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Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
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OCR for page 10
2
Principles for Science Management
Based on a review of the historical interactions between human spaceflight
programs and the scientific community, the committee saw its challenge as estab-
lishing a set of principles that, when employed, could facilitate the productive
integration of space science into a human exploration program. These principles,
along with the more specific recommendations developed in Chapter 3, might
serve as a guide for decisions on what science to do in conjunction with a human
exploration program, how and when to bring the scientific community into the
program, and how to define the responsibilities and authorities of participating
NASA offices.
There has been significant evolution in the interaction between the space
science and human spaceflight communities during NASA's 40-year history. The
two communities have pushed and pulled until a workable accommodation was
established for each program.) This history can be divided into three principal
eras: early lunar exploration before the Apollo landings; the Saturn launcher-
based programs (Apollo, Skylab, and the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project); and the
post-Saturn Space Shuttle era. Each of these eras featured a distinct but evolu-
tionary distribution of authorities and responsibilities among the science and hu-
man spaceflight offices.
INTERACTION BETWEEN SPACE SCIENCE AND HUMAN
SPACEFLIGHT COMMUNITIES
Early Lunar Exploration
The management structure used during the Ranger, Surveyor, and Lunar Or
10
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PRINCIPLES FOR SCIENCE MANAGEMENT
11
biter programs evolved over time, culminating in the structure used to manage the
very successful Lunar Orbiter program. Unlike Lunar Orbiter, the Rangers and
Surveyors were not initially conceived as support missions to human flight but
were reoriented to this goal as the Apollo program progressed.
After the initial Soviet space successes with the Sputnik program in late 1957,
the United States attempted to gain leadership in space exploration with several
hasty, ill-conceived attempts to beat the Soviets to the Moon. These robotic
missions either failed totally or reached the Moon after the Soviet missions. In
1959, NASA abandoned these crash programs and formulated a systematic pro-
gram to explore the Moon and the nearby planets. Two challenging lunar pro-
grams, Ranger and Surveyor, were initiated. The first NASA spacecraft to be
stabilized in all three axes, the first two Rangers were designed to explore the
space environment between Earth and the Moon. Surveyor originally consisted
of an orbiter and a soft lander, each carrying a variety of scientific instruments.
NASA Headquarters assigned both the Ranger and Surveyor projects to the
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). When measured against the existing technol-
ogy and the knowledge and experience of those involved, Ranger was probably
the most difficult and certainly one of the most frustrating projects everunder-
taken by the Office of Space Science (OSS). Each mission carried a number of
scientific instruments, each to be furnished by a scientist, most of whom worked
at universities or other government laboratories. To demonstrate that the space-
craft worked, the JPL Ranger project manager wanted to launch the first Ranger
as soon as possible and viewed anything that stretched the schedule as an impedi-
ment to be eliminated. The scientists, believing that their experiments were the
objective of the Ranger project, found themselves in conflict with JPL and fre-
quently with each other. The project manager also found that he could not get
reliable information about the performance of the Atlas-Agena launch vehicle
under development by the Department of Defense, and he did not know how
many instruments he could accommodate.
When NASA assigned responsibility to JPL to conduct the lunar and plan-
etary program, the senior management of JPL argued that they needed their own
scientific advisory structure to help them plan the program. They expected NASA
Headquarters to approve the JPL program, send money, and then wait for the
results. Responsible for the overall program and under pressure from Congress to
beat the Soviets, however, NASA Headquarters chose not to delegate responsi-
bility for formulation of the programs to its centers: JPL could conduct studies
and make recommendations, but the final decisions would be made at Headquar-
ters. Further, NASA money would be accompanied by technical directives that
JPL must follow. There were also disagreements about who would select inves-
tigators, JPL or NASA Headquarters.
