for such activities as training in synthetic environments and using simulators to represent parts of systems, thereby shortening the time required for more expensive training with actual systems and forces in their real environment. Computer and communication networks allow distributed training, so that one expert instructor can train people simultaneously at widely dispersed locations, with a consequent reduction in travel costs and time away from assigned stations. Such training can be designed to be adaptive, allowing each trainee to go at his or her own rate, without having to conform to a fixed schedule based on some average training performance; it will also be possible to change the “courseware” easily to fit the different backgrounds of trainees and different circumstances of training and variations in system design. Distributed networks providing access to remotely located experts—e.g., the designers of a system, or the nation's best electronics warfare experts—together with technical aids such as computer-based plug-in diagnostic tools, can help personnel at sea or at far-flung bases to accomplish their tasks expeditiously and effectively without extensive in situ backup.

Quality of Life

Quality of life—the large complex of factors attending job satisfaction and living in the job-associated environment—is a key factor affecting personnel

2  

This should not be construed to mean that a military class in our society is being advocated. That is, indeed, an outcome to be guarded against, perhaps by ensuring that the Service professional's family life is rooted in the civilian community.

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×

productivity and retention. Military careers must be competitive with careers in the civilian economy, and expectations for quality of life are now higher than they may have been in the past. The quality of life for naval force personnel depends not only on pay, which is a key factor, but also on the perception that the Services have policies that value and support their personnel, that the Services ' leadership takes those policies seriously and implements them effectively, and that the public approves of and supports the missions and values of the people in the Services.

Research confirms what could be understood intuitively, that people feel more satisfied with their lives if they are satisfied with their jobs, and that good matching of people to jobs leads to better job performance and greater job satisfaction. The well-known psychological tests and associated techniques for accomplishing such matching must be considered part of the Service personnel management's kit of tools. Technology can also improve the work environment in many ways, from enhancing creature comfort to providing adequate and suitable tools and machinery to get jobs done.

Deployed sailors and Marines also perform better if they know that during their absences their families are well provided for in terms of housing, schooling, religious and medical care, work opportunities for spouses and older children, and all the other tangible and intangible factors that lead families to feel satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their daily lives. Sailors and Marines also want to keep in touch with their families, a need that is possible to meet with today 's worldwide communications networks. But shipboard and remote base policies and routines must provide for it, and must do so without compromising ship or base security. A ship that is operating in emission control (EMCON), for example, cannot allow calls out, nor can it allow tracking of the ship to locate it for incoming cell-phone calls arriving by satellite. Thus, technical means must be devised to support a policy of keeping in touch with families without jeopardizing the force or its operations.

There is also evidence that deployed personnel feel they are being benefited if they can use their spare time to advance their education and technical skills, leading either to more rapid promotion or better job prospects on leaving the Service. Providing such benefits could help make longer stays at sea acceptable to more sailors, thereby reducing the number of personnel ashore who must be retained for rotation. The balance is a delicate one to achieve, since the rotation policy will affect family interests as well. More must be learned about attitudes and interests that affect views of the rotation policy in relation to perceptions of quality of life in the Service.

It is clear that costs will be incurred in ensuring a quality of life that will encourage retention of personnel. The amount of the investments needed to improve living and working conditions must be known and planned for, and ways of measuring their success must be determined. Ongoing research in all the Services is suggesting quantitative measures of quality of life that may be a

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×

starting point for obtaining the information needed to assess the effects of such investments.

Many current measures of quality of life (QOL) are based on subjective ratings of such factors as satisfaction with housing, sense of connection to units and communities, and job satisfaction. More objective measures may include retention rates as they vary with compensation and their correlation with subjective measures, use of family services, and other indicators of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with job and family circumstances. Such measures of QOL must be related analytically to broader decision measures that allow reliable estimation of the potential effects of investments in improving QOL on unit and force readiness and performance. Continuing research to achieve this capability will require ongoing data collection and analysis carried out by responsible organizations that will be able to provide timely information to those who will make the investment decisions and oversee their implementation. The research must also give attention to tracking the results of the investments, to enable continual evaluation and refinement of QOL-related actions.

Caring for Naval Force Personnel

Because the sailors and Marines of the naval forces are ultimately there to fight if need be, some of them will become casualties, of combat or of the exotic environments in which they will operate, and they must be appropriately cared for. Modern technology will allow naval force personnel to be embedded in advanced, technically aided support systems for enhanced survivability.

Whether personnel are at home or deployed, in combat or noncombat conditions, more casualties can be expected from sickness and disease than from combat or high-risk operations. Modern trends in medical care emphasize maintaining “wellness” rather than simply treating those who are ill. This approach covers the gamut from preventing disease to encouraging healthy living habits, about which more comes to be known yearly. Maintaining health could in the coming decades involve such advanced techniques as gene testing and tailoring work and living patterns to avoid exposure of individuals susceptible to specific diseases and injuries.

Modern wound treatment techniques stress the importance of reaching the wounded soldier or sailor quickly to diagnose the exact nature and location of a wound or injury and initiate treatment within the first half hour or less; success in this step can increase the survival of battle casualties manyfold. Advancing medical technology can provide for rapid treatment in situ to stanch blood loss, support broken bones, and prevent infection. It can provide “artificial skin” for rapid sealing and treatment of burns. It can provide robotic assistance for rapid retrieval and evacuation of casualties, multiplying the ability of a few corpsmen to treat more people in a shorter time. Growing capabilities in telemedicine—the ability of corpsmen or nonspecialist doctors in field conditions to reach ex-

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×

perts anywhere in the world for advice and instruction in treating difficult wounds, injuries, or diseases—will further multiply the capabilities of medical personnel in the field.

Detection of attacks by chemical or biological weapons, and use of vaccines or antidotes against their effects, must be an important part of keeping sailors and Marines healthy and fit, and of treating them if they become casualties. Preparations for such attacks involve provision of protective clothing, which must be much improved over current chemical warfare protective gear that greatly reduces the ability of the wearer to perform useful tasks and that rapidly induces heat prostration; extensive use of sensors to detect attack, even down to the individual suit level; and suitable sealing and flow control of ship and combat vehicle ventilation systems.

In all these ways, advancing medical and related technology can lead to healthier naval force personnel and greater recovery rates among casualties. In the long run, the result is a “virtual increase” in force size, with a greater fraction of the precious personnel resource being on the job and productive rather than off the job due to sickness or injury. The naval forces should waste no time in assessing the tradeoffs and taking advantage of the opportunities that rapidly advancing medical science and technology are offering.

THE COMBAT FLEET

The combat fleet consists of the platforms that convey combat power to the locations where it is needed and the weapons that deliver that combat power against opposition targets. The weapons strongly influence the design of the platforms. This examination of potential technological progress in the combat fleet first considers a potential weapon capability that can contribute strongly to future fleet combat strength. It then examines the design of ships, aircraft, and submarines that will use those and other weapons. In closing this discussion of the combat fleet, some issues in deciding directions of the evolution of the fleet are noted.

A Family of Land-attack Missiles for the Fleet

Today the Navy is beginning work on a new kind of ship, the “arsenal ship,” so called because its sole purpose will be to carry and launch on command a variety of missiles against targets located and identified by the off-board combat information system. One of the kinds of missiles the ship will be able to launch will be a “marinized” version of the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS, or NTACMS in the naval version), a rocket-propelled guided missile with ranges from 100 to 200 miles, depending on the warhead weight carried. This Navy version of the tactical missile will also be capable of launch by any other surface ship that has a VLS or by submarines similarly equipped. The Navy is also

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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developing an extended-range guided munition (ERGM), a guided, gun-launched shell with a rocket motor, to be fired from shipboard guns to ranges of 60 or 70 miles in support of joint and combined forces in action ashore. The ERGM is essentially a rocket-propelled tactical missile whose first stage is a naval gun barrel.

The value of such missiles for strike warfare, interdiction, and naval surface fire support is their unprecedentedly fast response time to target and the ability to launch many weapons simultaneously or in rapid succession to achieve high volumes and rates of fire —sometimes as much as one or two orders of magnitude greater in these respects than warheads conveyed by aerodynamic vehicles. These qualities would enable them to be highly responsive to the needs of the joint and combined forces that have been landed and are operating ashore in the mode that will emerge from the OMFTS doctrine using techniques described in the regional conflict study.3 They will be especially useful in providing surge firepower at the opening of a conflict or campaign, and for early support of ground forces from the sea. And, with a fleet stretched thin, a small force of surface combatants and submarines can promise heavy firepower in a short time, for deterrence purposes, to buy time for arrival of reinforcements, to fix opposing forces in place, or to destroy them, as the situation may require. Such missiles are also much more difficult to defend against, increasing the assurance of penetration to substantive targets without the need to undertake costly campaigns for suppression of enemy air defenses.

Based on projected advances in rocket-propelled guided missile capability discussed below, a family of three such missiles, defined by diameters of 5 inches, 10 inches, and 21 inches, can be visualized that will meet mission requirements ranging from naval surface fire support of forces ashore to long-range strike of theater-strategic targets. Approximate characteristics of the missiles are shown in Table 7.1.4

Especially noteworthy is the large number of smaller missiles that can be carried in standard VLS missile bays.5 For comparison with these numbers, a

3  

Naval Studies Board. 1996. The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., pp. 36-39.

4  

The land-attack capabilities of the missiles are emphasized here in keeping with the current power projection orientation of naval forces. It is apparent that with appropriate guidance system adaptation, the missiles could also be used in antisurface ship warfare. It is also apparent that, although this presentation emphasizes the launch of these missiles from surface ships and submarines, the basic designs can be adapted for air launch as well.

5  

The smaller numbers of 5-in. and 10-in. missiles shown in Table 7.1 assume single-stacking of the missiles, with four 10-in. missiles per cell and sixteen 5-in. missiles per cell. A precedent for multiple missiles per cell exists in current plans to stack four 10-in.-diameter Evolved Sea Sparrow (ESSM) air defense missiles per cell. If the smaller missiles could be double-stacked vertically for launching, with one group on top of the other, the lower number shown in Table 7.1 would double. A critical problem, however, would be to vent the exhaust gases of the missiles in the upper stack so that they would not damage those in the lower stack. The problem can be solved by appropriate engineering design. To be conservative, it was assumed in calculating the larger numbers of missiles shown in Table 7.1 that the volume required for venting the exhaust gases would reduce the number of cells in the standard 64-cell bay to 48. The constraints on multiple stacking would not apply to missiles cold-launched from submarines. Cold launch can be applied to surface ships as long as the engineering provision embedded in the guidance system is engineered so as to prevent the missiles from falling back on the ship in case of ignition failure. With cold launch and triple stacking, as many as 3,072 5-in. missiles could be loaded in a 64-tube VLS bay.

