19The commercial work is driven by the
need to accommodate the large number of standards used in mobile
telephony. The design of common hardware for a wide range of
applications would offer convenience to consumers and simplify
manufacturing; however, the ultimate popularity of these systems
will depend on whether they prove to be cost competitive with
multiple dedicated implementations.
Several DOD-funded experimental models have been built. In field
demonstrations, SpeakEASY was shown to be capable of receiving
communications from the Air Force and translating them for the
receivers and networks used by Army ground forces. The four-channel
radio is compatible with some legacy waveforms and spans
frequencies from 2 MHz to 2 GHz. The ACE, JCIT, and Millennium
programs are not yet completed. Software radios are also being
designed under the GloMo program to have adaptive
interference-rejection capabilities. It is not yet clear whether
any of these systems will offer the performance and cost
effectiveness needed to initiate a production program.
Most commercial dual-mode digital cellular and
personal-communications units can implement multiple transmission
and reception formats using DSP software. Information about
commercial radios still in development is typically not publicly
available. There are undoubtedly plans to make software radios,
which will likely be less flexible than are military versions. The
commercial radios may contain software that is not intended to be
changed after manufacturing. Furthermore, they will likely not
offer the frequency range, extent of waveform synthesis, or
sophisticated security expected for military applications.
Meanwhile, the commercial sector has focused intensive R&D
efforts on various radio components to achieve incremental,
practical advances. The DOD can expect to take advantage of the
rapid commercial progress in many componentsA/D converters,
DSP chips, RF amplifiers, display elements, processors, batteries,
and storage deviceswhich will probably drop in price over the
next several years. However, as discussed in Chapter 2 (Section
2.4), the DOD will likely need to develop its own specialized
filters that can accommodate a broad range of frequencies and
bandwidths,
OCR for page 139
Page 139
as well as antennas that offer both frequency and beam-shape
agility.
When all the functions of a radio are defined by software, the
''intelligence" and network services offered by the radio can be
extended to greatly enhance military applications and perhaps
eventually lead to intelligent radio services in commercial
applications as well. Smart radios (i.e., radios capable of
optimizing frequency, modulation, and protocols for a given purpose
and signal environment) can incorporate the rules learned by an
experienced communications specialist. Many simple rules define how
to minimize interference. These rules can be applied in real-time,
packet-based communications systems much more effectively than in
traditional voice systems. Through real-time evaluation of each
communication link and the spectrum in which the system operates,
new levels of intelligence can be achieved to avoid jamming or to
optimize transmissions under a wide variety of conditions (e.g., by
minimizing battery drain, reducing traffic in the vicinity of
hostile jamming activities, maximizing bandwidth or network
capacity).
The introduction of the multimode software radio creates a
significant opportunity for the convergence of many different
systems and functions. Traditional defense platforms have separate
systems for communication, navigation, identification, data
exchange, signals intelligence, electronic warfare, and other
functions. A software radio could be rapidly configured to perform
any of these functions in any combination required. This
convergence of technology will reduce the numbers of military
systems procured while also increasing the cost effectiveness and
utility of equipment. The resulting lightweight, agile platforms
will be capable of rapid response to support the small units of
fast-moving military forces now evolving. The increased
availability, utility, and power of radio devices will create a new
paradigm for military communications (see Table 3-2).
3.4.3.2 Co-Site Interference
Co-site interference, which is already a problem for military
communications platforms, will worsen with the introduction of
multimode, multiband radios unless new mitigation approaches are
developed. Current technology designed to reduce the effects of
co-site interference on radio performance is quite limited. Power
combiners can connect up to five transmitters to a single antenna,
but only if the frequencies are sufficiently separated. Receive
co-site filters can suppress the carrier of colocated transmitters,
but broadband signals are not suppressed adequately, and the
broadband noise of transmit power amplifiers is not suppressed
sufficiently at frequencies near the transmitting frequency.
OCR for page 140
Page 140
TABLE 3-2 Current and Emerging Military
Communications Paradigms
Current Paradigm
Emerging Paradigm
Radios are a precious resource. Hardware
developed decades ago remains in low-rate production with high unit
cost. Radios are rationed to one or fewer per platoon.
Radios are a ubiquitous resource. Like
computing, communications will become so inexpensive that it will
be widely available. As with computers, new radios are implemented
as applications software running on standard platforms.
Legacy radios. Radios are standardized but
there are too many standards, all based on legacy hardware. Few
radios are compatible with other radios even within the U.S.
inventory. The problem is amplified when the Allied and
multinational radio systems are considered.
