PART II
IN-DEPTH PERSPECTIVES



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PART II IN-DEPTH PERSPECTIVES

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Does the American Way of Zoning Cause the Suburbs of Metropolitan Areas to Be Too Spread Out? William A. Fischel Dartmouth College Are American metropolitan areas too spread out? I think the answer is yes. Virtually every measure of metropolitan density indicates that U.S. cities are more spread out than those of the rest of the world (Mieszkowski and Mills, 1993:136). Much of American suburbanization can be accounted for by more-or-less market-driven factors, and there is a smattering of evidence that some other countries' metropolitan areas could use some additional suburbanization. These qualifications notwithstanding, I maintain that the peculiarly American system of local land use controls contributes considerably to sprawl. Although many writers apply the term sprawl to all suburbanization, I employ it only to a normative judgment that the extent of suburbanization is excessive. The normative bases are economic efficiency and the judgment that, if two institutions are (approximately) equally efficient, the one that is more egalitarian should prevail. Efficient suburbanization—and efficient densities—are achieved when owners who wish to increase the intensity of use of their land cannot do so without causing the aggregate value of land in their neighborhood or (small) community to decrease. This criterion is elaborated in Fischel (1990:47-51), and indirect evidence discussed there as well as in this paper strongly suggests that few American metropolitan areas would meet this test. This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I treat the issue of income segregation. Income segregated neighborhoods are not obviously caused by zoning. However, evidence reviewed in this section strongly suggests that the American pattern of homogeneous, high-income suburbs is at least in part the result of our system of local land use controls. With respect to reforming this problem, however, the best has long been the enemy of the good. Reformers'

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insistence that the suburbs must develop new housing for the poor invites municipalities to adopt land use policies that democratically exclude everyone. The excessively low densities that result probably do more to isolate most of the poor than would a predevelopment policy that nonetheless tolerated more-or-less homogeneous suburbs. The following section treats the ''flight to the suburbs'' hypothesis and with it the question of how much suburbanization is caused by market factors rather than by urban public policy failures (to the extent that such distinctions can be maintained). The consensus among urban economists is that central-city problems do contribute to additional movement to the suburbs. I take a very rough guess that perhaps a quarter of modern (post World War II) suburbanization might not have occurred if central-city public amenities (schools, safety, antipollution) were comparable to that of the average suburb. Although exodus from central cities contributes to suburbanization, it does not necessarily cause the suburbs to develop at excessively low density. Indeed, one would expect higher densities in suburbs if the only cause of sprawl were central-city problems. But suburbs are not passive receptors of development. I describe in the fourth section a process of rational, homeowner-dominated suburban politics that causes their land use controls to become ever tighter in the face of development. The key to this process is the progressive denigration of the rights of owners of undeveloped land, who are the most consistent (and often the only) transmitter of the demands by outsiders to live or work in the community. The spiral of suburban down-zoning sends development ever farther from the central city and may contribute to the formation of satellite "edge cities" that institutionalize the low-density patterns. The penultimate section considers other public policies and arguable market failures (other than central-city problems) that contribute to the low-density patterns in American suburbs. These seem on balance to be relatively minor as causes of sprawl, although some of them—most notably federal environmental policies—are important supplements to suburban attempts to exclude development. The final section frames the public policy issue in terms of micro versus macro solutions. The macro solution to zoning-induced sprawl is metropolitan governance. The hazards of this are loss of the desirable features of local self-government and the possibility that metropolitan governance will result in too little suburbanization and excessively high densities and even higher housing prices. The micro solution is to restore the rights of owners of undeveloped land. I believe that there is a manageable standard called "normal behavior" for judges to follow that would significantly reduce sprawl. The hazards of the micro approach are governance by unelected judges and the possible loss of local amenities from too-enthusiastic defense of private property rights.

