Cover Image

PAPERBACK
$155.25



View/Hide Left Panel
Click for next page ( 120


The National Academies | 500 Fifth St. N.W. | Washington, D.C. 20001
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Terms of Use and Privacy Statement



Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.

OCR for page 119
National Science Policy and Technological Innovation HARVEY BROOKS There is lime debate about Be necessity of a federal role in technological innovation when the government is the ultimate user and the goods or services produced are widely acknowledged to be "public goods.'' There is general agreement, too, that where the costs of R&D can be entirely recovered from the future revenue streams generated by products, services, or information, there is lime justification for a government role. In many cases, however, the proper relative roles of the public aM private sector are highly controversial. An important factor in each of these cases is who makes the choices and strategic judgments as the R&D evolves. Here, whether the judgments to be made relate primarily to science or technology considerations or primarily to market considerations is ofterz key. HISTORIC ROLES OF GOVERNMENT IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION Although industry is the dominant source of commercially significant tech- nology in the United States, government has been a much more important and direct influence on the direction and rate of technological innovation than much of our national ideology and public rhetoric would lead us to suppose. Government in particular has been a source of much Generic technology," as well as fundamental science, which has then served as a substrate for technological innovation by the private industrial sector. Government has supported the generation of new knowledge and tech- niques directly, for example, through sponsoring the exploration of the largely unknown American continent in the early nineteenth century, or through the creation of such government agencies as the Agricultural Research Service, the National Bureau of Standards, the Geological Survey, and the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) in He late nineteenth and early twentieth centunes. It has also subsidized the expansion of certain basic 119

OCR for page 119
120 HARVEY BROOKS industries: the canal system in the early nineteenth century, the westward extension of the railroads in the mid-nineteenth century, the creation of a national highway system to undergird a growing auto industry, the devel- opment of an infrastructure of airports and air traffic control as well as air mail subsidies to sustain the grow of a commercial air transport system, and special tax benefits to stimulate the development of the domestic petro- leum industry to name just a few examples of indirect government involve- ment. These indirect subsidies had the effect of creating a "demand pull" for new technologies, not only within the industries immediately affected, but also in collateral industries that supplied or serviced the subsidized in- dustries. For example, the demand for durable steel rails for the railroads was a major factor driving technological innovation in the burgeoning steel industry (Morison, 1974:72-861. Tax benefits for the petroleum industry not only resulted in cheaper fuel, which stimulated demand for automobiles, but also fostered innovation in oil exploration and drilling technology, in which We United States still leads We world. The subsidy for highways indirectly stimulated innovation in highway construction and planning techniques, but it also influenced the direction of innovation in the automobile industry toward large and powerful cars with increased driving amenities, a stimulus that was reinforced by tax benefits to the oil industry, which effectively lowered gasoline prices. Thus, in hundreds of ways, government throughout American history has influenced the priorities of entrepreneurs and innovators in We private sector. This influence has been no less when it was inadvertent or incidental to some over government purpose, such as national defense, than when it was explicit and intentional, as in We case of U.S. agricultural programs or water development in the West. Throughout American history, also, the military has often been a direct or indirect source of technological innovation. Sometimes security consid- eraiions have been used as an important justification to command a wider political consensus, as was the case win federal sponsorship of the Interstate Highway System in 1956 (Rose, 1979), the financing of aeronautical research after World War ~ through the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1982; Nelson, 1977:111; Nelson, 1984:51-52), and the creation of He U.S. Naval Observatory in the 1840s. A. Hunter Dupree (1957:62) has observed that "the Naval Observatory is the classic example of the surreptitious creation of a scientific institution by underlings in the executive branch of the government in He very shadow of Congres- sional disapproval." Introduced in He guise of a "Depot of Charts and Instruments," ostensibly to standardize chronometers on naval ships for more accurate navigation, the observatory quickly grew into a major center for studies in hydrography, astronomy, magnetism, and meteorology, so that even today it is the leading world center for astrometric observations and the source of time and star-posit~on standards for practically the entire world.

