Click for next page ( 14


The National Academies | 500 Fifth St. N.W. | Washington, D.C. 20001
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Terms of Use and Privacy Statement



Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.

OCR for page 13
Overview of Dredging Issues The adequacy of American ports to meet the nation's present and future needs became the focus of major policy attention in the early 1980s. The issue attained sufficient importance to be addressed both by President Reagan in his 1983 State of the Union message and in the - Democratic party's response to that message (Democratic National Committee, 1983~. Two complex developments converged to focus this high-level attention on the adequacy of ports. The first was the changing character of the U.S. economy vis a vis the world economy, and the changing character of commercial shipping into and out of the nation's ports. The second development was the unraveling of a social contract that had evolved over 150 years between the federal govern- ment and the ports concerning how both maintenance and new construc- tion dredging would be funded, managed, and regulated. By the early 1980s these two general developments were characterized by: Proposals from 24 ports for improvement dredging projects based on the perception that such capabilities were critical to their future competitiveness. More than a decade of paralysis for federally funded new construction dredging and major delay for some ports willing to fund their own construction dredging. The most powerful pressure for developing the capacity to handle large ships is the claim that such ships offer lower-cost transporta- tion. Advocates of additional port dredging contend that without the capacity to handle large, economically efficient ships, commerce into and out of the United States must either use smaller, higher-cost ships or larger ships must enter and leave the nation's ports less than fully loaded. In either case, higher transportation costs are the result. These higher transportation costs, it is argued, have the effect of increasing the price of American products on the world mar- ket and raising the landed price of foreign imports. The controversy over ports revolves around dredging. Resolution of (1) Does the United States need additional port capacity to handle larger ships? (2) Is dredging the most attractive way for the United States to handle larger ships? (3) How should dredging be funded and what are that controversy requires finding answers to six issues: 13

OCR for page 13
14 the implications for dredging of various funding approaches? (The committee in defining its task specifically excluded recommendations about funding formulas, since this is a political choice which will be made by Congress.) (4) What are the causes of the slowdown in de- cision making for local projects and the stalemate for federal projects, and what are the ways to bring increased speed, predict- ability, and stability to the decision making process? (5) What are the problems associated with design and implementation of new con- struction and maintenance dredging and how can they be dealt with? (6) What are the environmental problems associated with dredging and how can they be most effectively managed? Traditionally, dredging has been divided between federal and local projects. Federal projects are paid for with congressionally appro- priated funds and are carried out by the U.S. Army Corps of Engi- neers. In general, federal projects deal with the construction and maintenance of major access channels, maneuvering areas, and emergency anchorages in U.S. ports. Local projects are characterized by nonfederal funding and gen- erally deal with construction and maintenance dredging of berths and minor channels, or landfill projects (or both). Local projects do not require congressional action and are normally not managed by the Corps, but they are subject to detailed regulatory review which rests primarily with the Corps. Construction dredging normally involves creating new navigational facilities or the improvement of those that exist by underwater exca- vation. Maintenance dredging involves the removal of materials as necessary to keep facilities at the originally constructed depths and widths. Although the physical activities required to carry out these two types of dredging are similar, the issues associated with them may be quite different. Differences range from how the decisions to dredge are made through how the dredging is funded, to regulatory ap- proval procedures. Although controversy surrounds both maintenance and construction dredging, clearly construction dredging--specifically whether there is a need to handle larger, deeper-draft vessels, and if so, who should pay for it--is the key issue driving the present national debate. The subject of this report is an investigation of several issues associated with port dredging. It is organized around three general questions: (1) Is additional port construction and maintenance dredging necessary now or over the next two decades? (2) What im- pediments and barriers militate against carrying out additional dredging if it is needed? (3) What alternatives offer promise of mitigating or effectively responding to those impediments in order that any needed dredging can be carried out? Proponents of new or additional port dredging have identified three areas of need. The first is for additional capacity to handle deep- draft ships and more traffic. The deep-draft ships most commonly referred to are liquid- and dry-bulk carriers requiring water depths of 50 ft or more. The second is the need in a number of ports for additional depths to handle ships requiring water depths of 40 to 45