The first Ranger failed in August 1961, and five more failed before Ranger 7
transmitted beck more than 4,000 pictures of the lunar surface in July 1964. Rang-
ers 8 and 9, the last two, also succeeded, and returned more than 17,000 high
OCR for page 12
2
SCIENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE HUMAN EXPLORATION OF SPACE
quality images of the lunar surface. A major share of Ranger's problems can be
traced to the struggles of a new agency whose allocation of roles and responsibili-
ties was still being established.2
Surveyor suffered delays and cost overruns. Atlas-Centaur, Surveyor's
launch vehicle, failed on its first launch. In mid-1962, NASA eliminated the
Surveyor orbiter and all of the lander' s scientific instruments except those needed
to fulfill Apollo requirements. The cancellation of the Surveyor orbiter created
pressure on OSS to develop an alternative lunar orbiter, because the Office of
Manned Space Flight (OMSF) needed lunar photographs to select Apollo landing
sites. The Space Science Board urged Congress to fund a lunar orbiter, which it
did. In October 1962, in response to OMSF requirements and congressional pres-
sure, OSS and OMSF formed a joint working group to plan a Lunar Orbiter pro-
gram to map the lunar surface. Since JPL was already saturated with Ranger and
Surveyor, as well as the Mariner project, this working group was asked to select a
NASA center to develop the Lunar Orbiter. In early 1963, OSS started the Lunar
Orbiter program at the Langley Research Center.
Surveyor 1 landed on the Moon on June 2, 1966. Two months later, on
August 10, 1966, Lunar Orbiter 1 returned its first pictures of the lunar surface.
Five of the seven Surveyors succeeded, and all five Lunar Orbiters successfully
completed their missions.
By the time of their successful missions, the primary purpose of all three of
these programs was to provide information that the Apollo project needed. In the
Lunar Orbiter project, OMSF, which had overall responsibility for the Apollo
program, had a customer-like relationship with OSS. That is, OMSF expressed
its requirements to OSS and left it to OSS to obtain the needed data within speci-
fied time constraints. Although OSS formulated and oversaw the development
and operation of all three programs and took responsibility for delays and over-
runs, the customer model is not an exact representation because OSS sought and
maintained funding for these missions as well. After early problems, the man-
agement approach evolved to successfully support the Apollo program and en-
able ground-breaking lunar science.
Several observations concerning the management of space science emerged
from the experience of the early days of NASA's lunar exploration program. The
chances of mission success are enhanced if the objectives of each specific project
or mission are clearly specified. If the prime objective of a project is to gather
engineering data on a new space system, for example, and the accomplishment of
scientific experiments is a secondary objective, then that fact should be made
clear to the scientists participating in the project. If the prime objective of the
mission is to accomplish a scientific task, then that fact must be made equally
clear to the project team, which should be judged by its success in accomplishing
the scientific objectives of the mission, as well as by meeting schedule and bud-
get commitments. Also, scientific goals can be pursued most effectively if con-
ducted within the framework of a single space science program run by one NASA
OCR for page 13
PRINCIPLES FOR SCIENCE MANAGEMENT
13
Headquarters office, and leaving selection of investigators to the Headquarters
science office.
Apollo, Skylab, Apollo-Soyuz
The interactions between science and human spaceflight in Apollo, Skylab,
and the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) were much more complicated than
those in the Lunar Orbiter case. Apollo began strictly as a human spaceflight
mission, as NASA's initial plans included no scientific experiments. But the
Space Science Board's 1962 Iowa Summer Study examined the role for the hu-
man in research on the lunar surface,3 and the Physics Committee, an OSS advi-
sory group, proposed that the astronauts place optical corner reflectors on the
Moon. Ultimately, a substantial lunar research program arose from these sugges-
tions and from other experiments proposed by other NASA advisory groups.
In the early 1960s, tension arose about the conduct of lunar science on
Apollo should there continue to be one lunar science program formulated by
OSS or should the Apollo project formulate and conduct its own lunar science
program? How should the science program be defined and funded, and by whom?
In March 1962, an ad hoc working group on Apollo lunar science was set up
at the request of oMSF.4 The ad hoc working group met three times in early
1962 and submitted a report to the Iowa Summer Study held that summer. In the
fall of 1962, the associate administrator of OSS moved to set up a more formal
Joint Working Group on scientific lunar exploration and the development of sci-
entific experiments for Apollo, structured to report to both OSS and OMSF. Dis-
cussions between OSS and OMSF continued in 1963, leading in July 1963 to a
reorganization of the Joint Working Group into the Manned Space Science Divi-
sion, which continued to report to the two offices (Figure 2.1~. Selection and
preliminary development of experiments were assigned to OSS, and development
of flight hardware and integration to OMSF; each office bore the costs for its
share of the experiment development.
