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Discovering the Mind at Work
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Charlging Views of Cognitive
Competence in He Young
ROCHEL GELMAN and ANN L. BROWN
It was once commonly thought that the newborn child cannot hear, see,
or smell; that the first year of life is spent in a blooming-buzzing confusion;
and that infants lack ability to form complex ideas about the world. For
much of this century, most experimental and developmental psychologists
accepted the traditional thesis that the newborn's mind is a blank slate (or
tabula rasa) upon which the record of experience is gradually impressed.
It was further held that language is an obvious prerequisite for any abstract
thought (e.g., Vygotsky, 1962; Whorf, 1956), so in its absence, a baby
could not have knowledge of anything other than sensations. Since babies
are born with an extremely limited repertoire of behavior and spend most
of their early months asleep, they certainly appear passive and unknowing;
there is no obvious way for them to demonstrate otherwise.
But challenges to this view arose. On the theoretical side, it is hard to
overestimate the impact of Piaget, Chomsky, Simon, and the Gibsons, who
profoundly influenced psychologists' ideas of what to look for and how to
characterize the child. These new theoretical views stimulated innovative
research programs with Me very young. It became clear that with carefully
Partial support for the preparation of this chapter came from fellowships to the authors while
at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California. While there
both authors received funds from the Spencer Foundation, and Rochel Gelman was also supported
by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and a National Institute of Child Health and Development
(NICHD) Fellowship F32 HD-06623. Additional support for the work came from National Science
Foundation grant BNS-8140573 to Gelman and NICHD grants HD-06864 and HD-05951 to Ann
Brown.
175
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ROCHEL GELMAN and ANN L. BROWN
designed methods one could find ways to pose rather complex questions
to infants and young children. A substantial new body of data has now
accumulated about the capacities of infants and young children and stands
in contrast to the older emphasis on what Hey lack. From these data a
contemporary view has emerged that the very young can be competent,
active agents of their own conceptual development. In short, the mind of
the young child has come to life.
This essay is divided into four parts. First, we introduce the seminal
theoretical ideas that have influenced psychologists' conceptions of the
child's emergent mind. Next, we delineate some of the evidence in support
of infant and preschool cognitive competence and illustrate some of the
methods developed to make the study of young minds plausible. Finally,
we ask how this putative youthful brilliance interacts with formal learning
tasks in school, emerging with a seeming paradox: Young children seem
to know more than we thought possible, but older children in schools seem
to be much less competent than was once assumed. The natural learning
settings of young children are contrasted with the formal environments they
encounter at school, and we see that instructional programs that capitalize
on young children's natural propensities to create and test theories can
significantly accelerate learning.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The first step away from the empiricists' "tabula rasa" view of the infant
mind was taken by the Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget. Beginning in the
1920s, Piaget argued for the need to postulate complex cognitive structures
in the young human mind, which empiricist accounts of human thought
had tended to play down or deny. Piaget did not think that human infants
are born with innate cognitive structures, but rather that structures develop
due to the child's ever-present tendency to engage the environment actively,
interpreting it in accordance with progressively changing cognitive "schemes."
From close observations of infants and careful questioning of children, he
concluded that cognitive development proceeds through certain stages, each
involving radically different cognitive schemes, so that sometimes young
children even form practical convictions contrary to those held by older
children and adults.
While Piaget observed that infants actually seek environmental stimu-
lation that promotes their intellectual development, he thought that their
initial representations of objects, space, time, cause, and self are constructed
only gradually during the first two years. He concluded that the world of
young infants is an egocentric fusion of the internal and external worlds,
and that the development of an accurate representation of physical reality
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CHANGING VIEWS OF COGNITIVE COMPETENCE IN THE YOUNG 177
depends on the gradual coordination of schemes of looking, listening, and
touching. Piaget thought that for many months the infant does not realize
that an object producing a given sound is the same as an object that looks
a certain way. The very young infant, up to 10 months or so, was said to
think that an object exists only as long as she can touch, hear, or see it;
once out of direct sensory contact, it ceased to exist. From this view, it
followed that babies do not represent an independent space in which three-
dimensional objects exist. In this regard, Piaget's account of infant cognition
is actually close to being empiricist; still the position that cognitive schemes
are actively constructed rather than passively impressed separates him from
empiricists (or in modern terminology, behaviorists).