OCR for page 119
NATIONAL SCIENCE POLICY AlID TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 121 In the early nineteenth century the military loaned its officers to help survey for the railroads and generally to assist them in solving civil engineering problems. In those days military expeditions and surveys were better staffed and supported, and closer to the best elements of American science, than were any civilian projects (Dupree, 1957:651. Also in the mid-nineteenth century the government arsenals at Harper's Ferry, Virginia, and Springfield, Massachusetts, pioneered in the development and introduction of milling machines and other machine tools, and in proving out the principles of mass production and interchangeable parts (Rosenberg, 1976:20~. Indeed, in the whole evolution of the American scientific establishment to this day one can discern a consistent pattern in which technical sophisti- cation has diffused outward from military science and technology into the civilian economy and eventually into the whole political and social structure. This has even been true for Me introduction of new technologies less ob- viously related to military applications. Medical developments such as an- tibiotics, techniques of blood preservation, and the use of chemical pesticides to control disease vectors were initially introduced in connection with Me military. Much of modern psychology had its origins in techniques of psy- chological testing first used on a large scale in World War I. Frequently the institutional structures created in wartime to push military applications of science have become permanent in Me subsequent period of peace and have been redirected toward the generation of a new level of government support for fundamental science and for advanced scientific and engineering edu- cation, as well as new siding and credibility for the scientific community in its influence on national policy (Brooks, 19701. The Growing Role of Government The role of government in science and technology has been increasing, in all the industrialized countries, but it has probably changed fastest in the United States, especially during and since World War II. Many of the new technologies that have been at the forefront of U.S. economic growth during the postwar period had Heir origins either in World War II or in the subsequent period of the cold war: commercial transport aircraft; semiconductors, solid- state electronic devices, and integrated circuits; computers; nuclear power; satellite communications; microwave telecommunications and radar appli- cations, such as air traffic control; antibiotics; pesticides; new materials, such as high-strength steel alloys, titanium, high-temperature ceramics, fiber-rein- forced plastics, and composites; and new methods of metal fabrication and processing, such as numerical-controlled machine tools or powder metal- lurgy. Much of this has been derivative from military and space activities, although in many cases, once the basic technology was transferred to He private sector, it tended to take off on its own, with rapid proliferation of

OCR for page 119
122 HARVEY BROOKS incremental improvements, cost reductions, quality enhancements, and an- cillary technologies necessary for wide commercial acceptance. Much commercially significant innovation has also been an indirect de- rivative of the eno~ous public investment in biomedical research. Although innovation in pharmaceuticals and medical devices has been largely generated in the private sector by private research and investment, it is doubtful whether much of this would have taken place without the base of knowledge resulting from govemment-sponsored programs. Much modem medical instrumenta- tion and diagnostics derive from basic advances in the physical sciences, including laboratory instrumentation, which occurred as a result of broad- based government sponsorship of fundamental physics, chemistry, and bi- ology (Handler, 1970:25~257; Grabowski and Vemon, 1982~. It is important to recognize, however, that several other equally innovative industrial areas owe less to government initiative or science sponsorship: industrial chemicals, synthetic fibers, heavy machinery (including construc- tion equipment), electric power generation (other than nuclear steam supply), and telecommunications are specific examples. Moreover, even where gov- emment has been an important influence, the civilian applications, market penetration, and broad economic benefits would not have been realized with- out the strongly complementary initiatives and technical ingenuity of private entrepreneurs. Govemment-generated science and technology were only the starting point and not Me basic driving force. This is nowhere better illustrated than in the semiconductor industry, where government started as almost the sole customer for the early transistors, whereas today military and space end uses account for only about 10 percent of the market for semiconductor devices (Levin, 1982:19, Table 2.11. Government and Basic Science The government role in stimulating the broad development of science for it own sake, rawer than for well-defined special social purposes, is a relative latecomer to the U.S. science policy scene, especially when compared win many other industrial counties. Although the Founding Fathers showed some concern with the development of a national science policy, and even proposed the creation of a national university (Dupree, 1957:1~15, 40), this interest largely lapsed win the rise of a more pragmatic, populist political orientation following the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828. When the British indus- ~ialist Smithson left a bequest to the U.S. government for the founding of a national institution devoted to He cultivation of science in its own terms, Congress debated for 10 years before deciding to accept the bequest, ques- iioning whether the support of science was an appropriate federal function except for specific practical public purposes (Dupree, 1957:7~791. Through- out the nineteenth century American scientists, considering themselves a

OCR for page 119
NATIONAL SCIENCE POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 123 beleaguered minority, continually bemoaned the countries exclusive concern with applied science and its neglect of pure science. They looked with envy at European governments and their tradition of public patronage of pure science (along with the arts). Well into the twentieth century the support of science was not viewed as a government responsibility, and until World War II, the development of American science depended mainly on private pa- tronage, particularly the great private foundations. A few far-sighted indi- viduals were beginning to point out the dependence of the continued advance of the U.S. economy on a broad-based science, and Herbert Hoover in the 1920s actually proposed a government-industry coalition to provide funds for the support of science in the ultimate interest of industrial innovation (Dupree, 1957:340-343; Layton, 1971:Ch. 81. The Watershed of World War 11 World War II marked a true watershed in the development of Amencan science policy. It was the first war in history in which fundamental scientific or engineering developments originated during wartime came to fruition and were used in battle during the same war; hitherto wars had only stimulated technology which became significant in a subsequent war. Though the seeds of the wartime science policy had been sown in the activities of private philanthropy, in selected government activities such as NACA and in advocacy by a few leaders of the scientific community (Dupree, 1957:358-361), a new relationship between government and science was triggered by the crisis of the war. In contrast with World War I, when scientists were brought into the service of the war effort primarily as military officers under the direction of military commanders, He scientific war effort in World War II was organized as an independent civilian enterprise under the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), directed by Vannevar Bush, and managed by industrial and academic scientists in equal partnership win the military rather than subordinate to it. Although He work was fully funded by government, it operated outside the Civil Service with scientists remaining within their familiar institutional settings. Military re- search and development was conducted under contract to private institutions on an unprecedented scale, with the government bearing all the costs, in- cluding those of administration and infrastructure ("overhead"), on a reim- bursable basis, generally with no profit, and no financial gain or loss to either individuals or institutions. The research contract win fully reimburs- able overhead was a distinctly U.S. invention, which proved to be an ex- traordinanly flexible instrument in the subsequent partnership between government and private institutions that evolved in basic research, hardware development, and even policy analysis and system management during He postwar period.

