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4 National-Urban Relations in Foreign Federal Systems: Lessons for the United States Harold L Wolman INTRODUCTION This paper examines the nature of the relationship between national governments and large urban governments in countries with political structures relatively simi- lar to that of the United States. The United States has always viewed itself as a unique country with distinct problems and solutions. Yet the economic transformation the advanced Western nations appear to be undergoing has created similar problems for all of them, not the least in terms of its impact on their urban areas. Thus, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in its report, Managing Urban Change, cited a list of problems affecting urban areas in the more advanced OECD countries that would seem quite familiar to most Americans. The OECD (1983a:50) made the follow- ing observation: Many cities of the OECD countries are exhibiting social and economic problems of concern to policy- makers which, when concentrated in certain areas, are indicative of urban decline. Symptoms are evident in the daily experience of their inhabi- tants and in the newspaper headlines and evening television programs: high levels of unemployment, low paid or irreg- ular employment, closure of factories, shops and offices; deteriorating housing conditions, the physical decay of the built environment and infrastruc- ture, vacant land and abandoned buildings; 91

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92 severe social problems including low educa- tional achievement, isolated elderly people, single parent families, poverty and hopelessness; concentrations of ethnic minorities, often en- countering discrimination in finding homes and work; crime and vandalism, the occasional outbreak of riots, and a general breakdown of law and order. The economic forces underlying these problems appear to be nearly universal (see Table 4-1). TABLE 4-1 National Employment by Industrial Sector (percentage) Manufacturing 1973 1982 Services 1973 1982 Australia 23.9% 18.8% 49.5% 56.1% Austria 35.7 31.0 43.5 49.1 Belgium 31.8 24.1 Canada 22.4 18.2 43.8 49.2 France 27.9a 24.7a 45.0 50.5 Japan 27.4 24.5 42.7 49.0 Netherlands 25.Ql 20.5a 53.3 60.0 New Zealand 25.0 24.0C 44.3 47. Norway 23.5 19.7 44.8 52.9 Sweden 27.4 22.4 49.5 57.0 Switzerland 35.0 32.~ 42.4 47.3b United Kingdom 32.2 25.4 48.0 56.3 United States 24.8 20.4 43.8 47.6 West Germany 36.4 35.0b 39.1 43.2 NOTE: ~Manufacturing. excludes construction. ~Ser- vices. include trade, restaurants, and hotels; finance, insurance, and real estate; and community social and personal services. al975 data. b~g80 data. C]981 data. SOURCE: International Labor Organization (1983) Yearbook of Labor Statistics.

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93 Western economies are transforming from specialization in routine manufacturing processes to more complex manufacturing and advanced services economies. In all of the more advanced OECD countries, manufac- turing employment is declining as a percentage of total employment and service employment is increasing; this ~ the major urban Manufacturing jobs no longer are sufficient to employ the lower skilled labor force that tends to be concentrated disproportion- ately in central city areas. The OECD (1983a:62) con- cludes that The consequences for the remaining inner city residents may be prolonged unemployment or irreg- ular and low paid employment.. The similarity of problems suggests that there may be something to be learned from examining the relationship of national government to urban government and the prob- lems of urban areas in these countries. However, given the distinctive structure of the American political sys- tem and the inevitable difficulties of interpreting the meaning of experience grounded in a specific foreign context, it is desirable to limit the comparison to those systems most similar to the U.S. system. Since the United States is a federal political system, the temptation to simply compare national-urban relations in other federal systems is strong. Before acceding to this temptation, however' some further consideration is in order. Although scholars have disagreed quite substantially on the proper defini- tion of federalism, nearly every definition assumes the existence of a regional level of government interposed between national and local governments, with the re- gional government having at least some spheres of activity in which it is able to make final decisions (i.e., it is not merely an administrative unit of cen- tral government). Thus, Riker (1975:101) defines fed- eralism as: process is occurring more rapidly in areas than in the nation as a whole. _ ~ A political organization in which the activities of government are divided between regional gov- ernments and a central government in such a way that each kind of government has some activities on which it makes final decisions. The United States, Australia, Canada, Germany, Aus- tria, and Switzerland all meet this definition, for all have regional (state, provincial, etc.) bodies of gov- ernment that have power to make final decisions in some

