1
Human Resource Issues for the Navy and Marine Corps

A most difficult aspect of the task facing the Panel on Human Resources involved seeing over the horizon—anticipating developments and requirements that will be present in the year 2035. How might the United States have developed training for World War II before we fought World War I? How might our nation have prepared for the Korean War in, say, 1920?

Revolutionary breakthroughs are rare and, by definition, difficult to foresee. It is possible, however, to extrapolate developments that are evolving from current technology and global trends. The panel sought to determine what might be done now to encourage the evolution of capabilities and practices that will ensure the effective and efficient acquisition and management of human resources needed by the Navy and Marine Corps to meet operational requirements in 2035. The panel specifically tried to identify areas in which relatively small investments are likely to yield substantial returns.

Some aspects of the operational environment likely to exist in 2035 could have a substantial impact on the development and management of human resources and deserve emphasis here. The panel assumed the following:

  • Service personnel will be inundated with technology and information.

  • Fewer people will be required or available for Navy and Marine Corps missions, but the investment in those people will be greater. Individuals will have more training, autonomy, decision-making responsibility, and military value.

  • Many operations will involve joint and/or multinational forces. Service personnel will have to deal successfully with organizational and cultural diversity and to coordinate their operations with both military and civilian organizations.



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1 Human Resource Issues for the Navy and Marine Corps A most difficult aspect of the task facing the Panel on Human Resources involved seeing over the horizon—anticipating developments and requirements that will be present in the year 2035. How might the United States have developed training for World War II before we fought World War I? How might our nation have prepared for the Korean War in, say, 1920? Revolutionary breakthroughs are rare and, by definition, difficult to foresee. It is possible, however, to extrapolate developments that are evolving from current technology and global trends. The panel sought to determine what might be done now to encourage the evolution of capabilities and practices that will ensure the effective and efficient acquisition and management of human resources needed by the Navy and Marine Corps to meet operational requirements in 2035. The panel specifically tried to identify areas in which relatively small investments are likely to yield substantial returns. Some aspects of the operational environment likely to exist in 2035 could have a substantial impact on the development and management of human resources and deserve emphasis here. The panel assumed the following: Service personnel will be inundated with technology and information. Fewer people will be required or available for Navy and Marine Corps missions, but the investment in those people will be greater. Individuals will have more training, autonomy, decision-making responsibility, and military value. Many operations will involve joint and/or multinational forces. Service personnel will have to deal successfully with organizational and cultural diversity and to coordinate their operations with both military and civilian organizations.

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Units will be dispersed, but most operations will require rapid task organizing and training for preparation of forces. The Department of the Navy will require the capability to determine quickly and accurately the location and capabilities of units and individuals and their specialized skills and knowledge. Responsibilities for missions other than war (i.e., peacekeeping, peace imposition, disaster relief, and counter-terrorism) will continue. These missions will require rapid, ad hoc preparations for unusual and unforeseen contingencies. Biological and chemical threats will increase. On the basis of these considerations, the panel arrived at eight strategic objectives. It was the consensus of the panel that these objectives require and deserve the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) if our nation's naval forces are to develop and maintain the human resources—the human performance and competence—they will need to meet the challenges of the 21st century. These eight strategic objectives are discussed in the remainder of this report. RECRUITING PEOPLE OF ABOVE-AVERAGE ABILITY Recruit a higher proportion of people with above-average abilities, including already trained people through lateral entry, and retain high performers for longer periods. The quality of the fighting force can be linked directly to the quality of recruits entering the Navy and Marine Corps. The quality of recruits can be measured within a two-by-two matrix based on high school degree and score on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). The highest-quality recruits are high school diploma graduates (HSDGs) who score within the upper half of the AFQT. As a group, high school dropouts, including those who go back for a general equivalency diploma (GED), and recruits in the lower mental category perform more poorly on all performance criteria than do HSDGs. High quality in recruits implies better individual performance and better unit performance. Much research has shown that high-quality recruits are more likely to complete their first term of service, less likely to be demoted or receive nonjudicial punishment, and more likely to be promoted faster and further than others. Strong evidence of these benefits comes from a misnorming incident of the late 1970s.1 Test scores on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) were misnormed so that recruits received highly inflated scores on the AFQT, the test composite that determines eligibility for service. Because of this 1   Schratz, M.K., and M.J. Ree. 1989. "Enlisted Selection and Classification: Advances in Testing," Military Personnel Measurement: Testing, Assignment, Evaluation, M.F. Wiskoff and G.M. Rampton, eds., Praeger Publishers, New York.

