While denying the adversary information, the Department of the Navy may also need to employ active measures to manipulate, corrupt, or destroy information as necessary. Use of methods such as jamming, deception, and psychological operations can be continued and extended through capabilities provided by rapid growth worldwide of information technologies for activities such as network-based operations.

These requirements are complicated by the Navy's increasing dependence on, and interconnectivity with, public and commercial information sources and infrastructure elements. The commercial aspects of the Navy Department's information environment must not prevent its effective exploitation and protection of the information infrastructure or content. The associated challenges must be aggressively recognized, analyzed, and acted upon.

This chapter discusses the technical areas that support the development of an effective capability to conduct information operations and warfare in the time frame of 2035. While the discussion focuses on specific technologies, the crucial importance of people and organizations, particularly in creating and maintaining a robust defensive posture, must not be overlooked. In particular, the panel argues that the Department of the Navy should:

  • Continue to exercise the full spectrum of IW in an effort to establish policy and procedures in preparation for hostilities or conflict such that it involves all levels of government-military leadership;

  • Continue to make IW activities operational, integrating defensive and offensive elements at the control of the warfighter and developing a clear operational vision of what really can and what really cannot (or will not) be accomplished with IW; and

  • Invest in specific technology applications, including those that can support countermeasures and defensive capabilities, offensive capabilities, and intelligence support activities, as detailed in this chapter.


Because of the fundamental changes in the worldwide information environment described in this study, it is crucial that the warfighter have a clear vision of what he can and cannot do in the information dimension in terms of warfare activities. The ownership of infrastructure elements and information content is a significant issue to be considered. There has been considerable hand waving about attacking an adversary's information and/or supporting infrastructure in order to deny him the use and leveraging capabilities of information, but the lessons learned from a number of military exercises seem to indicate that to date little well-thought-out policy or practice has been developed. There are three issues here:

The National Academies | 500 Fifth St. N.W. | Washington, D.C. 20001
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Terms of Use and Privacy Statement