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94 spheres. Accordingly, all of those countries are in- cluded in this comparison. But our concern is with national-urban relations. Does the nonexistence of an intermediate-level regional government in many countries inevitably render the experience of those nations irrel- evant to the United States? In the United Kingdom, a country in which the sub- stance of urban problems is close to our own, the cen- tral government conducts relations with local govern- ments, which have the ability to make final decisions about important issues of urban policy. Central govern- ment relations with local authorities are direct, be- cause an intermediate government layer does not exist. However, in the United States, where an intermediate layer (states) does exist, the federal government also conducts some relations directly with city governments. As defined by Richard Bird (1980:12): Systems in which there is some degree of autono- mous decision making at different levels . . . are considered to be federal systems. The es- sence of federalism in this perspective is thus not the extent to which the rights of subnational governments are, in some sense, constitutionally entrenched. Rather, it is that local or state governments, are, in some relevant fashion, ef- fective decision-making bodies. Bird's argument is persuasive,-at least with respect to the purpose of this study, which is to examine national- urban relationships. Accordingly, while accepting as federal the six major systems with intermediate levels of government cited above, I have also included the United Kingdom as a relevant nation for this analysis. Choosing to focus primarily on federal systems, even given this expanded definition, does have some conse- quences. First, the urban problems identified earlier are not as dramatic or as advanced in some of the coun- tries, in particular, Canada and Australia, as they are in others, in particular the Federal Republic of Ger- many, the United Kingdom, and the United States* (see Table 4-2). Other countries with urban problems similar *Thus, large Canadian urban areas actually gained em- ployment in the manufacturing sector between 1971 and

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95 to those of the United States, i.e., the Netherlands, Belgium, and Sweden, are not included. In addition, Austria has few large cities other than Vienna, which is both a city and a state, and Australia's local govern- ments perform few important functions. However, these variations in country circumstances and structure can be viewed as strengths of the analyses rather than as weak- nesses, for they provide an additional range of experi- ence and practice. OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS With the exception of the United Kingdom, all of the countries under consideration are federal in terms of Riker's definition, in that they they have regional levels of government that possess policymaking rather than solely administrative responsibilities.* As with the U.S. Constitution, the Australian, Austrian, Swiss, and German constitutions enumerate the powers of the federal government and leave residual powers to the states. The Canadian constitution, on the other hand, leaves residual powers to the federal government. The United Kingdom is, by contrast, a unitary state in which all powers reside with the central government. The German and Austrian federal systems differ mark- edly from the others in that they divide governing func- tions as well as powers among levels of government. Thus, as Bernd Reissert (1980a:50) explains with respect to the German system: In general, responsibilities are divided not by policy areas but by functions in the policymaking process. On the one hand, the bulk of legisla- tive powers, except in the field of education, lies with the federation, and the federation is 1980, while Australian urban areas remained relatively stable. However, losses in urban manufacturing employ- ment were substantial in Germany' the United Kingdom, and Switzerland (see Table 4-2). *States in Australia, provinces in Canada, lands in Aus- tria and the Federal Republic of Germany, and Cantons in Switzerland. These regional levels of government are referred to as states throughout the discussion. ^