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Income Segregation is Not the Same Problem as Sprawl Income segregation is a growing problem in American cities. Abramson et al. (1995) studied census tract patterns for the 100 largest metropolitan areas between 1970 and 1990. Their measure of income segregation had increased by 11 percent over that period (1995:70). However, over the same period, their measure of racial segregation declined. This section deals with income segregation issues as they relate to zoning. The issue of zoning-induced income segregation is often conflated with the question of whether purely market forces in the United States induce high-income people to live predominately in suburban areas. The monocentric urban economics model predicts that, as incomes generally rise (that is, both poor and rich become richer than before), there will be more suburbanization. This is borne out empirically (Mills and Hamilton, 1994:124). But income growth does not necessarily imply that, at any particular moment, high-income people will live in suburbs. Whether the rich live farther from the center of the city than the poor is an empirical question that involves balancing two offsetting tendencies. Richer people demand more housing (interior space and outside lawns) than poor people, and housing is more cheaply available (per square foot of living space, not per house) in the suburbs. However, people in the suburbs have to commute farther, and time wasted on commuting is more costly for rich people than for poor people. Some evidence suggests that the suburban lure of lower-cost housing offsets the penalty of more commuting time, which means that it is "natural" for wealthier people to settle in the suburbs. But there is questioning of the power of this argument (Wheaton, 1977), and it has been pointed out that it is often not true in other countries and was not true at earlier periods in American history (LeRoy and Sonstelie, 1983). Historical factors are more likely to account for the pattern of suburbs being settled by the rich in the United States. The stock of housing is both durable and costly to remodel extensively. Housing in central cities was largely constructed for those who in the past were middle- or high-income people. As American incomes generally rose over time, this older housing no longer met the demands of upper-middle-income families. Rather than tear down or extensively remodel older housing to meet the more recent demands, it is cheaper to build from the ground up (Mills and Hamilton, 1994:245). The open ground is in the suburbs. This long-term filtering process does not necessarily penalize the poor financially. As more people become affluent and move to the suburbs, the price of the older housing in central cities falls. Because of its durability, this housing stock still provides better housing services for a given price than does constructing new housing for the poor (Weicher and Thibodeau, 1988). The problem is that this pattern tends to concentrate the poor in central-city and older suburban neighbor-

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hoods. The greater social problems of the poor contribute to declines in neighborhood amenities. A good deal of American criticism of zoning hinges on the failure of the suburbs to accommodate low-income housing in their midst (Briffault, 1990; Downs, 1973). This focus is valid, but it can create an unrealistic expectation of what would happen if "exclusionary" zoning were somehow eliminated. Most discussions of exclusionary zoning assume that outsiders can distinguish motives for zoning, but few public officials who urge the preservation of open space are stupid enough to say that its chief value is to preclude low-income housing. It is nearly impossible by inference to distinguish more innocent objectives from exclusionary ones (Bogart, 1993; Fischel, 1985:140). There is little historical evidence that, in the absence of zoning, the rich would be as likely to live next to the poor as to another rich household. Sam Bass Warner's study of Boston's suburban development prior to the use of zoning did not find neighborhood mingling. Land use patterns were income-segregated by neighborhood as independent builders responded to the demands of the market (Warner, 1962:Chap. 6). The same seems to have been true of New Haven. Marketing considerations and informal constraints created uniform housing patterns there well before zoning was even contemplated (Cappell, 1991). Houston, the only large city not to have zoning, is not generally characterized by mixed-income neighborhoods. Houston's suburban development occurs in homogeneous planned communities that are governed by private covenants whose restrictions would be the (unexpressed) envy of the most exclusive municipal planning board (Peiser, 1981). The problem with misapprehending the settlement patterns that would result in the absence of zoning is that it creates unrealistic expectations for zoning reforms. The state that has carried such reforms the farthest is New Jersey (Haar, 1996). Its supreme court was the first (and, with respect to the vigor with which it pursued the matter, the only) to recognize that zoning desired at the local level is not necessarily desirable for the metropolitan region as a whole. (The case is Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 [N.J. 1975].) The New Jersey court's initial remedy for exclusion was the creation of an obligation for communities to allow "least cost" housing to be developed (Oakwood at Madison v. Township of Madison, 371 A.2d 1192 [N.J. 1977]). I think this was a major and largely positive reform, but the New Jersey supreme court six years later did not regard it as going far enough. The reason was that newly built "least-cost" suburban housing was still relatively expensive. The New Jersey court apparently expected, contrary to most economic evidence, that unleashed private developers would build many units for low-income households. This makes little sense for a capital good, housing, that is highly durable. In order to get enough years of use to justify the high construction cost, it is best

