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2 Principles for Science Management Based on a review of the historical interactions between human spaceflight programs and the scientific community, the committee saw its challenge as estab- lishing a set of principles that, when employed, could facilitate the productive integration of space science into a human exploration program. These principles, along with the more specific recommendations developed in Chapter 3, might serve as a guide for decisions on what science to do in conjunction with a human exploration program, how and when to bring the scientific community into the program, and how to define the responsibilities and authorities of participating NASA offices. There has been significant evolution in the interaction between the space science and human spaceflight communities during NASA's 40-year history. The two communities have pushed and pulled until a workable accommodation was established for each program.) This history can be divided into three principal eras: early lunar exploration before the Apollo landings; the Saturn launcher- based programs (Apollo, Skylab, and the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project); and the post-Saturn Space Shuttle era. Each of these eras featured a distinct but evolu- tionary distribution of authorities and responsibilities among the science and hu- man spaceflight offices. INTERACTION BETWEEN SPACE SCIENCE AND HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT COMMUNITIES Early Lunar Exploration The management structure used during the Ranger, Surveyor, and Lunar Or 10

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PRINCIPLES FOR SCIENCE MANAGEMENT 11 biter programs evolved over time, culminating in the structure used to manage the very successful Lunar Orbiter program. Unlike Lunar Orbiter, the Rangers and Surveyors were not initially conceived as support missions to human flight but were reoriented to this goal as the Apollo program progressed. After the initial Soviet space successes with the Sputnik program in late 1957, the United States attempted to gain leadership in space exploration with several hasty, ill-conceived attempts to beat the Soviets to the Moon. These robotic missions either failed totally or reached the Moon after the Soviet missions. In 1959, NASA abandoned these crash programs and formulated a systematic pro- gram to explore the Moon and the nearby planets. Two challenging lunar pro- grams, Ranger and Surveyor, were initiated. The first NASA spacecraft to be stabilized in all three axes, the first two Rangers were designed to explore the space environment between Earth and the Moon. Surveyor originally consisted of an orbiter and a soft lander, each carrying a variety of scientific instruments. NASA Headquarters assigned both the Ranger and Surveyor projects to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). When measured against the existing technol- ogy and the knowledge and experience of those involved, Ranger was probably the most difficult and certainly one of the most frustrating projects everunder- taken by the Office of Space Science (OSS). Each mission carried a number of scientific instruments, each to be furnished by a scientist, most of whom worked at universities or other government laboratories. To demonstrate that the space- craft worked, the JPL Ranger project manager wanted to launch the first Ranger as soon as possible and viewed anything that stretched the schedule as an impedi- ment to be eliminated. The scientists, believing that their experiments were the objective of the Ranger project, found themselves in conflict with JPL and fre- quently with each other. The project manager also found that he could not get reliable information about the performance of the Atlas-Agena launch vehicle under development by the Department of Defense, and he did not know how many instruments he could accommodate. When NASA assigned responsibility to JPL to conduct the lunar and plan- etary program, the senior management of JPL argued that they needed their own scientific advisory structure to help them plan the program. They expected NASA Headquarters to approve the JPL program, send money, and then wait for the results. Responsible for the overall program and under pressure from Congress to beat the Soviets, however, NASA Headquarters chose not to delegate responsi- bility for formulation of the programs to its centers: JPL could conduct studies and make recommendations, but the final decisions would be made at Headquar- ters. Further, NASA money would be accompanied by technical directives that JPL must follow. There were also disagreements about who would select inves- tigators, JPL or NASA Headquarters. The first Ranger failed in August 1961, and five more failed before Ranger 7 transmitted beck more than 4,000 pictures of the lunar surface in July 1964. Rang- ers 8 and 9, the last two, also succeeded, and returned more than 17,000 high