Interoperability. Radio waveforms,
bandwidths, channels, modulations, error correction, and
cryptography are all implemented in software. Even legacy systems
are implemented in software, which might even be downloaded over
the air.
Manual mode and frequency selection. Radio
operators select frequencies and modes based on command
instructions. Radio units are often manually turned off (e.g.,
"radio silence") and communications cease.
Connectivity. The radio decides which
modulation, frequency, and power level is best based on "RF
situation awareness" (the need to remain covert), the available
resources, and the amount of data that need to be transmitted.
Communications van complex. All the various
radios need to be housed in large communications vans, which are
scarce resources.
"Palm top" communications complex.
Multibands, multimodes, and multichannels are on a card;
connectivity is achieved by "cleverness" and resource allocation,
not brute-force transmit power and antennas.
Radio as a communicator. Each radio has one
channel for voice or messaging.
Radio as a sensor. Each radio has many
channels. Some can be programmed and used in networks for
intelligence collection and emission location by triangulation.
Development lead time. Radio upgrades and
developments are measured in years.
Rapid prototyping and deployment. New
features and upgrades are implemented in software, with "few"
hardware changes required.
Individual radio units. Communication is
point to point on a single link that is limited by output power,
sensitivity, and waveform propagation.
Communications network. The full set of
protocols, including TCP/IP message routing, is implemented. Whole
groups of units work together to achieve connectivity.
Closed, proprietary architecture. Fully
functional "black box."
Open architecture. Standard interfaces and
packaging are the norm, with plug-and-play hardware and software
modules.
OCR for page 141
Page 141
Moreover, receive co-site filters become complex when the number
of co-site transmitters is three or more, and receiver noise
performance is degraded, resulting in reduced transmission range
and an increased error floor. Co-site problems extend to antenna
beam shape, which changes when antennas are used in close proximity
to each other or to metallic structures. Because of the unique
conditions on military communications platforms, R&D in this
area will likely need to be supported by the DOD.
3.5 Defense Technology Policy
Issues
The government influences private-sector technology development
in a variety of ways. The instruments of government policy include
indirect methods, such as investment tax credits, or direct methods
such as federal funding for R&D and technology testbeds.
Sometimes these policies are implemented to accelerate the
development of strategically important technologies; at other times
the motive is to ensure that equipment will be available for
procurement by the government in a timely fashion.
Government policies supporting the development of appropriate
defense technologies have always been a special case. In the past,
when defense requirements generally guided private-sector
technology advances (e.g., transistorized components), federal
investments in R&D were not controversial. Now that
sophisticated consumer and industrial products are developed
independent of defense requirements, the need for federal
investments may seem less pressing. However, the DOD needs to
maintain a competitive advantage over potential adversaries with
respect to warfare capabilities, including communications systems.
The technology policy issue for the future is how to encourage
innovations in electronics and communications technology that will
dominate world markets while also ensuring that the U.S. military
retains capabilities that exceed those of potential
adversaries.
3.5.1 Implications of Changes in
Military Tactics
The Gulf War demonstrated the way in which high technology
permeates warfare. Advanced sensing, imaging, and targeting
capabilities in the Patriot missile defense system, stealth
aircraft, and other systems provided extensive advantages for U.S.
forces. For example, Patriot missiles were aimed using surveillance
satellites controlled from the United States. Liftoffs from Iraq
were observed by these satellites within seconds, and critical
targeting information was relayed through controllers in Colorado
to the front-line Patriot batteries. This orchestrated activity
demonstrated the capabilities of the U.S. military's existing
global communications network, which required the support of
high-bandwidth data links
OCR for page 142
Page 142
to move sensor information both to and from the theater of
action. But the Gulf War experience also suggests that
communications advances are needed to enable rapid infrastructure
deployment, logistics enhancements, and increased protection of
technologies to prevent their exploitation by adversaries.
3.5.2 Rapid Infrastructure
Deployment
During the ground war, the mobile forces moved so quickly that
the communications infrastructure could not keep up with the front
lines. Future communications systems will likely need to be rapidly
deployable (and redeployable) so that they can keep pace with
rapidly developing battles. Because Iraq did not react when U.S.
troops first began arriving in Saudi Arabia, the coalition forces
were able to build up an overwhelming combat strength in the Middle
East as well as the logistical stockpile needed to pursue vigorous
modern warfare. Adversaries in future wars are unlikely to be so
accommodating, meaning that forces will need to be projected
rapidly from the U.S mainland. Future conflicts are likely to be
"come as you are," and communications infrastructures will need to
support immediate action.
