there will be a repository of suitable objects representing knowledge, the JSIMS program is not really organized to develop that knowledge, except for standard cases. The image conveyed is of software development, which needs databases filled out but has no particular interest in the knowledge per se. This may prove unfair, however, and current work on object models is certainly a connection to model content, so a dashed line indicates that how JSIMS ends up is yet to be determined.
In yet another contrast, mature models such as Vector II have long been seen as a repository of detailed information about forces, equipment, tactics, and terrain. The RAND Strategy Assessment System (RSAS) was also developed with knowledge acquisition strongly in mind. The JWARS program is harder to characterize. The program itself has a distinct “software” flavor, but there has to date been much less emphasis on flexibility than is visible in the JSIMS effort. Again, a dashed line is shown. Just to make another point, a dashed line is attached to TACWAR. While the original developer (the Institute for Defense Analyses) continues to modify TACWAR for particular studies and thus sees it as a tool, albeit a difficult tool to change, some of TACWAR 's users appear to see it more as a fixed, configuration-controlled commodity. Rather generally, complex-model developers with whom panel members are familiar express considerable worry about misuses of their creations, which they hesitate to think of as “products” in the normal sense.
With this background, the report proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 surveys the potential of DOD's M&S briefly, painting a very rosy future. Chapter 3 describes reasons for worry, primarily reasons related to model validity and system complexity. It concludes that a good deal of research is needed and that failure to invest adequately in such research could lead to major M&S failures. Chapter 4 elaborates on what the panel means by model quality and validity. Chapter 5 describes an important class of research that should be organized around warfare areas rather than M&S per se. Chapter 6 describes needed improvements in the conceptual, methodological, and technological infrastructure for M&S. Chapter 7 deals with challenges of assimilating and exploiting M&S technology. A collection of appendixes is intended to elaborate on and provide reference for points made in the report.