OCR for page 13
15 ft. (The vessels most often cited in this category are latest-genera- tion containerships, but a number of vessels in the world fleet re- quire water depths in this range. The third need is for additional maintenance dredging. Assessing the nation's dredging needs requires setting them in a more general context. Specifically, it is necessary to understand the role of ports in the broader world economy and transportation system to assess whether additional capacity is needed, and if needed, whether there are alternative ways of meeting the nation's port requirements that are more attractive than dredging. Proponents and opponents of port dredging and the alternatives to dredging range across a broad spectrum. Some contend that U.S. ports are adequate; others contend that there are more cost-effective ways than dredging to meet the nat~on's need to handle large vessels. In assessing present and future port needs and ways of meeting those needs, this report applies five broad criteria: economics, navigational safety, environmental implications, national security and defense, and implications for future ocean transportation flexibility. Ports are one component of a five-component international or coastwise transportation system. In the case of exports, the first component is the inland transportation network that carries goods from points within the United States to ports. U.S. ports represent component two of the system, which involves the transfer of goods between the inland transportation system and oceangoing vessels. Component three involves the oceangoing vessel moving from a U.S. port to a foreign port. Component four involves the receiving port transferring cargo from the oceangoing vessel to an inland transportation system. And the final component involves the receiving country's inland transportation system delivering the cargo from the port to its final destination. The same five components are, of course, involved in coastwise traffic (between domestic ports) and ark reversed in the case of imports. CHANGES IN THE WORLD ECONOMY AND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM Concern with ports is intimately tied to the concern with international competitiveness which has become intense with the changing relationship between the U.S. and the world economy. Over the last two decades this change has accelerated rapidly as the U.S. economy has moved from the post-war period of satisfying domestic markets and supplying the world with a vast array of goods and commodities to one which is now the largest component of an increasingly interdependent world economy. For the first two decades following World War II, foreign trade was not a significant factor with regard to U.S. economic well-being. By 1980, however, 19 percent of the goods made in the United States were exported (up from 9 percent in 1970), and more than 22 percent of the goods consumed in the United States were imported (up from 9 percent in 19701. A perhaps even more telling statistic is that "by 1980 more than 70 percent of all goods produced in the United States were actively

OCR for page 13
16 competing with foreign-made goods" (Reich, 19831. It is these economic changes that underpin an increasingly widely held belief that the future economic well-being of the United States is dependent on the nation's capacity to compete in a world economy. There is a growing view that the United States must pursue every avenue in its effort to increase its competitiveness and therefore its exports. That is because exports are needed to pay for an increasingly high volume of imports. In 1984 the U.S. experienced its largest-ever trade imbalance with imports exceeding exports by more than $100 billion. Two options are frequently identified for addressing this trade imbalance. One is to restrict imports into the United States by using public policy to build barriers to those imports. As the trade imbalance has grown, increasing pressures have developed for taking such restrictive policy action. The other proposal is to increase the competitiveness of U.S. exports such that those exports are capable of paying for imports. Free international trade, and therefore, opposition to building barriers to imports has characterized every Administration since the end of World War II. It is widely believed, however, that unless the United States can become more competitive, the pressures for restricting imports will become irresistible. It is in this context, then, that the present and future adequacy of U.S. ports has become an integral part of the broader debate over the future competitiveness of the United States in the world economy. Key to understanding the changing relationship of the U.S. to the world economy is an appreciation of the changing character of this nation's imports and exports. Reich (1983) suggests some of the changes: "During the 1970s the share of American manufactured goods in total world sales declined by 23 percent while every other industrialized nation except Britain maintained or expanded its share. American's diminishing presence in the international market has been particularly marked in capital-intensive, high-volume industries. Since 1963, the U.S. proportion of world automobile sales has declined by almost one-third. United States sales of industrial machinery also declined by one-third; sales of agricultural machines by 45 percent; telecommunications machinery by 50 percent; metalworking machinery by 55 percent." In the period immediately following World War II when the industrial capacity of Europe and Japan was being rebuilt, the United States experienced an export boom and supplied some 60 percent of the world's manufactured goods. As Europe and Japan regained industrial capacity, trade between the United States and these other areas of the world moved into relative balance. Within the last decade, the flow of mass-produced industrial goods has reversed with the United States becoming a major importer and Europe and the Pacific Rim countries becoming major exporters. In the present period, U.S. exports have come to be dominated by such bulk commodities as coal, grain, and timber and by what are now regularly characterized as high-technology products, plus sophisticated services such as communications and computer software.