The recognition of this need has heightened interest in "instant
infrastructures" based on satellite communications and mobile
elements. The RAP has been proposed as a basis for a moveable
front-line infrastructure with sophisticated, on-the-move antenna
systems able to maintain high-bandwidth, point-to-point links with
the rear-area infrastructure. To avoid the latencies inherent in
satellite communications, hybrid systems that consist of DBS
downlinks and UAV uplinks are being investigated. In general, these
systems are viewed as backups to the terrestrial trunk
linkages.
Continued military R&D investments will probably be needed
because there seems to be little commercial interest in moveable
infrastructures. One example of a commercial system with moveable
elements is the Metricom multihop packet radio network, which
operates in the unlicensed ISM bands in the San Francisco Bay and
Washington, D.C., metropolitan areas. Although the infrastructure
radios are in fixed locations, the multihop architecture makes it
possible to add coverage in an incremental fashion through the
addition of relay radios within the service area; bandwidth can be
added also.
3.5.3 Logistics
Future military communications systems will need new features
corresponding to the reduced size of U.S. forces. Current planning
provides
OCR for page 143
Page 143
forces that are only sufficient to fight two regional conflicts
at the same time. Instead of stationing so many troops overseas in
areas of high tension, a split-base approach will be used, with
advanced echelons overseas and the bulk of the forces on the U.S
mainland. This approach will require high-quality, high-bandwidth
connectivity worldwide, complete with access extensions that can be
rapidly deployed, torn down, and reestablished as troops move.
Logistics tracking and management will be especially critical,
given the growing need to transport materiel from the United States
to the scene of the conflict. Many commercial systems are
available. For example, OmniTRACS makes it possible to track
vehicles continuously as they move and to plan routes efficiently.
Package delivery services such as UPS and Federal Express have
deployed sophisticated logistics systems for tagging packages and
tracking them en route while also providing user-friendly on-line
services that enable shippers to find their shipments. Wireless
LANs were originally developed partly for warehousing applications.
Finally, wireless tagging technology could provide the DOD with
automatic inventory and location-identification capabilities,
providing the basis for a complete logistical information system
that could track the location of every item shipped.
3.5.4 Preparing for Unsophisticated
Adversaries
There is some uncertainty about the technical requirements for
communications during future confrontations with unsophisticated
adversaries. Recent U.S. actions in Haiti and Somalia are examples
of these types of operations, which may become more common as the
United States plays an expanding role in peacekeeping and
peacemaking missions. These countries tend to have little modern
communications infrastructure, although this situation is changing
as worldwide markets evolve for advanced technology. When deployed
in less-developed countries, the U.S. military could bring along
state-of-the-art commercial infrastructure technology. These
systems would need to be shipped, installed, and operational within
days, with military systems sufficing in the meantime. The
commercial systems could transport the bulk of noncritical traffic,
making it accessible to a smaller number of military-specific
systems in the field.
In many ways, peacekeeping and other nontraditional military
operations are similar to law enforcement activities, and many of
the same communications issues need to be addressed. Even an
unsophisticated adversary could disrupt service to U.S. forces
using commercial systems. For example, cellular infrastructure is
difficult to hide and could easily be targeted for sabotage.
Although stealth and LPD are not always critical to defense
communications, steps need to be taken to prevent adversaries
OCR for page 144
Page 144
from learning of upcoming operations, performing traffic
analyses, and intercepting specific types of communications
traffic. The basic security and authentication mechanisms in the
latest commercial systems can reduce interception by the
technically unsophisticated; they are sufficient for nontactical
communications traffic such as logistics support. Military-specific
systems will continue to be needed for transmissions that require
complete security.
The DOD might need cooperation and technical information from
U.S. or foreign manufacturers so as to monitor the traffic of
adversaries, track specific telephones, or infiltrate existing
communications systems in particular countries. The U.S. military
therefore needs to maintain a technical awareness of foreign-made
equipment, perhaps as part of the effort to demonstrate, test, and
procure COTS wireless technology (see Sections 3.2 and 3.3).
3.5.5 Preparing for Sophisticated
Adversaries
Sophisticated communications technology is rapidly becoming a
commodity. During the Gulf War some military specifications and
procurement procedures were abandoned in an effort to get new
capabilities, such as GPS, into the hands of the troops. Any
adversary could buy the same sophisticated technologies; the threat
is measured by how much the adversary can afford. Indeed, one of
the implications of the Gulf War as a model for future conflicts is
that the United States might not prepare sufficiently to recognize
or defend against sophisticated adversaries.