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2 SCIENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE HUMAN EXPLORATION OF SPACE quality images of the lunar surface. A major share of Ranger's problems can be traced to the struggles of a new agency whose allocation of roles and responsibili- ties was still being established.2 Surveyor suffered delays and cost overruns. Atlas-Centaur, Surveyor's launch vehicle, failed on its first launch. In mid-1962, NASA eliminated the Surveyor orbiter and all of the lander' s scientific instruments except those needed to fulfill Apollo requirements. The cancellation of the Surveyor orbiter created pressure on OSS to develop an alternative lunar orbiter, because the Office of Manned Space Flight (OMSF) needed lunar photographs to select Apollo landing sites. The Space Science Board urged Congress to fund a lunar orbiter, which it did. In October 1962, in response to OMSF requirements and congressional pres- sure, OSS and OMSF formed a joint working group to plan a Lunar Orbiter pro- gram to map the lunar surface. Since JPL was already saturated with Ranger and Surveyor, as well as the Mariner project, this working group was asked to select a NASA center to develop the Lunar Orbiter. In early 1963, OSS started the Lunar Orbiter program at the Langley Research Center. Surveyor 1 landed on the Moon on June 2, 1966. Two months later, on August 10, 1966, Lunar Orbiter 1 returned its first pictures of the lunar surface. Five of the seven Surveyors succeeded, and all five Lunar Orbiters successfully completed their missions. By the time of their successful missions, the primary purpose of all three of these programs was to provide information that the Apollo project needed. In the Lunar Orbiter project, OMSF, which had overall responsibility for the Apollo program, had a customer-like relationship with OSS. That is, OMSF expressed its requirements to OSS and left it to OSS to obtain the needed data within speci- fied time constraints. Although OSS formulated and oversaw the development and operation of all three programs and took responsibility for delays and over- runs, the customer model is not an exact representation because OSS sought and maintained funding for these missions as well. After early problems, the man- agement approach evolved to successfully support the Apollo program and en- able ground-breaking lunar science. Several observations concerning the management of space science emerged from the experience of the early days of NASA's lunar exploration program. The chances of mission success are enhanced if the objectives of each specific project or mission are clearly specified. If the prime objective of a project is to gather engineering data on a new space system, for example, and the accomplishment of scientific experiments is a secondary objective, then that fact should be made clear to the scientists participating in the project. If the prime objective of the mission is to accomplish a scientific task, then that fact must be made equally clear to the project team, which should be judged by its success in accomplishing the scientific objectives of the mission, as well as by meeting schedule and bud- get commitments. Also, scientific goals can be pursued most effectively if con- ducted within the framework of a single space science program run by one NASA

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PRINCIPLES FOR SCIENCE MANAGEMENT 13 Headquarters office, and leaving selection of investigators to the Headquarters science office. Apollo, Skylab, Apollo-Soyuz The interactions between science and human spaceflight in Apollo, Skylab, and the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) were much more complicated than those in the Lunar Orbiter case. Apollo began strictly as a human spaceflight mission, as NASA's initial plans included no scientific experiments. But the Space Science Board's 1962 Iowa Summer Study examined the role for the hu- man in research on the lunar surface,3 and the Physics Committee, an OSS advi- sory group, proposed that the astronauts place optical corner reflectors on the Moon. Ultimately, a substantial lunar research program arose from these sugges- tions and from other experiments proposed by other NASA advisory groups. In the early 1960s, tension arose about the conduct of lunar science on Apollo should there continue to be one lunar science program formulated by OSS or should the Apollo project formulate and conduct its own lunar science program? How should the science program be defined and funded, and by whom? In March 1962, an ad hoc working group on Apollo lunar science was set up at the request of oMSF.4 The ad hoc working group met three times in early 1962 and submitted a report to the Iowa Summer Study held that summer. In the fall of 1962, the associate administrator of OSS moved to set up a more formal Joint Working Group on scientific lunar exploration and the development of sci- entific experiments for Apollo, structured to report to both OSS and OMSF. Dis- cussions between OSS and OMSF continued in 1963, leading in July 1963 to a reorganization of the Joint Working Group into the Manned Space Science Divi- sion, which continued to report to the two offices (Figure 2.1~. Selection and preliminary development of experiments were assigned to OSS, and development of flight hardware and integration to OMSF; each office bore the costs for its share of the experiment development. In September 1963, OMSF established a Manned Spaceflight Experiments Board to review all experiments, whether scientific experiments proposed by OSS, technology experiments proposed by NASA's Office of Advanced Research and Technology, or military experiments proposed by the Department of Defense (Figure 2.1 shows the NASA spaceflight organization at this time, including the Manned Space Science Division). The Manned Spaceflight Experiments Board examined the technical requirements of the experiments, such as the weight, ori- entation, and amount of power and astronaut time required. This board did not question the scientific merits of the scientific experiments that had been approved by the associate administrator for OSS, but, in his capacity as chairman of the board, the associate administrator for OMSF retained final approval authority for all experiments that flew on the Apollo missions. Some scientists believed that

