Cover Image

PAPERBACK
$57.00



View/Hide Left Panel

years, however, a new theory of institutions based on the economics of property rights and transaction costs has earned a measure of recognition among economists.

Although institutional analysis could potentially complement standard macro- and microeconomic theory in the design of policies for economic development, it has yet to develop a strong policy orientation.1 This chapter introduces institutional analysis to the old theory of economic policy—to its policy models and its instruments, targets, and policy measures—in the hope that the new institutionalism will reveal its policy implications when viewed against the background of the traditional policy world. More particularly, the chapter explores the ways information scarcity affects policies aimed at social transformation.

The next section briefly summarizes the old theory of economic policy, associated with the Dutch economist Jan Tinbergen (1956). This is followed by an examination of three policy issues that were not a central concern of mainstream economics in the early post-war period: (1) the requirements of structural policy, (2) the need to extend the policy model, and (3) the implications of information scarcity. The chapter then presents a public policy view of the new institutionalism; problems of incomplete data and control and of incomplete models and decisions suggest an intricate policy world. Next is a discussion of the policy determinacy implicit in rational-choice political economy. The final section looks at the general policy implications of institutional analysis for major social transformations, such as those attempted in Eastern Europe and in the Third World.

THE OLD THEORY OF ECONOMIC POLICY

In a perceptive discussion of the theory of economic policy, Hansen ( 1963) emphasizes the central role of models in policy formulation. As almost all policy aims at influencing economic outcomes or processes, policymakers—politicians, administrators, social scientists, voters, or rulers—must rely on a model, or a description of the economic system, which sometimes is little more than a rough qualitative picture (Hansen, 1963:3). It is argued below that the information assumptions of institutional analysis assume that actors employ incomplete and variable models of their environments when attempting to advance their public or private policies.

1  

The recent interest in institutions has stimulated work along various lines, including studies that use biological and evolutionary metaphors. The old institutionalism also appears to be thriving once again. This chapter is concerned only with that segment of institutional analysis that is based on methodological individualism and is predicated on some form of rational behavior in various information environments (Eggertsson [1990, surveys this work). The alternative institutional approaches are even less concerned with policy than the work discussed here.



The National Academies | 500 Fifth St. N.W. | Washington, D.C. 20001
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Terms of Use and Privacy Statement