In September 1963, OMSF established a Manned Spaceflight Experiments
Board to review all experiments, whether scientific experiments proposed by OSS,
technology experiments proposed by NASA's Office of Advanced Research and
Technology, or military experiments proposed by the Department of Defense
(Figure 2.1 shows the NASA spaceflight organization at this time, including the
Manned Space Science Division). The Manned Spaceflight Experiments Board
examined the technical requirements of the experiments, such as the weight, ori-
entation, and amount of power and astronaut time required. This board did not
question the scientific merits of the scientific experiments that had been approved
by the associate administrator for OSS, but, in his capacity as chairman of the
board, the associate administrator for OMSF retained final approval authority for
all experiments that flew on the Apollo missions. Some scientists believed that
OCR for page 14
SCIENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE HUMAN EXPLORATION OF SPACE
ADMINISTRATOR
DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR
1 ~1
ASSOCIATE
ADMINISTERS (OR _
r
Director
Traclcing and Data
Acquisition
Manned Space Science
Division
Manned
Spacecraft
Center
Marshall
Space Flight
Center
Kennedy
Space
Center
Program
Offices.
14
OFFICE OF OFFICE OF OFFICE OF
MANNED SPACE SCIENCE AND ADVANCED RESEARCH
FLIGHT APPLICATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY
_ l _ _ l _ I .
Program
Offices* . _
~1
OFFICE OF
ADVANCED RESEARCH
AND TECHNOLOGY
Operations Office |
Program
Offices
Goddard Space
Flight Center
Jet Propulsion
Laboratory
Wallops
Station
Ames
Research
Center
Langley Lewis Flight
Research Research Research
Center Center Center
FIGURE 2.1 NASA spaceflight organization, November 1963. SOURCE: Reprinted
from W.D. Compton, Where No Man Has Gone Before: A History of Apollo Lunar Explo-
ration Missions, NASA History Series, NASA SP-4214, NASA, Washington, D.C., 1989.
this encroached on the OSS role in science selection and constituted an unneeded
administrative burden.
In September 1965, the deputy administrator of NASA issued a directive
allocating responsibility for aspects of manned spaceflight programs. In part, it
confirmed the existing OSS-OMSF agreement and provided that OMSF would
OCR for page 15
PRINCIPLES FOR SCIENCE MANAGEMENT
15
have the responsibility of developing scientific experiments selected by OSS. It
also provided that OMSF would fund the experiments. While disagreements
between the staffs of OSS and OMSF did not disappear, this established the prin-
ciple that there would be one space science program formulated by OSS.
This imperfect arrangement continued until September 1967, when a NASA
reorganization promoted OSS head Homer Newell to NASA Associate Adminis-
trator and made Newell's former deputy, Edgar Cortright, deputy associate ad-
ministrator of OMSF. Under Newell's oversight, OSS and OMSF shortly there-
after created a joint Apollo Lunar Exploration Office to be staffed jointly by
OMSF and OSS and to be physically and organizationally located in the OMSF
Apollo Program Office (Figure 2.2~. A former OSS manager of the highly suc-
cessful Lunar Orbiter program was designated the new director of lunar explora-
tion. Reporting to him were four assistant directors, all experienced OSS pro-
gram managers and program scientists. For administrative matters, hardware
development, and funding status, the director of lunar exploration reported to the
director of the Apollo program office, but for all scientific matters he reported to
the associate administrator for OSS. Thus, the Lunar Exploration Office was
established not as a liaison office or working group, but rather as an integral
component of the Apollo program organization within OMSF, charged with re-
sponsibility for lunar experiment hardware that would both meet the Apollo
schedule and satisfy OSS science requirements.
The arrangement proved successful, based on several important factors.
Cortright, now deputy associate administrator of OMSF, knew and trusted the
OSS people in the Lunar Exploration Office and hence could assure the director
of the Apollo program office that they would accomplish the tasks assigned to
them. At the same time, because the leaders of the office were all experienced
OSS employees, they enjoyed the confidence and support of the associate admin-
istrator of OSS and knew that when they had completed their work for the Apollo
program they would return to OSS. Key to success were the shared recognition
by OSS and OMSF of the need for a joint office and staffing of this office with
experienced individuals of acknowledged achievement.
Having proved its worth during the Apollo missions, the joint project office
concept was also applied to the Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM), the solar obser-
vatory operated by the astronauts on the Skylab space station (1973-1974~. OSS
had already selected experiments for the Advanced Orbiting Solar Observatory
(AOSO) prior to approval of Skylab. Forced to cancel AOSO because of a short-
age of funds, OSS transferred the instruments to the ATM. The ATM project
manager reported jointly to the associate administrator for OSS and the associate
administrator for OMSF, just as in the case of Apollo.