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SCIENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE HUMAN EXPLORATION OF SPACE ADMINISTRATOR DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR 1 ~1 ASSOCIATE ADMINISTERS (OR _ r Director Traclcing and Data Acquisition Manned Space Science Division Manned Spacecraft Center Marshall Space Flight Center Kennedy Space Center Program Offices. 14 OFFICE OF OFFICE OF OFFICE OF MANNED SPACE SCIENCE AND ADVANCED RESEARCH FLIGHT APPLICATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY _ l _ _ l _ I . Program Offices* . _ ~1 OFFICE OF ADVANCED RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY Operations Office | Program Offices Goddard Space Flight Center Jet Propulsion Laboratory Wallops Station Ames Research Center Langley Lewis Flight Research Research Research Center Center Center FIGURE 2.1 NASA spaceflight organization, November 1963. SOURCE: Reprinted from W.D. Compton, Where No Man Has Gone Before: A History of Apollo Lunar Explo- ration Missions, NASA History Series, NASA SP-4214, NASA, Washington, D.C., 1989. this encroached on the OSS role in science selection and constituted an unneeded administrative burden. In September 1965, the deputy administrator of NASA issued a directive allocating responsibility for aspects of manned spaceflight programs. In part, it confirmed the existing OSS-OMSF agreement and provided that OMSF would

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PRINCIPLES FOR SCIENCE MANAGEMENT 15 have the responsibility of developing scientific experiments selected by OSS. It also provided that OMSF would fund the experiments. While disagreements between the staffs of OSS and OMSF did not disappear, this established the prin- ciple that there would be one space science program formulated by OSS. This imperfect arrangement continued until September 1967, when a NASA reorganization promoted OSS head Homer Newell to NASA Associate Adminis- trator and made Newell's former deputy, Edgar Cortright, deputy associate ad- ministrator of OMSF. Under Newell's oversight, OSS and OMSF shortly there- after created a joint Apollo Lunar Exploration Office to be staffed jointly by OMSF and OSS and to be physically and organizationally located in the OMSF Apollo Program Office (Figure 2.2~. A former OSS manager of the highly suc- cessful Lunar Orbiter program was designated the new director of lunar explora- tion. Reporting to him were four assistant directors, all experienced OSS pro- gram managers and program scientists. For administrative matters, hardware development, and funding status, the director of lunar exploration reported to the director of the Apollo program office, but for all scientific matters he reported to the associate administrator for OSS. Thus, the Lunar Exploration Office was established not as a liaison office or working group, but rather as an integral component of the Apollo program organization within OMSF, charged with re- sponsibility for lunar experiment hardware that would both meet the Apollo schedule and satisfy OSS science requirements. The arrangement proved successful, based on several important factors. Cortright, now deputy associate administrator of OMSF, knew and trusted the OSS people in the Lunar Exploration Office and hence could assure the director of the Apollo program office that they would accomplish the tasks assigned to them. At the same time, because the leaders of the office were all experienced OSS employees, they enjoyed the confidence and support of the associate admin- istrator of OSS and knew that when they had completed their work for the Apollo program they would return to OSS. Key to success were the shared recognition by OSS and OMSF of the need for a joint office and staffing of this office with experienced individuals of acknowledged achievement. Having proved its worth during the Apollo missions, the joint project office concept was also applied to the Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM), the solar obser- vatory operated by the astronauts on the Skylab space station (1973-1974~. OSS had already selected experiments for the Advanced Orbiting Solar Observatory (AOSO) prior to approval of Skylab. Forced to cancel AOSO because of a short- age of funds, OSS transferred the instruments to the ATM. The ATM project manager reported jointly to the associate administrator for OSS and the associate administrator for OMSF, just as in the case of Apollo. For the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP), the associate administrator for OSS was given the responsibility for selecting the experiments to be per- formed during the mission. After a false start resulting from a desire to expedite