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error, about 30 percent of the recruits fell into the lowest acceptable category (i.e., Category IV), six times the percentage being reported then. In the aftermath of this problem, Congress ordered the armed services to validate the ASVAB as a selection device using hands-on tests of performance. Analysis of the results of these new tests indicated that the Department of Defense (DOD) lost about $3 billion in productivity as a result of this inadvertently poor selection of recruits for service. Over the past few years, the attrition gap between the highest-quality recruits and others appears to be growing. This trend suggests the importance of increasing the quality of people as technology increasingly pervades naval operations. Recent research has shown that the recruit quality of crews in operating units such as surface combatants is positively correlated with higher unit readiness as measured by Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) scores.2 The SORTS reporting system incorporates four areas of unit readiness: personnel, training, materiel, and equipment and supply. Each of these four areas improves as the quality of the crew improves. SELECTIVE RECRUITING THROUGH MORE LATERAL ENTRIES The Navy and Marine Corps, like the other Services, take a bifurcated approach to recruiting. Most enlisted recruits are high school graduates, and most officers are college graduates or beyond. This model was fine in the past because most young people fell into one or the other of these two categories. In the future, continuation of current recruiting practices may become increasingly problematic because more and more young people are graduating with associate degrees from community colleges and so fall between the two categories. Today, there is nearly one graduate from a community college for every two high school graduates not going to college. The Navy Department recruits only about 400 yearly of the more than half a million associate degree graduates, however. Navy and Marine Corps recruiters should consider entering this large market of skilled people—a market that is growing while the Navy's traditional personnel market is decreasing. Lateral entry can provide the means by which people with skills that have been developed in the civilian economy can be invited or induced into the Services so that those skills and knowledge can be made directly available to the military. This approach is consistent with the adopt-and-adapt philosophy that emerged in this study as a useful strategy for the Navy and Marine Corps. Community college graduates offer several advantages. First, on average, they have higher test scores than high school graduates. Second, they have lower attrition rates than high school graduates. Finally, many community college 2   Jondrow, J.M., L.J. Junor, J.S. Oi, M.T. Robinson, and M.M. Simons. 1995. Measuring the Status of Readiness and Personnel Quality, CAB 95-75, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Va.

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graduates have skills and training that normally must be provided through the Navy's own training investments. By recruiting community college graduates and taking advantage of their skills, it may be possible to avoid some training costs. The Department of the Navy may well be able to take a more proactive role in this activity. It could work with community colleges, perhaps through the American Association of Community Colleges, to suggest curriculum and curricular changes that would produce graduates who are specifically prepared for Navy and Marine Corps careers. One way in which technology can be employed to extend recruiting onto community college campuses is to expand recruiting efforts on the Internet. In only a few years, employment sites have become quite common on the Internet. Internet sites can be used to post job announcements and to provide general information and advertising. Advertising on the Internet has quickly become as sophisticated as advertising using other media. In any case, the Navy will need to modernize its recruiting procedures and marketing efforts in order to remain competitive. Recruiting more extensively from the community college market will pose challenges to both the recruiting and the training community. Recruiters may have to provide new incentives such as advanced pay grades, scholarships, and recruiting bonuses. The training system may have to become more flexible to manage people with different incoming skill levels. Review of past Navy Department programs for lateral entry and analysis of lessons learned from them will be needed to recommend policies and procedures for similar programs to be initiated today or in the future.3 KEEPING PEOPLE LONGER Overall, the Navy's retention pattern falls somewhere between the extremes of the Air Force (on the high side) and the Marine Corps (on the lowest side). The desired retention rate for the first term of Navy service is close to 50 percent. In contrast, the Marine Corps wants to keep only about 20 percent of those completing their first term. The comparable Air Force rate is 60 percent. Increases in the retention rate have positive benefits for the Navy. First, if the Navy keeps more of its people, it will have to recruit and train fewer. Given the problem of early attrition, the Navy now needs to recruit more than 1.5 recruits to get one sailor to the end of his first term. Easing the attrition problem will also ease recruiting. Second, as discussed below, more experienced personnel are more productive. Three major factors that historically have affected Navy retention are (1) relative military and civilian pay, (2) the tempo or pace of personnel deployments 3   See, for example, Tyson, K.W., and S.A. Horowitz. 1992. Lateral Entry of Military Personnel, IDA Paper P-2565, Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, Va.