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to start with high-quality construction, which is initially affordable only by the nonpoor (Mills and Hamilton, 1994:251). As a result of its impatience with what the market for new construction was producing, the New Jersey court hit upon a scheme that required suburbs to accept a quota of new, low-income housing for any "market-rate" housing that would be built (Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390 [1983]). These quotas were to be financed by charging developers of market-rate housing for rezonings (required by the courts, not volunteered by the municipalities) that allowed the builders to use more profitable higher densities (Fischel, 1991). This scheme looks generally desirable in terms of mixing population. An important drawback of Mount Laurel II was that the court focused on the proportion of low- to high-income housing rather than the overall density of housing. Once a community was certified as having a proportion of new housing that satisfied its "fair share" of low-income housing, it was virtually invited by the New Jersey court to be as exclusive with the rest of its undeveloped land as it wanted to be: "Finally, once a community has satisfied its fair share obligation, the Mount Laurel Doctrine will not restrict other measures, including large-lot and open area zoning, that would maintain its beauty and communal character" (456 A.2d at 421). The incentives for the suburbs then became to switch from selective exclusion of the poor to general exclusion of everyone (Fischel, 1991). I have it on local authority that Bedminster Township, for example, has not budged from its multiacre minimum lot sizes since its much-noted (Lamar et al., 1989) quota of Mount Laurel-induced housing was constructed. The new judicial remedy was sufficiently disturbing to New Jersey's large constituency of suburban voters that the state legislature took on the task of administering the court's order. Under the guise of complying with the decision, the legislature's 1985 Fair Housing Act actually subverted most of its goals (Schill, 1991:847). The New Jersey supreme court acceded to this as part of a deal in which the governor agreed to reappoint the chief justice, according to Kirp et al. (1995:142). This extraordinary pressure—reappointment is historically routine in New Jersey—by the executive on the judicial branch and its equally extraordinary acceptance by Chief Justice Wilentz may explain why Mount Laurel II has not been emulated by other state courts. What appears to have most disturbed New Jersey opponents of Mount Laurel remedies was not just the fiscal impact of the subsidized housing (although that was certainly important). The more critical issue may have been the neighborhood effects. Many built-up suburbs were actually willing to pay other communities between $10,000 and $20,000 per unit to accept half of their mandated share (Rubin et al., 1990:335). The housing development across the street, not on the other side of town, is most disturbing, and the Mount Laurel approach flew in the face of that anxiety. (I infer this both from numerous newspaper articles and my 10 years experience as a zoning board member in my New Hampshire hometown.)