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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TABLE 7.1 Approximate Characteristics of Family of Land-attack Missiles

Mission

Length

W'hd Weight

Range

Number in 64-Tube VLS Bay

5-in. Naval forces fire support

5 ft to 7 ft

50 lb

100 km

1,024 to 1,536 *

10-in. Interdiction

10 ft

100 lb

240 km

256 to 384 *

21-in. Strike

21 ft

400 lb

> 600 km

64

* Depending on how they are stacked; see text note 5.

† Range limited by arms control treaties. The START I treaty limits ballistic missiles launched from surface ships to a 600-km range. The range of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, as these missiles would be defined under the treaty, is not limited, but the number of launchers is. The issue to be resolved in separate understandings that might not be reached until posed by the advent of the systems, is whether submarine launchers for these tactical missiles would fall within the treaty launcher limits. The START I range limits on surface-launched missiles expire in 2006, after which renewal or renegotiation would be required. It could well take up to or beyond 2006 to develop and start to field VLS-launched missiles having the range, with desired payload weight, that would raise the issue.

DDG-51 carries around 500 5-in. shells in its magazine, and a DD-963 and CG-47 each carry around 1,000; numbers of ERGMs would be fewer. The missile launch mechanism on the ship, even for multiple-stacked missiles, would be simpler and less expensive than the combination of gun, recoil, and loading mechanisms for high-rate-of-fire guns (according to a briefing by the VLS Program Office, a 64-cell VLS bay costs $2.5 million, plus installation, while other Navy figures indicate that a 5-in. 54-caliber automatic naval gun with a loading mechanism costs $12 million to $13 million plus installation). Use of VLS missile launchers would thus permit more efficient use of valuable shipboard volume.

At this stage of development, missiles such as those described are insufficiently accurate (e.g., they can achieve a circular error of probability (CEP) of less than 20 meters) to compensate for the lower unitary warhead weight the missiles can deliver at long range relative to attack aircraft. Their accuracy is

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×

sufficient for delivery of distributed antipersonnel, antimateriel, and antiarmor submunitions. With increased accuracies achievable at low cost during the next 30 to 40 years through the use of GPS/inertial guidance packages currently under development, the lighter warheads deliverable at the longer missile ranges, with their explosive energy augmented by the warhead's kinetic energy on impact, will be able to deliver destructive energies on target that are sufficient for a large fraction of target engagements. (For example, to the first order, a 400-lb missile warhead striking a target at Mach 5 will deliver total energy roughly equivalent to that of a 1,000-lb bomb striking at Mach 1, although the destructive effects of the energy may be distributed differently.6) In addition, higher energy density explosives that are currently a topic of research will, if sensitivity problems can be solved, make the smaller missile warheads much more powerful—perhaps up to a factor of 2 or 3.

The use of a common GPS grid for target location and weapon guidance will reduce warhead delivery error for fixed or “theater-strategic ” targets, and it will allow reduction of the target acquisition “basket” for attack of targets that can move during the missile's flight time (as long as they do not move beyond the missile's kinematic target-tracking capability.)7 The ability to track the latter targets accurately, in real time, that the evolving information system is expected to achieve will allow continual in-flight update of target location using relatively inexpensive one-way data links to the incoming warheads.8Or, simple seekers might be used, with target acquisition aided by accurate placement of the missile within a narrow “basket.” Such relatively low-cost techniques will ultimately enable the missiles to achieve CEPs smaller than critical target dimensions in many circumstances, and to attack moving targets as well as stationary ones. The energy requirements for target destruction or total disablement will be reduced correspondingly, especially with “smart” targeting—targeting the critical points that will permanently disable the functioning of larger target complexes. Such accuracies will also greatly reduce incidental or collateral civilian damage in target areas, and will allow friendly forces to bring supporting fire much closer to their positions than purely ballistic air- or gun-delivered weapon trajectories have allowed.

Advances in rocket motor design for the land-attack missiles over the 2000 to 2035 time period can include staging and increasing the specific impulse of the propellant by perhaps 20 to 30 percent. Such improvements will increase their range to values well beyond that achieved with rocketry to date. Other

6  

A full analysis of target, missile, and warhead interactions would be necessary to match warheads, target types, and modes of attack for these new systems.

7  

Naval Studies Board. 1996. The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., p. 51. The concept of targeting coordinates will also require the support of a robust mapping, charting, and geodesy effort.

8  

Naval Studies Board. 1996. The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., pp. 63-64.

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×

improvements could include cold or nearly cold launch, imposing less heat and erosion load on the vertical launch tubes and permitting the use of the same missiles in surface ships and submarines. This step would reduce overall system cost. We can also expect further unit missile cost reduction through assiduous effort over the 35-to 40-year time period, by such means as simplification and standardization of guidance, control, warhead, and rocket motor components (even at the expense of some penalty in performance gains attending subsystem simplification) and large-scale production of the resulting weapons (tens of thousands of missiles of all sizes, with many common components). 9

A New Generation of Navy Surface Combatants

Advancing technology, and the need to accommodate weapon systems such as the above family of missiles, can be expected to lead to many design advances in the next generation of Navy surface ships and submarines. Surface combatant design is discussed here; submarine design is discussed below.

Advanced surface combatant designs will incorporate and extend many features currently in experimentation on today's ships. Indeed, once these features are developed to the application stage, many of them can be retrofitted to greater or lesser extent in today's ships at major maintenance and overhaul milestones during their service lives to increase survivability, system reliability, and ship service life. These features include changes in how the ship's crew is assigned, how instrumentation is integrated to let fewer people operate the ship, and other system changes on the “smart ship,” the cruiser USS Yorktown. Foremost among the changes in ship design that advancing technology will permit and encourage will be the following:

  • Fully integrated instrumentation and automation in design of ships, using distributed and networked sensors, actuators, and microprocessor controls to minimize crew size and maximize efficiency. This will include damage control, a very sensitive area that is currently a major determinant of crew size. Automation in damage control is also the subject of current Navy research, and will be advanced by fully integrating instrumentation, automation, and revised crew functions into new ship design from the start.

  • Passive and active signature reduction and capability for signature management in all aspects—wake reduction, noise reduction, hull and superstructure shaping, and electromagnetic and infrared emission control. Even if surface ship signatures remain relatively high in terms of gross detectability in all but a few specialized cases, for a variety of reasons, significant reduction from current values, which will be made feasible at low cost by design and structural changes,

9  

Naval Studies Board. 1996. The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., pp. 63-67.

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×

will help acoustic and electronic countermeasures function much more effectively to mask ships under combat conditions or in other circumstances where detection and tracking must be made difficult for opponents.

  • Open architectures that will allow modular replacement of diverse subsystems whose technology matures at different rates, and to allow off-board maintenance of complex systems.

  • Modular design of weapon systems, including plug-in data buses for actuation and compatible containers for the weapons themselves, allowing field flexibility in reprogramming for various weapon types without extensive ship modifications and crew retraining preceding each choice.

  • Integrated electric power systems and electric drive, including the introduction of high-temperature superconductivity when the technology evolves appropriately, will enhance volume flexibility in ship design, will improve overall system efficiency, and will help with active and passive signature reduction (although, as with any change of technology, new signatures may be created). Readily controlled electric drive will be enabled by solid-state electronic controls (i.e., through the use of PEBBs) that are now appearing, which will replace bulky switches, transformers, and banks of condensers, and will allow easy management of voltages to different ship systems and AC/DC conversion.

  • Ship structures made of composite materials will enable embedded and conformal sensors, specific shaping, and material properties that will help meet future signature goals. Such structures will reduce radar observability, weight, corrosion, and maintenance requirements.

  • New hull forms that are currently under investigation, some under Navy sponsorship, may include new wave-piercing hull forms with bow sections that look more like submarine hulls than traditional ship hulls. The combination of hull optimization and propulsion efficiency gains associated with electric drive may permit higher ship speeds if needed (perhaps 40 to 45 knots) and better seakeeping in rough water; this, in turn, will permit the use of smaller ships for a mission, so that ships can come closer to being sized for weapon system needs rather than to meet severe operational conditions, with resulting cost reductions.

Ship vulnerability to hits will always be a problem. Short of heavier armor or dynamic armor, the first of which will greatly increase ship weight and both of which will greatly increase ship cost, the best approaches are to reduce the chances for targeting a ship by signature reduction, and to reduce the chances that it will be hit, by active defense. Also, the chances of surviving a hit can be greatly improved by known design features such as separation of critical, redundant system elements (such as fiber-optic lines and instrument networks), and by automation in damage control that reduces response time and more accurately focuses damage control efforts. Finally, armor can be applied selectively to critical areas such as magazines and combat direction centers. All such measures are in train today in the design of modern warships, with serious attention to automation in damage control being the newest addition to the list.

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×

Two main kinds of future surface combatant ship embodying these characteristics are visualized as promising candidates to meet emerging needs efficiently: a fleet combat ship that evolves from today's surface combatants, and a land-attack ship that evolves from the arsenal ship concept on which work is beginning. The two would have overlapping mission capabilities, with each specialized for different parts of the mission spectrum.

The fleet combat ship, eventually replacing today's guided-missile cruisers and destroyers, would be designed to engage in ASUW, ASW, AAW, and defense ATBM, and it could carry out power projection missions. It would emphasize sensors and defensive combat capability in the newly developed cooperative engagement capability (CEC) mode. Its weapon suite design would emphasize the sensors needed for these missions, including surface radars, sonars, and Aegis and beyond for ATBM. It would be able to operate helicopters for ASW and mine warfare, and UAVs for reconnaissance and targeting. It would have all the necessary links and nodes for C4ISR within the overall naval force combat system. Its armament would include some 100 to 200 missile tubes, depending on ship size, loaded with weapons for ATBM, AAW, ASUW, and ASW; depending on circumstances of the time and on the missions assigned, ships of this kind might also be loaded with land-attack missiles, as today's fighting ships are. If missile technology advances meet expectations, such a ship may not need guns except for self-defense. Close-in defenses using laser weapons for defense against antiship missiles in the CEC mode, wherein the incoming targets can be illuminated from the side, may mature in time to be included in these ships' weapon suites.

The land-attack ship is visualized as an evolutionary advance from the arsenal ship concept. It would have 300 to 500 missile tubes loaded with missiles from the family of attack missiles described above, or a similar family that may evolve. The numbers of tubes will depend on resolution of questions about vulnerability and the advisability of concentrating too large an inventory of attack missiles in one platform. Since it will be an extremely attractive target, the ship may well need some close-in self-defense weapons, operated within the fleet in CEC mode so that extensive defensive targeting sensors would not be needed. The potential advantages may suggest building a land-target-oriented C4ISR node (with input from external sensors) into the ship design to enable it to receive target information and launch missiles independently at times. This capability would enhance its flexibility as a combat ship oriented to prepare the battlefield for and to support operations of the land forces, and to operate in small surface combatant forces under some circumstances.