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(PERSTEMPO), and (3) sea-shore rotation. During the 1980s the average wage of young men, the main source of military personnel, fell relative to inflation. After large pay raises in the early 1980s, military pay remained flat relative to inflation. Studies and analyses4 have suggested that these trends contributed to the general improvement in force personnel quality. The Navy uses the following three rules for managing PERSTEMPO: Units cannot be deployed for more than six months at a time; Over a five-year period, a unit cannot be away from home port for more than half the time; and The turnaround time, or time between deployments, must be at least twice as long as the length of the deployment. These rules have been instituted as a way to manage retention. The fear is that violating them will cause significant numbers of sailors to leave the Navy. At least one study5 suggests, however, that expanding deployments beyond six months does not necessarily decrease retention. The study, covering deployments between 1977 and 1988, examined the relationship between PERSTEMPO and retention. Deployments were divided into four categories: short (4 to 5 months), normal (about 6 months), long (about 7 months), and very long (8 or more months). Statistically, the study was unable to distinguish among the retention behavior for sailors on short, normal, and long deployments; it showed little impact from the increased length of deployment. Fleet sailors have suggested one caveat to these findings. Some of the long deployments were associated with challenging and exceptional deployments (crisis responses), which tend to boost morale. The impact of these deployments on the morale of fleet sailors' families remains to be determined. If the Navy has fewer platforms but faces a steady stream of humanitarian, crisis response, and other missions, it may encounter increasing problems in PERSTEMPO. With changes in technology, the time between maintenance cycles is likely to increase, and units will remain on station longer. PERSTEMPO will increasingly become a driving factor in ship schedules. To alleviate some of the retention pressures associated with higher PERSTEMPO, the Navy may have to investigate ideas such as rotating crews and not ships—a concept similar to use of the Navy's blue-gold crews for ballistic missile submarines. The difference is that crews or portions of crews could be flown out to deployed ships, which 4   Jondrow, J.M., L.J. Junor, J.S. Oi, M.T. Robinson, and M.M. Simons. 1995. Measuring the Status of Readiness and Personnel Quality, CAB 95-75, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Va. 5   Cooke, T.W., A.J. Marcus, and A.O. Quester. 1992. Personnel Tempo of Operations and Navy Enlisted Retention, CRM 91-150, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Va., February.

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would remain on station. This approach would increase the coverage of a smaller fleet without unduly affecting retention. Sea-to-shore rotation is another factor that may influence retention. Increases in the amount of sea duty are traditionally associated with lower retention. This fact will be of particular significance in the coming century because of outsourcing. Outsourcing is likely to have a much greater impact on shore billets than on sea billets. The Navy's current plan to outsource 30,000 military billets will increase the average sea-to-shore rotation from about 3.7 years at sea for each 3 years ashore now to about 5.7 years at sea for each 3 years ashore in the next century. Another form of rotation might be tried. For some occupational areas, careers might be designed with alternating military and civilian billets. An individual might spend 5 years in a military billet followed by 5 years in a civilian billet, followed by 5 years in a military billet, and so forth. The intention would be to increase both retention and competence for billets in some designated career fields. Analyses would be required to determine if this sort of rotation might accomplish these desirable ends. The CNO should appoint a committee to devise a comprehensive strategy for improving the conditions of sea duty. Such a strategy will need to cross many boundaries within the Navy from acquisition to personnel policies to fleet operations. Engineering reduced manning into ships and reducing the drudgery required to maintain them could be dual goals of the acquisition process. Personnel policies such as increased compensation for voluntary extensions of sea duty could encourage greater retention. Reducing watch-standing requirements and rotating crews on ships without losing operational effectiveness might be best managed by the fleet. By integrating efforts in these three (and possibly other) areas, the Navy could develop a unified and effective plan for increasing retention. ASSESSING TODAY'S QUALITY The Navy's recruit quality has improved dramatically since the early 1980s.6 For example, in FY 1980 the Navy recruited 75 percent HSDGs and 51 percent in the upper mental groups—personnel classified in Categories I to IIIA on the Armed Forces Qualification Test. By FY 1995, these numbers had improved to 95 percent and 67 percent, respectively. Today, the Navy recruits about 62 percent from the very best group (HSDG and upper mental group) in contrast to only about 38 percent in 1980. Also, the Navy no longer recruits personnel from the lowest acceptable mental group (Category IV) and limits its recruiting among 6   Jondrow, J.M., L.J. Junor, J.S. Oi, M.T. Robinson, and M.M. Simons. 1995. Measuring the Status of Readiness and Personnel Quality, CAB 95-75, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Va.

