National Academy of Sciences | 150 Year Anniversary

Questions? Call 800-624-6242

| Items in cart [0]

The National Academies Press

PAPERBACK
price:$46.75
add to cart

Rights & Permissions

topleft topright

Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035 Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 3: Information in Warfare (1997)
Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications (CPSMA)

Citation Manager

. "5 INFORMATION WARFARE." Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035 Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 3: Information in Warfare. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 1997.

Please select a format:

BibTeX EndNote RefMan


Page
93
bottomleft bottomright

The following HTML text is provided to enhance online readability. Many aspects of typography translate only awkwardly to HTML. Please use the page image as the authoritative form to ensure accuracy.


Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force, Volume 3 Information in Warfare

SUMMARY

The Department of the Navy must be able to manage and defend its information posture, including its information vulnerability, in the coming era of prolific information gatherers and promulgators. While doing this, the Navy Department must be able to deny information to adversaries as well as manipulate and/or attack it.

There are technology thrust areas that, if pursued, would provide the Department of the Navy with significant capabilities in information operations and information warfare. These technology thrust areas are based on the estimated evolutionary path of the global information environment in which the Navy Department will operate.

These capabilities must include both the content and infrastructure aspects of information.

None of this is inexpensive. There is clearly a tradeoff between the technological investments required to fully exploit the potential of IO and IW and the ongoing capitalization requirements of the more conventional platforms and weapons systems. The Navy Department must make these difficult tradeoffs to lay a foundation for its future ability to use information and information systems to support naval operations.

Page
93