OCR for page 13
17 Highlights of the changing character of U.S. trade in the past 50 years are presented in the following table. In 1947, as indicated on the table, the United States had a $9.5 billion trade surplus, as the nation supplied the world. Highlights of U.S. Export and Import Trade: Exports Minus Imports (in millions of dollars) Agri- Fuels Capi- Con- Auto- Mili cultural and Lu- Chemi- tal sumer motive tary Year Goods bricants cals Goods Goods Products Goods Other Total 1930-4594333518-922827-271782 1937-45939522486-3835322-184265 194716041013553314495811471748909530 1960857-73911284949-505633804-12265528 1970558-1384221610557-4834-22421230-31633303 19738023-6369313713928-8481-45431385-58541863 198124308-713331199545680-22864-117503608-11325-27566 SOURCE: Branson, 1984. This early post-World War II boom utilized ports built and expanded during the 1930s, when an extensive program of public works was undertaken to provide employment in response to the Depression and to establish the infrastructure for regional economic development. Many of the dredged navigational facilities authorized for ports in the 1930s and 1940s are still being maintained as they were created then. The vessels that came into service following World War II were the war-surplus "handy-size" tanker, and the Liberty and Victory general cargo ships. These small, flexible vessels were nicely accommodated by U.S. ports. In the 1960s, as industrial capacity recovered elsewhere, world trade grew rapidly. The economic activities of all nations benefitted from inexpensive Middle Eastern oil. To serve expanding world trade, shipowners began building a different type of fleet. Ships became increasingly larger and more specialized; for example, supertankers. As the United States accelerated its oil imports, the need was perceived for ports capable of serving supertankers. Efforts to develop these facilities became controversial when major oil spills occurred in the Santa Barbara Channel on the Pacific Coast and elsewhere in the world. After considerable controversy, however, Congress enacted the Deepwater Ports Act of 1974, which provided for the development of offshore petroleum facilities. One was built (Louisiana Offshore Oil Port, or LOOP) by five oil companies in 1979. Plans for other such facilities, however, were abandoned as the consequences of the oil disruptions of the 1970s were felt and Middle Eastern oil imports declined. A key factor, of course, was a nearly tenfold increase in oil prices. Worldwide, the transport of oil plummetted. The oil shocks of the 1970s had equally serious consequences for the nation's trade balance. A few data suggest the implications of