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Category IIIB personnel to HSDGs. In spite of this excellent record of improvement, the Navy ranks last among the Services in its ability to attract high-quality recruits. The Air Force recruits nearly 90 percent upper-mental-group HSDGs and more than 95 percent HSDGs. The Army and Marine Corps are much closer to the Navy, but in most years they have had a slightly greater proportion of high-quality recruits. As recruit quality has improved, benefits have been felt throughout the fleet. The Center for Naval Analyses devised an index7 to measure the changes in crew quality based on the influence of crew characteristics on SORTS scores. The Personnel Quality Index includes five components: (1) percentage of the crew who were high school degree graduates; (2) percentage of the crew who score in the upper half of the AFQT; (3) average number of years of service; (4) percentage of the crew demoted; and (5) percentage of the crew promoted to E-5 (second-class petty officer) within the first four years of service. Each of the first three factors is positively correlated with higher SORTS scores. Demotions are much more frequent among junior personnel and also among high school dropouts. As retention falls or recruit quality declines, demotions become more frequent and readiness declines. Finally, in the Navy's vacancy-driven advancement system, rapid (too rapid) promotions are more common during periods of low retention. Monitoring recruiting success and retention levels then provides much of the critical information necessary to monitor the health of the personnel system. The Personnel Readiness Index is one way to capture in a single metric the cumulative effect of recruiting and retention in the present relative to the past. In order to tie this index to fleet readiness, separate indicators are constructed for specific platform types. Figure 1.1 shows the index of personnel quality for surface combatants over the last 20 years. As the Navy approaches the end of its planned downsizing, the Personnel Quality Index for surface combatants is high. The index is displayed on a scale with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. At the end of FY 1995, the index stood more than 2 standard deviations above the average level over the entire period and 3 standard deviations above the level during the hollow force of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The index improved steadily throughout the middle and late 1980s as improvements were made in recruiting performance. A greater proportion of recruits came in with school diplomas and in the upper mental groups. As recruit quality improved, discipline problems started to wane and demotions fell. The index started to accelerate upward in the 1990s as a result of the downsizing. Recent data suggest that quality as measured by the Personnel Quality Index is leveling off. 7   Jondrow, J.M., L.J. Junor, J.S. Oi, M.T. Robinson, and M.M. Simons. 1995. Measuring the Status of Readiness and Personnel Quality, CAB 95-75, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Va.

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FIGURE 1.1 Personnel Quality Index for surface combatants. SOURCE: Adapted from Junor, L.J., and J.M. Jondrow. 1997. A Measure of the Quality of Our Forces, CNA annotated briefing 97-31, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Va., p. 8. The Personnel Quality Index rose so rapidly during downsizing partly as a result of the Navy's strategy to avoid involuntary layoffs. As recruiting was curtailed, the average tenure of sailors rose rapidly. Figure 1.2 shows both historical and projected average tenure for the enlisted Navy. In just six years, the average increased from 6.8 years in 1990 to about 8.2 years in 1996. This high level of readiness is not sustainable under the Navy's current program. After a few years, one of the major benefits of the downsizing strategy (i.e., the relatively large career force) will be lost through retirements and will be replaced by relatively large cohorts of recruits. Recent data suggest that quality as measured by the Personnel Quality Index is leveling off. Projections indicate that the average tenure will return to pre-drawdown levels by about FY 2005. The only way to maintain the higher average tenure rates into the future will be for the Navy to increase its retention rates.

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FIGURE 1.2 Seniority trends: average length of service, 1985 to 2005. SOURCE: Griffis, H.S., H.L.W. Golding, and C.S. Moore. 1997. Costs and Benefits of Aging the Navy's Enlisted Force, CNA annotated briefing 97-14, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Va., p. 7. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE The changing demographic profile of the United States could pose both a challenge and an opportunity for the Navy. Three demographic factors seem especially worth considering: (1) the rate of growth of the total population, (2) shifts in the age distribution, and (3) shifts in the racial and ethnic composition of the population. The U.S. Census Bureau makes a series of projections of future population growth. This discussion focuses on the middle projection. The Census Bureau estimates8 that by the year 2030, the overall population of the United States will increase by 32 percent compared to 1995, but the youth population (age 15 to 34) will grow by only 15 percent. This youth population reached its low point in 1992 to 1994. It will increase slightly, reaching approximately 90 percent of its 1988 level, after 2000. The reduced supply of 18-year-olds has a significant impact on the Services because industry, academia, and the military must compete for the same quality youth. However, in the absence of a major threat to U.S. security, the Navy's recruiting requirements will stay flat or decline further. With a 15 percent rise in the youth population, recruiting will become easier even though the population is aging. The racial and ethnic makeup of the population is also shifting. Today, minorities constitute roughly 19 percent of the youth population. By the year 2030 they will increase to about 26 percent. High-level policy within the Depart- 8   Day, Jennifer C. 1996. Population Projections of the United States by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1995 to 2050, Current Population Reports, U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., pp. 25-1130.

