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Transforming Post-Communist Political Economies (1998)
Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education (CBASSE)

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. "14 Pension Reform in the Post-Communist Transition Economics." Transforming Post-Communist Political Economies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 1998.

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Transforming Post-Communist Political Economies

placement from tax-funded pay-as-you-go systems. The post-communist states need to place greater reliance on prefunding of pension obligations (with private management of reserves) to (1) smooth out contribution rates as the "baby boomers" retire, and (2) deepen capital markets, and thus enhance growth, through the development of a contractual savings industry. The main difficulty in applying these recommendations in transition economies is that prefinancing in a mature pay-as-you-go system implies that the members of one generation must bear an additional burden—saving for their own retirement while simultaneously paying for that of their parents.4 This is affordable only if the current transfers can be gradually reduced through a major reform.

In the typical post-communist system, governments can reduce future entitlements by the following means:

  • Raising the effective retirement age (eliminating early retirement and raising the normal retirement age)

  • Changing the formula to lower the average benefit

  • Reducing indexation provisions (to, for example, the lower of wage or price increases)

Prefunding can be achieved in the public system only by building up a reserve fund. The World Bank (1994) recommends that these reserves be allocated to individual accounts (the Latin American approach), as this reduces the "taxation" element of the public pension system, thereby reducing labor market distortions. It also improves the management of the reserves. Funding can also begin through the development of optional, privately managed programs (private pension systems).

Few governments in Eastern Europe have tackled this entire agenda. All of the Baltic countries, Albania, Georgia, and the Czech Republic have tackled major parts of it, with some success. Of these, only Latvia and Georgia have adopted radical pension reforms. While Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Estonia have been able to avoid the kinds of pension cost explosions faced by Poland, Bulgaria, and Slovenia, even the former three countries are experiencing steady growth in expenditures, as they have simply not reformed entitlements sufficiently. Estonia was able to implement a steady increase in retirement age, but left in place all the exemptions from the Soviet period, even adding a few. Lithuania and the Czech Republic courageously eliminated almost all early retirement, but chose generous formulas as they attempted to return to the status quo ex ante. Lithuania and Estonia have also

4  

Strictly speaking, the savings of the working generation is not a "burden" since the money saved will come back to them later. Saving represents postponed consumption, however, which has a cost. Were the members of this generation able to obtain from future generations the equivalent on a per capita basis to what they are transferring, they would be better off than under a reformed approach that includes more funding and less reliance on current transfers. However, this is an unrealistic scenario.

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Front Matter (R1-R14)
Introduction (1-10)
Understanding Economic Change (11-18)
Underground Activity and Institutional Change: Productive, Protective, and Predatory Behavior in Transition Economies (19-34)
1 Property Rights in Transition Economies: A Commentary on What Economists Know (35-60)
2 Rethinking the Theory of Economic Policy: Some Implications of the New Institutionalism (61-79)
3 Missed Markets: Implications for Economic Behavior and Institutional Change (80-101)
4 Fuzzy Property: Rights, Power, and Identity in Transylvania's Decollectivization (102-117)
5 Rule Evasion in Transitional Russia (118-130)
Restructing Production Without Market Infrastructure (131-155)
6 Learning in Networks: Enterprise Behavior in the Former Soviet Union and Contemporary Russia (156-176)
7 Formal Employment and Survival Strategies After Communism (177-202)
8 Observations on the Speed of Transition in Russia: Prices and Entry (203-222)
9 Social Policy and the Labor Market in Russia During Transition (223-244)
Social Costs, Social-Sector Reforms, and Politics in Post-Communism Transformations (245-271)
10 Reform of the Welfare Sector in the Post-Communist Countries: A Normative Approach (272-298)
11 Social Policy Challenges and Dilemmas in Ex-Socialist Systems (299-321)
12 Health Reform in Russia and Central Asia (322-350)
13 Vulnerable Populations in Central Europe (351-369)
14 Pension Reform in the Post-Communist Transition Economics (370-384)
15 From Safety Nets to Social Policy: Lessons for the Transition Economies for the Developing Countries (385-400)
Democracy, Social Change, and Economies in Transition (401-410)
16 The State in a Market Economy (411-431)
17 The State as an Ensemble of Economic Actors: Some Inferences from China's Trajectory of Change (432-452)
18 Possible Future Directions for Economies in Transition (453-470)
Research Priorities for Post-Communist Economies (471-490)
Appendix: Further Reading (491-496)
Index (497-514)