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Although Mount Laurel advocates can point to specific projects that have been built (Lamar et al., 1989), my undergraduate student's search for statewide evidence that it had changed the general pattern of suburban housing development was fruitless. For example, the ratio of new apartment to new single-family home development in New Jersey communities singled out as having Mount Laurel obligations was not appreciably changed during the 1980s compared with earlier periods and compared with nearby Pennsylvania communities, which did not have a similar obligation (Giovannotto, 1994, summarized in Fischel, 1995:338). Although I regard neighborhood income segregation as likely to occur under almost any mechanism that operates without a strong dose of coercion, it must be emphasized that income segregation is greatly accentuated by modem zoning. It is one thing to observe that the rich and the poor live in different neighborhoods separated by a thoroughfare, a cemetery, or a railroad track. It is something of a greater order of magnitude to observe that they live in entirely different municipalities separated by miles of low-density development or "natural preserves." The larger-area separation surely discourages economic and social interactions that would otherwise be mutually beneficial and that are the cornerstone of a prosperous, democratic society. The spatial mismatch hypothesis, in which central-city youth are said to be unable to plug into job-finding networks because of excessive distances (Holzer et al., 1994), is just one pathology that emerges from excessive distance between people in metropolitan areas. Low-density counties also have lower output per worker (Ciccone and Hall, 1996). But does zoning actually cause income segregation by municipality? This is an instance in which the conventional wisdom—that exclusionary zoning is a real issue—is confirmed by evidence. The evidence is necessarily indirect because income segregation by neighborhood would, as mentioned earlier, most likely arise without zoning. The first bit of evidence is that high-income communities almost invariably have more restrictive zoning regulations than others. They impose more stringent regulations on undeveloped land than those that apply to existing, built-up neighborhoods. If market forces alone were sufficient to create exclusive communities, one would expect to see zoning standards such as minimum lot sizes be more uniform among communities. Rudel's excellent study of the evolution of zoning regulations among Connecticut towns (which jibes with my less-systematic observations) found that settlement by higher-income residents nearly always makes them more restrictive (Rudel, 1989:64-68, 81-137). It is well established that zoning does not simply "follow the market." The evidence is clear that most suburbs are zoned for minimum lot sizes greatly in excess of what the market would generate (McMillen and McDonald, 1991; Peterson, 1974; Wallace, 1988; White, 1988). The common knowledge among developers that a rezoning to allow greater residential densities nearly invariably

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raises the value of land indicates that it is zoning, not the market, that constrains the construction of higher-density housing in the suburbs. Other evidence that is consistent with zoning being an important source of suburban income segregation is a study using a national sample by Hamilton et al. (1975). They found that census tracts within metropolitan areas that had numerous governments—and hence numerous independent zoning authorities—were more homogeneous than the tracts within metropolitan areas that had fewer local governments. Since there is no reason to suppose that the land market operates differently in metropolitan areas with few or many governments, they attributed the sorting of people by income to the existence of independent local governments. This finding is confirmed with different samples by Eberts and Gronberg (1981). It is theoretically possible for communities to become stratified without zoning, but the conditions for doing so seem unlikely (Epple et al., 1988). Wheaton (1993) found that even under "ideal" conditions for spontaneous income segregation, at least a weak form of zoning for minimum lot size was necessary to obtain such stratification. Without fiscal zoning, developers have a strong incentive to build lower-cost housing in affluent districts to take advantage of the higher-quality services and lower tax rates. Doing so would give them a capital gain at the expense of existing homeowners (Hamilton, 1976). Since homeowners are the most politically effective group in small suburbs, they have the means as well as the incentive to pass zoning laws to protect the value of their major asset, their homes (Rossi and Weber, 1996:23). A determinants study by Rolleston (1987) established that the desires of affluent communities to protect their fiscal advantages were significant and large determinants of suburban zoning restrictiveness. The motive is not modern; local governments have been concerned about immigration by the poor since there were local governments (Burns, 1994:35). The incorporation of the many small, independent suburbs in Los Angeles County under the post World War II Lakewood Plan was motivated entirely by the desire of homeowners to preclude the invasion of apartments in residential areas, which had been allowed by the more prodevelopment county government (Cion, 1966). A similar motive seems to have been behind the resistance of Pittsburgh's suburbs to annexation by the central city in the 1920s (Lubove, 1969:94-100). The concern that suburban zoning makes low-income housing difficult to develop has been expressed by federal commissions of all political stripes. The National Commission on Urban Problems (1969), chaired by Senator Paul Douglas and commissioned by a Democratic president, regarded local, exclusionary zoning as a major barrier (1969:19). The Advisory Commission on Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing (1991), commissioned by a Republican president more than two decades later, came to the same conclusion (1991:2-6). That such similar conclusions should be reached more than two decades later indicates the staying power of localism in zoning.