New Directions for Naval Force Aviation10

Air-delivered weapons will continue to be important in situations where

10  

Two types of aircraft are not treated in this discussion: armed helicopters, and maritime patrol aircraft (MPA). Advances in both are expected to reflect progress that will be made in improving aircraft performance, “flyability,” and maintenance, and, in the case of helicopters, stealth. The chief advances in armed helicopters will be reflected in the Army's Comanche program, which will likely define evolutionary directions of the Services' combat helicopter force for decades to come. At some point, it will be necessary to replace the P-3 MPA, which, although specialized for ASW, performs many other missions. The available, long-range transport aircraft that will exist when the need arises will form the basis of the new MPA, into which the necessary combat systems will be integrated.

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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pilots on the spot are needed to perform functions—such as visual target identification in air defense or in armed reconnaissance, or response to the unexpected, as in close air support—where missile systems with humans elsewhere in the loop would not be responsive enough; where warhead weights needed are greater than ship-launched surface-to-surface missiles will be able to deliver; or where required depth of attack exceeds the sea-launched tactical missile range permitted under arms control treaty limitations. Aircraft (whether piloted or not) also have the advantage of being a reusable platform in situations that do not present an unacceptable risk of attrition, giving them an economic advantage for extended campaigns after antiaircraft defenses have been defeated.

Aviation is a major cost driver in naval force structure, warranting extensive attention to cost reduction both in acquiring aircraft and in the use of aviation in the combined arms context.

Advancing technology will offer many opportunities to improve aircraft performance while restraining cost increases or reducing costs. Microelectronic controls embedded in fixed-wing aircraft skins at flow transition zones will offer opportunities for boundary layer control that can increase lift, reduce drag, and consequently simplify high-lift devices like wing flaps. Increased turbine temperatures enabled by high-temperature metals will lead to higher thrust without increasing engine core diameters, or to smaller diameters for a given thrust. Both of these advances will permit expanding the flight performance envelope of future combat aircraft within a given gross weight and cost.

These advances will also permit lowering of takeoff and landing speeds to the 40- to 60-knot regime. Once that is achieved there will be a significant advantage in having airplanes take off loaded in short distances and land vertically after fuel and payload have been expended. With the increasingly high-thrust-to-weight-ratio engines that are expected, composite structures, and lightweight avionics, future aircraft designs may enable such performance with much reduced weight penalty. STOVL aircraft would not need to use the catapult and arresting gear. Thrust vectoring will help extend aircraft control into low-speed, high-angle-of-attack regimes not otherwise achievable, and will enhance combat maneuvering.

Stealth in aircraft design will always be needed for protection against proliferating air defenses. Especially, infrared signature reduction will be needed for

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×

protection of combat and logistic support aircraft against IR-guided shoulder-fired SAMs, and to protect aircraft against IR-guided air-to-air missiles. This problem will intensify as staring infrared arrays are incorporated into the weapons. Coatings to replace paint on aircraft skins and new nozzle designs will contribute to IR signature reduction at modest cost and little, if any, weight penalty.

Finally, advanced design and manufacturing techniques are expected to help in controlling costs as smaller numbers of aircraft are procured. These will include “electronic prototyping,” derived from simulation-based design, to learn enough about designs to avoid costly changes after commitment to production; design for smaller production runs using expandable tooling rather than high-capacity tooling designed for high-rate production; and large unitary structures with composite materials having fewer parts and fasteners. These new approaches are being instituted in new aircraft programs today, and continuing progress can be expected under the pressure of resource constraints.

Combat operations using the new aircraft capabilities, and capitalizing on the presence of other technical advances and weapon alternatives for mutual support and expanding the mission spectrum, can be expected to influence how aircraft are used for combat. Defensive counter-air will, depending on circumstances, be able to take advantage of networked multistatic targeting techniques, enabling longer-range, cooperative engagements with air-to-air missiles and with surface-to-air missiles in the “forward pass” mode, in which aircraft or UAVs carrying the sensors pass target location information to the missiles. This capability to engage air threats at extended range would confer a great combat advantage on our air defenses, since U.S. and foreign short-range air-to-air missiles will continue to have comparable performance, detracting from any dogfighting advantage our superior aircraft would have. Positive identification will always be a problem. Developments currently being pursued in noncooperative identification will ultimately enable tracking of any airborne vehicle from takeoff to landing and maintaining a dynamic database of such tracks. UAVs with lightweight sensors will be able to observe other airborne vehicles and transmit what is seen in real time. These developments may, over the next 35 to 40 years, permit air target identification that is equivalent to visual identification by the weapon launcher without the need for visual contact.

Despite the great weight of fire that will be possible with the family of land-attack missiles, there will continue to be a need for close air support of troops in contact with the enemy. Close support aircraft, which may in the future be manned or unmanned, together with armed helicopters, on air alert or operating from forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) in the immediate rear of the ground forces, will be able to turn around rapidly and fly many sorties per day— on the order of 5 to 10—to greatly increase the weight of fire that can be brought against moving or dug-in opposition forces at critical points and times in an ongoing battle. Such surge capability will be needed to help sustain the rapid

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×

pace of future operations ashore. It would also have the advantage of using relatively inexpensive direct attack weapons in situations requiring great expenditure of munitions during a dynamic battle.

Fixed-wing aircraft able to perform this mission will have to move from their sea base on carriers and amphibious assault ships to shore with the forces they are supporting (as the AV-8B Harrier aircraft can do today). This means that they will continue to need vertical and short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) capability. If the reduction of weight penalty for STOVL can be achieved in future aircraft, the capability could be extended to combat aircraft for other missions, giving naval combat aviation great flexibility of operation from a variety of ships and land bases.

There will also be a mix of UAVs in fleet aviation. Some will be theater-level, high-altitude, long-endurance craft that will be needed in the fleet's vicinity for days on end. The UAVs may well be furnished by a joint agency, but they may be able to land and take off from carriers if carrier designs provide for such operation by aircraft with their very long wingspans. There would also be value in being able to refuel such craft from carrier-based tankers while they are airborne; this would turn them into a satellite analog, but one that is always available to the naval forces during an ongoing operation. Also, long-range UAVs, whether land-based or flying from carriers, may well be able to take over many of the missions of manned maritime patrol aircraft (MPA). Without people on board, their endurance could be extended indefinitely by the means described. Such a shift would mean revising the MPA processing system from on board the aircraft to one at a land base or on a carrier or other warship, and possibly melding some of the current MPA tasks with those of carrier-based support aircraft.

Additional UAVs will be developed for general targeting, airborne early warning (AEW), and providing communication relays over forward troops. The carriers will have to launch and recover such aircraft until ground operations move far enough inland to provide a secure rear area from which the ground forces can operate them. Finally, the ground forces are likely to have a family of combat UAVs to help in target location for close air support, in weapon control for “forward pass” weapon delivery, and perhaps for weapon delivery directly.11

Carrier design may change with the needs and opportunities to operate aircraft of the kinds described above. Carriers will continue to operate ASW aircraft. Manned AEW aircraft will be used for a long time before UAVs could

11  

The Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, in a recent study of future aviation technology (United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. 1995. New World Vistas, Air and Space Power for the 21st Century, Aircraft and Propulsion Volume, United States Air Force, Washington, D.C.) projected an uninhabited combat air vehicle (UCAV) design for weapon delivery in the mode of a fighter aircraft, in situations that are dangerous for manned aircraft. The Marines' combat UAVs might be of this character, or they might be of far simpler design; the implications for fleet aviation of having UAVs that launch weapons will be the same.

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×

take over this mission, even if work on the UAVs were to start immediately. The need for general utility aircraft to bring cargo and personnel from shore to sea and return will continue. These aircraft may be versions of current and future ASW aircraft, or they may be derivatives of the Marines' V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft. There will also be value for the naval forces in acquiring a new-design heavy lift helicopter or functionally comparable vertical lift aircraft, tailored to carriage of containers as a replacement for the CH-53E when it reaches the end of its service life. The new helicopter would be tailored to handle logistic containers and the more rapid reloading at sea that containerization and other advances will bring. Carriers as well as amphibious support ships may also be called on to launch land forces in joint amphibious landings, as they were during the 1994 landing in Haiti.

Thus, carriers will become, even more than they are now, versatile, moving air bases at sea. Conceivably, if the STOVL combat aircraft can replace those in operation and being acquired today, if other manned aircraft functions such as ASW and cargo delivery all come to be carried out by vertical lift aircraft, and assuming that the UAVs can be designed to take off and land from a carrier deck in STOL mode (aided by the wind-over-deck derived from the ship's forward speed), it may be possible to design new carriers toward the end of the 40-year time period without the costly and operationally demanding catapults and arresting gear that help define carrier design today.

Finally, it must be emphasized that future design of carriers will be able to take advantage of all the technological advances in integrated ship instrumentation and automation, electric drive, and signature reduction that will characterize other surface ship and submarine design.12Thus, future carriers, including existing ships modified in periodic overhaul, will be able to reduce crew size and increase operating efficiency along with all the other ships of the fleet.

Future Submarine Design

Research and development has already provided reactor core lifetimes that eliminate the need for refueling during a submarine's service life—an important cost avoidance. Future advances in stealth, power density, and propulsion plant efficiency will be enabled by the development of electric drive and continuing research in nuclear plant design. Submarine design will benefit from the same advances expected in the design of surface ships, in distributed instrumentation, automation, and design integration that will allow crew reduction and more efficient use of the personnel on board ship. The advances in submarine capability induced by these and other technology advances will be impressive.

12  

The Naval Studies Board carrier study (Naval Studies Board. 1991. Carrier-21: Future Aircraft Carrier Technology, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.) remains valid in describing in detail the potential application of these advances to carrier design.

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×

The main determinant of future submarine design, however, will be the need to design the ships to execute routinely a broader spectrum of missions than have been assigned to submarines in the past. This will be reflected in aspects of the designs that affect the submarines ' ability to carry out their missions while maintaining stealth, avoiding near-shore minefields, and maintaining communications with other forces. In addition to more shoreward orientation of submarines' mission spectrum, circumstances may arise in which opposing surveillance and defenses make it too dangerous for surface ships to approach closely enough to shore to provide sustained fire against inland targets and to carry out other power-projection missions. Submarines ' stealth will, if they are appropriately configured, allow them to fulfill some of the vital power projection roles of the surface fleet, more safely and with less need for external protection.

Submarines will still undertake the traditional missions of ASW13 and ASUW. They will also have to be designed as strike ships, able to launch any of the family of missiles described above. This will induce a significant design change moving well beyond the relatively few missile launch tubes in the bow of current attack submarines. Rather, the submarines are likely to be designed with payload sections comparable to (but easily distinguishable from) those of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), including closely packed launch tubes and VLS technology adapted for underwater cold launch of the missiles for strike, fire support, or new missions such as ballistic missile defense.14 In addition, the submarines will have to be designed to launch and recover UUVs routinely, and to launch or simply to control UAVs for various missions. UUV missions will include minefield reconnaissance, mine hunting and minefield neutralization, scouting for opposing submarines in ASW, offensive mining, intelligence collection and area surveys, and other tasks requiring underwater stealth. UAV missions will include targeting for the submarines' torpedoes and missiles, support of submarine-deployed special operations forces, and reconnaissance for information gathering in support of theater operations. The submarine system will have to be designed to maintain electronic,

13  

The ASW mission is discussed in the section below titled “New Approaches to Undersea Warfare.”

