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Science Management in the Human Exploration of Space

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Science Management in the Human Exploration of Space Committee on Human Exploration Space Studies Board Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications National Research Council NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS Washington, D.C. 1997

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NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance. This report has been reviewed by a group other than the authors according to procedures ap- proved by a Report Review Committee consisting of members of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distin- guished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of sci- ence and technology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Bruce Alberts is president of the National Acad- emy of Sciences. The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the Na- tional Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. William A. Wulf is president of the National Academy of Engineering. The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy mat- ters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Kenneth I. Shine is president of the Institute of Medicine. The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy's purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Bruce Alberts and Dr. William A. Wulf are chairman and vice chairman, respectively, of the National Research Council. Support for this project was provided by Contract NASW 4627 and Contract NASW 96013 between the National Academy of Sciences and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organizations or agencies that provided support for this project. Cover: Mars mosaic image courtesy of the U.S. Geological Survey, Flagstaff, Arizona. Lunar cres- cent image courtesy of Dennis di Cicco. Cover design by Penny E. Margolskee. Copies of this report are available free of charge from Space Studies Board, National Research Council, 2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20418 Copyright 1997 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America

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COMMITTEE ON HUMAN EXPLORATION NOEL W. HINNERS, Lockheed Martin Astronautics, Chair WILLIAM J. MERRELL, JR., H. John Heinz III Center ROBERT H. MOSER, University of New Mexico JOHN E. NAUGLE, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (retired) MARCIA S. SMITH, Congressional Research Service PETER W. RODNEY and MARC S. ALLEN, Study Directors BARBARA L. JONES, Administrative Associate . . .

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SPACE STUDIES BOARD CLAUDE R. CANIZARES, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Chair MARK R. ABBOTT, Oregon State University JOHN A. ARMSTRONG,* IBM Corporation (retired) JAMES P. BAGIAN, Environmental Protection Agency DANIEL N. BAKER, University of Colorado LAWRENCE BOGORAD, Harvard University DONALD E. BROWNLEE, University of Washington JOHN J. DONEGAN, John Donegan Associates, Inc. GERARD W. ELVERUM, JR., TRW ANTHONY W. ENGLAND, University of Michigan DANIEL J. FINK,* D.J. Fink Associates, Inc. MARTIN E. GLICKSMAN, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute RONALD GREELEY, Arizona State University BILL GREEN, former member, U.S. House of Representatives NOEL W. HINNERS,* Lockheed Martin Astronautics ANDREW H. KNOLL, Harvard University JANET G. LUHMANN, University of California, Berkeley JOHN H. McELROY,* University of Texas, Arlington ROBERTA BALSTAD MILLER, CIESIN BERRIEN MOORE III, University of New Hampshire KENNETH H. NEALSON, University of Wisconsin MARY JANE OSBORN, University of Connecticut Health Center SIMON OSTRACH, Case Western Reserve University MORTON B. PANISH, AT&T Bell Laboratories (retired) CARLE M. PIETERS, Brown University MARCIA J. RIEKE, University of Arizona JOHN A. SIMPSON, Enrico Fermi Institute ROBERT E. WILLIAMS, Space Telescope Science Institute MARC S. ALLEN, Director *Former member. TV

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COMMISSION ON PHYSICAL SCIENCES, MATHEMATICS, AND APPLICATIONS ROBERT J. HERMANN, United Technologies Corporation, Co-chair W. CARL LINEBERGER, University of Colorado, Co-chair PETER M. BANKS, Environmental Research Institute of Michigan LAWRENCE D. BROWN, University of Pennsylvania RONALD G. DOUGLAS, Texas A&M University JOHN E. ESTES, University of California, Santa Barbara L. LOUIS HEGEDUS, Elf Atochem North America, Inc. JOHN E. HOPCROFT, Cornell University RHONDA J. HUGHES, Bryn Mawr College SHIRLEY A. JACKSON, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission KENNETH H. KELLER, University of Minnesota KENNETH I. KELLERMANN, National Radio Astronomy Observatory MARGARET G. KIVELSON, University of California, Los Angeles DANIEL KLEPPNER, Massachusetts Institute of Technology JOHN KREICK, Sanders, a Lockheed Martin Company MARSHA I. LESTER, University of Pennsylvania THOMAS A. PRINCE, California Institute of Technology NICHOLAS P. SAMIOS, Brookhaven National Laboratory L.E. SCRIVEN, University of Minnesota SHMUEL WINOGRAD, IBM T.J. Watson Research Center CHARLES A. ZRAKET, MITRE Corporation (retired) NORMAN METZGER, Executive Director v