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I think it is important to at least raise the issue of why suburban communities are averse to having low-income residents. Most of the above-mentioned studies have emphasized the desire for fiscal protection and a sense of snobbishness. [The only legislated program requiring a modest proportion of new housing in each community to be for low-income residents is Massachusetts' Anti-Snob Zoning Act (Stockman, 1992).] I believe, however, that these factors do not tell the whole story. An important problem, I believe, is fear of crime and other forms of public disorder such as aggressive begging (Segelhorst and Brady, 1984; Ellickson, 1996a). Disorder is worrisome to homeowners not simply because of personal risk, but because it reduces housing values as well (Taylor, 1995). These fears are only partly controlled by expenditures on police and courts, which are, in any event, costly and uncertain deterrents (Cassell and Hayman, 1996). The least costly way for middle-class people to obtain more safety is to put some distance between themselves and the poor and to use zoning regulations to maintain that distance (Wilson and Boland, 1976:186; Oates, 1977). The rising crime rates of the 1970s and 1980s have been estimated to cause a significant amount of the flight to the suburbs (Cullen and Levitt, 1996; Skogan, 1990:82). Cullen and Levitt estimate that, for the 1976-1993 period, moderate-to-large U.S. central cities lost more than one resident to the suburbs for each crime committed (1996:9). The effects of crime were particularly large on the out-migration of high-income households with children (p. 4) and did not vary by race (1996:20). This may partly explain the divergent trends over the 1970-1990 period observed by Abramson et al. (1995), in which racial segregation fell but income segregation rose. Higher-income blacks as well as whites respond to rising crime by leaving inner-city neighborhoods. The focus on crime as a cause of excessive suburbanization actually is cause for some guarded optimism. Crime rates in nearly all large central cities have been falling rapidly in the last few years to levels that are nearly those of the 1960s (New York Times, December 20, 1996, p. A1.) If this trend continues, middle-class people may reverse some of their out-migration. More important, if crime reduction is a uniform trend (and not simply the result of extraordinary and costly efforts by cities), suburban homeowners may be less inclined to resist development of lower-cost housing. Reductions in sprawl would reduce the physical distance between people of all income classes and thereby decrease the degree of isolation of the poor from the job market and other forms of social capital (Schill, 1991). Indeed, research on peer group effects in neighborhoods and schools suggests very strongly that social isolation is bad for the economy as a whole, not just the poor (Benabou, 1993; Case and Katz, 1991; Cutler and Glaeser, 1997; Henderson et al., 1978). (For a less pessimistic view of the effects of spatial isolation on income distribution, see Kremer, 1997.) The problem, as Tony Downs has persistently pointed out, is how to get the population as a whole to cooperate to break down the social