14  

It may be argued whether, in the interest of preserving stealth and passive defense, submarines in the land-attack mission will simply launch deep-strike missiles against fixed targets and leave interdiction and naval surface fire support (NSFS) missions against moving or relocatable targets to surface ships, or whether, because the surface fleet may become too vulnerable in the early stages of a conflict, submarines will have to undertake the entire spectrum of land-attack missions. It can be similarly argued that surface ship vulnerability may favor the submarine as a forward-positioned missile launch platform for ballistic missile defense. Resolution of these arguments will have to await indications of threat development over the decades, and they may not be finally resolved until an active conflict presses the issue. For current purposes it is sufficient to note that over their designed service lifetimes future submarines may have to undertake those missions, so that the capability to perform them should be designed into the submarines from the start.

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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acoustic, or laser communication with these unmanned vehicles, regardless of the degree of autonomy that is built into the vehicles' operation away from the submarine.

Special operations forces fielded by the Marines or by the Special Operations Command will become more important in the coming modes of warfare described above and in the regional conflict study.15 Such forces require stealth and support, and the size of units that may have to be launched and recovered by submarines will likely become larger than submarines have landed and recovered in past SOF operations. The capability to host and deploy these larger numbers of special forces will also have to be designed into future submarines.

Finally, submarines are and will continue to be ideally situated to gain information about actual or potential opponents using stealth to reach offshore observation positions while remaining themselves unobserved, and to engage in related information warfare activities. This will require sensor and communications systems related to those needed for the other tasks and missions described above, but augmented to meet additional needs imposed by the information-gathering and warfare missions.

Today's tactical submarines are able to carry out all of the above missions to some degree. Taken all together, with refinement and extension of the missions, the capabilities described above will lead to new multimission modularity in submarine designs that will significantly change their configurations and modes of operation.

Strike and Fire Support Evolution

The evolution of the surface fleet will depend on many economic and operational factors as well as the opportunities that technology will offer. The advantages of the family of missiles described in this section can be expected to encourage their proliferation as a weapon of choice for many naval force missions. This will affect the design of surface ships and submarines, it will influence how combat aviation is used by the fleet in strike, interdiction, and fire support, and it will influence how forces are configured to operate ashore.

For the naval forces to understand how these influences will act and to gain confidence in the new systems, they will have to implement the capabilities and use them in a variety of operations over a period of time. As indicated at the beginning of this section, this is, in fact, happening today. Also, the number of missile launch tubes in the Navy has been growing as new ships and submarines come on line, with the expectation that there will be about 7,000 tubes on about 70 ships just after the turn of the century, with more to follow as the planned 6

15  

Naval Studies Board. 1996. The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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arsenal ships are acquired. Consideration is currently being given to converting Trident SSBNs made available by strategic arms control reductions to a strike/ SOF configuration; this would provide still more launch tubes that could be safely positioned near a hostile shore. There will be ample opportunity to load many of these tubes with newer versions of the land-attack missiles as they are developed, extending NTACMS and adding, for example, VLS-launched versions of the ERGM. As experience is gained and confidence grows in the planning for and utilization of these missiles in actual operations over periods of time, the resulting knowledge can be fed back into future plans to extend the missile family and adapt the forces suitably.

One of the criteria by which the value of a land-attack missile family, such as the one described, will have to be judged will be their overall impact on the naval forces' economic structure and the costs of carrying out major campaigns. Operational and technical differences among the systems make such comparisons difficult and dependent on many assumptions about scenarios, force maneuvers, targets, attack rates, weapon kill capabilities, and so forth. In addition to differences in tactical usage and effects, overall system costs would be key elements in the tradeoffs. The total costs of gun- and aircraft-based weapon delivery systems, with the costs of the munitions they deliver, must be compared with the overall delivery system costs together with the costs of the missiles themselves in the case of the missile-based systems. A detailed economic comparison among the systems was beyond the scope of this study. However, such an analysis, informed by the early operational experience described, will be essential for the Navy Department to ascertain the overall mix of weapon types that will maximize the naval forces' power projection capability within the budgets that will be available.

NEW APPROACHES TO UNDERSEA WARFARE
Antisubmarine Warfare

The marked reduction of U.S. research and development in ASW since the end of the Cold War has been paralleled by the increasing presence of two especially threatening aspects of potentially hostile submarine warfare:

  • The continually improved quieting of Russian nuclear submarines and European-built diesel and air-independent propulsion (AIP) submarines, and the spread of these capabilities to other nations, some of which may become hostile; and

  • Increased operation of U.S. surface Navy and logistic support ships in relatively shallow waters adjacent to potentially hostile coastal zones, in which ASW is especially difficult.

At the same time, it is likely that the marked reduction of submarine opera-

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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tions by nations of the former Soviet Union outside of Russian contiguous waters has led to a reduction in the training and readiness of U.S. ASW forces. The teamwork arising from the stimulus of the real-world experience gained in the interactions with those forces is a perishable capability that will have to be replaced in some other way.

Along with the evolving Operational Maneuver From the Sea concept that calls for logistic support of land operations from the sea with a much smaller or, in some cases, nonexistent land base, these factors raise the risk that an opponent could seriously interfere with a U.S. naval force expeditionary warfare campaign.

At about the time the Cold War ended, it was recognized that the conventional approaches to passive ASW were being negated by the quieting of Russian submarines, which had reached performance levels comparable to or exceeding the performance of U.S. nuclear attack submarines.16 Modern conventional submarines submerged in deep water along coastal shelves are essentially undetectable by a single passive listener. Their noise output in the coastal environment is low, and reflections from the bottom and the surface and uncertain transmission paths make it very difficult to detect them at significant range even with active sonar.

Consequently, there was a move toward the use of low-frequency active (LFA) and explosive echo ranging (EER) ASW, and toward new designs of several kinds of deployable, distributed passive sensor arrays that, it was hoped, would allow the detection and tracking of the quieter submarines. Of course, the problem with monostatic active ASW is that in emitting a signal the emitter, which may be a submarine, reveals itself. Although EER systems mitigate this problem, their range thus far has been short, and so to be effective they require advanced information about where the target may be. Similarly, to be used efficiently, deployable arrays need cueing for placement and orientation so that they will be deployed in areas where there are submarines to be detected.

Future sensors (some of them MEMS-based), high-speed, high-capacity computing, precision navigation, and networking technologies will help in solving these problems. ASW is a cooperative enterprise involving a vast collection of different means to find and attack submarines:

  • Surface combatant ships that have hull-mounted sonars, and also tow active and passive tactical sensor arrays;

  • Ship-launched helicopters with dipping sonars;

  • Fixed-wing aircraft, launched from carriers and from shore bases (MPA), that can drop fields of sonobuoys or floating acoustic sensor arrays to listen (or,

16  

“Text of Armed Services Panel Report on Naval Undersea Warfare R&D,” Inside the Navy— Special Report, Inside Washington Publishers, Arlington, Virginia, March 20, 1989.

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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  • with an external active source, ping and listen) for submarines and then process the data on board;

  • Long, densely populated sensor arrays towed behind especially configured ships (T-AGOS) for generalized surveillance of large ocean areas;

  • Submarines with hull-mounted sonars and sensor arrays; and

  • Fixed sensor arrays in large areas of the ocean, connected to processing stations at shore bases; and, to some extent

  • Linkage among some of these sensors where possible.

Most of these means describe ASW capabilities built for passive listening to detect submarines by emitted noise. Nonacoustic means of detecting submarines successfully to varying degrees include cueing when the submarines leave their bases, magnetic detection, wake detection, detection of surface signatures created on passage through the water at depth, detection of emissions such as communications when they occur, detection of periscopes when in use, detection of snorkels of submarines that must breathe from the atmosphere when submerged, detection of surface-related activity such as the launching of weapons or landing parties, and detection of the submarines themselves from aircraft or spacecraft when they are near enough to the surface. The combat ships, helicopters, carrier-based fixed-wing aircraft, and MPA are also able to deliver antisubmarine torpedoes.

Submarine quieting degrades this vast array of capability to the point that the ASW force is capable of placing only small-diameter detection circles in the water, around sensors (fixed and mobile) that individually have only a very small detection range—perhaps as small as a mile or less, without the overlapping areas of coverage that would be needed for the sensors and subsystems to work cooperatively. In this environment the use of LFA ASW, together with increased emphasis on nonacoustic detection, is, of necessity, receiving increasing attention.

Future sensor, computing, and networking advances can contribute to alleviating some of the effects of quieting, alleviating the “alerting” disadvantages of low-frequency active sensing, and making cooperative use of the sensors more feasible. In addition, matched-field coherent signal processing that exploits signal amplitude and phase as well as variations in environmental conditions, made possible with future supercomputers, will permit extraction of much smaller signals from the ambient noise, thereby extending the range of passive detection. This type of signal processing is roughly analogous to the use of synthetic aperture radar (SAR) instead of simple monostatic pulsed radar, with similar improvements expected. Together with growing computer power, MEMS and other advanced sensor technology will permit very large and therefore highly sensitive and highly directional arrays, with tens of thousands of sensors connected by fiber-optic networks, to be built onto the sides of submarines. Similar techniques can be adapted to towed and fixed, bottom-mounted or moored arrays. Rough assessments brought to light during this study estimated potential

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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increases of about 15 to 20 decibels in passive signal detection by these means, and the recovery of a significant fraction of the signal lost to recent advances in submarine quieting. Translation into increased detection range depends on specific ocean conditions, but the gains could be measured in miles under favorable propagation conditions. Exploitation of adaptive noise cancellation and beam formation should yield further improvements.

The same processing advances and computing power will enable multistatic active acoustic detection, using several sources on shore or on buoys deployed at sea. Improved processing will permit separation of interfering signals arising from multipath reflections and from reflections off false targets such as schools of fish. With appropriate coordination and timing, it will permit friendly submarines to position and align themselves to avoid reflections that would give them away. Detection ranges could be extended to distances on the order of 20 to 30 miles by use of multistatic active detection.

Finally, networking technology like that used in creating the cooperative engagement capability defense of the surface fleet will permit connecting all the sources of sensing and signal processing in a cooperative system that combines passive, active, and nonacoustic ASW. Like its electromagnetic counterpart that helps in detection of low-observable missiles and aircraft attacking the fleet and shore targets, a networked ASW cooperative engagement system will greatly advance the ability to find and attack hostile submarines beyond the capability of the individual means listed above.