OCR for page 13
18 these developments. In 1970, imported oil cost the nation $2 billion. By 1974, the cost of these imports rose to $6.5 billion, and by 1980, oil imports cost the nation $78.9 billion. Estimates are that in 1984 oil imports will cost about $60 billion. Almost all projections suggest that a high oil import bill will continue. Worldwide, one response to accelerating oil costs was to search for alternative energy sources. The most abundant, readily available alternative was coal and around the world, nations quickly sought to substitute coal for some of their oil imports. It was this rapid move to coal that focused the present national attention on the inadequacy of ports. With large, readily available coal reserves, the United States experienced a surge in demand for its steam coal in 1980. That demand was triggered by a combination of the Iranian oil disruption and unstable conditions in other major coal exporting nations. During 1980, newspapers in the United States were full of reports of large numbers of colliers waiting for weeks and sometimes months to gain access to U.S. coal~loading facilities. A number of studies during this period (Energy Information Administration, 1981; ICE, Inc., 1981; National Coal Association, 1981; Wilson, 1980) concluded that the United States had an opportunity to become a major supplier of a massive new world market for steam coal. To gain and secure that market, however, it was repeatedly noted that the United States would need to be able to handle the most efficient dry or combination bulk carriers requiring water depths greater than those available in U.S. coal ports. In the years since 1980, the development of a world oil surplus, the declining price of oil, a strong dollar, and the reestablishment of political stability in Poland and labor stability in Australia have reduced the demand for steam coal exports from the United States. Whether the present situation with regard to world energy will be sustained for a long period remains an open question. A major oil disruption in the Persian Gulf could trigger renewed demand for U.S. coal exports. In combination, then, the changing role of the U.S. in the world economy, the changing character of U.S. exports and imports, and the unpredictable world energy situation have created substantial uncertainty with regard to future port capacity needs. Projecting the future size and character of world shipping is extremely difficult. As a result, few mid- and long-term shipping forecasts have been made in recent years. Lloyd's Register of Shipping (1984) suggests why such forecasts are not being made by noting: "World shipping and ship building are experiencing the worst economic recession in the last 50 years and the interaction of technical, commercial, and political factors makes it very difficult to predict the likely rate of recovery." The hesitancy in making long-term forecasts is readily understood when one reviews the inaccuracy of forecasts made in the past (see Figure 1, Appendix Gel. Estimates of liquid cargoes, principally oil, show the most striking contrast with actual cargoes carried. *Tables and full-page figures have been placed in Appendix G for the convenience of the reader.

OCR for page 13
19 While the total volume of goods and commodities carried in oceanborne trade follows the world economy, the relationship that previously prevailed between world GNP growth and growth in demand for oceanborne transport was disrupted in the 1970s. In the following table, oceanborne transport is divided into three categories: oil, bulk, and other. From 1965 to 1973, the growth in the quantity of oil transported annually averaged a rate that was more than twice the rate of growth of the world GNP. From 1973 through 1980, the quantity of oil being transported remained almost stable while world GNP was growing at an annual rate of 2.3 percent. In the case of bulk commodities, the quantities being transported continued to grow more rapidly than GNP but less rapidly than during the 1965-1973 period. By comparison, during the 1973-1980 period, the quantities of other commodities in ocean transport grew at a rate, when compared to world GNP, that was rougly twice that of the 1965-1973 period. Annual Average Increase (%), World GNP and Oceanborne Freight Transportation . Total Oil Bulk Other : World Ton- Ton- Ton Period GNP Tons Miles Tons Miles Tons Miles Tons 1965-1973 4.6 8.4 12.9 10.5 16.0 7.9 10.2 5.2 1973-1980 2.3 2.2 1.2 0.2 -1.0 3.0 3.9 4.9 .. . . . . aCoal, grain, bauxite/alumina, iron ore, rock phosphate SOURCE: Maritime Transport Committee, 1981. Ton Miles - 6.4 5.7 One result of these changes and optimistic forecasts was that vessels ordered during the period of growth became surplus. For the first time since World War II, during both 1982 and 1983, the total deadweight of the world fleet declined, yet the rate of scrapping was insufficient to bring cargo-carrying capacity into balance with available cargoes. Nonetheless, shipowners continued to order vessels in 1983, "as covert and overt subsidies [encouraged] owners to replace aging vessels,...in addition, the [shipbuilding] industry was offering more efficiently designed ships with the emphasis on fuel economy, and finance was freely available" (Lloyd's Register of Shipping, 1984~. A particular emphasis has been on containerships which are typically employed in the liner trades. The growth of trade in goods that can be packed and shipped in containers offers partial explanation. The number of containerships increased 5.7 percent in 1983; their container-carrying capacity increased 7.5 percent (Maritime Transport Committee, 1984~. Table 1 (Appendix G) indicates the variety of vessels in the world fleet that called on ports of the United States in 1980 (engaging in foreign trade). Considerable specialization of vessel types can be seen in this list, much of it matching the changing mix of U.S. imports and exports previously discussed. Design drafts for a number