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isolation of the poor (Downs, 1973, 1994). Breaking down the spatial isolation of the poor by discouraging excessively low-density suburbs would seem to be an important first start. Flight From Central Cities Could Result in High-Density Suburbs The problem of sprawl raises at least two distinct issues related to excessive suburbanization. One asks whether American central cities are being depopulated for reasons besides otherwise benign and probably unstoppable economic trends and technological changes. The second asks whether the population density of suburbs is artificially low. These are not the same issue, nor are they necessarily related. On one hand, central cities could be depopulated as the result of suboptimal public policies, with people moving to the suburbs and causing suburban densities to be too high. On the other hand, central-city depopulation trends could be natural, but suburbs could have artificially low densities, spreading the population out too far into the countryside. To put it another way, one trend (city depopulation) does not have to imply the other trend (low-density suburbs). Although this essay dwells on the possibility of the second trend (unduly low-density suburbs), it may be useful to review what is known about the first (city depopulation). The issue was recently reviewed in the Journal of Economic Perspectives by two distinguished urban economists, Peter Mieszkowski and Edwin Mills (1993). Mills in particular has been concerned over much of his career with the causes of suburbanization. He has done this by advancing both theoretical models and empirical evidence that address suburban growth. As a result of his focus on the standard urban economics model's location predictions (described in the previous section), Mills has emphasized the "natural" causes of suburbanization as being improvements in transportation infrastructure (which reduce the costs of commuting), technological changes that allow employment decentralization, and, most important, long-term increases in household incomes. Even if all households had exactly the same income, city growth in an era of rising personal incomes would be disproportionately located in the suburbs. Mills's empirical work pushed the date for the beginning of American suburbanization back to the 1880s (Mills, 1972:48). Using the concept of population density gradients (the percentage increase in population density as one moves closer to the center of a city), Mills showed that the decades following World War II were not unusual in their suburbanization trends. Indeed, the major surge of suburbanization (which otherwise seems to have been going on uniformly since 1880) appears to have begun in 1920, not 1950 (Mieszkowski and Mills, 1993:140). It is notable that the number of communities that adopted

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that the total number of cases adjudicated during the first year of the law was six, which suggests that negotiation was usually successful.) Regulatory takings is not the only legal doctrine that might be invoked to help landowners develop at normal densities. Several state courts have continued the substantive review of local legislation that the federal courts nominally discarded in the 1930s (Friedman, 1988). The problem with substantive review is how to set the appropriate standards. If 4-acre minimum lot sizes are unconstitutional, as was decided by the Pennsylvania supreme court in 1965 (Coyle, 1993:54), what about 3-acre minimum lot sizes? Once again, encouragement of courts and legislatures from bodies other than the obviously (even if usefully) self-interested development industry would have a beneficial effect. The least-cost housing standard initially adopted (and later impatiently abandoned) by the New Jersey supreme court in Oakwood at Madison (cited above) is a good candidate. It appears to be consistent with the writings of Tony Downs, who has spent much of his career grappling with these problems (Downs, 1969; 1991). The Oakwood least-cost housing doctrine is more modest in its goals than the Mount Laurel II doctrine, but the latter clearly upset voters' sense of established entitlements and proved to be judicially unmanageable. One might reasonably ask whether, given that a few states are doing something, development interests actually need the endorsement of more neutral bodies. As I have pointed out elsewhere (Fischel, 1995:Chap. 8), state legislatures have been induced to protect specific groups from excessive regulation. For example, siting of mobile homes and group homes has received special protection in many states, and excessive exactions have often been reined in. In the halls of the state legislatures, developers' interests seem not to have fared so badly. There is a difference, however, between developers' interests and landowners' interests. Developers are often unconcerned with metropolitan location. Many buy only land that is zoned for the use they want. Some large developers have told me that they are indifferent to zoning, except when the rules are changed after they have purchased the land. As a result, the party most sensitive to the location demands of otherwise-excluded outsiders are the owners of developable land. But these owners are not easily organized, since their situations differ from one place to another and since their battles over rezoning tend to be episodic rather than ongoing. Landowning interests are not entirely alone in the political arena, of course. Aside from the developers who do take ownership positions in land not zoned for what they want, a newly vigorous property rights movement has advocated a return to landowner rights (Yandle, 1995). The problem is that much of this movement tends to be driven by a larger ideological agenda that is viewed with suspicion by the mainstream of academics, news media, judges, and legislators. The utilitarian notion that increasing the rights of landowners might lead to net gains for society at large tends to be lost in debates about the welfare state, big