For the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP), the associate administrator
for OSS was given the responsibility for selecting the experiments to be per-
formed during the mission. After a false start resulting from a desire to expedite
OCR for page 16
16
DIRECTOR
Program
Control
Director
Apollo
Program
1 11 1 111 1 1 -
SCIENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE HUMAN EXPLORATION OF SPACE
Science and ASSOCIATE
Technology _ _ ADMINISTRATOR
Advisory _ __ FOR MANNED
Committee SPACE FLIGHT
1
Bellcomm Inc.
l I DIRECTOR
MSF Field Center
Development
Manned Space Flight
Expenments Board
1 '
DIRECTOR DIRECI OR
MSF Management Space
Operations Medicine
Director
Apollo
Applications
Program
Director
Advanced
Manned Missions
Program
Program
Control
Director
Lunar
Exploration
Systems
En8.
l
Flight Lunar
Development Science
Test
_ Operations
Quality &
_ I Reliability
I Marshall l l Kennedy
| Space Flight | | Space
Center
| Center
1
| Space
I Shuttle
L Task Force
Manned
Spacecraft
Center
Space
Station |
Task Force ~
FIGURE 2.2 Office of Manned Space Flight organization, 1969. SOURCE: Reprinted
from W.D. Compton, Where No Man Has Gone Before: A History of Apollo Lunar Explo-
ration Missions, NASA History Series, NASA SP-4214, NASA, Washington, D.C., 1989.
selections, OSS assembled science working groups that successfully carried out a
standard, if greatly accelerated, competitive selection process in just two months.
Several lessons were learned from Apollo, Skylab, and ASTP about the con-
duct of scientific research during human spaceflight. The formation of a joint
program office, staffed by representatives of both NASA's science and human
spaceflight offices, was shown to be an effective solution to the day-to-day ten
OCR for page 17
PRINCIPLES FOR SCIENCE MANAGEMENT
17
signs that arose between advocates of human exploration and advocates of sci-
ence concerning the scientific experiments conducted during the Apollo missions.
In addition, unifying Apollo and ASTP science objectives and processes with
ongoing science management processes of OSS avoided duplication of activities,
provided more effective cross-fertilization among scientific disciplines, and mini-
mized confusion among policymakers. In one sense, however, the Apollo man-
agement approach reversed the earlier Lunar Orbiter approach: in Apollo, funds
were sought and obtained for the science program by OMSF rather than by OSS,
even though OSS selected the investigations to be carried out.
Shuttle/Spacelab
The relationship between the science and human spaceflight offices shifted
again in the Space Shuttle/Spacelab program.
After the completion of the Apollo Moon landings, lack of support for an
expensive space program in the Administration and Congress closed the Saturn-
Apollo production lines and led NASA to propose a new, low-cost launch ve-
hicle, the reusable Shuttle, for transporting humans to and from Earth orbit. In
1969-1970, NASA hoped to develop the Shuttle and a space station in parallel.
Financial guidelines imposed on NASA by the Administration, however, pre-
cluded simultaneous development of two major human spaceflight systems. In
1971, when the members of NASA's Space Station Task Force found that the
station had been postponed indefinitely, they abandoned work on it and, instead,
turned to a pressurized, habitable container that the Shuttle could carry to and
from orbit. Spacelab resulted from the work of the task force as a substitute for a
continuously orbiting space station. In January 1972, the President approved the
Shuttle program. In December 1972, the European Space Research Organization
undertook to develop and manufacture Spacelab.5
There were disagreements within NASA and within the scientific commu-
nity itself over the value of Shuttle/Spacelab. Scientists from disciplines that
required long-duration observations or collection of data from orbits beyond those
achievable by the Shuttle argued that a switch by NASA to the Shuttle/Spacelab
system would leave them unable to conduct their research. Astronomers who had
been disappointed by the loss of the first Orbiting Astronomical Observatory, on
the other hand, were concerned about a national commitment to the Large Space
Telescope (ultimately the Hubble Space Telescope) without a provision for the
ability to repair any malfunctions.