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ment of the Navy is already addressing the issue of diversity. The Secretary of the Navy has established a 12/12/5 goal for officer recruiting—that is, 12 percent of the officer recruits should be African Americans, 12 percent Hispanic, and 5 percent Asian-Pacific Islanders. Considerable senior leadership attention is also being paid to increasing ethnic diversity in high-technology enlisted occupations. With improved training and educational technology, the Navy may be in a better position to help disadvantaged youth overcome shortcomings in the educational system. Although U.S. demographic trends alone may not pose a problem for the Navy's ability to attract a sufficient number and quality of recruits, economic trends are a different matter. The declining wages of high school graduates have helped all the armed services achieve their recruiting goals over the past 15 years. Youth earnings that rise faster than the Navy's budget would put considerable pressure on recruiting commands and all other aspects of the human resource system. To remain competitive in an all-volunteer force, starting wages in the military would have to rise also. If youth wages increase by only 2 percent per year faster than the Navy's budget each year for 35 years, the Navy will have to double the size of the military personnel-Navy (MPN) account to remain competitive, lose quality in the force, or cut strength by half. Although demographic trends are often cited as a major concern in the future, it may well be that economics—remaining competitive in the youth labor market—will be a greater source of problems for the future Navy. Interrelationships In the discussion that follows, the panel focuses on issues that will affect the overall management of the Navy Department's personnel system in the future. All of these factors are a part of an integrated and interactive system. If one part of the system is changed, it will affect many other parts of the system. For example, if technology reduces the requirement for numbers of people but places greater demands on individuals, such changes will affect whom the Navy recruits, how they are assigned, trained, and compensated, how long their careers should last, and how quickly they can advance through the ranks. It is difficult to predict what changes may be required, but it is clear that policy makers will need flexibility in adjusting to changing circumstances. The personnel system of 35 years ago, which was built around a draft of significant numbers of personnel, is no more appropriate for today than today's personnel system will be 35 years into the future. Job Classification and Assignment The Department of the Navy may be able to increase the productivity of its people by better matching individual abilities, preferences, skills, and interests to

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the demands of the job. Such a classification and assignment system will take more fully into account the differences in levels of abilities across the population and differences among individuals to better allocate human resources to meet Navy needs. The current classification and assignment system appears to contribute little to making effective job matches. An improved system would increase productivity, job and career satisfaction, and retention by better matching people to jobs. There are two problems with the current system. First, the current composites (i.e., combinations of ASVAB subtests) do not statistically differentiate levels of predictions across jobs. Second, minimum composite cutoff scores are so low that nearly every recruit qualifies for all jobs. The Department of the Navy could take a two-pronged approach to improving initial job assignments. First, current technology could provide test composites that differentiate and predict the demands of different jobs; it would better match people to jobs.9 Second, computer technology and optimal control techniques could be used to optimally distribute personnel across jobs and enhance overall productivity. Research suggests that the cost of such changes would be low relative to the benefits. Evidence for the possibility of improvement comes from Army research because the Navy has not done classification research showing productivity gains in dollar terms. Nord and Schmitz10 evaluated the economic benefits of improving the mean predicted performance and found that even an increase of only 0.1 standard deviation will reduce recruiting and training costs by millions of dollars. The Compensation System The current military compensation system uses a single pay and allowance table for all the Services even though they need quite different personnel. Flexibility has been grafted onto the system through different grade structures and myriad special payments such as selective reenlistment bonuses. To recruit better people and increase the average tenure within the Service, some changes in the compensation system will be necessary. Probably the most important reform is in the retirement pay system. Under the current retirement system, military personnel are fully vested at 20 years of service, but they are not vested before. Civilian employers are required by law11 9   For a general discussion, see Kyllonen, P.C., 1995, ''CAM: A Theoretical Framework for Cognitive Abilities Measurement," Current Topics in Human Intelligence, Volume IV, Theories of Intelligence, D. Detterman, ed., Ablex Publishing, Norwood, N.J. 10   Nord, R., and E. Schmitz. 1991. "Estimating Performance and Utility Effects of Alternative Selection and Classification Policies," The Economic Benefits of Predicting Job Performance, J. Zeidner and C.D. Johnson, eds., Volume 3, The Gains of Alternative Policies, Praeger Publishers, New York. 11   These regulations are part of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S. Code, Sec. 1053.