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16 DIRECTOR Program Control Director Apollo Program 1 11 1 111 1 1 - SCIENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE HUMAN EXPLORATION OF SPACE Science and ASSOCIATE Technology _ _ ADMINISTRATOR Advisory _ __ FOR MANNED Committee SPACE FLIGHT 1 Bellcomm Inc. l I DIRECTOR MSF Field Center Development Manned Space Flight Expenments Board 1 ' DIRECTOR DIRECI OR MSF Management Space Operations Medicine Director Apollo Applications Program Director Advanced Manned Missions Program Program Control Director Lunar Exploration Systems En8. l Flight Lunar Development Science Test _ Operations Quality & _ I Reliability I Marshall l l Kennedy | Space Flight | | Space Center | Center 1 | Space I Shuttle L Task Force Manned Spacecraft Center Space Station | Task Force ~ FIGURE 2.2 Office of Manned Space Flight organization, 1969. SOURCE: Reprinted from W.D. Compton, Where No Man Has Gone Before: A History of Apollo Lunar Explo- ration Missions, NASA History Series, NASA SP-4214, NASA, Washington, D.C., 1989. selections, OSS assembled science working groups that successfully carried out a standard, if greatly accelerated, competitive selection process in just two months. Several lessons were learned from Apollo, Skylab, and ASTP about the con- duct of scientific research during human spaceflight. The formation of a joint program office, staffed by representatives of both NASA's science and human spaceflight offices, was shown to be an effective solution to the day-to-day ten

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PRINCIPLES FOR SCIENCE MANAGEMENT 17 signs that arose between advocates of human exploration and advocates of sci- ence concerning the scientific experiments conducted during the Apollo missions. In addition, unifying Apollo and ASTP science objectives and processes with ongoing science management processes of OSS avoided duplication of activities, provided more effective cross-fertilization among scientific disciplines, and mini- mized confusion among policymakers. In one sense, however, the Apollo man- agement approach reversed the earlier Lunar Orbiter approach: in Apollo, funds were sought and obtained for the science program by OMSF rather than by OSS, even though OSS selected the investigations to be carried out. Shuttle/Spacelab The relationship between the science and human spaceflight offices shifted again in the Space Shuttle/Spacelab program. After the completion of the Apollo Moon landings, lack of support for an expensive space program in the Administration and Congress closed the Saturn- Apollo production lines and led NASA to propose a new, low-cost launch ve- hicle, the reusable Shuttle, for transporting humans to and from Earth orbit. In 1969-1970, NASA hoped to develop the Shuttle and a space station in parallel. Financial guidelines imposed on NASA by the Administration, however, pre- cluded simultaneous development of two major human spaceflight systems. In 1971, when the members of NASA's Space Station Task Force found that the station had been postponed indefinitely, they abandoned work on it and, instead, turned to a pressurized, habitable container that the Shuttle could carry to and from orbit. Spacelab resulted from the work of the task force as a substitute for a continuously orbiting space station. In January 1972, the President approved the Shuttle program. In December 1972, the European Space Research Organization undertook to develop and manufacture Spacelab.5 There were disagreements within NASA and within the scientific commu- nity itself over the value of Shuttle/Spacelab. Scientists from disciplines that required long-duration observations or collection of data from orbits beyond those achievable by the Shuttle argued that a switch by NASA to the Shuttle/Spacelab system would leave them unable to conduct their research. Astronomers who had been disappointed by the loss of the first Orbiting Astronomical Observatory, on the other hand, were concerned about a national commitment to the Large Space Telescope (ultimately the Hubble Space Telescope) without a provision for the ability to repair any malfunctions. Within NASA, the associate administrator of OSS organized and co-chaired the Shuttle Payload Planning Steering Group. This group, made up of members of OSS and OMSF, worked to make sure that OMSF, which was developing the Shuttle, understood space science requirements and that OSS understood the ca- pabilities and constraints of the Shuttle. Out of these discussions emerged agree- ment on the need for upper stages for the Shuttle to place some scientific missions