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Foreword From the dawn of the space age, human spaceflight and space science have made uneasy bedfellows. A 1960 report commissioned by Science Advisor George Kistiakowsky for President Eisenhower concluded that ". . . among the major reasons for attending the manned exploration of space are emotional com- pulsions and national aspirations.... It seems, therefore, to us at the present time that man-in-space cannot be justified on purely scientific grounds, although more thought may show that there are situations for which this is not true. On the other hand, it may be argued that much of the motivation and drive for the scientific exploration of space is derived from the dream of man's getting into space him- self."i In addition to questions of motivation and justification, accommodating the frequently conflicting needs of human life support and scientific investigation inevitably increases pressures on finite financial and tangible resources. The successes of joint crowed and scientific missions, from Apollo to the Hubble repair to Shuttle/MIR, show the possible benefits of cohabitation. Of course, there have also been periods of friction and consequently unrealized po- tential. This report of the Space Studies Board' s Committee on Human Explora- tion examines U.S. spaceflight history and draws lessons about "best practices" for managing scientific research in conjunction with a human spaceflight pro- gram. Since NASA's current focus is the development and subsequent operation of a crowed orbital laboratory, the International Space Station, some of these lessons should be immediately useful. The report is intended to be especially germane for a national decision to resume human exploration beyond low Earth orbit. Claude R. Canizares, Chair Space Studies Board i"Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Man-in-Space," December 16, 1960, in Exploring the Unknown, Volume I: Organizing for Exploration, John W. Logsdon, ea., NASA SP-4407, NASA, Washington, D.C., 1995, p. 411. . . vat

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Preface In 1988 the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering stated in the report Toward a New Era in Space: Realigning Policies to New Realities that ". . . the ultimate decision to undertake further voyages of human exploration and to begin the process of expanding human activities into the solar system must be based on non-technical factors. It is clear, however, that if and when a program of human exploration is initiated, the U.S. research com- munity must play a central role by providing the scientific advice necessary to help make numerous political and technical decisions." Since its establishment in 1958, the Space Studies Board, formerly the Space Science Board, has been the principal independent advisory body on civil space research in the United States. In this capacity, the Board established the Commit- tee on Human Exploration (CHEX) in 1989 to examine science and science policy matters concerned with the return of astronauts to the Moon and eventual voy- ages to Mars. The Board asked CHEX to consider three major questions: signs? missions? 1. What scientific knowledge is prerequisite for prolonged human space mis 2. What scientific opportunities might derive from prolonged human space 3. What basic principles should guide the management of both the prerequi- site scientific research and the scientific activities that may be carried out in con- junction with human exploration? This report addresses the third of these topics. The first was the subject of Six

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26 SCIENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE HUMAN EXPLORATION OF SPACE sis (R&A) and flight programs are managed by customary peer-review practices to achieve broad scientific goals laid out in widely circulated solicitations. In 1996, however, budgetary control over the scientific components of the space station program, including the NASA-Mir Research Program and Space Station Facilities and Utilization, was removed from OLMSA and placed under the management of the International Space Station program within OSF, OLMSA's partner in the HEDS strategic enterprise. In this arrangement, these important elements of the space laboratory research program are effectively once again vested in NASA's human spaceflight office, at least from a budgetary point of view, where they are directly subordinated to the priorities of the flight pro- gram.l2 As argued in the Space Studies Board reports cited above (including the 1970 report), a program of extended-duration human spaceflight will place major new demands on the life sciences. In order to overcome past management prob- lems, to bring additional high-quality research and researchers into the program, to ensure that those scientists are able to conduct cutting-edge research, and to enable NASA management to incorporate human biomedical factors directly into programmatic decisions at the highest levels, the committee recommends that: 3. NASA should maintain a dedicated biomedical sciences office headed by a life scientist. This office should be given management visibility and decision- making authority commensurate with its critical role in the program. The option of having this office report directly to the NASA Administrator should be given careful consideration. SCIENCE ENABLED BY HUMAN EXPLORATION Early examinations of enabled science in human exploration included the Space Science Board's Iowa Summer Studyi3 on the scientific opportunities aris- ing from the Apollo program, and the work of NASA's Task Force on the Scien- tific Uses of a Space Station.~4 In its Opportunities report, the present commit- tee discussed the distinction between enabling and enabled science in human exploration. If these research categories are clearly distinguished and the distinc- tion maintained during the course of implementation, then the most problematic issue that remains is the relative role of humans and robots. The tension between advocates of human exploration and advocates of robotic science missions has existed for a long time. Some researchers are convinced that space science objec- tives can be met using Earth-controlled or autonomous robotic spacecraft alone. Others believe, equally firmly, that the future viability of the entire U.S. civil space program depends on human presence in space. If these differences are carried into the future, the committee believes that the only result will be the diminution of the total U.S. space effort, probably at a significant cost to both groups.~5