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96 TABLE 4-2 Urban Employment and Population Change Percent Percent Change, Change, Percent Total Manufacturing Change, Unit Period EmPloYment Employment PoPulation Australia Brisbane M 1971-76 14.1% 1. 7% 27. 5% Austria Vienna M 1971-81 NA NA - 3. 2 Linz M 1971-81 NA NA 10. 7 Canada Montreal M 1971-80 3.9 6.9 21.4 Toronto M 1971-80 15.7 22.3 6.7 Vancouver M 1971-80 0.1 1.7 7.8 Switzerland Zurich M 1970-75 5.2 -15.3 -2.8 C 1970-75 3.4 -17.2 -13.1 Basel M 1970-75 8.9 1.0 - 5.1 C 1970-75 6.5 - 0.8 -15.4 Gene~ra M 1970-75 6.4 - 5.4 2.6 C 1970-75 2.8 -13. 9 -11.3 United Ringdom London M 1975-77 - 3. 5 - 1.5 -10.1 C 1968-76 -24.8 NA -17. 7 Manchester M 1975-77 - 6.8 - 4.2 - 4.9 C NA NA -17. 4 Liverpool M 1975-77 - 4.6 - 6.8 - 8.7 C 1972-80 -19.4 NA -16.4 ) Baltimore M 1970-80 18.3 -18.0 5.0 C NA NA -13.1) Chicago M 1970-80 9.6 -12.4 1.8 C NA NA -10. 8 Detroit M 1972-80 6.7 -12. 1 - 1.8 C NA NA -20. 5 West Germany Munich M 1970-78 3.0 - 8.8 11.6 C 1970-78 NA NA 0.2 Bamburg M 1970-78 - 4.6 -16. 6 0.8 C 1970-78 NA NA - 7.2 Duisberg M 1970-78 - 8.9 - 8.1 - 8.1 C 1970-78 NA NA - 9. 6 NOTE: Figures on percentage change in population are for 1970-1980 for Switzerland; for 1971-1980, for United Kingdom; and for 1970-1980, for United States. C ~ Central city. M ~ Metropolitan area. NA ~ Not available. SOURCE: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

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97 also responsible for most tax legislation and for the allocation of taxes among different tiers of government. State governments, however, have a voice in the framing of federal legislation via the Bundesrat (upper house of parliament), where all federal laws affecting the interests of the states require the approval of a majority of state government votes. On the other hand, policy implementation and spending are the domain of the states and local government because the federation does not have an administration of its own to administer federal laws. Under the con- stitution only foreign policy, the federal fi- nances, the federal railways, the federal postal service, the federal waterways, and the federal armed forces are subject to direct federal admin- istration. In all other policy areas, there are no federal field agencies and all nonlegislative functions are carried out by the states and local government employing their own financial re- sources, with the federal government having no further say in the matter. In all but one of the countries being examined, local governments, as in the United States, are the creatures of the state (intermediate) level of government; the one exception is, again, the United Kingdom, where local governments are creatures of the central government. However, in Germany and Austria local governments have constitutional recognition--that is, they are provided with specific powers and standing by virtue of the fed- eral constitution. In both countries local authorities are given the power to deal with all matters of a purely local nature not circumscribed by federal or state law. By contrast, in Australia, local governments may do only what they are expressly permitted to do by state author- ity, the same situation that exists in the United King- dom with respect to central-local relations. Local governmental systems vary considerably among the countries. Australia and Canada look much like the United States in terms of their mixture of overlapping general-purpose authorities and special districts, while Germany, Austria, and Switzerland have more orderly systems of local government. However, both Austria and Germany also have city-states, a structural arrangement that has, from time to time, been suggested for large

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98 U.S. cities, but never implemented. Vienna, the only large urban area in Austria, functions as both a city and a state, and, in Germany, Hamburg, Bremen, and Berlin are city-states. These cities are thus treated constitutionally and legislatively as states as well as cities, and they perform state functions and receive state tax-sharing and grant-equalization payments not available to other cities. In both countries the city- state arrangement appears to result from a continuation of historic arrangements rather than from any well- thoughtout, recent determination to treat these cities differently. Local governments play an important role in service delivery in all of these countries with the exception of Australia, where many of what are normally considered local functions are performed by the state. The weak role of Australian localities is reflected in Table 4-3, which sets forth local government expenditures as a percentage of total public sector general government expenditure. Australian localities accounted for only 6.8 percent of total general government expenditure, while localities in the other countries accounted for 20 percent or more. TABLE 4-3 Local Government Expenditure as a Percentage of General Government Expenditure (1979) Country Percentage . Australia Austria Canada Switzerland United Kingdom United States West Germany 6.8 20.0 22.4 23.6 29.2 25.1 18.0 SOURCE: organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (1983a); plus data from the United States and United Kingdom derived by author.