Noam Chomsky (1957), focusing on language, proposed that the human
mind is innately prepared to learn language without needing much help
from the environment. He provided explicit hypotheses about the nature of
the language structures that produce and comprehend language, an account
that held out the promise of explaining how young children can say things
they have never heard, e.g., "I'm unthirsty," "I have two footses," "I
wented home." Chomsky's hypotheses are still controversial (Wanner and
Gleitman, 1982), but the effect of his work gave strong impetus to a
"nativist" account of mental abilities, which maintains that humans are
born with conceptual structures that guide the acquisition of knowledge
about the world.
Like Piaget, the Gibsons have maintained that infants actively explore
the environment, but in sharp contrast, they deny that the infant slowly
constructs the world. They maintain that, shortly after birth, the infant's
world is a remarkably veridical one, filled with three-dimensional objects
in real space, not unconnected elementary sensations. They support their
view with findings that neonates integrate sight and sound and respond as
if they assume that the world is out there waiting to be explored. The
Gibsons assign a role to learning but propose that it proceeds rapidly due
to the initial availability of exploration patterns that can yield accurate
information about objects and events.
Simon (1972) and his colleagues (e.g., Klahr and Wallace, 1976) helped
introduce a somewhat different perspective, that development means over-
coming information-processing constraints, such as limited short-term mem-
ory capacity and lack of general knowledge. Those working in the information-
processing tradition focused both on the possibility that early failures in
completing Piagetian tasks are due in part to limits on processing capacity
and the conditions under which children actively employ strategies for
problem solving and knowledge acquisition.
All these theoretical developments challenged the empiricist account and
influenced the direction of research in developmental psychology. The claim
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ROCHEL GELMAN and ANN L. BROWN
that young children have different mental structures and ideas about the
world was taken up in investigations of their concepts, strategies, and
problem-solving abilities. These studies led to the conclusion that, despite
the many differences between young and old, the young have remarkable
abilities to participate actively in their acquisition of knowledge.
STUDYING INFANT KNOWLEDGE
Because infants are so limited physically, experiments to find out what
they know and how they think have had to find methods suitable to the
level of infant motor capabilities. A good example is a method used by
Kalnins and Bruner (1973~. They showed 5- to 12-week-old infants a silent
color film and gave the infants a pacifier to suck, the nipple of which was
connected to a pressure switch controlling the projector lens. The infants
quickly learned to suck at a given rate to bring the movie into focus, showing
not only that they were capable of and interested in learning how to control
their own sensory environment but also that they preferred a clear image
to a blurry one.
A second method demonstrates and depends on an infant's thirst for
novelty. The "habituation paradigm" involves presenting babies with a
stimulus a picture, sound, or series of sounds to which the baby attends
either by looking at it, turning to it, or doing something to keep the stimulus
on. Over a series of trials, infants, like everyone else, stop responding to
repeated presentations of the same stimulus; that is, they habituate. They
recover interest if a recognizably different stimulus is presented. For ex-
ample, four-month-old infants will suck vigorously when first introduced
to the phoneme (speech sound) "ha," then gradually lose interest and stop
sucking in response to it. But when presented a different phoneme, "pa,"
they resume sucking (Eimas et al., 19711.
Fantz (1961, 1966) directed attention to the power of the preference
method to study infants' tendency to explore. He determined what infants
looked at by watching their eyes closely. Infants lying on their backs in
his laboratory could look up to the left or right at, for example, a bull's
eye and a checkerboard. The experimenter recorded whether and for how
long the baby looked left or right. Even newborns chose to look at patterned
displays over homogenous gray ones. Infants generally prefer somewhat
novel displays over ones they have seen before (e.g., Kagan et al., 1978;
Kessen et al., 19721.
