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1 Introduction The post-Apollo future of human space exploration beyond Earth orbit has been a subject of ongoing debate and study with little progress or commitment toward a clearly defined long-term goal since the late 1960s. In 1989, President Bush attempted to establish direction by announcing a long-term goal for the U.S. space program of returning humans to the Moon and then voyaging to Mars early in the 21st century. His proposal, termed the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI), was not followed by political action, nor has it been pursued by the current Ad- ministration. There is continued support for U.S. leadership in an International Space Station (ISS) program, however, whose utilization relates directly to a goal of long-duration human spaceflight. Indeed, the Committee on Human Explor- ation's first report, Scientific Prerequisitesfor the Human Exploration of Space, dealt specifically with the requirements for a microgravity research facility in space. Recently, NASA's associate administrators for space science and human ex- ploration issued a joint directive to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and Johnson Space Center to form a multicenter working group to fully integrate robotic and human Mars exploration planning.2 The integrated activity is intended to result in a proposal that can be brought forward for human exploration missions that could begin "sometime in the second decade of the next century." The committee based its second report, Scientific Opportunities in the Hu- man Exploration of Space,3 on the assumption that any program of human explo- ration of the solar system would have significant science content; in fact, most exploration studies4~9 depict science goals as major motivations for such a pro- gram. The November 1996 directive cited above specifically identifies "science planning and science strategy" as a focus area for the integrated planning effort. s

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6 SCIENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE HUMAN EXPLORATION OF SPACE Although no science requirement has been identified that can be met only by a human presence, the committee believes that the scientific community should take the initiative in determining what space science goals might benefit from a human spaceflight program, given that such a program exists primarily for other reasons. In contemplating involvement with human flight programs, many space sci enlists are conditioned by the fact that, despite notable successes and benefits, interactions between the scientific and human spaceflight communities have sometimes been marked by friction and dubious accommodation. Both the suc- cesses and failures constitute important lessons for any future human exploration program; while preparing its reports on the enabling (prerequisite) and enabled (opportunistic) sciences for a human exploration program, the committee recog- nized the value of reviewing the history of space science programs carried out within the larger context of a human exploration program. Thus, the committee and the Space Studies Board set out to determine what attributes of past pro- grams, particularly management attributes, might minimize the conflict and maxi- mize the potential for a productive integration of science with human exploration. . APPROACH The committee identified several broad principles that have contributed to mission success in the past. In doing so the committee made use of histories by John Naugle,~i Homer Newell, and William Compton,~3 as well as the recollec- tions and judgments of committee and Space Studies Board members, many of whom played major roles in the evolution of these principles. These inputs were augmented by views solicited from representatives of the current and past space science and human exploration program offices at NASA. To aid in identifying the effects of different management structures and ap- proaches, the committee first reviewed the history of space science programs conducted in the context of human exploration, including the robotic program that preceded Apollo. It then analyzed those programs that involved interactions between space science and human spaceflight in terms of where mission require- ments were defined and where authority for experiment selection and responsi- bility for funding were vested. The resulting groupings are loosely referred to as management models, although they also happen to correspond to distinct eras in the evolution of NASA's programs. The committee also considered the historical development of space biomedicine a disciplinary area identified in its Prereq- uisites report as critical to future human exploration programs. The committee then extracted lessons learned and developed some general principles that could be applied to future programs.

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INTRODUCTION 7 MANAGEMENT OF THE CLASSICAL (ROBOTIC) SPACE SCIENCE PROGRAM During most of NASA's existence, the Office of Space Science (OSS)14 has formulated, funded, and executed NASA's space science program. Advised by the Space Studies Boardi5 and assisted by the scientific community, OSS estab- lished long-range objectives, devised missions, selected scientists to conduct ex- periments, and planned the data analysis program. OSS funded all robotic mis- sions, including those conducted to gather data in support of Apollo. It budgeted for the scientific instruments, the spacecraft, and the conduct of flight operations. Prior to the advent of the Space Shuttle, OSS budgeted for and procured the expendable launch vehicles used to launch NASA's spacecraft. (In recent times, the budget for expendable launch vehicles has been restored to OSS.) OSS se- lected a NASA field center to manage each mission, and that center appointed a project manager and a project scientist to implement the mission. Policies and procedures for robotic space science missions emerged during the early days of the space program from a vigorous process in which the merits of alternative procedures were debated. In many cases, procedures used to man- age successful scientific projects were generalized and incorporated into formal NASA policy. The approach adopted proved fruitful, especially in planetary ex- ploration, but also in physics and astronomy. The scientific data that came from Ranger (ultimately), Surveyor, and Apollo; from planetary programs such as Mariner, Viking, Voyager, and Magellan; from space physics missions such as the Explorers, Pioneers, and Orbiting Solar Observatories, and from astronomy programs such as the Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM) on Skylab, the Orbiting Astronomical Observatory, the International Ultraviolet Explorer, the Compton Gamma Ray Observatory, the Cosmic Background Explorer, and the Hubble Space Telescope demonstrate the effectiveness of NASA's evolved policies and practices. A NEW ENVIRONMENT Those who created the structure to manage science in the Apollo program had a relatively clean slate to work with, but this will not be so in the future. Officials directing a future human exploration program will have to work within, or modify, deeply ingrained policies, procedures, and cultures built up by NASA and the scientific community over 40 years. In addition, NASA has entered into a cooperative research relationship with the National Institutes of Health, for ex- ample, which could play a role in gathering the enabling biomedical data needed to support extended space missions by humans. Similarly, future human explora- tion missions are likely to involve significant international collaboration, as does the ISS program today. As a consequence, participants external to NASA may play an increased role in structuring or implementing the program.