OCR for page 119
124 HARVEY BROOKS It was probably the accident of the cold war and the accelerating military- technological rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union that prevented the system of research contracting that evolved during the war from being dismantled in the postwar period. The political climate after World War II stood in shard contrast with that following World War I, when much of the wartime science apparatus was dismantled and military contractors were widely viewed by the public as "merchants of death," the root cause of war itself rawer than a source of national security. Instead of government and civilian science turning their backs on each over, the institutional "swords" built to fight the scientific World War II were at least partially forged into the "ploughshares" of a postwar policy for the broad development of science in the interests of society (Bush et al., 1960), even though the military influence on overall scientific priorities remained substantiale.g., the large emphasis on the physical sciences. The consensus in support of even this much of a civilian science policy was to a considerable extent maintained by the threat of the Soviet Union; the support of even the purest science was justified in terms of its possible ultimate value in the rivalry between the superpowers (England, 1983:212, 219, 2801. Nevertheless, it gradually evolved into a full-fledged civilian science policy, increasingly divorced from its national security parentage. THE POSTWAR ERA AND THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT BETWEEN SCIENCE AND SOCIETY ''Science the Endless Frontier" The public debate on the postwar organization of science was opened in November 1944 by a letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Vannevar Bush (actually drafted by Bush) asking him to set up a committee to study how the lessons learned in OSRD could be applied in peacetime "for the improvement of national health, the creation of new enterprises bringing new jobs, and the betterment of the national standard of living." The resulting report, Science the Endless Frontier (Plush et al., 1960), became the fundamental charter for American postwar science policy, and its general philosophy, though not its specific organizational recommen- dations, continues to guide government support of science and technology in the United States to this day (Brooks and Schmitt, 19851. It recom- mended the use of public funds to support basic research in colleges and universities and to "foster the development of scientific talent in our youth. " Research was to be supported largely through contracts and grants with universities and research institutes, as well as private firms, leaving `' infernal control of policy, personnel, and the method and scope of re- search to the institutions themselves. " It also proposed that the governance

OCR for page 119
NATIONAL SCIENCE POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 125 of the federal agencies sponsoring research in private institutions be left in the hands of "persons of broad interest in and understanding of the peculiarities of scientific research and education." Thus science was to be accorded a high degree of self-governance and intellectual autonomy, in return for which its benefits would be widely diffused through society and the economy. This diffusion was to be further fostered by the extensive use of contracts with private industry in preference to civil service labo- ratories for developmental activities. As a consequence, industry has ac- counted for between 70 and 75 percent of total public and private expenditures for R&D and between 50 and 55 percent of all federal R&D expenditures (National Science Foundation, 1984c:3, 111. In one important respect the postwar scientific system did not follow the pattern envisioned by the Bush committee. The committee had sug- gested that a single agency be responsible for all extramural research sponsored by the government, to be known as the National Research Foundation. It was to support not only basic research but also long-range applied research that would contribute to various federal missions, in- cluding the military and public health. Instead of a single R&D agency with mission-oriented functional divisions, there evolved a pluralistic sup- port system, with several cabinet-level federal agencies having partially sheltered divisions responsible for the support of long-range research re- lated to their missions, e.g., the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in the case of public health; the Office of Naval Research, the corresponding offices for the Army and the Air Force, and the Advanced Research Projects Agency (now the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) in the case of the military; and the National Science Foundation (NSF), responsible only for basic research and science education not tied to any particular federal mission (Brooks, 1973a). Both NSE and the newly cre- ated Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) were prohibited from setting up their own civil service laboratories, but were encouraged or required to '~contract out" the actual conduct of research to private organizations, sometimes created especially for that purpose under independent boards of private citizens. The "contracting out" idea was also adopted by the Air Force, in some measure by the Army, and least by the Navy; it also became the norm when, in the aftermath of sputnik, the largely civil service NACA was converted into the National Aeronautics and Space Admin- istration (NASA) by the Space Act of 1958. Within a few years the trans- for~ed agency was converted from one which was 98 percent "in-house" in its conduct of research, to one which contracted more than 80 percent of its R&D, especially the development part, to the private sector (Bok, 1966) The other major heritage from OSRD was the principle of awarding re- search and development contracts to the most qualified organization, irre-