OCR for page 13
20 of the bulk carriers exceed the water depths of many U.S. ports. For bulk carriers with more than 46 feet of draft, water-depth limitations would prevent their being fully loaded, incoming or outgoing, in most of the major bulk-commodity ports in the United States (except Los Angeles, Long Beach, an oil terminal in Bellingham, Washington, or grain terminals in Seattle and Tacoma). SUMMARY What can one conclude from this mix of changing and sometimes conflicting data? The changing relationship of the U.S. to the world economy and the changing character of the world's commercial fleet make confident projections of future shipping patterns extremely difficult. So far as the needs of U.S. ports are concerned, and specifically the need for new construction dredging, the picture is characterized by great uncertainty. That uncertainty has doubtless been a factor contributing to the stalemate in new port construction activities. PORT DECISION MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES The second factor contributing to the U.S. port construction stalemate has been what was previously characterized as the unraveling of the social contract between the federal government and the nation's ports concerning funding, management, and regulation of dredging. To appreciate what has occurred, a brief review of the evolution of that social contract is useful. The beginning of this history occurred in the very early years of the Republic. Prior to 1824, river and harbor improvements were commonly executed and paid for by state and local governments. In this early period, federal responsibility covered navigation and safety services such as coastal charts, lighthouses, and beacons. Congress authorized states and individual ports to levy tonnage duties to pay for such work (Hill, 1957~. Direct federal involvement in port construction and maintenance, specifically dredging, was initiated in 1824 with the passage of the General Survey Act. Under this legislation, Congress made its first appropriations for rivers and harbors improvements. Since that time, the federal role in port construction and maintenance has been inextricably tied to the development of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The Corps was initially chosen because of its unique engineering expertise. President James Monroe advocated that the Corps serve as the national planning organization for rivers and harbors. Congress, however, rejected the notion of any national planning responsibility on the part of an executive agency and established a pattern of deciding and funding port developments on a case-by-case basis. The rejection by Congress of President Monroe's proposal for a national planning role for the Corps and the decision to authorize and

OCR for page 13
21 fund port projects on a case-by-case basis deserves special emphasis. It established a detailed decision-making role for Congress (and the Corps) which has meant that for more than 150 years, the Corps has carried out the mandates of Congress with Presidents having only very limited oversight and management control of these activities. This special relationship between the Corps and Congress has been the object of criticism off and on for the last 150 years. The nature of that criticism has remained essentially the same. Examples of the criticism are as follows: The system provides no national plan for ports and makes no distinction between ports of national versus local value; the process is dominated by logrolling and pork barrel tradeoffs; the system reflects sectional favoritism; and the system funds many projects that cannot be justified on an economic basis (Hill, 1957~. As early as 1830, President Andrew Jackson pocket-vetoed a rivers and harbors bill because it did not distinguish between works of national and those of local value. If the criticism of the system that developed has remained consistent, so has the basic framework of the relationships among Congress, the Corps, the Office of the President, and a range of local and national interest groups. The most distinctive characteristic of the system is the level of detailed control that Congress exercises with regard to Corps projects generally and port projects specifically. Corps projects are distinctive in that Congress provides year-to-year funding for multiyear construction projects. This year-to-year funding is in contrast to the more typical full-funding approach, which characterizes major construction projects carried out by most other federal executive agencies. Under the full-funding approach Congress includes the entire cost for multiyear projects in a single annual budget. Pull funding allows the executive agency much more authority and discretion than year-to-year funding (Scheppach, 1977~. Specifically, full funding allows the executive agency to reprogram funds from one project to another independent of specific Congressional approval. Second, multiyear funding gives the White House, through the Office of Management and Budget, substantially more control over the agency than is the case with the year-to-year funding that characterizes Corps projects. Alternatively, the project-specific, year-by-year funding approach results in a uniquely tight budgetary relationship between Congress and the Corps and gives the Corps a great deal of independence from the normal executive budget process (See Ferejohn, 1974; Maass, 1951; and Hill, 1957~. From the congressional side, this funding approach allows Congress and the specific congressmen and senators concerned with individual projects a great deal of control. Key to the success of a project is the capacity of the congressmen interested in specific projects to negotiate with their peers in a process that essentially involves trading support for each other's public works activities. Individual ports, then, develop tight links both to the local Corps districts and to their congressmen in promoting new construction. These represent micropolitical systems organized around individual ports.

