is not adequate for that purpose. Further, report results as ranges over the specified uncertainty band, because ‘point results' would be misleading. ”

As of the time this report was being prepared, the Department of the Navy did not appear to have a managerial concept for validation-related research. Further, its VV&A plan was deliberately permissive, in keeping with the Navy's tradition of decentralized activity on M&S. That approach may be desirable in many respects, but the failure to plan supportive research activities is a problem —albeit, one DOD-wide in its scope.

While VV&A is unquestionably important, it is doubtful that a focus on bureaucratic process will greatly improve the quality of models and simulations. Too many of the problems start at the outset as noted above. In Chapter 7 the panel recommends a “market-oriented approach” that emphasizes increasing the testability of M&S and then exposing the M&S to extensive “beta testing” by organizations such as the Naval War College. The panel also recommends demanding and then exposing to outside scientific review the “conceptual models” on which M&S should be based. Today, such conceptual models often do not even exist and hence cannot be reviewed, but that situation should change. The current emphasis on building and publishing object models is an important step in the right direction, as is work on common models of the mission space (CMMS).