OCR for page 119
126 HARVEY BROOKS spective of geographical or other nonscientific considerations. This was a sharp break with the tradition that had been established prior to World War IT, especially in agricultural research, where the policy had been to distribute federal research facilities and support very widely in each state. This proved to be the most controversial of the Bush committee's recommendations, and one on which the creation of the new science agency, NSF, nearly foundered (England, 1983:5-61. Today, nearly 40 years after the publication of the Bush report, the "social contract" between science and society that it advocated remains remarkably intact, despite numerous alarums and excursions whose rhet- oric has generally outrun their practical effect (Brooks and Schmitt, 19851. In the context of the American political system, this is a rather remarkable political phenomenon, and many would assert it has been responsible for American world leadership in pure science and in most fields of advanced technology (Bush, 1970:651. It may also be said, however, that the Bush social contract is probably under more fundamental challenge today than at any time in its postwar history, largely as a result of the erosion of U.S. international competitiveness in the increasingly interdependent world economy (Brooks and Schmitt, 19851. Trends in R&D Expen':litures The course of both federally sponsored and privately supported R&D since the end of World War II can be divided into three distinct penods. The first extended from the beginning of the cold war in the late 1940s to about 1967. This period was characterized by more or less steady growth in R&D ex- penditures, averaging up to 15 percent per year in real terms, with the life sciences considerably exceeding that rate after 1957 following the "take- off'' of the budget of He National Institutes of Health at that time. The bunk of federal R&D expenditures was devoted to space, defense, and militaTy- onented nuclear programs, which reached more than 90 percent of all federal R&D in the early 1960s (Brooks, 19631. The second period started in about 1967, when an abrupt leveling off in the volume of government-sponsored R&D began. This was associated with a severe budgeter, crunch resulting from the attempt of the Johnson admin- istration to maintain a "guns and butter" budget during He Vietnam buildup. However, the period of stagnation was prolonged until about 1977. MilitaIy R&D and space expenditures declined and He basic physical sciences also experienced a fall-off in support to about 14 percent below their 1967 peak when measured in constant dollars (using the GNP deflator). The life sci- ences, riding on the political popularity of biomedical research and backed by an effective political coalition in Congress, maintained continuing, though reduced, grown, considerably assisted by He "War on Cancer" Hat was

OCR for page 119
NATIONAL SCIENCE POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 40 30 J o 1 ~ 20 LL o _e . . - O / ~ / m 10 o 1960 1 965 1 970 1 975 127 . . . . . . . Total .- - . __ . _ . . \ Federal Private - . - . . . . 1980 1983 1 984 FIGURE 1 Feeder, pnvate, and total R&D expenditures, 196~1984 (billions of constant 1972 dollars). SOURCE: NahonaI Science Foundation, National Patterns of Science and Technology Resources (Washington, D.C.: 1984), Table 5. initiated win bipartisan support in the Nixon administration (U.S. Con- gress,l971; Strickland, 1972; Berger, 1980:62-631. Ouring this period pn- vately financed industrial research continued some growth, but with decreased emphasis on fundamental and longer-range research. The general trend is illustrated in Figure 1 (President's Con~niission, 1985:981. It was dig this second period Mat defense/space R&D dropped nearly to 60 percent of gov- ernment-sponsored R&D, partly owing to spectacular expansion of energy research, development, and demonstration programs, but also partly due to

OCR for page 119
128 HARVEY BROOKS TABLE 1 Trends in Federal Funding of Research and Development (billions of constant FY 1972 dollars) - FY 1986 FY 1967 FY 1972 FY 1984 (est.) l Defense $12.4 $9.2 $12.1 $16.1 Space 6.6 2.7 0.8 1.1 Heal 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.2 Energy 0.8 0.6 1.2 0.9 General science 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 Other 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.6 SOURCE: American Association for Me Advancement of Science, ALAS Report X: Research and Development, FY 1986. Intersociety Wowing Group (Washington, D.C.: 1985). research in support of the Great Society programs and of environmental protection (see Table 2 below for details). The third period began in 1977 with an acceleration in the growth of self- financed industnal research, a gradual restoration of government-supported research in the physical sciences, and a rapid acceleration of defense R&D, which increased even more rapidly in Me l980s after the advent of the Reagan administration (American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1985:27~. After 1980 civilian R&D shrank, particularly in the Department of Energy (DOE) and in the social sciences, and the proportion of space/ defense programs in government-sponsored R&D climbed to 72 percent. By FY 1985 defense R&D had exceeded its FY 1967 peak in real terms and was scheduled to exceed its FY 1967 peak by 30 percent in the FY 1986 budget. However, space and defense together were still 22 percent below their FY 1967 level in FY 1984 and would be 9 percent below their FY 1967 level in FY 1986, according to the President's budget. Total federal R&D was 22 percent lower in FY 1984 and would still be S percent lower in FY 1986 compared win its FY 1967 level. These results are summarized in Table 1. The changing Rends in federal funding of R&D reflect changes in overall national pnonties, which affected science policy. Those changes are analyzed in greater detail below. THREE EPOCHS IN POSTWAR SCIENCE POLICY The postwar period can be divided into three distinct epochs: the cold war period 1945-1965; He period dominated by social priorities 1965-1978; and the period dominated by industrial competitiveness 1978 to the present. In reality these periods overlap, and He onset of each new epoch was fore- shadowed by strenuous policy debates in Washington. The Tree epochs also