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government, the New Deal, and the meaning of the Cold War. Some words of endorsement for development-minded landowners in the suburbs by neutral and scientifically responsible bodies might go a long way. It does not seem all that costly to try. Conclusion American metropolitan areas are both excessively spread out and segregated by income class. This essay has argued that the major cause of both of these problems is the attenuation of market forces by local land use regulation. Demands by outsiders are systematically thwarted by local governments in suburban areas that seek to preserve the status quo. Development-minded landowners, whether for-profit, charitable, or private nonprofit, are often prevented from developing their land at densities and for uses that are considered normal by metropolitan area-wide standards. The better way to open up the suburbs, I submit, is not to have yet another layer of government, but to improve the rights of landowners. Acknowledgments I have benefited from written comments by Anthony Downs and an anonymous referee and from oral comments by members of the committee responsible for this volume. References Aaron, Henry 1972 Shelter and Subsidies: Who Benefits from Federal Housing Policies? Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Abramson, Alan J., Mitchell S. Tobin, and Matthew R. VanderGoot 1995 The changing geography of metropolitan opportunity: The segregation of the poor in U.S. metropolitan areas, 1970 to 1990. Housing Policy Debate 6(1):45-72. Advisory Commission on Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing 1991 Not In My Back Yard: Removing Barriers to Affordable Housing. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Altshuler, Alan A., and Jose A. Gómez-Ibáñez, with Arnold M. Howitt 1993 Regulation for Revenue: The Political Economy of Land Use Exactions. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. Anderson, John E. 1993 Use-value property tax assessment: Effects on land development. Land Economics 69(August):263-269. Asabere, Paul K. 1985 The relative lot size hypothesis: An empirical note. Urban Studies 22(August):355-357. Babcock, Richard F., ed. 1987 Exactions: A controversial new source for municipal funds. Law and Contemporary Problems 50(Winter).

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Bahl, Roy, David Sjoquist, and W. Loren Williams 1990 School finance reform and impact on property taxes. Proceedings of the Eighty-Third Annual Conference on Taxation. Columbus, OH: National Tax Association-Tax Institute of America. Baldassare, Mark, and Georgeanna Wilson 1996 Changing sources of suburban support for growth controls. Urban Studies 33(April):459-471. Barrows, Robert G. 1983 Beyond the tenement: Patterns of American urban housing, 1870-1930. Journal of Urban History 9(August):395-420. Bartik, Timothy J. 1991 Who Benefits from State and Local Economic Development Policies? Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. Benabou, Roland 1993 Workings of a city: Location, education, and production. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(August):619-652. Bentick, Brian L. 1979 The impact of taxation and valuation practices on the timing and efficiency of land use . Journal of Political Economy 87(August):859-868. Bloom, Howard S., and Helen F. Ladd 1982 Property tax revaluation and tax levy growth. Journal of Urban Economics 11(January):73-84. Bogart, William T. 1993 "What big teeth you have!": Identifying the motivations for exclusionary zoning. Urban Studies (December):1669-1681. Briffault, Richard 1990 Our localism: Part I—The structure of local government law. Columbia Law Review 90(January):1-115. Brownstone, David, and Arthur DeVany 1991 Zoning, returns to scale, and the value of undeveloped land. Review of Economics and Statistics 73(November):699-704. Brueckner, Jan K., and David A. Fansler 1983 The economics of urban sprawl: Theory and evidence on the spatial sizes of cities. Review of Economics and Statistics 65(August):479-482. Burns, Nancy 1994 The Formation of American Local Governments: Private Values in Public Institutions. New York: Oxford University Press. Callies, David L. 1994 Preserving Paradise: Why Regulation Won't Work. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Cappell, Andrew J. 1991 A walk along Willow: Patterns of land use coordination in prezoning New Haven. Yale Law Journal 101(December):617-642. Case, Anne C., and Lawrence F. Katz 1991 The Company You Keep: The Effects of Family and Neighborhood on Disadvantaged Youths. NBER Working Paper No. 3705, Cambridge, MA, May. Cassell, Paul G., and B. S. Hayman 1996 Police interrogation in the 1990s: An empirical study of the effects of Miranda. UCLA Law Review 43(February):839-931.

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