FIGURE D.2 Capabilities through a slice of scenario space.

to see when (under what assumptions) war outcomes would be favorable, unfavorable, and so on ( Figure D.2 ). The purpose, of course, is insight. With enough insight, one could do a great deal to hedge against ever being in one of the “bad” regions. Some of the hedges would be obvious (e.g., prepositioning to increase deployment rates), but others might be less so (e.g., having a variety of systems to avoid common-mode failures of critical precision-strike weapons)—until after the exploration makes them obvious. 4

4  

See Davis, Gompert, and Kugler (1996) for a relatively short account of this work and some of the unclassified insights from initial exploratory analysis of future regional contingencies, the upshot of which was to focus attention on Achilles' heel problems and the potential for “asymmetric strategies” by the adversary, rather than different ways to add marginally to the already substantial U.S. capability for “canonical” major regional contingencies with, for example, good use of warning and effective allies. For more discussion of how this relates to adaptive planning for military operations, see “Planning for Adaptiveness” in Davis (1994), which summarizes work over the preceding half-dozen years. A number of the ideas and methods referred to in this work were applied in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review. For an independent discussion of similar ideas, see the work of Bonder and Cherry in Vector Research, Inc. (1992).



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