A sophisticated adversary can be defined as one with the
technical capability to build advanced communications systems or
the financial resources to purchase what it needs on the global
arms market. The greatest immediate threats are countries that can
buy technologies from the countries that make them; for instance,
the SCUD missiles used by Iraq in the Gulf War were based on the
Chinese Silkworm missile.
To maintain a competitive advantage against these adversaries,
the U.S. military could add military-specific modifications, such
as security or waveform hiding, on top of commercial core systems.
The military can leverage many commercial technologies, among them
advanced ICs, DSP chips, and protocols. The advantage gained will
depend on how these capabilities are integrated into defense
systems and the choice and performance of the added
military-specific capabilities.
3.6 Summary
The DOD has many reasons to use commercial communications
products and practices whenever possible, building on a long
tradition of
OCR for page 145
Page 145
synergy between the two sectors. Many COTS technologies offer
cost and performance advantages, and their quality is better than
ever. The economies of scale achieved in mass production provide
additional benefits and lessons that can also be exploited by the
military. The selective use of commercial products and practices in
DOD systems could help accommodate growing needs for global,
untethered communications systems in spite of declining defense
budgets.
However, the military will continue to have some unique needs
that cannot be met by consumer products, or even future commercial
R&D programs, because the motivations and interests of the two
sectors differ. The DOD has unusual needs in three fundamental
areas: network architecture, which influences all other aspects of
a communications system; security, which encompasses
confidentiality, data and system integrity, and service
availability; and multimode, multiband systems, which can enable
interoperability among diverse systems. The DOD needs to examine
its needs in these areas carefully and probably pursue its own
R&D in selected technology areas. All of these issues are
addressed further in Chapter 4.
Notes
1. For example, advanced coding
(Cacciamani, 1970, 1971, 1973) has been used in commercial
satellite communications since the early 1970s for both data and
highly compressed digital imaging, enabling the use of antennas on
the order of 18 inches in diameter for digitally compressed video
signals with link BERs less than 10-9. The best known of these technologies
is probably CDMA, which has been widely adopted for cellular and
personal communications systems worldwide. Encryption, along with
data mining and RF fingerprinting, is increasingly being used to
protect against fraudulent use in cellular systems, video
entertainment subscription receivers, and business data. Finally,
on-board digital processing will be used in the planned mobile
telecommunications satellite and high-speed data satellites such as
Teledesic.
2. A short lead time in a growing market
can result in a large increase in market share. In addition,
because prices can fall quickly after a new product is introduced,
the first to market is often the only competitor to make a
substantial profit. Yet a release date is often difficult to
predict. Companies can be punished by the market if they fail to
meet predicted release dates, as often happens, for example, with
software upgrades.
3. The internal design cycle may actually
be much longer because the basic equipment architecture is more
likely to be on a two-year design cycle paced by the evolution of
new semiconductor components. During the baseline design cycle of
up to four years, anywhere from one to four design teams may be
working on the next baseline architecture.
4. Many U.S. commercial wireless
communications suppliers include divisions that have historically
been involved in defense work. Within these companies,
OCR for page 146
Page 146
cross-fertilization between the
defense-related and commercial units may provide a mechanism for
meeting military surge needs using the company's commercial
products. However, this type of crossover is not always
straightforward because of the differences between defense and
commercial markets.
5. For example, current regulations
regarding processors, A/D converters, and cryptography appear to
reflect technologies that are nearly a decade old. The advent of
common high-performance microprocessors enables the widespread
development and use of cryptographic algorithms, which are often
distributed on the Internet. The export of A/D converters is
limited to technology of less than 8 bits, but advanced sigma-delta
technology has only 1 bit (noise shaping and DSP techniques are
used to increase dynamic range). Thus, the number of bits no longer
seems like a useful metric for A/D converters; the metrics used to
evaluate microprocessors seem equally outdated.
6. This is a simplified description of the
decision-making process. More precisely, throughout the design,
fabrication, and deployment of commercial products, trade-offs are
made among performance requirements, standards requirements, cost
goals, and design approaches to define a product that would be the
most attractive and competitive in the marketplace. International,
national, and regional standards determine many commercial design
parameters, including off-axis emission from an antenna, maximum
power flux radiated to Earth from a satellite, the capability of
system users to coordinate or coexist with other users of a
frequency band in the same geographic location, and numerous
electrical safety regulations (e.g., related to wiring, batteries,
radiation hazards, and chemical exposure).
