National Academy of Sciences | 150 Year Anniversary

Questions? Call 800-624-6242

| Items in cart [0]

The National Academies Press

PAPERBACK
price:$57.00
add to cart

Rights & Permissions

topleft topright

Transforming Post-Communist Political Economies (1998)
Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education (CBASSE)

Citation Manager

. "14 Pension Reform in the Post-Communist Transition Economics." Transforming Post-Communist Political Economies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 1998.

Please select a format:

BibTeX EndNote RefMan


Page
375
bottomleft bottomright

The following HTML text is provided to enhance online readability. Many aspects of typography translate only awkwardly to HTML. Please use the page image as the authoritative form to ensure accuracy.


Transforming Post-Communist Political Economies

the working generation to abrogate. This may be the greatest social cost of the central planning pension legacy.

PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE

Almost without exception, the debate about pension reform in the post-communist states is about what kind of system should be put in place for the pensioners of the twenty-first century—today's workers. Most countries envision leaving the pensions already granted to current pensioners as is (with some form of purchasing power guarantee, either partial or full), as the politics of taking away a benefit already granted are almost insurmountable.

In demographically mature countries, old-age security systems should achieve the following goals:

  • Prevent poverty in old age.

  • Assist with income smoothing by supporting savings and insuring against the risk of long life.

  • Equitably support economic growth and development.

While the systems of the post-communist states have been effective in preventing old-age poverty during the transition, they have done so at a cost, as discussed above, and thus have not contributed to the third goal above. The high and growing number of the aging relative to workers means that this cost will only continue to rise. By relying on pay-as-you-go funding, these systems have also not encouraged savings.

Based on an analysis of pension systems around the world, the World Bank (1994) recommends a combination of pay-as-you-go and funded pension systems.3 Achieving such an arrangement involves setting up a multipillar system that includes the following elements:

  • Pillar 1—a mandatory pay-as-you-go public pension system designed to provide an income floor for all elderly persons

  • Pillar 2—a mandatory funded and privately managed pension system—one whose current reserves are equal to or greater than the present value of all future pension payment liabilities, based on personal accounts (the Latin American approach) or occupational plans (the OECD approach)

  • Pillar 3—a voluntary system (also funded and privately managed), with strong government regulation, to provide for additional savings and insurance.

Reform of pension systems to bring them closer to the World Bank's recommendations implies (1) longer working lives and (2) less income re

3  

Similar recommendations are offered in Disney (1996). For a critique of these recommendations, see Beattie and McGillivray (1995). James (1996) offers a response.

Page
375
Front Matter (R1-R14)
Introduction (1-10)
Understanding Economic Change (11-18)
Underground Activity and Institutional Change: Productive, Protective, and Predatory Behavior in Transition Economies (19-34)
1 Property Rights in Transition Economies: A Commentary on What Economists Know (35-60)
2 Rethinking the Theory of Economic Policy: Some Implications of the New Institutionalism (61-79)
3 Missed Markets: Implications for Economic Behavior and Institutional Change (80-101)
4 Fuzzy Property: Rights, Power, and Identity in Transylvania's Decollectivization (102-117)
5 Rule Evasion in Transitional Russia (118-130)
Restructing Production Without Market Infrastructure (131-155)
6 Learning in Networks: Enterprise Behavior in the Former Soviet Union and Contemporary Russia (156-176)
7 Formal Employment and Survival Strategies After Communism (177-202)
8 Observations on the Speed of Transition in Russia: Prices and Entry (203-222)
9 Social Policy and the Labor Market in Russia During Transition (223-244)
Social Costs, Social-Sector Reforms, and Politics in Post-Communism Transformations (245-271)
10 Reform of the Welfare Sector in the Post-Communist Countries: A Normative Approach (272-298)
11 Social Policy Challenges and Dilemmas in Ex-Socialist Systems (299-321)
12 Health Reform in Russia and Central Asia (322-350)
13 Vulnerable Populations in Central Europe (351-369)
14 Pension Reform in the Post-Communist Transition Economics (370-384)
15 From Safety Nets to Social Policy: Lessons for the Transition Economies for the Developing Countries (385-400)
Democracy, Social Change, and Economies in Transition (401-410)
16 The State in a Market Economy (411-431)
17 The State as an Ensemble of Economic Actors: Some Inferences from China's Trajectory of Change (432-452)
18 Possible Future Directions for Economies in Transition (453-470)
Research Priorities for Post-Communist Economies (471-490)
Appendix: Further Reading (491-496)
Index (497-514)