OCR for page 119
NATIONAL SCIENCE POLICY AND TECHNOLOGIC~ INNOVATION 129 coincide fairly closely with the three periods that mark the changes in funding patterns for federal R&D described above. The Cold War Period: 1945-1965 Until 1965, when the first indications of public revulsion against the Viet- nam War began, and when the environmental movement began to be polit- ically effective, the support of even the purest science and of graduate education had been justified to the Congress largely in teas of the military/techno- logical race with the Soviets (England, 1983:154, 218-2211. This science race was enormously stimulated by Soviet space achievements, beginning with the launching of the first sputnik in 1957. A simultaneous buildup of military and space investments followed, generating unprecedented new de- mands for highly trained scientific and engineering manpower. This in turn helped to fuel an expansion of higher education, especially graduate edu- cation, which also coincided with the "baby-boom" generation's coming of age. Accommodating the rising public demand for advanced education grad- ually became a goal in its own right, partially replacing the anticipated manpower demands of federally sponsored programs as a justification for federal support of science and higher education (Brooks, 19651. Military R&D and procurement undertaken in the l950s and early 1960s laid the groundwork for American domination of world markets in com- mercial jet aircraft, semiconductors, and (temporarily) nuclear power (Nel- son, 1982~. At the same time the so-called GI Bill of Rights introduced at the end of World War II laid the foundation for the U.S. postwar lead in the training of technical manpower, and this helped to staff the explosive grown of government technological programs in the 1960s. In the early 1960s, however, Were developed an intense debate among economists and students of science policy as to the net effect of these large government technological programs on the performance of the U.S. civilian economy, a debate that is being revisited today in only slightly revised form. A majority asserted that the civilian "spin-off'' from government programs would stimulate technical progress within the civilian economy, but a significant and increasingly vocal minority argued that the insatiable demands of federal programs would drain scarce talent away from the civilian sector by bidding up salaries and by providing more challenging and interesting technical opportunities for sci- entists and engineers, free of the normal disciplines and economic consents of He commercial marketplace (Hollomon and Harger, 1971; Brooks, 19721. The Social Priorities Period: 1965-1978 The growing technical successes of the space program and of some of He military systems programs such as Polaris created heightened public and

OCR for page 119
158 HARVEY BROOKS nity, the Soviet Union, and Japan, which has aggregate annual expenditures close to $450 million (Thomassen, 19841. In a way the justification for such intemahonal programs can be considered as a simple extension of the ar- guments used for large national government investments in precommercial applied research programs, where commercializable results are in the distant future and the technical risks are high. Such international cooperative pro- grams can be of two kinds. The more usual kind involves an agreed division of labor between national research institutions with wide sharing of results, joint planning of major facilities and experiments, and extensive short-term exchanges of technical personnel (from months up to a year or more). The rarer kind of cooperation involves the setting up of joint laboratories with a more or less permanent multinational staff. An example is the Italian-based laboratory of Euratom at Ispra, generally regarded as less successful than the fusion program. Still another type of international cooperative program is the Super-Phenix fast breeder reactor program, which involves both gov- ernment and industry, and whose objective is a full-scale commercial pro- totype (Nuclear News, 1985~. Although this is a predominantly French project, other European countries have made a significant investment in it in return for sharing in the information and operating experience developed. From the standpoint of participating researchers, such international pro- grams often have the advantage of being less subject to fluctuations in the budgetary priorities or other policies of individual national governments. Budgetary planning gets locked in by the international nature of Me com- mitment and thus tends to provide an environment of greater policy, as well as financial, stability. Other Public Policies for innovation So far the discussion of government intervention in the innovation process has been concerned with direct government sponsorship of R&D or of pro- totype construction and testing. Although this is the most visible and widely debated type of intervention, there are many more indirect policies that may be of equal importance. One of the principal advantages of such indirect policies is that they provide a natural Hearts for leaving decisions about viability in the market to industrial managers who are in the best position to judge what the market needs or is likely to accept. Thus, indirect forms of intervention are most appropriate when market judgments are most significant for success. Tax Benefits to Consumers One way to stimulate innovation is to provide tax benefits to consumers that lower the effective price of innovative products whose consumption the government decides yields public benefits or "ex- temalities" not offered by alternative products During the energy crisis many