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to provide partial vesting after only five years of service. The military retirement system skews the career lengths of a large fraction of the career force toward 20 years. As a result, some personnel stay too long, and others not long enough. A new system is needed that smoothes out retirement incentives over a longer portion of the career. Furthermore, new late-career retention incentives and modification of the mandatory retirement rules will be needed to encourage the continuation of top performers. Under the current selective reenlistment program, bonuses are available only to personnel with fewer than 14 years of service. The assumption has been that the retirement pay system provides such strong incentives that retention past 14 years will be close to 100 percent. Once the pay system for retirees is modified, late-career retention bonuses will become necessary. The move toward recruiting more community college graduates may also require changes in thinking about enlistment and reenlistment bonuses. In current practice, money is allocated separately for the two programs. With increased community college recruiting, the Navy may face tradeoffs between recruiting a new community college graduate or reenlisting and training an active duty sailor. To make rational tradeoffs, planners will have to move funding between these two sources of money much more freely. Another problem with the current compensation system is the fixed relationship between basic pay and allowances for officers and enlisted personnel. Pay raises are applied at a fixed rate for the entire pay table, and the same rate is often applied to allowances also. In 1979 an E-5 at 8 years of service earned $742 per month, and an O-3 with 8 years of service earned $1,570 per month.12 The ratio of officer pay to enlisted pay was then about 2:1. A similar comparison for 1993 military pay produces about the same ratio. The problem with this fixed ratio is that pay practices in the civilian world have changed substantially over the same period. The President's Council of Economic Advisors reports that the ratio of pay for college graduates (i.e., officer-like workers) to pay for high school graduates (i.e., enlisted-like workers) nearly doubled over the same period.13 The council's study suggests that pay changes are much more dynamic in the civilian labor force than in the military and that the Navy and other armed services may need greater flexibility to compete with the civilian marketplace. One final compensation issue deals with impending changes in sea-to-shore rotation and possible changes in PERSTEMPO. The Navy needs a pay system that provides incentives to sailors to extend their sea duty voluntarily and to reenlist in the face of high levels of PERSTEMPO. 12   Office of the Secretary of Defense. 1991. Military Pay Compensation Papers, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. 13   Council of Economic Advisors. 1996. Economic Report of the President , Council of Economic Advisors, Washington, D.C., February, p. 197.

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Mandatory Retirement Since the passage of the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act in the early 1980s, most officers have had to retire at or before 30 years of service.14 Most senior personnel are in their late 40s or early 50s when they reach mandatory retirement. Such practices are generally illegal in the civilian economy, even though other government institutions also have mandatory retirement at relatively young ages.15 With expected improvements in health care and fitness over the next 30 years, such a system will become increasingly wasteful of capable people. The Navy should support increases in the length of a military career as another way of increasing retention. Along with provisions for longer military careers and reforms in military retirement, more capable mechanisms will be required to retire workers who are no longer productive. Reduced Manning Reduce the numbers of sailors required on ships and ashore, and increase their performance by investing in their professional development and personal well-being. Fiscal restraints, among other considerations, compel the Navy to build ships that will operate with smaller crews at the same time that naval operational environments require it to increase its capabilities. Fortunately, advances in technology make satisfaction of both of these demands possible, and this will be accomplished if technology investments are made now to ensure that these advances are included in the design of future ship classes. The Navy has achieved significant reductions (of as much as two-thirds) in the manning of warships, at least in some cases. Figure 1.3 shows the decline over time in manning levels for 10,000-ton cruisers and suggests that crew reductions along with capability enhancements are possible and have historical precedents. These reductions are not uniform across ship operating departments. Manning for some combat systems departments has increased more than 30 percent in the past half century due to the addition of sensors (e.g., large, phased-array radars; large, bow-mounted sonars; satellite communication), computers, and weapons that did not exist earlier, whereas manning for some engineering departments has experienced a 30 percent decrease due to the substitution of gas turbine for steam propulsion. Further, an optimum mix of people and automation has to be established to optimize the cost-effectiveness of operating warships. Determining this mix 14   See Retirement Age for Officers Act of 1980, 10 U.S. Code, Sec. 1251. 15   Mandatory retirement was made illegal under the Age Discrimination Act of 1979, 29 U.S. Code, Sec. 623.

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FIGURE 1.3 Manning levels on a 10,000-ton cruiser, 1945 to 1985. SOURCE: Adapted from Glover, CAPT Greg, U.S. Naval Sea Systems Command (PMS 400 FSSP), and Robert Bost, Naval Surface Warfare Command, Carderock Division, "Smart Ship," briefing to Panel on Technology, August 5, 1996. properly will depend as much on our knowledge of human cognitive and information processing capabilities as on our technological capabilities. Current investments in personnel research and development may deserve review and continuing oversight to ensure that proper levels and priorities have been established to seek these advances. It should be noted that reducing ship manning has corollary benefits in that it reduces the shore infrastructure and overhead required to maintain current manning levels. Reducing shore infrastructure and undertaking ashore work in a new way—outsourcing and transferring work to civilians—will also enable the Navy to achieve substantial savings while still getting necessary work done. The resources saved can be used to support the remaining force better and otherwise modernize Navy operations. However, if the Navy pushes hard with important and highly worthwhile efforts such as today's smart ship effort, manning requirements for the 10,000-ton cruiser can be expected to decline from about 400 to about 325 people by 2005. This is neither the radical reduction that many are expecting nor the magnitude of reduction that the panel foresees as being needed. The smart ship represents a systematic effort to reduce the manning required aboard warships. Currently, however, the manning reduction achieved by the smart ship effort is about 44 enlisted billets and 4 officer billets (Box 1.1).