Studies like these do more than simply show that infants actively select
experiences; they can also tell us what the infant is capable of perceiving
and knowing. Recovery of interest in a novel speech sound could not occur
if infants could not recognize the rather subtle difference between "pa"
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CHANGING VIEWS OF COGNITIVE COMPETENCE IN THE YOUNG 179
and "ha." (See Aslin et al., 1983.) The same holds for visual preferences.
Discovering that very young infants can see, hear, smell, and be particular
about what exactly they perceive led to an emboldened attitude about the
kinds of experimental questions that could be asked. The answers about
infant understanding of the physical and numerical properties of objects
have been quite remarkable.
Early Knowledge of Objects
Piaget concluded that before infants could know about objects, they would
have to discover regularities between their sensations and actions, then
gradually integrate the sense-action schemes formed when they touched,
heard, and looked at objects, and finally come to appreciate the object as
a separate reality in the external world. Like the empiricists, Piaget thought
infants responded to the immediate stimuli, i.e., flashes of light on the
retina or sound waves in the eardrum, long before they recognized sources
of stimuli.
Recent experiments (Gibson and Spelke, 1983; Harris, 1983) have told
a different story. For example, Spelke (1976) used visual-preference meth-
ods to determine that four-month-old infants already integrate the sight and
sound of an event. Infants were shown two films projected side by side-
a person playing peek-a-boo and a hand beating a tambourine. The sound
accompaniment of one film was fed to a hidden loudspeaker placed midway
between the films. The babies reliably preferred to look at the movie cor-
responding to the sound source. Other research indicates that babies are
born with a tendency to turn to a sound and visually search for something
there (Field et al., 1980; Mendelson and Haith, 1976; Wertheimer, 1961~.
This integrative capacity extends beyond auditory and visual properties
to include the sense of touch. In recent experiments, Gibson and Walker
(1984) gave one-month-old infants either a hard lucite cylinder or a lookalike
soft sponge cylinder to explore with their mouths. The experimenter then
showed each infant both cylinders, squeezing the spongy cylinder in one
hand and rotating the hard cylinder with the other hand. The infants preferred
to look at whichever cylinder had not previously been explored orally,
showing a capacity to integrate what they saw with what they had mouthed.
Meltzoff and Borton (1979) reported similar findings with objects that were
smooth or had tiny notes on their surface.
These findings establish two important points about the cognitive struc-
ture that infants employ to interpret sensory input from objects: (a) They
endow objects win properties, such as rigidity, that transcend sensory
modality; and (b) infants can appreciate such properties even when they
are not acting on the objects.
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ROCHEL GELMAN and ANN L. BROWN
Von Hofsten (1980) provides further evidence that babies know things
about objects before they can successfully act on them. Around four months
of age, infants are able to reach out and grasp objects. At the same time,
without having had the experience of successfully catching a moving object,
they also anticipate trajectories correctly and move their hand toward the
spot where a moving object will be. This would appear to require reckoning
of the velocity and direction of the object, foreknowledge of the time that
the arm movement will take, and ability to combine these in calculating an
intercept.
Piaget noted the considerable difficulty infants have with occluded ob-
jects. When infants four to eight months old are shown an interesting object,
they reach for and grasp it and even follow its fall to the floor. But they
stop reaching or looking if the object disappears behind a barrier. Infants
8 to 12 months old will seek and retrieve an object they see someone cover,
but they show an odd tendency referred to as the "A not B error." If the
baby sees an object taken from behind one barrier, A, and, while the baby
watches, moved behind another barrier, B. the baby searches only behind
the first barrier (A)! Piaget concluded that "the object is still not the same
to the child as it is to us: a substantial body, individualized and displaced
in space without depending on the action context in which it was inserted"
(Piaget, 1954:641. Recent research suggests that the A not B error may be
confined to particular experimental situations (Bjork and Cummings, 1984;
Sophian, 1984~. After all, if babies can match what they mouth with what
they see, distinguishing between solid and spongy substances, they must
be sensitive to objects as substantial bodies.