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99 NATIONAL-URBAN RELATIONS With the exception of the United Kingdom, direct national-local relations of the sort that are prevalent in the United States are rare; the federal government interacts with urban governments primarily through state governments. The constitutional division of powers is between federal and state governments (although, as noted, in Austria and Germany local authorities are constitutionally given responsibility for ~local. mat- ters). Relationships Through the Grant System In Australia, Austria, and Germany some federal taxes are shared automatically with local as well as state governments. Tax-sharing relationships involve guaran- teed transfers rather than sustained national-local relationships; there is no national effort to influence local government policy or activity. The provision of general grants also represents, in formal terms, a financial transfer with no attempt to affect local government activity (except spending lev- els). Direct general grants from national to local gov- ernments, such as the U.S. revenue sharing program, occur only in the United Kingdom. However, in Germany, Australia, and Austria, the federal government requires that state governments distribute some of their tax revenue in the form of grants to local authorities. In the United Kingdom the Thatcher government has struc- tured its general grant system to include incentives to reduce local authority spending from local sources. Specific or conditional grants represent a more activist national government role. In Australia, Canada, Austria, and the United Kingdom, some special- purpose grants are made directly from the national gov- ernment to local authorities, although not nearly to the extent as in the United States. In Germany and Switzer- land all federal grants must be made to the state rather than local governments. Mandates In the United Kingdom, central government may di

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100 rectly legislate with respect to the nature and level of services that local government provides. In essence, the same situation exists in Germany and Austria, where local autonomy is guaranteed, except where federal in- terest is concerned. In the United States, federal di- rection of local activity occurs primarily through the use of conditions attached to the ~voluntary. receipt of federal grants. This method is not utilized substan- tially in any of the countries examined, although the attachment of conditions to state grants is not uncommon Relationship through Negotiations Local government associations play an important and quasi-formal role in consultations and, in some cases, negotiations with the national governments in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, but much less so in Australia and Canada. In effect, these more formal consultative arrangements with local government associations substitute for the more direct federal relationships with individual local governments in the United States. In the United States, the role of local government associations with respect to the federal gov- ernment is less formal and more that of lobbying than of consultation and negotiation. However, in both Austria and the United Kingdom local government associations are involved in formal negotiations with the national gov- ernment over the distribution of tax sharing and general grants, respectively. In Germany, according to the OECD (1983b:18): The Deutsche Stadtetag (Associations of Large Towns) plays a definite role in work leading to government and federal parliament decisions liable to affect cities. Association representa- tives must be consulted on all federal proposals in regard to town planning, land use, local fi- nance, and regional and local transport, and the Association representatives sit on several minis- terial committees with Bund and Lander ministers, e.g. the finanzplanungsrat (Financial Planning Committee). In both Canada and Australia, local government asso- ciations play a minor role with respect to the federal ,

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101 government, but a much more important and formal role, particularly in Canada, in grant negotiations with the state government. NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR URBAN PROBLEMS In none of the countries in this study is there an explicit national urban policy nor periodic national urban policy reports, such as in the United States. Nor, except in the United Kingdom, has the national government accepted an important role in coping with the problems brought about by changes in the structure of the urban economy. To a large extent this is due to the long-standing concern in these countries with the lag- ging economies of peripheral regions, to which a variety of regional development policies have traditionally been addressed. Problems in large urban economies are rela- tively recent and, in many of these countries, only beginning to be perceived. All of the national governments, however, are in- volved to some extent with urban problems through pro- grams addressed to specific urban concerns. Typically, these programs are in housing, urban renewal, infra- structure, and local transport. In most cases these national programs are provided indirectly to local gov- ernments through state governments. In general, how- ever, with the exception of the United Kingdom, national government concern with urban areas has not been nearly so strong as in the United States. In the United Kingdom, sinner cities. policy is aimed explicitly at the regeneration of the inner areas of cities. The Turban program. provides 75 percent match- ing funds to local authorities for economic development and social services in inner city areas. The central government also provides cities with housing and trans- port grants. The German federal government provides urban renewal, transportation (both streets and public transport), and hospital construction aid for local governments and sets the framework within which the funds may be used. How- ever, the funds cannot be provided directly to local governments. Instead, they are provided to the state governments, which determine the distribution of funds to local authorities and the specific purposes for which they can be used. State implementation of the program