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BOX 1.1 Current "Smart Ship" Manning Reductions Use on-call rather than full watch for advanced intelligence center and Condition III Use on-call rather than full watch for Repair 8 at Condition III Use automatic voice recorder for semimonthly log Reduce radioman manning Delete closed-circuit television technician Delete "messengers-of-the-watch" watch station Utilize forward-lookout rather than port and starboard forward-lookout watch stations Delete "boatswain mate-of-the-watch" watch station Reduce electronic technician and data systems technician Navy enlisted code or billet requirements Reduce yeoman, personnel man, and disbursing clerk workload Delete Navy counselor billet Reduce bridge watch team SOURCE: U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Commander, Naval Surface Force. 1997. Memorandum to Chief of Naval Operations via Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, re Smart Ship Project Assessment, September 19. The Navy would benefit from a total-ship initiative to produce the dramatic manning reductions that will soon be required. The goal should be a greater than 50 percent reduction not only on the ship level but also on the total infrastructure that supports the people on board ships. It may be achieved by capitalizing on technological opportunities such as the following: Extendible, generic, open architectures for ships systems; Advanced human or computer interfaces that include interactive expert systems; Automated situation assessment, planning, and execution software; High-speed networking; and Force multipliers for human-intensive functions. To do so will require rethinking culture and tradition, technology, and ship design. An effort to answer the following questions may be in order: What cultural changes offer promise for reducing total ship life-cycle-related Navy manning? What technologies offer promise for reducing total ship life-cycle-related Navy manning? What ship design paradigm changes are necessary for reducing ship-related Navy manning? There are substantial differences between the Navy's manning levels and those of its commercial counterparts for similar functions. A comparison of

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TABLE 1.1 Selected Comparisons of Navy and Commercial Ship Manning U.S. Navy Commercial Line handlers (40 to 50, 6 supervisors) 6 to 12 Four to six sections in port duty (65 to 100 per day) One- to two-man security watch Large "working parties" to load stores and sweep piers Vendors load own stores; base commander sweeps piers Pier sentry provided by ship Pier belongs to base commander, who provides pier security   SOURCE: Adapted from Glover, CAPT Greg, U.S. Naval Sea Systems Command (PMS 400 FSSP), and Robert Bost, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division, "Smart Ship," briefing to Panel on Technology, August 5, 1996. manning for selected shipboard functions is shown in Table 1.1. It is, of course, not possible to adopt all commercial practices to reduce Navy manning, but systematic review and analysis of these practices would likely yield a valuable set of lessons learned that would more than pay for the effort. The basic difference between the Navy and its commercial counterparts is that Navy officers and personnel supervise routine activities to a much greater degree than in the commercial world. The Navy may have to adapt strategies from commercial practices that rely on the use of fewer but more experienced people, require lower manning costs, and yield greater readiness. The Navy should eliminate the need for human monitoring and assessment of purely mechanical functions, eliminate excessive layers of supervision, and expand the concept of just-in-time manning. Key elements that should be examined in detail include watch standing, damage control, maintenance and repair, and training. Watch Standing Examples of initiatives that might be undertaken to reduce manning for watch standing are as follows: Eliminate the need for human monitoring and assessment of purely mechanical functions. Eliminate excessive layers of supervision. Expand the concept of just-in-time manning. Eliminate the need for human intervention in system functions and tasks that can be fully automated. Develop and/or adopt multifunction systems. Develop and/or adopt multimedia watch stations. Distribute watch standing among ships.