As further evidence for this view, Baillargeon et al. (in press) showed
five-month-old infants a screen that rotated toward and away from them
through an arc of 180 degrees. Once the babies were habituated to the
rotating screen, a yellow cube was placed alongside the screen for two trials
of viewing. Then the cube was placed behind the screen; on alternating
trials, the infant saw either a screen that once again rotated through the full
180-degree arc (and at least from the adult perspective seemed to crush the
covered object) or a screen that rotated through only a 120-degree arc,
stopping at the angle at which its further rotation would be blocked by the
presence of a solid object behind the screen. (One-way mirrors and varied
lighting accomplished the visual effects.) Although the infants had previ-
ously habituated to the full rather than partial rotation, they nonetheless
looked longer at the full rotation, treating the habituated event as even more
novel than one they had never seen before. These results suggest the babies
expect solid objects to persist even when no longer in sight.
In short, considerable research with young infants has shown that they
treat objects and events as sources for multiple kinds of sensory input, and
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CHANGING VIEWS OF COGNITIVE COMPETENCE IN THE YOUNG 181
that they recognize in objects properties such as rigidity and solidity that
transcend specific sensory modalities.
Abstract Concepts
Many theories of cognition have assumed that language is necessary to
Tract n~c,nerties common to a set of objects. Premack (1976) tellingly
~v-~~~ rears J
refuted this thesis when he showed that once a cn~mpanzee nab lea me
symbol for apple, it could apply that symbol to various parts of an apple
(seed, peel, etc.~. Preverbal human infants also recognize properties com-
mon to sets of nonidentical objects. Ross (1980), for example, habituated
one- and two-year-olds to one of five classes of items: O shapes, M shapes,
furniture, men, and food. Then children were shown another item from the
same class or an item from a novel class. They preferred the item from the
novel class. The children's ability to recognize category membership was
uncorrelated with their ability to supply a verbal label for the category.
Number is a property of sets divorced from any description of the objects
themselves. Hence, it is often treated as the ultimate in abstraction. A
variety of results indicate that infants abstract number from visual displays
of two, three, and sometimes four items (Starkey and Cooper, 1980; Starkey
et al., in press; Strauss and Curtis, 19811. For example, six- to nine-month-
old infants became habituated to color photographs of either two or three
assorted common household items, e.g., sponge, cloth, vase, comb, apple,
etc. (each trial displayed different items). Infants who were habituated to
two-object displays then looked longer at three-item ones, and vice versa.
Infants even abstract number intermodally (Starkey et al., 19831. They
prefer to look at the one of two displays that matches the number of
drumbeats (two or three) they hear emanating from a centrally placed loud-
speaker.
Summary
We have sampled the evidence that infants are not passive, unstructured
receivers of environmental input. Soon after birth they reveal an impressive
degree of implicit conceptual structure allied to active learning endeavors.
They behave as if they recognize that objects are independent of themselves,
having size and solidity, and are specified intermodally. They reveal sen-
sitivity to some properties of moving objects and form concepts about some
abstract properties of sets. It is not at all obvious why infants bother to
attend to the number of items they see or hear. But it looks as if human
infants come prepared to learn quickly about objects and certain concepts,
including number. These early competences provide a base from which
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ROCHEL GELMAN and ANN L. BROWN
much natural learning proceeds during the preschool years. Acquisition of
knowledge in these natural domains is guided as much by the availability
of implicit structures and principles that guide the child's active learning
about the nature of objects and events, causes, number, etc. as by the
availability of a supportive environment.
PRESCHOOL THOUGHT
Principles About Numbers, Causes, and Objects
Preschool thought and its development are much influenced by implicit
knowledge of fundamental principles governing the determination and ma-
nipulation of numbers, the character of physical causality, and the differ-
ences between animate and inanimate objects.
Number Many preschoolers spontaneously count collections soon after
they learn to talk. Gelman and Gallistel (1978) propose that even these very
young children make implicit use of some, if not all, of five principles of
counting: (1) The tags used in counting must be placed in one-to-one cor-
respondence with the items counted; (2) the tags must be drawn in order
from a stably ordered list; (3) the last tag used represents the number in
the set (cardinality); (4) the order in which the items are tagged is irrelevant;
and (5) sets of arbitrary composition may be counted. What evidence is
there for this view?