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MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS 27 Humankind is still in the earliest phases of the exploration of the inner solar system. Further evolution can be expected in the concepts and details of a con- tinuing program and in possibilities for enabled scientific research. Enabled sci- ence should be competitively evaluated in terms of its relationship to other space science initiatives and opportunities. Such an evaluation would involve not only scientific quality but also programmatic issues such as cost, schedule, and the value added by human presence. Cost is a particularly difficult issue to address. It is often argued that the incremental cost of individual science investigations is low in comparison to the total cost in human flight programs, and that such inves- tigations therefore should be incorporated into the human flight mission. In the past, this rationale, combined with a flight opportunity, has been used to justify the flight of experiments whose merit was questionable or at least not clearly established by peer review. A pernicious side effect of this reasoning can be the imposition on the program or flight system of research requirements, together with their attendant costs and risks, that are unwarranted by the quality of the potential science return. At the same time, there will arise occasions where it is decided, after thor- ough evaluation, that an investigation of high scientific merit should be accom- plished within the human exploration program even though some programmatic considerations, such as cost, might argue for implementation through a purely robotic program. A past example illustrates this point: the Apollo Telescope Mount on Skylab successfully accomplished scientific objectives derived from planning for the robotic Advanced Orbiting Solar Observatory, a program that had been canceled in the space science program for budgetary reasons. Space Science Strategies and Science Goals and Priorities A key element in the conduct of space science has been the development of a research strategy for each major scientific discipline. These strategies are de- veloped, to the extent possible, without regard to the mode of implementation and evolve as knowledge, technology, and instrumentation advance. The strategies are crafted in such a way as to leave technical implementation to the agency programmatic planning process since the scientific committees that develop them are not constituted to have the information and expertise necessary to address implementation options in detail. Another reason that the research strategies avoid implementation recommendations is that they are intended to remain valid for 5 to 10 years, while the programmatic context changes on a much shorter time scale due to dynamics of annual budgets and overall national policy. Each discipline's science strategy is used by NASA to help establish priori- ties for missions supporting that discipline. Because these priorities should apply also to research enabled by human exploration of the inner solar system, the com- mittee recommends that:

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28 SCIENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE HUMAN EXPLORATION OF SPACE 4. Each space research discipline should maintain a science strategy to be used as the basis for planning, prioritizing, selecting, and managing science, including that enabled by a human exploration program. Selection of Enabled Science Investigations The overall merit of enabled space science is of central importance. Thus the decision-making process leading to the selection of a given enabled science project can only be articulated and defended by rigorous and systematic evalua- tion. Such tools already exist in the form of the practices and procedures used to select NASA's science programs.~7 In addition, there are good reasons for locat- ing control of the selection process at NASA Headquarters. As in the case of enabling science (Recommendation 2, above), rather than develop new proce- dures, the committee recommends that: 5. NASA's Headquarters science offices should select the scientific experi- ments enabled by a human exploration program according to established prac- tices: community-wide opportunity announcements, open and equitable competi- tion, and peer review. Implementation of Enabled Science Once science investigations are selected for a human exploration program, their actual implementation in the context of a specific set of mission constraints, e.g., mass, volume, and power requirements, necessarily involves interactions between the science offices and those charged with implementing the flight pro- gram. Taking note of the broad success of the procedures devised for this pur- pose during the Apollo, Skylab, and Apollo-Soyuz programs (see Chapter 2), the committee recommends that: 6. The offices responsible for human exploration and for space science should jointly create a formal organizational structure for managing the enabled science component of a human exploration program. INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES Protocol Review In its first report, the committee commented that the potential hazards to be faced by the crews on human exploration missions beyond Earth orbit "must be adequately addressed within the context of a comprehensive program of health and safety. To do otherwise imposes unacceptable risks on the entire human exploration enterprise."~9 Experience from previous NASA programs, however,