OCR for page 119
NATIONAL SCIENCE POLICY ED TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 159 states as well as the federal government provided tax credits for household investments which improved energy efficiency or resulted in the substitution of renewable for nonrenewable energy sources, e.g., solar hot water heating or passive solar house design. The idea was to accelerate the market pene- tration of new technologies that would result in reduced oil imports, leaving the choice of technologies to the market. One could regard this as compen- sating the consumer for his contribution to the reduction of a "negative externality," since the alternative would be for him to require more imported oil. R&D Tax Credits Almost all He industrialized countries now offer some sort of tax credit or other tax benefit to firms which increase their R&D spending above some base year. This tax benefit could be thought of as compensating the film for He fact that there will always be some spillover effect from its R&D which will benefit other firms, consumers, or the general public, and which it will not be able to recapture in the price of its products. In addition, since there is an apparent correlation between firm grown and R&D spending, it might be argued that there is a generalized benefit to the economy as a whole from stimulating industries with higher growth potential. On the other hand, there is considerable debate as to whether the tax credit actually stimulates private R&D spending or merely provides a reward for spending that would have taken place anyway for competitive reasons or an inducement for firms to redefine existing marginal activities as R&D. In a recent study of the impact of R&D tax credits in the United States, Sweden, and Canada, Mansfield (1985a) has concluded that such credits and other allowances "appear to have had only a modest effect on R&D expenditures," and from this he infers that in their present form R&D tax incentives "are unlikely to have a major impact on a nation's rate of innovation" largely because the price elasticity of industrial demand for R&D is quite low. Technology-Forcing Regulations One way of stimulating industrial in- novation is to use government to set stiff performance standards for industrial products standards that cannot be met without considerable technological innovation and then rely on prospective sanctions to induce private R&D to meet the regulations. This was the strategy followed by the U.S. Congress in respect to the auto industry in three areas: exhaust emissions, fuel eff~- ciency, and vehicle safety. It is also implicit in water pollution regulations, notably in the Clean Water Act of 1977 (Public Law, 1977), which originally required zero discharge into waterways by 1985. The advantage of this approach is Hat it leaves the choice of technology to engineers and managers familiar with the technology of the industry. In the auto industry Here is no doubt that the new regulations stimulated the industry to step up its R&D spending rather dramatically from the early 1970s on, and that many technical

OCR for page 119
160 HARVEY BROOKS goals that the industry insisted were unrealistic were eventually achieved- most notably the attainment of lower emissions with virtually no sacnf~ce in fuel efficiency. On the other hand, many observers have argued that these technology-forcing regulations hurt the industry seriously at a time when it was just beginning to face severe competition in domestic markets from Japanese imports (Abernathy et al., 1982:83-88; Eckstein et al., 1984:50- 53~. In fact the attainment of the originally specified standards was postponed year after year, and it is at least debatable whether the goals could not have been achieved more efficiently without legislated standards and timetables that had to be continually revised (Goodson, 19771. Voluntary Standards Industrywide standards can be an important factor in encouraging the rapid diffusion and adoption of new technology. On the other hand, standards can sometimes be abused to confer unfair advantages on particular firms. This is another example of the fact that amving at the optimum choice between competition and cooperation (from a societal point of view) is a difficult balancing act. The United States has a unique system of voluntary standard setting through a number of indus~ywide standard- sethng associations, such as the American National Standards Lnstitute (ANSI) or the American Society for Testing Materials (ASTM). Standard setting is camed out and financed by the industry itself under antitrust safeguards that apparently work quite satisfactorily and have been relatively little criticized. It is important Mat the government maintain a legal regime which is supportive of such voluntary standard setting, which has been an important factor in U.S. competitive success in a number of areas. It is one of the instruments for assuring a continental market for new technologies and thus realizing scale economies at a relatively early stage in an emerging technological area. The lag in standardizing designs, for example, may have been an important factor in the faltering performance of the nuclear power industry in Me United States after a promising Stan. Intellectual Property Since the mid-1970s there has been a general trend toward strengthening intellectual property laws so as to improve the appro- pnability of Me benefits of innovation to the innovating organization. The argument for this has been that much of the financial risk involved in intro- ducing a new product or process to the market is incurred after the original invention has been made. Hence, many potentially valuable inventions are not converted into viable innovations because the innovator cannot be con- fident of a temporary monopoly In the market for long enough to recover his postinvention start-up production and marketing costs. Nevertheless, the benefits to commercial competition of stronger intellectual property rights always have to be balanced against He possibility that too much competition in the earlier "generic" phases of new technology development will result

OCR for page 119
NATIONAL SCIENCE POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 161 in wasteful duplication and slower progress due to a lack of cross-fertilization ideas. In some cases it is possible for too much emphasis on patents or proprietary know-how to result in overinvestment in certain areas,' thus re- versing the usual argument that We "positive extemalities" of R&D result in private underinvestment in R&D. There is now a widespread concern that the pendulum has swung too far in favor of the protection of intellectual property rights, particularly in the relations between industry and universities. Simultaneously, there is concern with government moves to regulate the free flow of scientific inflation for national security reasons (Corson et al., 1982; Wallerstein, 19841. There is also a question of the degree to which proprietary research, as well as government regulation of the flow of research information, has the effect of shielding emerging technologies from proper public assessment until after irreversible commitments have been made to final design and deployment (National Academy of Sciences, 1969:32-331. Antitrust Policy In the recent past there has been much criticism of the overly rigid interpretation of antitrust legislation in relation to cooperation among firms in R&D, particularly in the precommercial phases of innovation before the emergence of specific product designs (U.S. Congress, 19841. One of the sources of Japanese success in technological innovation in recent years is believed to be the Japanese govemment's policy of encouraging cooperation among fimns and even agreed division of markets for products in emerging technology areas. The U.S. Department of Justice has now clarified its interpretation of antirust legislation to be more positive toward research cooperation among firms, and the Department of Commerce has been actively promoting We idea of R&D limited partnerships (U.S. De- parunent of Justice, 1980; Me~Tifield, 1982; U.S. Congress, 19841. Planning vs. the Market The current debate over industrial policy in the United States has specific implications for R&D and science policy. The question is whether the overall national pattem of R&D the resultant of government and private R&D decisions should reflect some kind of con- sensual national vision of the future of technology. Even granted the desir- ability of some sort of coherent pattern, there remains a question of We process by which this pattern is arrived at. A decentralized decision-making process does not necessarily imply an incoherent outcome. The pattern does not have to be established deductively from some generalized vision of a future society established by a few "wise men." It can be established in- ductively through a political and market struggle between competing visions. Essential to the successful outcome from such a smuggle, however, is an open process in which ideas and visions can compete ''fairly," with wide- spread public participation. Even We market and the political process can be considered as compenng