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116 capita equalization grants to local communities. These grants make up 30 percent of the difference between fis- cal need (calculated giving greater weight to cities with larger populations) and fiscal capacity. In Switzerland, federal tax sharing and special- purpose grants are provided on an equalizing basis to the states. Equalization is based on fiscal capacity rather than need. States, in turn, make both general and conditional grants on an equalizing basis to munici- palities. Several states have horizontal equalization schemes whereby municipalities with a high fiscal capac- ity transfer part of their tax capacity to poorer munic- ipalities. The lack of direct federal-local grant relationships is a striking difference between the United States and other federal nations. In Austria, for example, Pernthaler (1983:37) notes, folly a few direct federal grants are made directly to communities. . . . An attempt by the federal government to extend the range was vehemently rejected for the states.. In Germany, there are no direct federal-local grants. A 1975 sup- reme court decision held that while the federal govern- ment could define the broad proposal of grants for local government--in particular urban renewal, transportation, and hospital construction--the grants themselves had to be provided to the states with both the specifics of the grants and the distribution mechanism left at that level of government. German urban programs are thus more similar to U.S. block grants to the states for small- city community development than to the community devel- opment block grants that go directly from the federal government to entitlement cities. In Canada, there are almost no direct federal-local programs and the effort to establish a federal agency for coordinating urban affairs was ultimately scrapped as a result of provin- cial opposition. In Australia, there are a small number of direct federal grants to local governments, primarily for social service purposes, but a 1974 national refer- endum that would have greatly expanded federal govern- ment grants to local governments was defeated. CONCLUSION The utility of comparing the United States with for- eign countries frequently is seen to lie in the poten- tial for transferring the policies or practices of those

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117 countries to the United States. While the possibility of such transfers does exist, the difficulty inherent in transplanting across systems of divergent political, social and economic characteristics should not be under- estimated. Perhaps a more valuable benefit to be gained from comparative analysis is that such analysis can both broaden the sense of the possible and provide a frame- work for better understanding our own behavior. The process of comparative analysis should lead to question- ing what frequently is simply assumed without question. Thus, the most valuable lessons derived may well be les- sons about ourselves rather than lessons about other countries. In order to provoke the introspection re- quired, it is useful to focus on the areas of greatest difference between national-local relations in the United States and in the other countries examined here. First, the most striking difference is the relative absence of equalization as an important objective of the intergovernmental fiscal system in the United States compared with the other countries. It is not probable that this reflects a more equal distribution of income among the states or among the major urban areas in the United States than in other countries. More likely, it reflects a strong U.S. aversion to redistribution as a political goal as opposed to redistribution as an inci- dental side effect, which of necessity, occurs in the pursuit of other objectives. In fact, the U.S. grant system, while mildly redistributive, is not equalizing. Davis and Lucke (1982:350) found a correlation of .154 between the per capita state distribution of federal grants in 1980 and state revenue capacity (that is, those states with higher fiscal capacity received, on average, more aid per capita than did states with lower capacity). As a result, fiscal disparities among states or among cities are much greater in the United States than in the other countries. The lesson the United States needs to learn is not how to set up equalizing intergovernmental transfers; it is how to develop the political will to do so. Second, direct national-local relations through the grant systems are much more prevalent in the United States than in the other federal countries, where the pattern is for federal grants to the state level and state grants to the local level. To some extent this reflects the U.S. history of relatively weak state governments and underrepresentation of urban interests