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8 SCIENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE HUMAN EXPLORATION OF SPACE in higher orbits and a commitment by NASA that the Shuttle would be designed so that it would be able to launch and service the Hubble telescope, and that the Hubble telescope, in turn, would be able to be launched and serviced by the Shuttle. After establishing the scientific requirements, the associate administrator for OSS controlled all space science and life science payload activity during devel- opment and operation of the Spacelab. The associate administrator for OSS funded and managed their development, rather than have them funded by OMSF and managed by a joint OSS/OMSF Spacelab Program Office as was done in Apollo and Skylab. The NASA administrator directed the associate administra- tor for OSS to select the scientists (the "payload specialists") who would fly on the Shuttle and conduct experiments in the Spacelab. The associate administrator for OSS would also direct the activities of the Spacelab Payload Project at the Marshall Space Flight Center and select the final payload complement. This arrangement was nearly the opposite of that used for Lunar Orbiter. In the latter, the office responsible for human spaceflight set requirements for the science office for the data it needed to land humans on the Moon. In the case of the Shuttle/Spacelab program, the science office established "requirements" for the human spaceflight office to optimize the platform for science utilization. In reality, the fundamental characteristics of the Shuttle system were fixed by a complex network of budgetary, technological, and national security constraints, rather than being defined by scientific users. The resulting Shuttle capabilities were presented to the scientific community as an "opportunity" that could be adapted to a certain extent and exploited, for example by the Spacelab (and later Spacehab and other systems). During development, testing, and operation of Spacelab, OSS continued to control the payload activity. When Spacelab became operational, OSS continued to fund and manage the development of all space and life science payloads. OSS selected not only the scientific investigators, but also the scientists who flew as payload specialists in the Shuttle to conduct experiments. In spite of very high costs, greater than expected complexity, and initial skep- ticism of the science community, Shuttle/Spacelab has been successful in that some high-quality laboratory science has been accomplished. In addition, the Shuttle has been successfully used to repair and service the Solar Maximum Mis- sion and the Hubble Space Telescope, as well as subsequently to upgrade the scientific capabilities of the Hubble. Several lessons were learned from experi- ence with this program. First, science carried out within the context of human spaceflight needs the involvement of scientists at all stages of the program's conceptualization, development, and operation. This continuing involvement is necessary to ensure that realistic science goals are established that take advantage of human presence, and that missions, flight hardware, and procedures are de- signed to promote the accomplishment of science. In addition, the Spacelab pro- gram again confirmed the practice of the investigators being chosen by the sci

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PRINCIPLES FOR SCIENCE MANAGEMENT 19 once office rather than the program office responsible for flying the mission. In the Shuttle/Spacelab era, OSS budgeted for and managed science funding, simi- lar to the earlier Lunar Orbiter but in contrast to A polio. On the other hand, the Shuttle/Spacelab program reversed the customer relationship of Lunar Orbiter in the sense that OSS expressed accommodation requirements to OMSF, rather than OMSF tasking OSS with its data needs. MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES In summary, a structure that grew out of the debate during the formulation of the Ranger and Surveyor programs was successfully used for the Lunar Orbiter program of robotic spacecraft that provided data used to select landing sites for the A polio crews. During the early lunar exploration era, the office responsible for human spaceflight set requirements for the space science office in the sense that they told the science office what information they needed and when they needed it. The science office was given the management and budgetary authority to obtain needed data as it saw fit, albeit within a strict schedule. A more elabo- rate structure evolved during the A polio program, and subsequently the Skylab and A S T P programs, to explicitly manage the interaction between the space sci- ence and human spaceflight programs. During this era, a joint management team that included representatives of the science office and the spaceflight office over- saw the conduct of space science within the context of the larger exploration programs. A third structure evolved during the era of the Spacelab program of pressurized modules and unpressurized pallets flown in the cargo bay of the Shuttle. During this period, the team approach that proved so successful during A polio was largely abandoned, and the earlier model whereby the spaceflight office set requirements for the science office was essentially reversed, with the science office developing and negotiating requirements for orbital platforms to be designed, built, and launched by the spaceflight office. The direction of the "customer-provider" relationship, and the related issue of which party advocates and obtains the science funding, are important because of their impact on project implementation. This in turn bears on the importance of clear priorities and the organizational locus of science decision making. The committee identified three broad principles in its survey of the history of the interaction between space science and human spaceflight. Experience with the Ranger and A polio programs demonstrates that waste and duplicated effort are minimized, and clear lines of authority are delineated, if the scientific aspects of solar system exploration are the responsibility of a single Headquarters office. Thus, the first principle is the following: INTEGRATED SCIENCE PROGRAM The scientific study of specific planetary bodies, such as the Moon and Mars, should be treated as an integral part of an overall solar system science program and not separated out simply because there