7. Customers understand and expect this
and are generally not willing to pay for a capacity that sits idle
most of the time. Even during the busiest hour of the average
business dayconditions that the systems are engineered to
handlethere is a measurable probability of blockage that is
calculated based on customer willingness to pay. Because the cost
of a blocked call is usually only the effort required to try again
shortly, there is little incentive to reduce the probability of
blockage to zero. An interesting demonstration of the customer's
acceptance of blockage and delay is the phenomenal growth of the
Internet, where service is provided on a best-effort rather than
guaranteed basis (although data services continue to come under
increasing pressure for better service access).
8. Intel Corp., which after marketing its
Pentium microprocessor found a design flaw in the precision of
certain mathematical operations, uses a test suite comprising of
billions of instructions to validate each possible instruction,
register, arithmetic function, interrupt process, and instruction
trap as well as sequences of events to prevent any surprises in
complex applications. Only now are academic researchers considering
more sophisticated theoretical techniques for dealing with testing
processes of such enormous complexity. This research is critical to
the future success of complex systems.
9. For example, commercial processes might
take place at temperatures ranging from 0 to 50 degrees Celsius
(°C) rather than -55 to 125 °C as in military processes.
Or, commercial processes might involve 30 G of force rather than
1,000 G.
10. The NES is an encryption system
certified by the National Security Agency
OCR for page 147
Page 147
that enables clusters of defense computer
networks to interconnect through the unclassified Internet. The NES
provides high levels of assurance that a system communicates only
with other systems that have comparable security levels.
11. Several military initiatives,
including the Multilevel Information Systems Security Initiative
and the DOD Goal Security Architecture, are intended to deal with
various aspects of infrastructure in an effort to enable
interoperability among systems. However, these programs have yet to
field functions that enable communication between independent
defense networks.
12. The ACN is designed to provide
hierarchical communications over a broad theater of operations.
Cross-linking and networking will enable various networks to
communicate and access services through satellite links worldwide.
The ACN will also serve as a repeater, picking up signals and
rebroadcasting them over and around terrain obstacles, thereby
extending the range of low-power equipment used on the ground.
13. In a base-station-oriented
architecture, a greater investment is ordinarily made in the base
station than in terminals. In such a network, both the transmit and
receive link equations can benefit from the improved performance of
larger antennas, more powerful transmitters, and more sensitive
receivers. In typical systems the link advantage relative to the
peer-to-peer design is approximately 10 dB.
14. Security is an issue in equipment
deployment: The use of systems with cryptographic security requires
procedures for securing clearances and equipment controls.
15. The TCP/IP protocol suite would need
to be supported on top of ATM because the DOD has identified TCP/IP
as the means for ensuring interoperability across heterogeneous
military networks and because the entire system is unlikely to be
constructed from native ATM technology.
16. An additional drawback is ATM's strong
connection orientation, which makes it difficult to support
mobility because existing connections need to be broken and
reconstructed repeatedly. Furthermore, the ATM cell (i.e., data
packet) structure was designed for the extremely low BERs of
fiber-optic communications, whereas a radio fade can persist for
several cell durations, making it difficult to use standard coding
techniques to improve link quality. The loss of even a small number
of ATM cells in a highly stressed network can dramatically reduce
packet throughput.
17. The importance of distilling source
information prior to transmission over a network is well understood
in the commercial sector but remains an issue for the military,
especially the Army, where communications, command-and-control, and
intelligence functions are separate. There is no financial
incentive on the part of the command-and-control and intelligence
communities to spend resources to distill data at the source. Often
the problem is passed off to the communications community, which is
forced to transmit whatever is provided. For example, in situation
awareness (SA) reports, positions are reported every 12 seconds
regardless of motion. As a result the communications system is
overloaded with SA reports. A more efficient approach would be to
project positions based on direction and velocity and only send
reports when the trajectory or velocity changes. But such an
approach would require the development of software at a cost to the
command-and-control
OCR for page 148
Page 148
community. Instead the practice has been
to blame the communications system for failing to support the
traffic load. This situation would never arise in the commercial
cellular industry, where providers take a systems approach and make
trade-offs between bandwidth costs and source compression
costs.
18. Mobile code, such as Java, might
eliminate the need to agree on a compression standard because the
delivery of executable code (along with the transmitted data) would
allow the receiver to adapt to the sender's coding scheme.
19. An alternative approach would be to
implement new functions in ASIC chips, which offer efficiencies in
terms of power consumption. However, this approach would not
provide an open architecture and might not be adaptable to future
radio waveforms.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
commercial communications