the absence of redundancies. This reflected the attitudes of senior audiences to whom the material was being presented, audiences who look skeptically at M&S.

• There were numerous expressions of concern by office and program directors to the effect that proper investments in M&S would require larger sums of money than available within their own domain alone —ven though such investments would have large long-term benefits. This was of particular concern with respect to simulation-based acquisition.

• The Navy's coordination office for M&S has been organizationally weak and may not be well located—especially if the intention is to link M&S to warfighters and decision makers concerned with force structure.

• The perception exists that the Army and, to some extent, the Air Force have “stolen a march” on the Navy in exploiting distributed interactive simulation (DIS) and in laying the groundwork for the revolutionary changes it will make possible. Some of this perception appears to be due to the Army and Air Force having put together coordinating offices and programs earlier and having communicated their efforts broadly. The Navy clearly possesses expertise in DIS and has begun to use it (e.g., the Kernel Blitz exercise and various activities within the Naval Research and Development Division (NRaD), San Diego, California). However, the perception does generally seem to be correct.

• Another aspect of the situation that matters is background. Until recently, at least, the Department of the Navy has been relatively aloof from the last decade's activities with distributed war gaming and advanced distributed simulation. Initially, this stance apparently reflected decisions not to invest in what seemed to be unfocused “technologists-going-crazy” activities. Panel members could understand and to some extent sympathize with that judgment. But the situation is far different in 1997 from what it was a decade ago. In future decades—and surely by 2035—M&S, including advanced distributed simulation, will be altogether ubiquitous and crucial.

A different set of problems relates to the Department of the Navy as a user and consumer of M&S and model-based analysis. The Navy needs to review itself with respect to these matters. While a review of such matters was outside the panel's charge, and the panel drew no conclusions, it notes that there are some troubling reports (see, for example, Calvin et al. (1995)).

If the Navy does have problems being a good consumer of M&S, especially high-level M&S at the mission and campaign levels, the problems have nothing to do with technical training or experience in a broad sense. Indeed, the Department of the Navy has many officers educated and trained in technical specialties such as propulsion and aerodynamics. Further, the Department of the Navy is a generally good consumer of M&S and model-based analysis at the component