Once a hostile submarine is found it must be attacked successfully. This outcome has been rendered more difficult with modern, quiet submarines (nuclear and nonnuclear) operating in the complex littoral environment and using sophisticated countermeasures. Advances are needed in antisubmarine weapons' sensors and guidance to improve detection of low-observable submarine targets, classify them against false contacts, cope with the highly variable acoustic environment, and overcome the countermeasures. Adversaries' submarines may also come to use the double-hull designs pioneered by Russian submarine builders. More powerful warheads are needed to attack such submarines within the same torpedo warhead package size as current air-delivered torpedoes. Meeting this requirement may be assisted by new warhead materials that will greatly increase the explosive power of torpedoes (and other undersea munitions). These same warhead materials will also be usable in mines and countermine munitions. Finally, advances in the undersea weapons that adversaries may use will require robust active and passive defenses for our ships and submarines, because the antisubmarine battle will not necessarily be purely one of hunter on our side versus hunted on the other.

Airborne nonacoustic detections will be fleeting and of relatively short range, but they will have the advantage of fixing the target submarine's position precisely. It will then be essential to be able to exploit this hard-to-come-by information rapidly, and rapid-reaction weapons must be developed for that purpose.

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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To be part of the cooperative ASW system, submarines will need to communicate with other fleet components. Meeting this requirement is easier now for them to do that than it was during the Cold War, since the risk of detection of antennas at or near the surface is lower, and the technology has advanced. Acoustic underwater communications are in R&D that can be used for short-range communications; the extraction of the communication signals from underwater reverberations and noise will be made possible by the same high-powered computing and processing techniques that will enable improved detection and tracking. Laser communications with submarines were also in work at the end of the Cold War and could be advanced for use in situations where water turbidity permits. Use of laser connections with distributed underwater communication buoys would also be possible if opposition becomes threatening enough. Radio communications using suitable antenna techniques will remain the means of choice for the submarine fleet to become part of the ASW cooperative engagement system, however.

History is replete with strategic disasters that resulted from failure to recognize emerging threats until it was too late to meet them. To avoid such an outcome arising from hostile transformation of what is viewed currently in many quarters as a quiescent submarine threat to naval force operations, it is important that R&D in the areas outlined above be continued at a level high enough to ensure successful implementation of ASW capability against the twin circumstances that have emerged to challenge our Cold War dominance of the field: submarine quieting, and operation in waters that are not conducive to the success of ASW methods used in the past.

Countermine Warfare

The other potential undersea expeditionary warfare “showstopper” for naval forces is mine warfare. All opponents trying to protect a shore against amphibious landings, or trying to deny free passage of warships and logistic ships through waters approaching their coasts, will use mines. Some of the mines will be highly sophisticated and hard to countermeasure; some could be deployed in a “smart minefield, ” in which diverse kinds of mines—bottom, floating, moored, or propelled and guided—might be controlled by a system of networked sensors that can trigger specific mines in a sequence that would inflict maximum damage on an approaching fleet or shipping train.

The Navy and Marine Corps have been well aware of this problem, and they have in work steps to meet it. The Chief of Naval Operations, in a December 1995 White Paper,17 initiated a concerted Navy attack on the hostile mine war-

17  

Boorda, J.M., ADM, USN. 1995. “Mine Countermeasures—An Integral part of Our Strategy and Our Forces,” White Paper, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D.C., December.

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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fare problem. This was to include integration of mine countermeasures forces with the fleet (instead of considering them as an adjunct to be called upon ad hoc); distribution of mine-hunting and neutralization capability among and on combat ships of the fleet; creation of the concept of mine warfare command ships, the first of which is operational; and increasing emphasis on mine warfare research and development.

Because the area of mine countermeasures (MCM) has been rather neglected until recently (in focusing on the Soviet threat, U.S. naval forces generally deferred to other NATO navies for MCM in forward areas), this study, as did the Naval Studies Board's 1992 study,18 has focused on the use of available assets and technology to create a major capability to deal with the area. The capability thus derived will take time to build, but once available it should serve our naval forces well for an extended period.

First and foremost, attention is needed to ensure availability of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance: intelligence to know in detail what mine warfare capability any operation will face; surveillance using all available assets to track mining activity and to gain the options of mine interdiction and mine avoidance; and reconnaissance to provide ground truth confirming unmined areas or to concentrate MCM forces only on areas known from both surveillance and reconnaissance to be mined. There are now Navy and joint programs, which must be supported, that aim at providing this capability.

To allow a battle force to proceed independently, an organic MCM capability, resident on combatants and support ships, must be in place. Assignment of a force able to deploy MCM-capable, or adaptable, helicopters with the ability to carry and use modular mine-hunting and mine neutralization equipment, remote mine-hunting undersea vehicles, possible new developments for mine neutralization such as acoustic pulse power if it becomes successful, and the offshore and surf-zone clearance capabilities that are described next, would provide a battle-force with the needed countermine protection. In addition, attention must be given to passive countermine measures, including a serious, steady program to reduce and control (or eliminate, where possible) the magnetic and acoustic signatures of ships, and attention to reasonable hardening of ships to the effects of mine detonations.

For mine clearance to the surf zone, surface craft of up to 30 tons ' displacement can perform the mine-hunting, mine neutralization, and mine-sweeping functions. In the past such surface craft have had limited speed and range and have been limited by sea state; however, the SWATH hull form offers a solution to those problems, permitting operations in sea state 3 or 4 and including survival in higher seas. A SWATH MCM platform of up to 30 tons in size could be designed to be transported, launched, supported, and recovered, along with air-

18  

Naval Studies Board. 1992-1993. Mine Countermeasures Technology, Vol. I-IV, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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borne MCM (AMCM) helicopters, by a ship similar in size and general design to the LSD-41. It is expected that a ship with such general characteristics could accommodate 10 MCM surface craft and 10 fully hangered AMCM helicopters. Thus, one ship capable of deploying with an amphibious ready group (ARG) or battle group can bring to bear the MCM capability of roughly 20 MCM-1 or MHC-51 ships. Additionally, this MCM-carrying ship could act in the capacity of a command ship for MCM operations and be fitted with appropriate communications, analysis, and command capabilities. Finally, an expendable mine neutralization vehicle (EMNV) can reduce the classification-to-neutralization cycle time, by precisely placing charges to achieve sympathetic detonation of the mine's main charge, and to complement the capability of small mine hunters and AMCM helicopters.

The most difficult of all mine scenarios is in the surf zone (SZ) and craft landing zone (CLZ) that amphibious landings must transit. This area can contain a high density of diverse mines mixed with an equally difficult array of obstacles, while speed and flexibility of clearance are mandatory. The rocket-propelled line charge (SABRE) and explosive net (DET) being developed by the Navy and Marine Corps will find use on beaches having no obstacles, and in neutralizing minefields on land. Additional “brute force” methods would greatly strengthen the naval forces' capability for rapidly clearing the SZ and CLZ immediately in the path of an amphibious landing, and shortly before the landing. One, which has been described in prior Naval Studies Board studies,19 would offer the only means for almost instantaneously clearing mines and obstacles from a 50-yard-wide channel to and across the beach. This would use large (e.g., 10,000-lb) precision-guided bombs dropped in a line set in GPS coordinates and exploded simultaneously. It would not necessarily explode all the mines blocking the channel, but it would at the least throw them and any emplaced obstacles to movement aside and set up a pair of berms that landing craft could use, with GPS assist, to guide themselves through the channel. Calculations, modeling, and limited field tests since 1992 have tended to confirm original estimates that all mines and obstacles can be excavated from a 50-yard channel by this method, known as Harvest Hammer. Smaller bombs might be used, requiring more sorties by combat aircraft; the critical elements of the technique are the accurate placement and timing sequence of the explosives.20

19  

Naval Studies Board, 1992-1993, Mine Countermeasures Technology, Vol. I-IV, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.; and Naval Studies Board, 1996, The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., p. 85.

20  

Recent Service analyses of similar approaches have been discouraging in terms of the number of aircraft sorties required, but they did not examine the problem in the terms described here. A test in the United Kingdom using emplanted charges has given encouraging results. Use of the heavy bombs would obviously require use of the USAF bomber force to deliver them in a joint support mode for amphibious landing, although if projected improvements in the energy of insensitive explosives are achieved, then organic aviation would be able to perform the mission.

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Mine countermeasures is the only warfare area that operates in daylight hours only (with a limited exception in the Persian Gulf). The AMCM helicopters cannot operate at night because they lack artificial horizons and night vision equipment, and the surface ships do not operate out of concern for floating mines. Installation of appropriate night operating equipment on the AMCM helicopters, and floating mine surveillance and neutralization provided by airborne light detection and ranging (LIDAR) and the Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System (RAMICS) supercavitating projectile, could double, or even further improve, the effectiveness of the available MCM forces.

Another approach would attack many mines in parallel, rather than hunting for mines and marking those found for later destruction, one at a time. An early proposed implementation of such a scheme is embodied in the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's (DARPA 's) “lemmings” concept, in which a mass of small crawling vehicles disperses over the ocean bottom, each one recognizing a mine it may encounter and then detonating at an appropriate time to destroy the mine. As currently articulated, in some scenarios the effectiveness of the lemmings concept may be reduced by countermeasures such as underwater fences, but the concept opens an R&D avenue that holds promise of more rapid mine field neutralization over the coming years and decades. A related approach, perhaps using the same principle of parallel attack, may be possible using coordinated UUVs, probably operating with a degree of autonomy but under general ship, submarine, or aircraft control.

High-pulsed-power techniques have been proposed to destroy mines from a distance. Power pulses from a single source would have to be very large and very close to the mines to be effective, but techniques to focus the power from several lower-powered pulses have been proposed and are currently entering exploration. It will be some time before it is known whether the techniques can be made to work in a disturbed aquatic environment.

The key point in the entire countermine warfare area is to recognize that mines are likely to defeat expeditionary force plans at critical times, and that avoiding that outcome with high certainty requires appropriately funded R&D focused on a large variety of methods, including those newly proposed as well as the older ones already in work, and accorded sufficiently high priority.

NEW APPROACHES TO OPERATIONS IN POPULATED AREAS

Armed conflict along the littoral will frequently take place in populated areas, control of which is often one of the main objectives of military action. Such operations may vary from evacuation and rescue missions to the capture of a city to use its port and airfield facilities and to prevail over the governing apparatus of a country. The opposition may vary from a small band of terrorists to regular army divisions.

Typically, once assault rather than siege becomes the tactic of choice, cap-

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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ture of populated areas can entail many friendly casualties, many casualties among the resident civilian population, and much incidental destruction. Every substantial building in a heavily populated area can be turned into a small fortress; if it is reduced to rubble, the rubble favors the defense. Sewers, fences, and irregular street plans or winding suburban roadways, often lined with thick vegetation, afford defensive cover. Taking a populated, built-up area without causing heavy civilian casualties may mean fighting with small arms from street to street, building to building, and room to room and is certain to result in high friendly casualties. Such fighting characterized World War II; it was experienced in driving the Viet Cong out of Saigon after the Tet attack in 1968; it was seen again in the Russian attempt to capture Grozhny, in Chechnya, in 1995. It has been a universal characteristic of 20th-century warfare in populated areas.