First, counting behaviors in young children are systematic, even when
they use nonstandard tags or orderings. For example, Gelman and Gallistel
(1978) report a two-and-one-half year old who said "one, two" when
counting a two-item array and "one, two, six" when counting a three-item
array (the one-one principle). The same child used her own list over and
over again (stable order principle) and repeated her last tag when asked
how many items she had (the cardinality principle). Such nonstandard lists
in counting are like the systematic errors made by young language learners
(e.g., "I runner"; just as the occurrence of such language errors implies
use of language rules by the very young, so the occurrence of stable non-
standard lists can be taken as evidence of implicit counting principles.
Further evidence for implicit counting principles is found in the fact that
young children spontaneously self-correct their own and others' counting
errors (German and Meck, 1983) and often are inclined to count without
any request to do so. Such behaviors point to a representation that monitors
and motivates performance (Greeno et al., 1984~.
Other studies have shown that preschool children solve simple arithmetic
problems by using counting strategies they invent (Groen and Resnick,
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CHANGING VIEWS OF COGNITIVE COMPETENCE IN THE YOUNG 183
1977; Siegler and Robinson, 19821. To illustrate, Groen and Resnick (1977)
taught four- and five-year-old children to solve addition problems of the
form x + y = ? by counting out x blocks, counting out y more blocks
and then counting the combined set. Children who practiced their addition
over several weeks got better. More surprising is that over half of them
invented a better way of solving the problems; counting on from whichever
was the larger of the two values in the problem. To account for such
inventions, it is necessary to postulate the use of something like an implicit
principle of commutativity.
Finally, the preschool child also understands that addition and subtrac-
tion, unlike displacement, rearrangement, or item substitution, alter nu-
merosity. This has been shown in "magic" experiments where a child is
confronted with unexpected alterations in the sets used in a kind of shell
game (German, 19771. In these experiments children between the ages of
three and five first learn to find plates holding different numbers of objects,
e.g., two and three, underneath each of two cans. Then they discover
surreptitious changes in the number, type, or arrangement of items in one
array. Those children who encountered irrelevant changes deemed them
such and those who encountered the effects of relevant transformations
pronounced them relevant. For example, changes in number elicited con-
siderable surprise, e.g., "Eeeeee, how did that happen?" Further, the
children postulated the relevant transformation, e.g., "One gone Jesus
Christ came and took it." They also could indicate what number they
expected, what number they actually encountered, and what arithmetic
operation would have to be performed to "fix" the came in this cases
addition.
Hence we see early implicit understanding of number, addition, and
subtraction. We will later ask why this competence does not guarantee easy
learning of mathematics in school.
Causality The suggestion that young children work with implicit notions
of cause will surprise those familiar with Piaget's work on the development
of the child's conception of causality. In one set of inquiries, Piaget asked
children to explain a variety of natural and mechanical phenomena, e.g.,
the cycle of the moon, floating objects, the movement of clouds, the op-
eration of steam engines, and bicycles, etc. Analysis of the explanations
led Piaget to characterize the young child's thought as fundamentally pre-
causal. He wrote, "Immediacy of relations and absence of intermediaries
. . . are the two outstanding features of causality around the age of four-
five" (Piaget, 1980:2681.
Piaget's conclusion that a concern for mechanism is completely lacking
in the preschooler is contradicted by several later lines of experimental
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CHANGING VIEWS OF COGNITIVE COMPETENCE IN THE YOUNG 197
the children's competence in the familiar format. Having practiced familiar
questioning rituals, the teachers were then able to introduce the unfamiliar
known-answer routines with great success. Another case of easing the
transition to formal schooling, by capitalizing on the children's strengths
rather than exposing their weaknesses, is the remarkable gains in reading
achievement shown by Native Hawaiian (Polynesian) children after reading
lessons were set in the context of a familiar Hawaiian interactive game,
"talk-story" (Au, 19801.