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8 SCIENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE HUMAN EXPLORATION OF SPACE A future human exploration program is not likely to be a spent to a single, scheduled event, as was the Apollo landing on the Moon. A more probable ap- proach is a phased one using, perhaps, the "go as you pay" strategy recommended in the report of the Augustine Committee. i7 Indeed, the November 1996 directive provides that the requested planning proposal be "credible in all respects: techni- cally, scientifically, fiscally, with respect to nsk, etc." No management arrangement can substitute for effective leadership. Such leadership will be required to identify and resolve cultural and other conflicts that will likely arise in such a large, complex, and expensive endeavor as returning humans to the Moon or traveling to Mars. The International Space Station pro- gram offers an opportunity to experiment and to begin forging a consensus on an optimal management approach. This could lead to a closer integration of the science and human exploration communities than has been achieved in the past, with a commensurate increase in both the likelihood of a human exploration pro- gram and the ultimate scientific return from it. NOTES AND REFERENCES Space Studies Board, National Research Council, Scientific Prerequisites for the Human Exploration of Space, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1993. 2. Letter to the directors of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and Johnson Space Center from Asso- ciate Administrators Wilbur Trafton, Arnauld Nicogossian, and Wesley Huntress, November 7, 1996; a press release announcing a cooperative activity to jointly fund and manage two robotic missions to Mars due for launch in 2001 was issued on March 25, 1997: "Space Science and Human Space Flight Enterprises Agree to Joint Robotic Mars Lander Mission," NASA Release 97-51. 3. Space Studies Board, National Research Council, Scientific Opportunities in the Human Ex- ploration of Space, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1994. 4. President's Science Advisory Committee, Joint Space Panels, The Space Program in the Post-Apollo Period, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., February 1967. 5. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Beyond the Earth's Boundaries: Human Exploration of the Solar System in the 21st Century, NASA, Washington, D.C., 1988. 6. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Leadership and America's Future in Space, NASA, Washington, D.C., 1987. 7. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Report of the 90-day Study on Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars, NASA, Washington, D.C., 1989. 8. Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program' Report of the Advisory Com- mittee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program (the "Augustine report"), U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1990. 9. Synthesis Group, America at the Threshold, Report of the Synthesis Group on America's Space Exploration Initiative, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1991. 10. Space Studies Board, National Research Council, Scientific Prerequisites for the Human Exploration of Space, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1993; Space Studies Board, Na- tional Research Council, Scientific Opportunities in the Human Exploration of Space, National Acad- emy Press, Washington, D.C., 1994. 11. John E. Naugle, First Among Equals: The Selection of NASA Space Science Experiments, NASA SP-4215, NASA, Washington, D.C., 1991, pp. 79-196. 12. Homer E. Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years of Space Science, NASA SP-4211, NASA, Washington D.C., 1980.

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INTRODUCTION 9 13. William D. Compton, Where No Man Has Gone Before: A History of Apollo Lunar Explora- tion Missions, NASA History Series, NASA SP-4214, NASA, Washington, D.C., 1989. 14. In the past, the office has been either the Office of Space Science (OSS) or the Office of Space Science and Applications (OSSA), depending on whether some or all of space applications, microgravity science, or life science were combined with space science. The report uses the OSS acronym in a general sense. 15. Formed in 1988 from the union of the Space Science Board and elements of the former Space Applications Board. 16. Office of Technology Assessment, NASA's Office of Space Science and Applications: Pro- cess, Priorities, and Goals, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., January 1992. 17. Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, Report of the Advisory Com- mittee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1990, pp. 6, 28, and 48. 18. Letter to the directors of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and Johnson Space Center from Associate Administrators Wilbur Trafton, Arnauld Nicogossian, and Wesley Huntress, November 7, 1996.