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118 in state politics. The unwillingness of states to address themselves to urban concerns during the 1950s and 1960s, when urban problems began to emerge, led to direct federal-local relationships, which continue to exist (although President Reagan's block grants lead in the other direction), even in an era in which states are much more active and representative. However, to the extent that city problems are concentrated in states with low fiscal capacity, the lack of a strong system of intergovernmental fiscal equalization among the states reinforces the continued existence of direct national- local grant relations. Third, formal negotiations or consultations between local government associations and the national government --particularly with respect to grant arrangements--exist in many of the other countries. In the United States individual city governments and local government associ- ations lobby the federal government, but they are rarely brought so overtly into the governmental process. To some extent this reflects another difference between the United States and other federal countries. Federalism is a much more formal and legalistic set of arrangements in other federal countries, whereas in the United States it is more the institutional structure through which intergovernmental politics occurs. Fourth, categorical or conditional grants are much more prevalent in the United States, while general grants are more prevalent in other countries. The utilization of categorical grants in the United States reflects the U.S. response to the problem of how to pursue national objectives in a country with diverse local political objectives. The problem does not arise as much in countries with less regional political diver- sity than the United States, such as Germany, Austria, and Australia. (In countries with greater regional political diversity, such as Canada, the federal govern- ment has selected a much more limited set of national objectives to pursue.) The pursuit of national objectives is also dealt with more directly in some countries. The U.K. central gov- ernment, for example, simply mandates local government to carry out what it deems to be local objectives; there is no need to attach conditions to grants. In Germany and Austria, the federal constitution gives local gov- ernments autonomy, except where the federal government defines a federal interest (i.e., posits national objec-

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119 Lives). In addition, in both countries constitutional arrangements require state and local governments to administer federal law. Finally, state governments play a much stronger role with respect to their urban areas in other federal coun- tries than in the United States. This observation, the explanation for which has already been touched on, sug- gests that any national urban policy in the United States should pay particularly close attention to the role of the states. In particular, the problem of how best to expand state responsibilities and actions for urban areas within the context of national objectives must be resolved. Reducing direct national-local grants and moving from categorical to block grants will not suffice if states do not themselves accept a more active role. In many of the countries examined, the lower direct federal government role in dealing with urban areas was accompanied by federal inducements or require- ments for states to pursue a more active urban role. Perhaps this is a direction worthy of examination for U.S. national urban policy. REFERENCE LIST AND BIBLIOGRAPHY Anderson, W. 1979 Internal memorandum to members of the Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations on USACIR's Comparative Study of Four Federal Systems, May 8. Auld, D.A., and Eden, L.B. 1983 Federal-provincial financial equalization and the Canadian constitution. Government and Policy December(1):475-487. Baker, I.G. 1980 The impact of federalism on economic and fiscal policy in Australia. Pp. 310-336 in R.L. Mathews, ea., Federalism in Australia and the Federal Republic of Germany: A Comparative Study. Canberra: Australian National Univer- sity Press. Beam, D.R., Conlan, T.J., and Walker, D.B. 1983 Federalism. Pp. 247-279 in A.W. Finifter, ea., Political Science: The State of the Disci- pline. Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association. ^