Within NASA, the associate administrator of OSS organized and co-chaired
the Shuttle Payload Planning Steering Group. This group, made up of members
of OSS and OMSF, worked to make sure that OMSF, which was developing the
Shuttle, understood space science requirements and that OSS understood the ca-
pabilities and constraints of the Shuttle. Out of these discussions emerged agree-
ment on the need for upper stages for the Shuttle to place some scientific missions
OCR for page 18
8
SCIENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE HUMAN EXPLORATION OF SPACE
in higher orbits and a commitment by NASA that the Shuttle would be designed
so that it would be able to launch and service the Hubble telescope, and that the
Hubble telescope, in turn, would be able to be launched and serviced by the
Shuttle.
After establishing the scientific requirements, the associate administrator for
OSS controlled all space science and life science payload activity during devel-
opment and operation of the Spacelab. The associate administrator for OSS
funded and managed their development, rather than have them funded by OMSF
and managed by a joint OSS/OMSF Spacelab Program Office as was done in
Apollo and Skylab. The NASA administrator directed the associate administra-
tor for OSS to select the scientists (the "payload specialists") who would fly on
the Shuttle and conduct experiments in the Spacelab. The associate administrator
for OSS would also direct the activities of the Spacelab Payload Project at the
Marshall Space Flight Center and select the final payload complement.
This arrangement was nearly the opposite of that used for Lunar Orbiter. In
the latter, the office responsible for human spaceflight set requirements for the
science office for the data it needed to land humans on the Moon. In the case of
the Shuttle/Spacelab program, the science office established "requirements" for
the human spaceflight office to optimize the platform for science utilization. In
reality, the fundamental characteristics of the Shuttle system were fixed by a
complex network of budgetary, technological, and national security constraints,
rather than being defined by scientific users. The resulting Shuttle capabilities
were presented to the scientific community as an "opportunity" that could be
adapted to a certain extent and exploited, for example by the Spacelab (and later
Spacehab and other systems).
During development, testing, and operation of Spacelab, OSS continued to
control the payload activity. When Spacelab became operational, OSS continued
to fund and manage the development of all space and life science payloads. OSS
selected not only the scientific investigators, but also the scientists who flew as
payload specialists in the Shuttle to conduct experiments.
In spite of very high costs, greater than expected complexity, and initial skep-
ticism of the science community, Shuttle/Spacelab has been successful in that
some high-quality laboratory science has been accomplished. In addition, the
Shuttle has been successfully used to repair and service the Solar Maximum Mis-
sion and the Hubble Space Telescope, as well as subsequently to upgrade the
scientific capabilities of the Hubble. Several lessons were learned from experi-
ence with this program. First, science carried out within the context of human
spaceflight needs the involvement of scientists at all stages of the program's
conceptualization, development, and operation. This continuing involvement is
necessary to ensure that realistic science goals are established that take advantage
of human presence, and that missions, flight hardware, and procedures are de-
signed to promote the accomplishment of science. In addition, the Spacelab pro-
gram again confirmed the practice of the investigators being chosen by the sci
OCR for page 19
PRINCIPLES FOR SCIENCE MANAGEMENT
19
once office rather than the program office responsible for flying the mission. In
the Shuttle/Spacelab era, OSS budgeted for and managed science funding, simi-
lar to the earlier Lunar Orbiter but in contrast to A polio. On the other hand, the
Shuttle/Spacelab program reversed the customer relationship of Lunar Orbiter in
the sense that OSS expressed accommodation requirements to OMSF, rather than
OMSF tasking OSS with its data needs.
MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES
In summary, a structure that grew out of the debate during the formulation of
the Ranger and Surveyor programs was successfully used for the Lunar Orbiter
program of robotic spacecraft that provided data used to select landing sites for
the A polio crews. During the early lunar exploration era, the office responsible
for human spaceflight set requirements for the space science office in the sense
that they told the science office what information they needed and when they
needed it. The science office was given the management and budgetary authority
to obtain needed data as it saw fit, albeit within a strict schedule. A more elabo-
rate structure evolved during the A polio program, and subsequently the Skylab
and A S T P programs, to explicitly manage the interaction between the space sci-
ence and human spaceflight programs. During this era, a joint management team
that included representatives of the science office and the spaceflight office over-
saw the conduct of space science within the context of the larger exploration
programs. A third structure evolved during the era of the Spacelab program of
pressurized modules and unpressurized pallets flown in the cargo bay of the
Shuttle. During this period, the team approach that proved so successful during
A polio was largely abandoned, and the earlier model whereby the spaceflight
office set requirements for the science office was essentially reversed, with the
science office developing and negotiating requirements for orbital platforms to
be designed, built, and launched by the spaceflight office.