OCR for page 119
162 HARVEY BROOKS processes in which the participants have different relative weights. The prob- lem with market-like processes in both the political and economic spheres is that they may tend to give too little weight to "externalities" and systemic effects. Unfortunately, the same tends to be tme of the political process, especially in pluralistic societies like He United States. Groups try to use the political process to defend or enhance their interests without reference to He "externalities" of their success. An interesting question is whether the highly communicative and consensual process of Japanese decision mak- in~ helps to offset this limitation of the decentralized mechanisms preferred in the United States, with the result that more internally consistent systems of action result while still avoiding the large errors that result from patterns imposed by a small group at the top of a hierarchy. OUTLOOK AND PROSPECT: CAN THE U.S. DECLINE BE REVERSED? Despite the searching self-criticism Hat is going on in the United States, in technological innovation we are still perceived by the rest of the world as No. 1. Nevertheless, our relative position has eroded. Some of this erosion was inevitable, especially given the long-term U.S. political interest in equal- izing weals and technical capacitor among nations in the interest of greater political stability and the strength of the free world consensus against political and military encroachment by He Communist bloc. The world economic and technical dominance by the United States that existed in He 1950s and early 1960s was not sustainable and was essentially incompatible with He legiti- mate aspirations of He rest of He world's peoples. Seven percent of the world's population controlling 50 percent of its GNP was probably not a triable situation for any prolonged period of history. Moreover, He "race for the new frontier" (National Research Council, 1983) does not have to be a zero-sum game internationally any more than it has been nationally among firms or regions of the county. The growing wealth of the rest of He world provides new markets and new opportunities for innovation by U.S. entrepreneurs. In principle I believe the United States still retains the capacity to stay in front of He rest of the industrialized world, but not way in front, if it gives high priority as a society to science, tech- nology, education, and productive investment without sacrificing a reason- able degree of equity among its population. This is not an easy prescription, nor is it an impossible one. REFERENCES Abernathy, William J., et al. 1982. The Competitive Stams of the U.S. Auto Ins smy: A Study of the Influences of Technology in Determining International Industrial Competitive Advantage, Automobile Panel. Committee on Technology and international Economic and Trade Issues, National Research Council. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.