OCR for page 13
22 Over the course of nearly a century and a half, the decision making process in Congress associated with the rivers and harbors legislation demonstrated a capacity to respond to perceived port needs. The history of this decision making process is one that has involved swings between periods of growth and periods when few new public works were undertaken. Viewed historically, however, this decision making system has generally proved satisfactory for those interested in port development. Beginning in the early 1970s, however, it was no longer possible for Congress to evolve decisions which allowed for the initiation of major, new, federally funded port projects. Several factors have been suggested as major contributors to this stalemate, but three are regularly identified. They are: (1) broad public concern with environmental consequences, (2) rising budgetary deficits, and (3) basic changes in public attitudes toward major federal construction projects. During the 1970s, broad public concern developed with environmental protection. In response to this public concern, Congress passed several pieces of environmental legislation mandating a variety of federal agencies to put environmental regulatory programs in place. In the case of port construction projects, the Corps was assigned responsibility for assessing the environmental consequences of port projects and assuring through a complex approval process that environmental concerns would be an integral part of the decisions made. As a part of this development, local citizens groups and a variety of state and federal agencies with environmental responsibilities became active participants in the decision making associated with port construction. Two consequences resulted from these developments. First, the process of port construction became significantly more complex, and second, the time required to meet these environmental responsibilities extended the period and cost required to carry out major port projects. Also, beginning in the 1970s, public concern with ever larger deficits increased. No longer able to count on getting their fair share of an ever-expanding federal budget, political leaders and their constituencies faced difficult tradeoffs among programs and projects. Political tradeoffs have always shaped the nation's policies and certainly its choice of public works projects. But by the late 1970s and the early 1980s, there existed such a mismatch between the public's expectations for government services and the government's fiscal capacity to deliver them that stalemate began to characterize many areas of public policy. (See Levine, 1980, for a collection of essays on the financial crisis in the public sector.) As deficits grew, so-called discretionary federal funding became the focus of intense attention. Many saw the omnibus water-resources projects bill (for all water projects funded by the federal government, including port dredging) as containing the most discretionary of federal expenditures. It should be noted that one of the characteristics of these public works expenditures is that all it takes to contain such expenditures is inaction. The annual funding approach reflected in the rivers and harbors legislation, therefore,

OCR for page 13
23 required on the part of those congressmen opposing public works expenditures only that they refuse to join a consensus in funding authorized projects. At a more general level, during the 1970s, there were increasing calls for a brake on big government. Although these calls for reducing the size of government meant different things to different people, a common theme was opposition to special interest projects viewed as being uneconomic. During the Carter Administration, there was particularly strong opposition in the White House to Western water projects. These projects were regularly criticized as uneconomic and inefficient expenditures of federal funds. Since port dredging is handled in the same legislation as these and other public works to develop water resources, dredging projects were also opposed. Remember that the original rationale for handling diverse public works projects in a single piece of legislation was the desire to utilize the engineering expertise of the Corps. Recall also that criticism of the local and uneconomic character of many public works projects goes back to the early 19th century. Present-day critics frequently see no distinction between port construction and the construction of dams and other water projects. The case-by-case authorization and annual funding approach in combination with the lack of any enabling legislation or broadly stated national policy which provides criteria for distinguishing between projects of local and national value, left the nation, by the 1980s, without an established framework for setting priorities among public works projects--as, for example, between dams and ports. Many of the proponents of additional port construction argue that there is a fundamental difference between a major port that links the United States to the world economy, an economy on which the nation is increasingly interdependent, and a dam serving a local area of the United States. These proponents emphasize that major ports are clearly of great importance nationally, while many other public works projects are, in fact, primarily in the local or regional interest. In the face of changing attitudes toward federal public works projects, a growing federal deficit, and broadly based public concern about environmental values, the system for making decisions about port construction that had evolved incrementally over the history of the American Republic was becalmed. Given the belief that additional port capacity is essential to the economic well-being of the United States and at the same time opposing additional large public expenditures, the Reagan Administration early in its first term sought to break the logjam on ports by proposing establishment of a port user fee. The rationale behind the Reagan Administration's user fee proposal was that it would allow nationally important port construction to be undertaken, and ensure equity and efficiency. That is, those who benefit pay, thus equity is achieved; only those projects that can pay their own way are carried out, thus efficiency is achieved. In seeking to understand the nation's port needs, the impediments to achieving those needs and the options for dealing with those impediments, this report investigates a broad set of concerns. These range from economic and engineering concerns through institutional and