Another successful intervention ploy is to lessen the gap between informal
and formal learning settings. As we have seen, natural tutoring involves
modeling on the part of the teacher and a gradual transfer of responsibility
to the novices when and if they are ready to take control of their own
learning. Instructional routines that mimic natural tutoring sessions are
proving quite successful. For example, junior high school "passive" learn-
ers with depressed reading comprehension scores were moved from tradi-
tional instruction to a reciprocal teaching environment based on theories of
natural tutoring. In reciprocal teaching, students of varying levels of com-
petence and an adult teacher take turns "being the teacher," that is, leading
a dialogue on a segment of text they are jointly attempting to understand
and remember. The teacher responsible for a particular segment of text
leads the ensuing dialogue by stating the gist in his or her own words,
posing a question, clarifying any misunderstandings, and predicting what
might happen next. All of these activities are part of a natural dialogue
between the adult teacher and students. If a student has difficulty with any
component of the dialogue, the teacher provides modeling and feedback at
the student's current level, gradually leading each student to independent
competence. Examples of such gradual transfer of responsibility can be
found in Palincsar and Brown (1984~.
Reciprocal teaching is based on certain central principles of effective
learning: (1) the teacher models the desired comprehension activities, thereby
making underlying processes overt, explicit, and concrete; (2) the teacher
demonstrates the activities in appropriate contexts, not as isolated decon-
textualized skills; (3) the students are fully informed of the need for strategic
intervention and the range of utility of a particular strategy; (4) the students
see immediately that the use of strategies works for them; (5) the respon-
sibility for the comprehension activities is transferred to the students as
soon as they can take charge of their own learning; (6) this transfer of
responsibility is gradual, presenting students with a comfortable challenge;
and (7) feedback is tailored to the students' existing levels, encouraging
them to progress one more step toward competence.
The reciprocal teaching procedure involves continuous trial and error on
the part of the student, coupled with continuous adjustment on the part of
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ROCHEL GELMAN and ANN L. BROWN
the teacher to the student's current competence. Through interactions
with the supportive teacher and their more knowledgeable peers, the
students are led to perform at an increasingly more mature level; some-
times this progress is fast, sometimes slow, but, irrespective of the rate,
the teacher provides an opportunity for the students to respond at a slightly
challenging level. As the students master one level of involvement, the
teacher increases his demands so that the students are gradually called
upon to adopt the adult role fully and independently. The teacher then
fades into the background as the students take charge of their own learning
from texts.
The results of the reciprocal teaching intervention with junior high school-
ers were dramatic. The students improved their ability to clarify, predict,
summarize, and ask questions. Consider the quality of the summaries; these
seventh-grade students initially produced summaries ranked inadequate even
by the standards set by fifth graders. At the end of two weeks of daily
reciprocal teaching sessions, they were able to produce quite acceptable
inventions, i.e., summaries, in their own words, of the gist of a particular
dialogue. A predominance of inventions characterizes the untrained sum-
marization performance of college freshmen (Brown and Day, 19831. Thus,
guided instruction had taken these failing seventh graders to a level of
competence far beyond that typical for their peers. Furthermore, they also
became able to assume the role of teacher, producing their own questions
and summaries and evaluating those of others. In addition, there were
significant improvements in independent performance on laboratory, class-
room, and standardized tests of comprehension. But perhaps more impor-
tantly, the children's feelings of personal competence and control improved
dramatically. Allowed to take charge of the dialogues, and even tutor less
advanced students, these "failing" students increased their courage as well
as their purely cognitive skills. Success bred positive expectations from
teachers and improved students' personal "efficacy," i.e., the confidence
to employ active learning strategies in the belief that they will work.
It is important to note that mimicking natural tutoring styles has proved
a successful instructional technique in areas other than reading: listening
comprehension (Brown and Palincsar, in press), writing (Applebee and
Langer, 1983; Scardamalia, 1984), storytelling (McNamee, 1981), studying
(Frase and Schwartz, 1976), and problem solving (Bloom and Broder, 1950)
have all responded well to reciprocal instruction strategies. In addition, it
is not only teachers who can serve as the agent of change but also mothers
(Ninio and Bruner, 1978; S. axe et al., 1984; Scollon, 1976; Wertsch, 1979),
peers (Bloom and Broder, 1950; Whimbey and Lochhead, 1982), and even
somewhat intelligent computer tutors (Brown et al., 1982; Heller and Hun-
gate, 1984; Lesgold and Reif, 19831. The concept of expert scaffolding,
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CHANGING VIEWS OF COGNITIVE COMPETENCEIN THE YOUNG 199
the gradually guided transfer of learning responsibility from an expert to a
novice, has wide applicability as an instructional philosophy.