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MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS 29 shows that concerns about astronaut health and safety, or about the forward and backward contamination of planetary bodies (planetary protection), can conflict with, or impede accomplishment of, the objectives of a specific mission. Analy- sis of the history of planetary quarantine during the Apollo era, for example, exposes a series of organizational and implementation problems, ranging from unclear allocation of authority and responsibility to deficient integration of engi- neering requirements and personnel training into the program.20 One study con- cluded, after examining alternatives, with a preference that "a life science pro- gram office would be established within NASA with responsibilities for life science research and for protecting against extraterrestrial contamination, both outbound and inbound. As recommended in the 1960 NASA report, this program would carry status equivalent to that of other program offices within NASA."2i Experience illustrates a clear need for independent objective review of the han- dling of these concerns and of constituent protocols by individuals and offices not responsible for the conduct of the flight program. The committee recommends that: 7. Officials responsible for review of activities or protocols relating to hu- man health and safety and planetary protection on human and robotic missions should be independent of the implementing program offices. The Role of Universities Since its earliest days, the space program has benefited from the involvement of academic scientists in the development of science priorities, mission concepts, and instruments for spacecraft, and analysis of results. NASA needs the ideas, skills, and support of the academic community. This participation provides a steady source of new talent and rapid dissemination of results of the space pro- gram into the scientific and engineering communities.22 In the early days of NASA, as competition for room on satellites increased, NASA established a for- mal procedure to ensure equitable access to its missions by all scientists whether at universities, NASA field centers, or other federal and commercial laborato- ries.23 The human exploration of space will extend over a long period and thus will require a continual input of new talent. In addition, the program will gener- ate new knowledge and technology. Therefore, the committee recommends that: 8. The external research community should have a leading role in defining and carrying out the scientific experiments conducted within a human explora- tion program. This recommendation is consistent with an earlier Board recommendation that NASA's research be conducted out-of-house wherever possible.24

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30 SCIENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE HUMAN EXPLORATION OF SPACE The Role of Scientific Expertise Within the Program In the early days of NASA, many academic scientists and NASA engineers thought that scientific research should be conducted by academic scientists and that the function of NASA field centers should be to provide launch vehicles, spacecraft, and engineering help to these academics. It rapidly became apparent to both groups, however, that each NASA field center responsible for a NASA scientific mission, including the contractor-operated Jet Propulsion Laboratory, needed a group of highly qualified space scientists to help on a day-to-day basis with conceiving new missions, developing approved missions, and providing a channel of communication between the center and the academic community. The best way to guarantee and monitor the competence of these in-house scientists is to expect them to compete successfully with their academic colleagues for the opportunity to participate in the NASA space science program as investigators themselves. In response to downsizing pressures and an agency desire to preserve and enhance the vitality of its science programs, the role of government space scien- tists, especially those at NASA field centers, has recently been reexamined in a number of Board studies and reports.25~27 An alternate approach to the vital functions performed by these scientists that is structured around external, but tightly coupled, "science institutes" has been examined recently by NASA.28 While not directed at a human exploration program, these analyses' rationale and conclusions apply directly to such a program, adapted perhaps to NASA's orga- nizational configuration at such a time. The key point is that the functions cur- rently exercised by NASA in-house project scientists are essential ones that should be maintained in any alternative organizational arrangement that might be adopted. Consistent with findings of these studies, the committee makes the general recommendation that: 9. A human exploration program organization must incorporate scientific personnel to assist in program planning and operations, and to serve as an inter- face between internal project management and the external scientific community. Such "in-house" scientists should be of a professional caliber that will enable them to compete on an equal basis with their academic colleagues for research opportunities offered by human exploration missions. Funding for Science in a Program of Human Exploration The question of the programmatic source of funding for scientific experi- ments was considered at length by the committee. It can be argued that to attain the desired control over the science part of the program, the science office should budget for the science and control the science budget allocation and accountabil