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FIGURE 1.4 Relative manning required for damage control in general quarters assignments on a DDG-51, a guided missile destroyer. COMMS, communications; OPS, operations. Damage Control Figure 1.4 shows the extent to which damage control functions drive manning in general quarters conditions on one fairly representative class of ships: DDG-51, guided missile destroyers. Initiatives that reduce damage control manning may considerably leverage manning requirements on Navy warships. Examples of initiatives that might be undertaken to reduce manning for damage control are the following: Critically examine functional coverage and retain those functions essential to survival—eliminate or defer others. Design ships for inherent resistance to damage. Provide more automation of damage control functions (e.g., remote controlled fire suppression and extinguishing; robust sensor and alarm systems with video surveillance that are installed in all spaces and that distinguish among and report fire, smoke, heat, and rate and depth of flooding). Improve tools to be used by repair parties. Maintenance and Repair The Navy should also strive to reduce manning by reducing maintenance and

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repair requirements. Initiatives that might be considered in this area are as follows: Design for reduced maintenance and increased reliability. Instrument for condition-based monitoring using embedded diagnostics. Provide vital equipment system redundancy. Expand the concept of fly-in maintenance and repair teams. Expand the use of digital maintenance, reference, and technical manuals (especially the use of interactive electronic technical manuals). Expand the use of condition-based maintenance to replace preventive maintenance where practicable. Use advanced materials and coatings to prevent if not eliminate corrosion. Significant new ship designs may be required to achieve the reductions needed in ship maintenance. Some areas to consider in new designs are low-density arrangement, double hull, size for passive vulnerability, enclaved or zonal manning and systems, blast-tolerant bulkheads and materials, and no-corners housekeeping. Training Training is a force multiplier that allows manning reductions through better use of personnel on board. Training and ergonomic design considerations must be elevated to a position of importance equal to that of operations in system design requirements and development. Training initiatives are described at greater length in Chapter 2, but in brief, the following initiatives should be considered as means to reduce manning as well as improve training functions: Embed training in systems and provide training on demand—the ship should be empowered to train itself based on its personnel needs, mission assignments, materiel, readiness status, and so on. Provide systems that supply continuous learning through continuous, dynamic skill enhancement and automated performance assessment. Provide adaptive training that tailors itself to the needs of individuals. Expand the use of performance aids such as electronic manuals, automated advisors based on expert systems, and electronic performance support systems. Mind-Machine Communication The interface between humans and machines could be dramatically improved through the use of interfaces that read human brain activity and then produce a

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desired response. Recent progress in this area suggests that this capability could well be available by 2035. It could have far-reaching implications for control of complex systems such as aircraft or teleoperated vehicles such as small submarines or even smaller devices transporting microsensors in the human body. Mindmachine communication of this sort is of direct interest to the naval forces. It will leverage human performance potential, act as a force multiplier, and permit manning reductions. It should be pursued as a research priority. Retention Retention of personnel is another force multiplier and a way to make better use of existing human resources. As new warships are designed and built, the Navy should continue to focus on shipboard habitability and use technology to increase the quality of life at sea. Many research studies and analyses16 have suggested that, more than any other factor, satisfaction on the job is key to retention. Duty in the naval forces may be arduous and even dangerous, but these conditions should be borne only when necessary. The perception that discomfort and danger have been minimized by the organization to the fullest extent practicable will increase the retention of skilled and experienced individuals. In conclusion, life-cycle costs, not just those limited to shipboard and not just acquisition costs, should be used as the measure of effectiveness in system tradeoff studies. Senior management must lead the effort to determine the extent to which legacies of culture and tradition are allowed to drive future ship manning. Competition and Outsourcing More sailors and most Navy civilians have jobs in naval shore activities. These activities account for a significant portion of the Navy's budget. Shore activities have been closely studied by the Center for Naval Analyses,17,18,19 the Defense Science Board,20 and others. As a result, recommendations have been made to significantly change the way the Navy manages its shore activities. 16   Segal, M.W., and J.J. Harris. 1993. What We Know About Army Families , U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Alexandria, Va. 17   Marcus, A.J. 1993. Analysis of the Navy's Commercial Activities Program, VRM 92-226.10, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Va. 18   Tighe, C.E., J.M. Jondrow, S.D. Kleinman, M. Koopman, and C. Moore. 1996. Outsourcing Opportunities for the Navy, CRM 95-224, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Va. 19   Tighe, C.E., S.D. Kleinman, J.M. Jondrow, and R.D. Trunkey. 1996. Outsourcing and Competition: Lessons Learned from DOD Commercial Activities Programs (occasional paper), Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Va. 20   Defense Science Board Task Force. 1996. Outsourcing and Privatization, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.

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These studies suggest that their recommendations will achieve reductions in operating costs measured in billions of dollars. Competition is the key to reducing costs. When the Navy opens up an activity in the shore infrastructure to competition, it results in savings of people and money. Studies have shown that across DOD, competition has generated savings averaging 30 percent.21 This result holds even when government entities win the competition. The Navy currently is planning to reduce 30,000 billets through competition over the next 10 years. This number represents only about 20 percent of the shore infrastructure. Over the next 30 years it would seem possible to double these savings. 21   Marcus, A.J. 1993. Analysis of the Navy's Commercial Activities Program, VRM 92-226.10, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Va.