Summary
Recognition of children's natural competence, both in terms of strategic
rules and knowledge, is having a profound effect on instructional theory.
Structured instruction, however, is necessary for the child to go beyond
imprecise, and sometimes erroneous, implicit theories and to acquire the
precise, explicit theories that constitute formal knowledge. Through the
intervention of certain forms of formal schooling, children are turned into
routine school experts (Hatano, 1982), able to perform, more and more
efficiently, the procedures taught and practiced in schools.
One problem, however, is that routine expertise can lead to the acquisition
of "inert knowledge" (Whitehead, 1916), acquired by rote learning and
practice but rarely used flexibly and creatively. Educational systems that
promote adaptive expertise (Hatano, 1982), whereby students come to un-
derstand, challenge, and flexibly apply their knowledge, depend on main-
taining the active thirst for knowledge that the preschool child brings initially
into settings of formal education. The more we learn about the knowledge
structures that children bring to school and the instructional practices that
foster their natural proclivities to build and refine theories, the more able
we will be to design instructional modes that promote adaptive expertise
rather than the acquisition of inert knowledge.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have concentrated on an apparent paradox concerning
the cognitive competence of children. Recent research with infants and very
young children suggests that they know far more about their world initially,
and develop this understanding more rapidly, than was previously supposed.
However, topical consternation over the putatively increasing incompetence
of school-aged children in academic settings stands in sharp contrast to
these claims of early ingenuity.
In the first part of the chapter, we discussed the necessity of granting
complex cognitive structures to the young human mind. This breaking away
from an empiricist account of human thought took its impetus from sweeping
changes in psychological theory pioneered notably by Chomsky, the Gib-
sons, and Piaget. Buttressing these theoretical claims is a body of contem-
porary research gleaned from a variety of ingenious techniques that make
it increasingly feasible to interrogate infants. The outcome of a painstaking
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ROCHEL GELMAN and ANN L. BROWN
set of inquiries is a window through which we can view the young child's
cognitive world, a window that is only beginning to open.
We now know that infants are sensitive to certain principles of movement
early in life; that they garner multisensory and multimodal information about
the nature of objects; that they endow objects with properties of rigidity and
solidity; and that they possess rudimentary theories of categories, recog-
nizing properties of sets of nonidentical objects, including numerosity, a
property of sets divorced from any description of the objects themselves.
Implicit principles of causality, numerosity, etc. guide the development of
such knowledge at a rapid pace during the preschool years, a time during
which children are busily engaged in exploring their environment. Char-
acterized as "tireless explorers," they invent primitive but serviceable
comprehension, learning, and memory strategies, and create and test con-
tinously evolving theories to breathe meaning into their physical and social
world.
The pace of this development seems to slow down during the school
years, but this may be because children's competence is increasingly viewed
in the light of their performance on academic tests. Learning in schools
differs from natural learning in that others are in charge of what must be
learned, others control the timetable, and students must develop interest
and skill in learning for learning's sake so that they can intentionally set
about acquiring large bodies of decontextualized knowledge.
In an increasingly complex and rapidly changing technological society,
more than ever before, students must be equipped to acquire new infor-
mation, critically evaluate it, and adapt to its implications. They must learn
to waive their imprecise theories in favor of the precise, explicit, more
encompassing theories that constitute formal knowledge. Profound theory
change of this magnitude comes at a cost that many may be reluctant to
pay without a supportive academic environment. In the latter part of We
chapter, we discussed innovative pedagogical procedures that serve to main-
tain and bolster the child's natural curiosity and theory-building capacities.
In the exploitation of such techniques lies hope for solving the paradox of
early competence and later academic crisis.
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Representative terms from entire chapter:
rochel gelman