OCR for page 13
24 environmental concerns to the general character of worldwide oceanborne shipping. Conceptually, this report starts with the most general questions. Although additional construction and maintenance dredging has powerful advocates, it is important to note that there are opponents who have concluded that new construction dredging is unnecessary. The crux of the debate over dredging needs revolves around the costs and benefits of the additional investments that would be required for U.S. ports to be able to handle ships of larger size. This report, then, moves in Chapter 4 to an investigation of the relative advantages and disadvantages to the United States of being able to handle larger-volume ships. In Chapter 5, the report investigates the relative attractiveness of additional dredging in existing ports versus a variety of other ways of handling large-volume ships. Chapter 6 considers the various proposed approaches to funding federal projects and their implications for the over-all port construction and maintenance system. Chapter 7 describes the institutional decision making system for dredging and ways of bringing stability, predictability, and speed to that decision making. Chapter 8 addresses technical needs and issues associated with both new construction and maintenance dredging. Chapter 9 assesses the environmental issues associated with dredging, the state of scientific knowledge with regard to these issues, and some approaches to addressing the issues. REFERENCES Branson, W. H. (1984), "Trade and Structural Adjustment in the U.S. Economy: Response to International Competition," Discussion Paper 170, Wood row Wilson School, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J. Democratic National Committee (1983), "Response to the State of the Union Address," Broadcast, Democratic National Committee, Washington, D.C. Energy Information Administration (1981), "Interim Report of the Interagency Coal Export Task Force," Draft, Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of Energy. Ferejohn, J. A. (1974), Pork Barrel Politics, Rivers and Harbors Legislation, 1947-1968 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press). Fearnley's (1982), World Bulk Trades 1981 (Oslo, Norway: Fearnley's) Hill, F. G. (1957), Roads, Rails, and Waterways (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press). ICE, Inc. (1981), Potential Role of Appalachian Producers in the Steam Coal Export Market (Washington, D.C.: ICE, Inc.~. Levine, C. H. (1980), Managing Fiscal Stress: The Crisis in the Public Sector (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers). Lloyd's Register of Shipping (1984) Annual Report 1983 (London: Lloyd's Register of Shipping). LloYd's Reqister of Shipping (1983), Statistical_Tables (London: Lloyd's Register of Shipping). Maritime Transport Committee (1984), Maritime Transport 1984 (Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development).

OCR for page 13
25 Maass, A. (1951), Muddy Waters: Rivers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). - Maritime Transport Committee (1984), Maritime Transport 1984 (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). Maritime Transport Committee (1983), Maritime Transport 1982 (Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development). Maritime Transport Committee (1982), Maritime Transport 1981 (Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Economic Development). National Coal Association (1981), "A Forecast for U.S. Coal in the 1980," Washington, D.C., National Coal Association. Reich, R. B. (1983), The Next American Frontier (New York: Times - Books).t Scheppach, R. D. (1977), "Water Resource Funding--A Congressional Per- spective," Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Economics Association, December, New York City. Schonknecht et al. (1983), Ships and Shipping of Tomorrow (Centreville, Md.: Cornell Maritime Press). Wilson, C. L. (1980), Future Coal Prospects: Country and Regional Assessments--Report of the World Coal Study (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co.) The Army Engineers and the Nation's