Denying War-supporting Capability

Modern and future technology will offer many means to avoid the worst of these characteristics of military operations in populated areas. The nature of the attack may determine the means used. If it is desired simply to greatly reduce the ability of a heavily populated area to support a war effort, this can be done by precision attack against the facilities that support the area: its power stations; its major transportation nodes (bridges, tunnels, rail, and aviation control points); and its communication nodes. Such attacks, which can be made by appropriately armed land-attack missiles if not by aircraft with the proper weapons, need not destroy the facilities completely; they need only incapacitate them severely by attacking their most exposed and vulnerable elements. In addition, the target area will be vulnerable to information warfare using diverse media, to confuse the leadership and to render their popular support ineffectual. Even urban areas in primitive countries will have such vulnerabilities and will not be able to function effectively to support their populations, much less to support national war efforts, if such critical targets are taken out of action.

Knowing the Local Area

If a major populated area or a part of it must be captured or secured, emerging and future technologies will permit doing so with far fewer casualties and less destruction than has been seen in the past. An essential prerequisite, however, is extensive and accurate local intelligence and an understanding of the culture in the local area by the entering forces and their leadership.

Without local knowledge, attacking or occupying forces are likely to be subject to unexpected and deceptive tactics, sneak attacks and unexpectedly effective defense, and the confounding effects of hostile civilian actions. The local knowledge required involves more than knowing the layouts of streets, facilities, and buildings, although those are required, even to specific construction details

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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of key buildings. It is also essential to understand the local culture, in order to understand what local tactics and doctrines may arise from local history, to anticipate how local forces may manipulate or hide within the civilian population, and to understand the kinds of psychological operations, appeals, or threats— through the media and otherwise—the local population will respond to, and how they may respond. Ideally, the backgrounds of local leaders will be known, so that it is understood how they operate and how they may be thwarted before they attempt hostile counterattacks. Knowledge of the local language will be extremely valuable, but by itself should not be taken as a substitute for deep local knowledge. None of this is different from the knowledge needed for successful warfare anywhere; it is rendered especially important by the stakes, in casualties and length of war, that are involved in military operations in populated areas.

Building this kind of background will require local expertise. There will be no substitute for effective intelligence, informed by area expertise derived from trusted sources that have been proven reliable. This expertise may often be found within local or coalition forces, but must then be treated cautiously lest local political objectives distort the knowledge transmitted. Local intelligence networks that can be called into play when needed will make invaluable contributions. All this may take more time and advanced preparation than the development of a particular crisis or action will permit. Planners will have to anticipate where such actions may take place and start early to build long-lead-time elements of local knowledge. Although intelligence resources may be limited overall, the cost for building area expertise, even if some of the effort pertains to areas where it is ultimately not needed, is small relative to the payoff for having it or to the loss incurred if it is not available when it is needed. The task must be joint, because joint forces will inevitably be involved, so that the naval forces will not have to absorb the expenses all on their own. The Department of the Navy must take the lead in initiating the joint intelligence preparation for expeditionary warfare contingencies along the littoral, however, since they are likely to be the first to need it on the spot.

Tactics, Weapons, and Techniques

Once the necessary local knowledge is available, the capture of populated areas in the future will depend on our forces “operating smart” with advanced technical means, rather than using massive force. In this approach, major forces would surround the area to be taken, to blockade it and to be positioned for later entry to secure it, but they would not enter against potential opposition.

Small, platoon-sized units would penetrate early in conjunction with information warfare and psychological operations to neutralize defending forces, using their area expertise and intelligence with helicopter and light armored vehicle mobility (or boat mobility in areas with waterways) for decisive positioning of forces, rather than for direct attack. They will be able to use advanced sen-

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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sors, including covertly distributed MEMS-based unattended sensors with GPS location and broadcast capability, building-penetrating radar, acoustic sensors, and infrared scanners, to locate opposing forces as precisely as possible before attacking them—to the point of knowing which rooms in a building are occupied. They will be aided by extensive use of robotics, such as small, sensor-carrying remotely piloted air vehicles of various sizes and unmanned ground vehicles, for scouting blind streets and other areas, for denying pathways, for decoying, and for placing explosives or otherwise attacking and destroying targets. They will be able to operate mainly at night, when even if opponents have night vision devices it is easier for an attacker to sow confusion and create disorganization.

Among the weapons being devised for the attacking forces in the future will be extensive nonlethal or less-than-lethal weaponry to incapacitate rather than to kill or wound opponents. Those within the realm of possibility include means to render people dysfunctional individually or in groups, through activation of such means as disabling sound levels, nausea-creating agents, and sticky, slippery, and wetting substances, and by rapidly erecting barriers to movement in the form of helicopter-emplaceable quick-hardening foams or other rapidly emplaceable barriers.

Many of the above means to neutralize defenders of populated areas may not work against large and heavily defended cities—capital cities defended by hostile and well-armed divisions that are not loath to use armor and artillery, for example. But even in those situations, the means described may be used to take a city by sections from the outside in if the time is available and there is value in doing so. The means described for disabling a population center can help to shorten the time by weakening resolve to resist. More to the point, however, those situations represent one end of a continuum that has rescue of hostages and defeat of terrorists holding specific facilities at the other end, and many stages of military action in actively or potentially hostile populated areas in between. No one would argue against preparation to deal with most of the spectrum because one end of it may be especially difficult when using the means described.

The naval forces will need all of these advanced information and technical capabilities, ranging from means of disabling infrastructure and obtaining deep local knowledge to ways of capturing hostile areas with minimal friendly and local casualties, as an essential part of their “kit of tools” for expeditionary warfare and operations other than war.

REENGINEERING THE LOGISTIC SYSTEM

Logistics is usually considered as an “annex” to military operational plans. However, logistic considerations determine what operations can be undertaken, when they are undertaken, and the extent to which they will succeed.

The emerging Navy and Marine Corps concept for Operational Maneuver

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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From the Sea in expeditionary warfare incorporates a radical change in logistic concepts. Instead of building a massive logistics base ashore to support subsequent ground-force operation, with attendant time delays and protection requirements, most of the logistics base is to be kept at sea, at least for the early stages of any operation. When it is moved ashore it may not be as massive as logistics bases have been in the past—it may contain enough supplies for a week or so, rather than 60 days' worth. Logistic support for the combat forces is to be provided on an “as needed” basis, with a base ashore to support surges according to operational need. In the new logistic system, there will be far less redundant supply. This feature parallels and relates to changing concepts of logistics and support in the civilian economy that are being driven by economics, advancing transport, manufacturing, and system management philosophy, and associated technological developments in the information and transportation areas.21 These changes will also be reflected throughout the joint logistic system for supporting forces in theater.

The changes in the logistic system that are called for will demand more than marginal improvements achievable through occasional renewal of system elements like shipping. They will require changes in logistic concept, priority, and equipment at all levels, and a long-term strategic plan for achieving the changes in parallel with the changes in the combat forces that are to be supported.

Achieving efficient logistics will depend in part on reducing the logistics load. This means incorporating distributed, computer-assisted advances in system readiness, maintenance capability, and support based on extensive and readily available information about the status of systems and supplies, and taking other steps to reduce the total amount of supply to be delivered. It will also entail significant changes in system design for loading, moving, and delivering essential support for forward combat forces. To assess the nature of these changes in the logistic system, it is necessary to assume certain factors as givens:

  • Operational Maneuver From the Sea, in some evolved form, will become the standard naval force expeditionary warfare doctrine.

  • Maritime prepositioning forces (MPFs) will continue to be used into the indefinite future.

  • Intercontinental and local force logistics will both be fully integrated into the worldwide information system and communication network with message priority equal to that of tactical communications. (Logistic communications to and from forward forces in a “supply as needed” combat situation are tactical communications, not the pipeline-filling transmissions that have characterized logistic communications loads in the past.)

21  

For a detailed discussion of the impact of OMFTS on naval force expeditionary warfare logistics, see Naval Studies Board, 1996, The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., pp. 69-81.

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×

From this base, logistic support of the naval forces may be considered in terms of readiness, support of forces at sea, and support of forces ashore.

Information-based Readiness and Its Impact on Logistics

The term “information-based readiness” has been coined to describe a logistic system that will capitalize on the use of computer-based design and management in all activities that create and support major military systems, and that make and keep them ready for operation and combat. This concept constitutes a major application of the enterprise process technologies discussed earlier. It implies concurrent incorporation of logistic support with operations as part of an end-to-end simulation-based system design process for all military systems. Information-based readiness will then require sensor-monitored performance of all weapon system platforms and stored weapons such as missiles, for condition-based, rather than schedule-based, maintenance. Parts will be supplied as needed, and some may be manufactured in forward areas by agile manufacturing techniques. This approach will mean significant changes in the transportation systems to ensure ad hoc movement from points of origin to supply nodes and subsequent delivery of diverse goods directly to using forces, rather than routine, a priori bulk delivery to a central storage point. The new capability could not be implemented without modern computing power. For forward forces anywhere in the world, there will be computer-based, distributed training of repair personnel, computer-based troubleshooting, and distributed troubleshooting expertise available on call from system design and integration contractors or the few rear-area military support depots.

Supporting Forces at Sea

The main loads that must be delivered to ships at sea are fuel and ammunition. Two approaches to easing the resupply problem for fuel are to reduce the need for fuel and to move the fuel that is needed more efficiently.

Reduction of fuel use at sea would reduce the frequency of refueling, which takes ships out of action for significant periods of time. The need for ships' fuel will gradually be reduced by incorporation of more efficient electric drive and hull drag reduction in the major platforms. Aviation fuel needs will gradually be reduced as engine efficiencies, reflected in reduced specific fuel consumption, increase in new and upgraded aircraft. Such changes may not be reflected in a markedly reduced need for fuel resupply in wartime, when all systems are pressed to the limits of performance. However, even small improvements in efficiency will mean significant cost savings over system lifetimes, and they could enable extended operations under some wartime conditions when even modest increases in time between refuelings could confer a tactical or operational advantage. There may also be reductions in aviation fuel use as the mix of

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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naval force aviation changes along with changing combat techniques and systems; this will be difficult to predict, and the differences will have to be assessed and reflected in changes to the logistic system as the forces evolve.