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120 Bennett, R.J. 1984 The finance of cities in West Germany. Progress in Planning 21:1-62. Bieri, S. 1979 Fiscal Federalism in Switzerland. Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations. Canberra: Australian National University Press. Bird, R.M. 1980 Central-Local Fiscal Relations and the Provi- sion of Urban Public Services. Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations. Canberra: Australian National University Press. Canada Department of Regional Economic Expansion 1981 Regional and Urban Development, Trends and Federal Policy: Canada. Workshop paper for the Urban Decline Project, OECD. Conrad, C.-A. 1980 Local Governments in the Federal Republic of Germany. Pp. 219-231 in R.L. Mathews, ea., Federalism in Australia and the Federal Republic of Germany: A Comparative Study. Canberra: Australian National University Press. Council of Europe 1975 The Financial Structures of Local and Regional Authorities in Europe: The Development of Central, Regional, and Local Finance Since 1950. Strasbourg: Council of Europe. . 1976 The Financial Structures of Local and Regional Authorities in Europe: Financial Apportionment and Equalization. Europe. Strasbourg: Council of Davis, A., and Lucke, R. 1982 The rich-state-poor-state problem in a federal system. National Tax Journal 35(3):337-363. Feldman, E.J., and Milch, J. 1978 Coordination or Control: Federal Initiatives in Canadian Cities. Paper delivered at the 1978 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, August 31- September 3. Friedrich, C.J. 1968 Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice. New York: Prager. Hallstern, G.-M., Spreer, F., and Wollman, H., eds. 1982 Applied Urban Research. Bonn: Federal Research Institute for Regional Geography and Regional Planning.

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121 Hanson, R., ed. 1982 National Policy and the Post-Industrial City: An International Perspective. D.C.: National Academy Press. Washington, Harris, C.P. 1980 Local government in Australia. Pp. 232-247 in R.L. Mathews, ea., Federalism in Australia and the Federal Republic of Germany: A Comparative Study. Canberra: sity Press. Australian National Univer- Heidenheimer, A.J., Heclo, H., and Adams, C.T. 1983 Comparative Public Policy. Second Edition. London: MacMillan. Huber, W. 1980 Financial Development Trends of Austrian Cities in the 1 9 9 Be . Vienna: Municipal Documentation Center. Hutchinson, J. n.d. Fiscal Federalism in Australia. In draft. U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Washington, D.C. Intermet n.d. A Study of the Financial Practices of Govern- ments in Metropolitan Areas. Final report prepared for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. International Centre for Local Credit 1978 Economic and Financial Pictures of Cities in Western Europe. The Hague: Centre for Local Credit. International International Labor Organization 1983 Yearbook of Labor Statistics. Geneva: International Labor organizaton. Lane, W.R. 1980 Fiscal federalism in Australia. Pp. 296-309 in R.L. Mathews, ea., Federalism in Australia and the Federal Republic of Germany: A Comparative Study. Canberra: Australian National Univer- sity Press. Leach, R. 1977 The Governance of Metropolitan Areas in Austra- lia with Lessons from Canadian and American Experience. Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations. Canberra: Australian National University Press. Macdonald, H.I. 1982 Federal-provincial fiscal issues in Canada.

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122 Pp. 145-152 in R.L. Mathews, ea., Public Policies in Two Countries: Canada and Austra- . .. . . lie. Canberra: Australian National University Press. Mathews, R.L. 1980a Federalism in Australia and the Federal Republic of Germany: A Comparative StudY. Canberra: Australian National University Press. 1980b Federalism in Retreat: The Abandonment of Tax Sharing and Fiscal Equalization. Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, Reprint Series 50. Canberra: Australian National University Press. 1981 Revenue Sharing in Federal Systems. Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations. Canberra: Australian National University Press 1982 Intergovernmental financial arrangements and taxation. Pp. 153-181 in R.L. Mathews, ea., Public Policies in Two Countries: Canada and ~ ~ . Australia. Canberra: Australian National University Press. Maxwell, J. 1971 Revenue sharing in Canada and Australia: some implications for the United States. National Tax Journal 24(2):251-265. McKay, D. 1980 Review Paper on Intergovernmental Relations in the EEC Member States. London: CES Ltd. Mitchell, R.E. n.d. The Australian Federal Grants Systems and its Impact on Fiscal Relations of the Federal Government with State and Local Governments. Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, Reprint Series 38. Canberra: Australian National University Press. Gates, W. 1972 Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt Brace. 1977 An economist's perspective on fiscal federal- ism. In W. Oates, ea., The Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism. Lexington, Mass.: - Lexington Books. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 1980 Revenue Statistics of OECD Countries, 1965- 1980. Paris: organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 1981 Organisation of Urban Policy at National and Regional Levels of Government and Instruments .

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