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20 SCIENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE HUMAN EXPLORATION OF SPACE may be concurrent interest in human exploration of those bodies. Thus, there should be a single Headquarters office responsible for conducting the scientific aspects of solar system exploration. A common problem in programs with multiple goals is the relationship be- tween actual and perceived priority of those goals. This issue has arisen to vary- ing degrees in almost all of NASA's human-related space projects. Human ex- ploration is not undertaken primarily for scientific reasons, but it has important scientific elements.6 Thus it is essential that the relative priority of all the com- peting goals be well understood by all participants. Accordingly, the second broad principle is that clear objectives and priorities should be established at the level of individual component flight projects in the program in order to properly integrate science goals with the conscience goals of human exploration: CLEAR PROGRAM GOALS AND PRIORITIES A program of human space- ;flight will have political, engineering, and technological goals in addition to its scientific goals. To avoid confusion and misunderstandings, the objectives of each individual component project or mission that integrates space science and human space;flight should be clearly specified and prioritized. Although a human exploration program cannot be justified by scientific con- siderations alone, such missions have the potential, as noted in the committee's second report,7 to provide significant scientific opportunities. NASA's experi- ence indicates that the scientific return can be enhanced if there are good commu- nications and a cooperative working relationship between engineering imple- menters and the scientists. A demonstrated means of facilitating productive integration of space science and human spaceflight is to establish a joint office. Thus, a third broad principle is that space science conducted in the context of a human exploration program should be managed through a joint spaceflight and science program office: JOINT SPA CEFLIGHT/SCIENCE PROGRAM OFFICE The offices responsible for human spaceflight and space science should jointly establish and staff a pro- gram office to collaboratively implement the scientific component of human ex- ploration. As a model, that office should have responsibilities, functions, and reporting relationships similar to those that supported science in the Apollo, Skylab, and Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) missions. Chapter 3 considers these principles and their implications in further detail in the context of the committee' s two earlier reports.

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PRINCIPLES FOR SCIENCE MANAGEMENT 2 REFERENCES 1. For more details, see Homer E. Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years of Space Sci- ence, NASA SP-4211, NASA, Washington, D.C., 1980. 2. R. Cargill Hall, Lunar Impact: A History of Project Ranger, NASA SP-4210, NASA, Wash- ington, D.C., 1977. 3. Space Science Board, A Review of Space Research: The Report of the Summer Study Con- ducted Under the Auspices of the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences at the State University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, June 17-Aug. 10, 1962, Publication 1079, National Acad- emy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., 1962. 4. Details of the evolution of the relationship between science and the Apollo program are provided in Where No Man Has Gone Before: A History of Apollo Lunar Exploration Missions, by William D. Compton (NASA History Series, NASA SP-4214, NASA, Washington, D.C., 1989); see also Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years of Space Science, by Homer E. Newell (NASA History Series, NASA SP-4211, 1980). 5. Douglas R. Lord, SPA CELAB, an International Success Story, NASA SP-487, NASA, Wash- ington, D.C., 1987. 6. Space Studies Board, National Research Council, Scientific Prerequisites for the Human Exploration of Space, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1993. 7. Space Studies Board, National Research Council, Scientific Opportunities in the Human Ex- ploration of Space, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1994.