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MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS 31 ity process. A counter-argument holds that the expense of conducting science in conjunction with human spaceflight is so high that it should be budgeted under the human spaceflight program, where it would be a comparatively small cost element, to prevent it from crowding out other science priorities in science office budgets. Historically, as Chapter 2 recounts, both of these approaches have been used at different times. During the early lunar exploration program, the Office of Space Science budgeted for the robotic missions. In contrast, the Apollo, Skylab, and Apollo-Soyuz programs themselves budgeted for their associated science. During Shuttle/Spacelab, the science programs have budgeted for science experi- ments and data analysis, although the Shuttle program has funded most of the integration of the payloads into the Shuttle and much of the common support equipment. The committee concluded that there has been no clear correlation between science effectiveness and the programmatic source of science funding; rather, the committee's deliberations revealed that science effectiveness is correlated with the control of the management processes by which the science is selected and implemented. Science budgeting responsibility, on the other hand, has histori- cally been largely a function of expediency and opportunity. For example, the high national priority of the Apollo program supported the high cost of Apollo science. In the Shuttle era, the assignment of science budgeting to the science office was driven by the desire to minimize the apparent cost of the Shuttle pro- gram. It was pointed out to the committee that the synchronization of budgeting by the science office (or offices) in support of science enabled by a human explora- tion program remains a problem. That is, if the science office assumed the re- sponsibility for budgeting human exploration program science, it would be re- quired to ask for funds to plan and support science for human flight programs not yet approved in order for the science to be incorporated into the program in its early phases. This additional science funding could prove difficult to attract un- der these circumstances, and the science office would naturally be cautious about committing any of its existing resources specifically to such support. At the same time, NASA would like to be able to offer any scientific advantages of a human exploration program as part of its advocacy for that program. The committee appreciates the problem and suggests that the best approach is implied by Recom- mendation 4, that is, that strategic science planning that avoids prescribing imple- mentation details can constitute a sound basis for preparation, negotiation, and participation, and offers the best assurance of appropriate balance and optimum synergy between robotic and human exploration. This approach would use the science strategies to inform a continuing dialogue and integration with the human exploration enterprise, strengthening both efforts and helping forestall late and ineffective science involvement. In a zero-growth or declining budget environment, such as exists now and

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32 SCIENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE HUMAN EXPLORATION OF SPACE which also existed as Apollo tailed off, one cannot pretend that the higher cost of doing business within human spaceflight programs has no impact on science pro- grams (see, for example, note 12 below). Thus, while scientific accomplishment does not appear to have been strongly correlated with the source of funding in the past, control of the science budgets by the science offices may, in fact, be essen- tial to maintain the quality of the research program and a productive balance with flight system development in the future. The committees general principle fa- vonng the establishment of a joint spaceflight/science program office provides a mechanism for this within the context of a sound management structure; the com- m~ttee therefore recommends that: 10. Working through their partnership in a joint spacepight/science pro- gram office, the science offices should control the overall science management process, including the budgeting and disbursement of research funds. NOTES AND REFERENCES Space Studies Board, National Research Council, Scientific Prerequisites for the Human Exploration of Space, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1993, pp. 10-12. 2. Space Studies Board, National Research Council, Scientific Opportunities in the Human Ex- ploration of Space, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1994, pp. 6-7. 3. Office of Technology Assessment, NASA's Office of Space Science and Applications: Pro- cess, Priorities, and Goals, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., January 1992. 4. Space Studies Board, National Research Council, Radiation Hazards to Crews of Interplan- etary Missions: Biological Issues and Research Strategies, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1996. 5. Space Studies Board, letter report to NASA Associate Administrator Harry Holloway from Louis J. Lanzerotti and Fred W. Turek, April 26, 1993. 6. Space Studies Board, National Research Council, Managing the Space Sciences, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1995; Recommendations 5-1 through 5-8, pp. 57-58. 7. These considerations have most recently been addressed by the Board in connection with the Explorer mission line. See the report Assessment of Recent Changes in the Explorer Program, Space Studies Board, National Research Council, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1996. 8. These views can be traced back to early days of the human flight program. See, for example, the Space Science Board's Life Sciences in Space, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., 1970, p. 19. 9. Space Studies Board, National Research Council, Managing the Space Sciences, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1995, p. 37. 10. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA Strategic Plan, February 1995, NASA, Washington, D.C. 11. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Budget Estimates-Fiscal Year 1998, p. SAT 2-3, 1997. Scientific objectives are also prominent in the four top-level HEDS goals presented in NASA's Enterprise for the Human Exploration and Development of Space-The Strategic Plan, January 1996, NASA, Washington, D.C. 12. This is clearly indicated by supporting narrative in NASA's FY98 Budget Estimates volume: "This past year NASA consolidated the management of Space Station research and technology, sci- ence utilization, and payload development with the Space Station development and operations pro- gram in order to enhance the integrated management of the total content of the annual $2.1 billion budget. The Space Station program manager is now responsible for the cost, schedule, and technical