The direction of the "customer-provider" relationship, and the related issue
of which party advocates and obtains the science funding, are important because
of their impact on project implementation. This in turn bears on the importance
of clear priorities and the organizational locus of science decision making.
The committee identified three broad principles in its survey of the history of
the interaction between space science and human spaceflight. Experience with
the Ranger and A polio programs demonstrates that waste and duplicated effort
are minimized, and clear lines of authority are delineated, if the scientific aspects
of solar system exploration are the responsibility of a single Headquarters office.
Thus, the first principle is the following:
INTEGRATED SCIENCE PROGRAM The scientific study of specific planetary
bodies, such as the Moon and Mars, should be treated as an integral part of an
overall solar system science program and not separated out simply because there
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20
SCIENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE HUMAN EXPLORATION OF SPACE
may be concurrent interest in human exploration of those bodies. Thus, there
should be a single Headquarters office responsible for conducting the scientific
aspects of solar system exploration.
A common problem in programs with multiple goals is the relationship be-
tween actual and perceived priority of those goals. This issue has arisen to vary-
ing degrees in almost all of NASA's human-related space projects. Human ex-
ploration is not undertaken primarily for scientific reasons, but it has important
scientific elements.6 Thus it is essential that the relative priority of all the com-
peting goals be well understood by all participants. Accordingly, the second
broad principle is that clear objectives and priorities should be established at the
level of individual component flight projects in the program in order to properly
integrate science goals with the conscience goals of human exploration:
CLEAR PROGRAM GOALS AND PRIORITIES A program of human space-
;flight will have political, engineering, and technological goals in addition to its
scientific goals. To avoid confusion and misunderstandings, the objectives of
each individual component project or mission that integrates space science and
human space;flight should be clearly specified and prioritized.
Although a human exploration program cannot be justified by scientific con-
siderations alone, such missions have the potential, as noted in the committee's
second report,7 to provide significant scientific opportunities. NASA's experi-
ence indicates that the scientific return can be enhanced if there are good commu-
nications and a cooperative working relationship between engineering imple-
menters and the scientists. A demonstrated means of facilitating productive
integration of space science and human spaceflight is to establish a joint office.
Thus, a third broad principle is that space science conducted in the context of a
human exploration program should be managed through a joint spaceflight and
science program office:
JOINT SPA CEFLIGHT/SCIENCE PROGRAM OFFICE The offices responsible
for human spaceflight and space science should jointly establish and staff a pro-
gram office to collaboratively implement the scientific component of human ex-
ploration. As a model, that office should have responsibilities, functions, and
reporting relationships similar to those that supported science in the Apollo,
Skylab, and Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) missions.
Chapter 3 considers these principles and their implications in further detail in
the context of the committee' s two earlier reports.
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PRINCIPLES FOR SCIENCE MANAGEMENT
2
REFERENCES
1. For more details, see Homer E. Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years of Space Sci-
ence, NASA SP-4211, NASA, Washington, D.C., 1980.
2. R. Cargill Hall, Lunar Impact: A History of Project Ranger, NASA SP-4210, NASA, Wash-
ington, D.C., 1977.
3. Space Science Board, A Review of Space Research: The Report of the Summer Study Con-
ducted Under the Auspices of the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences at the
State University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, June 17-Aug. 10, 1962, Publication 1079, National Acad-
emy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., 1962.
4. Details of the evolution of the relationship between science and the Apollo program are
provided in Where No Man Has Gone Before: A History of Apollo Lunar Exploration Missions, by
William D. Compton (NASA History Series, NASA SP-4214, NASA, Washington, D.C., 1989); see
also Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years of Space Science, by Homer E. Newell (NASA History
Series, NASA SP-4211, 1980).
5. Douglas R. Lord, SPA CELAB, an International Success Story, NASA SP-487, NASA, Wash-
ington, D.C., 1987.
6. Space Studies Board, National Research Council, Scientific Prerequisites for the Human
Exploration of Space, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1993.
7. Space Studies Board, National Research Council, Scientific Opportunities in the Human Ex-
ploration of Space, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1994.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
human spaceflight