Ammunition resupply requirements will also change as the means of land attack and fire support change. Shifting strike and fire support from “dumb” bombs and shells to greater use of guided weaponry, and using large numbers of tube-launched weapons for strike and naval surface fire support, will radically affect those requirements in currently unpredictable ways, leading to many changes in logistic support loads and how they are delivered. A major operational problem, capable of technical solutions but needing system analysis of the design and operational tradeoffs, will be whether to reload missiles into ship VLS at sea, or to return the ships to the nearest base for that purpose after all or parts of their loads are expended. Exploration of this problem must become part of the overall, simulation-based system design for the surface and undersea land-attack ships and forces, possibly arriving at different solutions for each type of force.

For the remainder of the logistic load, reduced crew sizes will be reflected in a reduced logistic train from CONUS to the fleet. More efficient and rapid delivery to the under-way replenishment ships can be achieved with containerized loads, saving at-sea manpower and preparation time. With a move to containerized logistics, the next generation of logistic ships will have to be designed so that the loads can be broken out for “retail” delivery to diverse warships at sea. This is consistent with the changes needed for OMFTS.22 Faster fuel-pumping capacity that is in development will also reduce the time spent in refueling, rearming, and resupply operations.

Solid-waste management has also become a major problem for ships at sea, as constraints against ocean dumping of such waste increase. System-based solutions will be required in new ship design: designing for reduced waste in the first place, and consideration of on-board treatment, compacting, and storage for shore disposal, incineration, or a combination of these methods.23 This will have to be considered part of the overall logistic system in designing for support of ships and aircraft at sea.

Supporting Forces Ashore

As for ships at sea, the greatest loads to be moved ashore during combat operations are fuel and ammunition. In most environments, uncontaminated water also represents a significant load, difficult to process in mobile operations

22  

Naval Studies Board. 1996. The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., pp. 74-75.

23  

Naval Studies Board. 1996. Shipboard Pollution Control: U.S. Navy Compliance With MARPOL Annex V, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×

and difficult to deliver from outside. Fuel needs ashore will be mitigated to some extent by the use of more efficient power sources for support equipment— long-life batteries and fuel cells instead of electric generators, for example— although the fuel needs are associated mainly with combat vehicles and aircraft.

Although fuel transport by pipeline from ships or depots will be available to support forward ground forces in stable situations, combat operations will be wide ranging and will require air resupply, or resupply by tanker trucks when stable and secure land lines of communication are established. Air resupply of fuel and water to mobile forces during combat will depend heavily on the use of 500-gallon pods slung under heavy-lift helicopters and V-22 aircraft, both of which will be able to carry more than one pod per load. This (and other air resupply) will require protection of the air routes of supply, and landing zones— forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) and forward troop positions.

A reduction of massed artillery fire in favor of fire support from the sea, as visualized in the OMFTS doctrine, will significantly reduce the daily ammunition load that must be delivered. For example, the regional conflict study estimated that the logistic load to support a light battalion-sized force ashore would be reduced from 37 to 7 tons per day if all the battalion's fire support were delivered from the sea.24 Land combat units with less heavy equipment, as visualized under the evolving doctrine, will also require less fuel.

Remaining logistic requirements for the ground forces in combat will have to be supplied routinely (for food and other consumables) or ad hoc (for maintenance items), usually by air. Air delivery will involve vertical-lift aircraft, with the same protection problems posed by fuel and ammunition delivery, and sometimes precision air drop using systems that are being developed by the Army and Air Force.

In addition to reducing the loads as described above, the ground forces will have to practice “smart” logistics to ensure steady resupply as needed with minimal waste in the system. This will, as will ship resupply at sea, require containerization starting from the sources in CONUS, and continuous visibility into container contents through electronic tagging and tracking until delivery to the using units. Logistic and MPF ships will have to be designed with the capability for on-board container handling and load manipulation, and for operating vertical-lift aircraft. A heavy-lift helicopter to replace the CH-53E, when that is needed, should be designed to move containers from ships to operational forces ashore, less awkwardly than in the current process for large underslung loads. Not least, integral container carriage will allow such aircraft to fly closer to the terrain in areas where very low altitude flight is needed to afford a measure of protection from shoulder-fired SAMs.

There will be times when logistics delivery over-the-shore (LOTS) will be

24  

Naval Studies Board. 1996. The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., p. 70.

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×

required. Currently, such delivery is limited to relatively calm seas—sea state 2, or waves of 3-ft height or less—permitting over-the-shore offloading only about half of the time in areas around the world where military operations are likely. There are means in work or proposed for increasing LOTS capability for off-loading through sea state 3, or waves up to 5-ft height. This advance would increase the period of time in which offloading could be conducted over the shore by 20 percent or more in many areas, depending on the geographical area and the season. The means in work include stable cranes, high-sea-state lighter-age, and “portable ports” or emplaceable causeways that will permit docking and offloading of combat vehicles and load transporters.

Many aspects of the logistic advances described can be implemented using existing technology. In areas such as containerization and container handling, loading and unloading at terminals, and asset tracking, the commercial world is ahead of the military. The latter can adopt and adapt the technology applications it will need. In doing so, it will have to ensure that compatibility is retained between the military and commercial systems, in case the latter must be called on to augment the military logistic system—much in the manner in which the Civil Reserve Airlift Fleet (CRAF) is used.

Logistics and support, in addition to communications, are areas where extensive “outsourcing” and privatization will take place, in the interest of conserving resources and improving efficiency. This will add to the use of COTS systems and technology that will be adapted to many military systems. All of this trend reinforces the argument for extensive efforts to ensure functional and physical compatibility between military and commercial systems.

MODELING AND SIMULATION AS A FOUNDATION TECHNOLOGY

Over the years since World War II, mathematics and computer models have been used increasingly to describe the dynamics of military engagements and warfare. Simulated equipment and computers have enabled representations of military equipment and operations. Modeling and simulation (M&S) now constitutes a fundamental technology area underlying all aspects of the creation and use of military systems and forces. Three basic kinds of simulation that are used by the military forces reinforce and interact with each other: (1) so-called constructive simulation of systems and combat performed wholly on computers; (2) distributed interactive simulation (DIS) and “virtual” simulation that join actual or simulated equipment operated by people—many of them in different locations and networked together—with computer-generated “environments” to simulate operations of the systems and their use in the field; and (3) simulations of combat (field exercises) in which military units with their actual equipment operate in the field on instrumented ranges, with quantitative measurement of system and unit performance. All DIS, virtual simulations, and field exercises have

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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people in the loop by design, and constructive simulations have also been devised to involve people for decision making.

The various techniques involved have also been developed by industry to support design and construction of military as well as commercial systems. Applications vary from exploration of preferred system design parameters to simulation, derived from computer-aided design practices, of system elements or complete platforms—aircraft, ships, or manufacturing plants—to examine how internal space is utilized and how the systems will perform under various conditions.

All these forms of simulation are now used in complex combinations. They affect all aspects of naval force planning, acquisition, and operation: designing systems and optimizing their operation; choosing among systems and forces for specific military tasks; developing and testing operational concepts with real or postulated force designs; mission planning and rehearsal, and evaluating alternative courses of action in carrying out missions; evaluating mission outcomes and the results of operational test and evaluation; and training forces and commanders at all command levels.

Such a pervasive technology requires a new “corporate” management approach if the naval forces are to capitalize fully on the benefits that modeling and simulation can offer. These include the ability to evaluate and to integrate ideas, systems, and force designs and to adjust them to each other before actual building begins, as well as to evaluate the economies to be gained by eliminating steps in building and modifying hardware early in the creation of military systems and forces. As was the case in prior years for the technology of computing itself as it was being integrated into commerce, industry, and the military forces, it is now becoming apparent that M&S demands the attention and support of top Department of the Navy command and management levels because it affects every aspect of military force design, equipment, and operation. The necessary integration of viewpoint and utilization cannot “just happen” without such attention and support.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recognized this in arranging for the construction of large-scale simulation models—JWARS, to support the requirements and process of force design, and JSIMS, to support education and training and their integration into military operations. The Navy and the Marine Corps have been building their own separate management and operational structures for M&S and establishing simulation systems for the individual Services. The latter include, in addition to the use of M&S in weapon system design, the Navy's Battle Force Tactical Trainer (BFTT), a simulation of maritime operations (MARSIM), the Naval Simulation System (NSS), and the Marine Corps Commandant's Battle Laboratory that will, among other things, systematically test and help develop the evolving OMFTS concept. The Navy's cooperative engagement capability was developed using “embedded simulation” by operation of actual air defense systems aboard ships at sea and defenses on land against simulated attackers.

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Completely incorporating and effectively using M&S as a Navy Department foundation technology requires the creation of a joint Navy and Marine Corps strategy that spans the two Services ' operations in expeditionary warfare, where the two must function as a single force that operates in a joint environment with other Service forces involved. This strategy and the M&S activities it guides and supports must also feed, draw from, and interoperate with the joint efforts embodied in JWARS and JSIMS.

After completion of the institutional arrangements by which the Department of the Navy can best capitalize on M&S, two important advances (which could be undertaken simultaneously) are needed: (1) bringing the M&S conceptual foundation up to date with current knowledge of how modern warfare is and may be fought, and (2) changing the technical basis of M&S to incorporate and capitalize on modern computing and M&S technology. The needs for these advances apply initially in the area of constructive simulation but also will have an important influence on the way virtual simulations and field exercises are planned and on the way their results are interpreted and used. There is at present a dearth of theoretical understanding and knowledge of modern, post-Cold War types of warfare based on collected and analyzed data to describe the phenomena of warfare—what really happens in complex interactions among modern armed forces and between them and irregulars of various derivations, why it happens, and what drives the effects of the critical parameters. Indeed, the databases on which such a theoretical foundation can be built have yet to be assembled.

As a result, while computer programming and software technology have advanced rapidly and have been used to build today's generation of models and simulations, the knowledge base on which the existing models and simulations are built is obsolete and deficient in many ways. For example, many models derived from years of development still do not allow for dynamic evolution of a battlefield or a battle area and feedback into force operations, and their output in the hands of users not familiar with their multitudinous and usually hidden assumptions often does not accord with modern understanding of force-on-force interaction. As another example, simulations that attempt to describe the functioning of individual systems or subsystems in exquisite detail both challenge the economics of efficient computing and miss the mark in simulating the functioning of networked systems with many similar components that can each be described by a few functional attributes.

Decision makers who rely on M&S for system acquisition or military planning have little basis, at present, for knowing whether the M&S results that they use are valid representations of the real world on which to base extrapolations to some future world. There is a dearth of model validation that compares the results of models describing warfare with the outcomes of actual conflicts or even of field exercises, nor are there credible methods for model validation. If there is to be any confidence in the projections and plans that the M&S results are supposed to support, there must be a continuing effort to validate existing

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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and new models against real-world situations when there are data for comparison, however sketchy or anecdotal. Building databases that include historical data from actual warfare and from pertinent exercises will be an essential part of such an effort.