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MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS 33 performance of the total program. The OLMSA and OMTPE [Office of Mission to Planet Earth] remain responsible for establishing the research requirements to be accommodated on the space sta- tion and will respond to the direction of the program manager to ensure the utilization priorities and requirements are consistent with the overall Space Station objectives." (p. HSF 1-2) 13. Space Science Board, National Research Council, A Review of Space Research: The Report of the Summer Study Conducted Under the Auspices of the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences at the State University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, June 17-Aug. 10, 1962, Publi- cation 1079, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., 1962. 14. Task Force on the Scientific Uses of Space Station, Space Station Summer Study Report- March 1985, NASA, Washington, D.C., March 21, 1985. 15. The relationship between human and robotic exploration is discussed at greater length on pp. 9-15 in the Space Studies Board report, Scientific Opportunities in the Human Exploration of Space. 16. See, for example, Space Studies Board, National Research Council, An Integrated Strategy for the Planetary Sciences: 1995-2010, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1994, and Space Studies Board, National Research Council, Strategy for Space Biology and Medical Science for the 1980s and 1990s, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1987. 17. The Space Studies Board addressed aspects of NASA research selection procedures in sev- eral letter reports: letter to Associate Administrator Harry Holloway on April 26, 1993 (Space Studies Board Annual Report 1993, p. 32); letter to Life Science Division Director Joan Vernikos on July 26, 1995 (Space Studies Board Annual Report 1995, p. 85). 18. Space Studies Board, National Research Council, Managing the Space Sciences, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1995, pp. 57-58. 19. Space Studies Board, National Research Council, Scientific Prerequisites for the Human Exploration of Space, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1993, p. 12. 20. These problems are briefly referred to in the Space Studies Board report Mars Sample Re- turn-Issues and Recommendations, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1997, p. 35. A detailed account of the Apollo quarantine program experience is provided in Back Contamination: Lessons Learned During the Apollo Lunar Quarantine Program, by John R. Bagby, Jr., July 1, 1975 (prepared for the Jet Propulsion Laboratory under Contract #560226). 21. T. Mahoney, Organizational Strategies for the Protection Against Back Contamination, NASA-CR-149274, Final Report, University of Minnesota, St. Paul, Minn., 1976, pp. 39 and 47. This recommendation provides a sample organization chart that shows an Office of Life Science reporting, in parallel with the Office of Space Science and the Office of Manned Space Flight (and several others), directly to an Associate Administrator for Programs. The "1960 NASA report" cited in the quotation was the report of the NASA Bioscience Advisory Committee, dated January 25, 1960. In his report (cited in note 19 above), J. Bagby concluded that "[m]anagement of any future quarantine operation should be established as a special program office out of the office of the Admin- istrator of NASA" (p. 42, emphasis in the original). 22. Homer E. Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years of Space Science, NASA History Series, NASA SP-4211, NASA, Washington, D.C., 1980, pp. 223-241. 23. John E. Naugle, First Among Equals: The Selection of NASA Space Science Experiments, NASA History Series, NASA SP-4215, NASA, Washington, D.C., 1991, pp. 79-196. 24. Space Studies Board, National Research Council, Managing the Space Sciences, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1995, pp. 43-44. 25. Space Studies Board, letter to NASA Chief Scientist France A. Cordova from Claude R. Canizares, March 29, 1995, Space Studies Board Annual Report-1995, p. 74. 26. Space Studies Board, letter to NASA Chief Scientist France A. Cordova from Claude A. Canizares, August 11, 1995, Space Studies Board Annual Report-1995, p. 88. 27. Space Studies Board, National Research Council, Managing the Space Sciences, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1995. 28. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA Science Institutes Plan, NASA, Wash- ington, D.C., 1996.

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