Recent simulation concepts being developed in the commercial world, and the growing mass of results from virtual simulations and measured field exercises in the military world, can help rectify some of these deficiencies in modeling and simulation. To make the most of the new concepts and data, much of the current approach to and utilization of models in planning will have to be changed, often at the price of extensive investment in replacements for current models, simulations, and M&S tools. Future practice should create an interlinked, hierarchical family of models, all developed together, describing various levels and phases of expeditionary warfare from the system through the strategic level. Such a family of models would be based on a common high-level architecture and a common set of input data. The various models would be calibrated together and have functional connections to allow various elements of the family to operate together in diverse combinations.

Use of M&S in the military environment where there will be great uncertainty about opposing forces and operational environments far into the future must allow for that uncertainty. Within the family of models and simulations, it will be necessary to provide the capability for easy and inexpensive exploratory analyses and tests with different scenarios, databases, and concepts of operation, to learn which approaches are most likely to give robust solutions before specific plans and force designs are “cast in concrete.”

These advances in the M&S field to support naval forces will not be made effectively without focused technical support. As in any other important technical area, an ongoing research effort is needed to provide that support. This research must first be focused on military science and technique, to ensure that the knowledge base incorporating the latest concepts and understanding about the uses of naval forces and how they will fight is included in the resulting models and simulations. Research must be performed in simulation science and technology applicable to military systems and operations. And databases covering worldwide military forces and environments, by warfare area, must be constructed and maintained. This research program would, especially, review and resolve technical problems in adopting and adapting related developments from civilian areas that can be applied in military M&S.

FOCUSED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

No modern, technology-intensive enterprise can prosper without sustained research and development support focused on the enterprise's main objectives. This truism has been recognized for the armed forces since World War II, but the nation may be losing sight of it today as budget concerns move front and center

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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in national attention. The environment in which future naval forces will exist and in which they will have to function effectively will be characterized by continuing budget stringency, barring the emergence of some future mortal threat to the United States and its allies. Regardless of the level of resources that will be allocated to support the creation of the entering wedges of capability that this study foresees as essential to future naval force viability, and however they are found, the R&D part of those resources will have to be spent as efficiently and effectively as possible, and in a timely manner.

In addition to effective technical management, a key step in effective use of resources for R&D will be to focus the R&D effort on those elements that are unique to military and naval forces, and for the rest to capitalize to the greatest extent possible on R&D and technology emerging from the civilian, commercial sector. The technology areas listed in Table 6.1 were reviewed to see where relevant R&D is currently performed and is likely to continue. The review showed extensive scientific and technology development effort in the civilian sector that can be of value and use to the naval forces in the following technology areas or clusters:

  • Information technology (with some exceptions to be noted),

  • Technologies for human performance,

  • Computational technologies,

  • Automation,

  • Materials (with some exceptions to be noted),

  • Power and propulsion technologies,

  • Environmental technologies, and

  • Technologies for enterprise processes.

Although particular areas of science and related military and naval applications will always require Department of the Navy investment and attention, military R&D in the above areas can concentrate heavily on adapting the civilian and commercial technologies and their products to naval force use.

This orientation must be adopted with caution, however, because in many areas commercial industry is also deferring long-term R&D in favor of short-term programs offering a quick payoff in highly competitive markets. The Department of the Navy must thus remain vigilant to ensure that its needs will indeed be met in these areas by the civilian world. In no sense, therefore, should comments on priority in this regard be taken as a suggestion that basic, long-term research be foregone by the Department of the Navy in all these areas without first ascertaining that research needed for naval force purposes will in fact be performed by the commercial sector. The Navy Department must also be ready to recognize and adapt wholly new advances that can change how military tasks are performed, equipment is brought into being, and kinds of equipment created. The naval forces must remain open to new and vital knowledge. The issue is to apply appropriate judgment to allocation of scarce research resources.

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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With due attention to these caveats, it appears now that science and technology for military and naval force use will have to be especially sustained by the military R&D community (where possible and beneficial, in cooperation with the civilian community) in the following areas because, in the absence of large civilian markets, no one else is likely to support it (the inclusions in parentheses give examples of the kinds of capabilities and devices that would be included in each):

  • Sensor technologies (electronically steered and low-probability-of-intercept (LPI) radar, IR and advanced infrared search and track (IRST), multispectral imaging, embedded microsensors and “smart” skins and structures, lasers, SQUIDs);

  • The sensor technologies would be joined in application with specialized information technologies (secure data access; stealth and counterstealth; ASW; chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons detection; automatic target recognition) to contribute to the military parts of the information-in-warfare system. (Fundamental research into the theoretical basis of naval warfare underlying modeling and simulation must obviously be supported by the naval forces, as well.)

  • Military-oriented materials (energetic materials, including explosives and rocket propellants, high-temperature materials for engine turbine blades and combustors, and composites, among others);

  • The materials together with power and propulsion technologies (rocket engines, warheads, and advanced aircraft, ship, and submarine power plants) would contribute to the creation of advanced weapon systems and, in the form of long-life and high-power-density power sources, to reducing equipment loads and logistic resupply requirements.

In many of these areas, the naval forces will have to join with the other military departments to share the applied R&D and advanced development loads so that the total resources are spent as efficiently as possible. R&D expenditures by the Navy Department in these areas, and in the adaptation of civilian technology to naval force purposes, must be focused in two areas: development of unique naval force capabilities needed to support ongoing force improvement and creation of future capability; and development, by work-sharing arrangements in the joint environment, of capabilities that all the Services will be able to use. Deciding the allocation of resources between these two areas of effort will obviously be the responsibility of the Department of the Navy working with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the other military departments, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Some of the jointly agreed R&D will help the naval forces, just as some of the Navy Department R&D will help meet needs of the other Services.

Within the Department of the Navy, the following areas of concentration for R&D application, associated with the entering wedges of capability and leading

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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to their creation, should be especially fostered25 (for completeness, the following list brings forward some critical R&D areas that were circleussed in more detail in the report of the regional conflict study26 than in this report; these items are starred in the list):

  1. Information, intelligence, and space systems:

    • Information security, defensive information warfare;

    • *Satellite-based position-location security, deniability to opponents, within treaty commitments;

    • Penetration of concealment, cover, and deception for intelligence and situational awareness;

    • Preserving privacy, security, and military functionality while using commercial communications.

  2. Human resources:

    • Distributed training;

    • Advanced casualty treatment and recovery, including chemical and biological casualty avoidance and treatment;

    • Data comprehension;

    • Quality-of-life research: QOL data collection; QOL metrics and analysis of return on investment in QOL.

  3. Surface and air systems:

    • Rocket-propelled missile system design: staging and advanced, insensitive propellants for range extension, tailored warheads, terminal guidance, cold launch, at-sea reload, and cost reduction;

    • Target sensing, target recognition, and target location using unmanned platforms;

    • Continued work in stealth and counterstealth for all platforms, with special emphasis on the IR regime for aircraft signature reduction;

    • Continuation of ATBM systems development;

    • Laser weapons for ship defense against missiles, in the cooperative engagement capability (CEC) mode;

    • Electric systems, oriented toward advanced propulsion and power conditioning for Navy ships and submarines;

25  

There may be other areas of effort that are not mentioned in this list, that in the judgment of the Navy Department's R&D management have deserved program emphasis and resources. Failure to mention such an area of effort here does not carry the connotation that the study examined it and decided that it was of no importance, only that it was not directly connected with the entering wedges of capability described in this report.

26  

Naval Studies Board. 1996. The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×
  • Ship design for smaller crews—especially, distributed sensors, actuators, controls, and intelligent automated subsystems;

  • Advanced ship hull forms, especially those contributing to speed, seakeeping, and stealth;

  • Advanced submarine designs;

  • Advanced combat aircraft design features, including more efficient, high thrust-weight ratio engines, lightweight unitary structures, microsensor-based aerodynamic flow control techniques, and low-speed aerodynamic and propulsion control techniques, to mitigate weight penalties associated with vertical or near-vertical lift;

  • Advanced aircraft design and manufacturing processes, using simulation, electronic prototyping, and flexible tooling.

  1. Undersea systems:

    • Matched-field coherent processing technologies for extending passive ASW detection and tracking capability;

    • Multistatic active ASW;

    • Multispectrum active and passive nonacoustic sensors for both ASW and mine detection;

    • Mobile underwater synoptic sensor networks;

    • Ocean science and related technology developments;

    • Secure tactical communications between undersea and surface, air, and space systems;

    • Advanced explosives, undersea weapon warheads, and mine fusing and warheads;

    • Ship defense against torpedoes;

    • Advanced countermine warfare—rapid location and tagging, parallel neutralization, defeating “smart” minefields, explosive blasting of channels to the beach from the air with precision bomb emplacement and timing.

  2. Ground forces and their combat support:

    • *Target designation for precision weapon delivery on precisely known coordinates;

    • *Reliable combat identification;

    • *Integration with at-sea forces in the overall information and communication network, down to the smallest forward unit;

    • *Reducing vulnerability of vertical-lift aircraft to shoulder-fired SAMs; airborne detection of minefields in landing zones;

    • *Situation awareness, target detection, sensors, robotic vehicles, and nondestructive weaponry for fighting in built-up areas; techniques for operations other than war, nonlethal weapons, and crowd-control devices.

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×
  1. Logistics:

    • Design for readiness and minimal field maintenance;

    • *Adapting to fully containerized logistic support—packaging, transport, delivery, ships, airlift, depot handling, and “retail” distribution to forward units;

    • *Information-based logistic techniques, equipment, and systems for maintaining weapon system readiness and for delivering materiel to forces at sea and over the shore;

    • *Achieving sea-state 3 LOTS capability.

  2. Modeling and simulation:

    • Military science and phenomenology;

    • Simulation science and methodology applicable to military systems;

    • Constructing and maintaining warfare-area and world databases;

    • Adopting and adapting related developments in civilian fields to military problems and activities;

    • Validating concepts and methodology.

Finally, it must be emphasized that some major system advances take place in major steps after ongoing research and advanced development have created new opportunities. This has been especially apparent in the aviation area, where ongoing R&D in propulsion, aerodynamics, and structures leads periodically to a major advance in capability embodied in a new class of aircraft. For this to happen, the R& D must be supported in a sustained, long-term program in which each step is built on the last, such that at significant points a new system can be built on the advances achieved to that time. An example is the Integrated High Performance Turbine Engine Technology (IHPTET) program, jointly sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, and industry. This program, together with its predecessor Service programs, has led to major advances in turbine and compressor materials, advanced combustors and engine controls, and overall engine designs. These advances have led in turn to major improvements in thrust, thrust-weight ratio, and fuel economy, leading to the superior U.S. military aircraft engine performance we see today, and to significant advances in civilian aviation as well.

The areas of surface ship and submarine design and construction, ASW, and oceanography listed above need a similar model of integrated, sustained R&D support, with clearly defined goals and schedules, industry-government collaboration, and stable funding, to achieve the potential seen for them in this study.

Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
×
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035." National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 1: Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5838.
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