OCR for page 119
NATIONAL SCIENCE POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 163 Altshuler, Alan, Martin Anderson, Daniel Jones, Daniel Roos, and James Womack. 1984. The Future of the automobile. Report of MIT's International Automobile Program. Cambndge, Mass.: ~ Press. American Association for the Advancement of Science. 1985. AMS Report X: Research and De- velopment, PY 1986. Intersociety Worlcing Group. Washington, D.C. Aspin, Congressman Les. }984. Defense spending and He economy. News Release, April. Ayres, Robert U. 1984. The Next Industrial Revolution: Reviving Industry Through Innovation. Cambndge, Mass.: Ballinger. Bauer, Raymond A., with Richard Rosenbloom and Laure Sharp. 1969. Second Order Consequences, A Methodological Essay on the Impact of Technology. Cambndge, Mass.: MIT Press. Baxter, William F. 1983: Transcript of presentation to the National Association of Manufacturers, Prototypists, Inc. Washington, D.C., May 10, 1983. Berger, Edward J., Jr. 1980. Science at the White House, A Political Liability. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press. Bloom, Justin L. 1984. Japan's Ministry of international Trade and Industry (~l) as a Policy Instrument in the Development of I~orma~on Technology. Program on Infonnation Resources Policy. Harvard University, C~mbudge, Mass. October. Bok, Enid C. 1966. The establishment of NASA. Pp. 161-270 in Sanford A. Lakoff, ea., Knowledge and Power. New York: Free Press. Bower, Joseph L. 1985. Restructuring petrochemicals: A comparative study of business and gov- ernment strategy to deal with a declining sector. Chapter 7, pp. 263-300, in Bruce R. Scott and George C. Lodge, eds., U.S. Cornperinveness in the World Economy. Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press. Brooks, Harvey. 1963. Government support of science. Pp. 11-21 m~cGrw-Hill Yearbook Science and Technology. New York. Brooks, Harvey. 1965. Future needs for the support of basic research. Pp. 77-110 in Basic Research and National Goals. Report of the Committee on Science and Public Policy, National Academy of Sciences, to the House Science and Astronautics Committee. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov- ermnent Printing Office; also repented as Chapter 6 in Harvey Brooks. 1968. The Government of Science. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Brooks, Harvey. 1970. Impact of the defense establishment on science and education. Pp. 931-962 in U.S. Congress, House. NationalScience Policy. House Congressional Resolution 666, Heanags Before the Subcommittee on Science, Research, arid Development, Committee on Science and Astronautics, 91st Cong., 2d sess. Brooks, Harvey. 1971. Thoughts on graduate education. The Gr~e Joz~nzal 8(23:319-336. Brooks, Harvey. 1972. What's happening to the U.S. lead in technology?Harvard Business Review, May/June. Brooks, Harvey. 1973a. The physical sciences: Bellwether of science policy, in James Shannon, ea., Science and the Evolution of Public Policy. New York: The Rockefeller University Press. Brooks, Harvey. 1973b. Technology and values: New ethical issues raised by technological progress. ZYGONIJoz~ 1 of Religion and Science 8(1). Brooks, Harvey. 1978. The dynamics of funding, enrollment, cumc~um and employment, in Martin L. Pert, ea., Physics Careers, Employment, and Education. New York: American Institute of Physics. Brooks, Hanrey. 1982a. Science indicators and science priorities. Chapter 1, pp. 1-32, in Marcel C. La Follette, ea., Q~z~ in Science. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Brooks, Harvey. 1982b. Towards an efficient public technology policy: Cntena and evidence. Pp. 329-380 in Herbert Giersch, ea., Emerging Technologies: Consequences for Economic Growth, Structural Change, and Employment. Symposium 1981, Instinct fiir Weln~schaft an der Univ- ersidit Kiel. (Paul Siebeck). Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr. Brooks, Harvey. 1983. Technology, competition and employment. Pp. 115-122 in R.J. Miller, ea.,

OCR for page 119
164 HARVEY BROOKS Robotics: Future Factories, Future Workers. Special issue of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. November. Brooks, Harvey. 1985a. Can science and technology rescue the Altering U.S. economy? Materials and Sociery 9(1):1-12. Brooks, Harvey. 1985b. Technology as a factor in U.S. competitiveness. Chapter 9 in Bruce R. Scott and George C. Lodge, eds., U.S. Competitiveness in the World Economy. Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press. Brooks, Harvey. 1985c. Technology assessment and environmental impact assessment. Pp. 105- 122 in U.S.-China Conference on Science Policy, January 9-12, 1983. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. Brooks, Harvey, and Roland W. Schmitt. 1985. Current Science and Technology Policy Issues: Two Perspectives. Occasional Paper No. 1, Graduate Program in Science, Technology, and Public Policy. Washington, D.C.: The George Washington University. Bush, Vannevar. 1970. Pieces of the Action. New York: William Morrow. Bush, Vannevar, et al. 1960. Science the Endless Frontier: A Report lo the President on a Program for Postwar Scientific Research. Originally issued July 1945; reissued as part of the Tenth Anniversary Observance of the National Science Foundation as NSF 60-40. Washington, D.C. Corson, Dale R., et al. 1982. Scientific Communication and lVational Security. Report of Panel on Scientific Communication and National Security. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. Dupree, A. Hunter. 1957. Science in the Federal Government: A History of Policy and Acnviiies to 1940. Cambndge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Eckstein, Otto L., Christopher Caton, Roger Bnnner, and Peter Duprey. 1984. The DRI Report on U.S. Manufacturing Industries. Lexington, Mass.: Data Resources. Economist. September 15, 1984. British science policy: Concem over Cern. P. 93. Elkana, Yehuda, et al. 1978. Toward a Metric of Science. New York: John Wiley & Sons. Energy Modeling Forum. 1982. World Oil: Summary Report. EMF Report No. 6, Eric Zausner, Working Group chairman, Stanford University. Especially p. 7, Using the import premium in policymaking, and pp. 67-75, Lee value of reducing oil imports. England, J. Menon. 1983. A Patron of Pure Science. Washington, D.C.: National Science Foun- daiion. Executive Order 12044. March 23, 19?8. Improving Government Regulations. Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of tile President. Fnedman, Benjamin N. 1985. Saving, investment, and government deficits in the 1980's, in Bruce R. Scott and George C. Lodge, eds., U.S. Competitiveness in the World Economy. Boston, Mass.: Haward Business School Press. Goodson, R. Eugene. 1977. Federal Regulation of Motor Vehicles: A Sublunary and Analysis. Report to the U.S. Department of Transportation. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation. Grabowski, Henry G., and John M. Vernon. 1982. The pharmaceutical industry. Chapter 6, pp. 283-360, in Richard R. Nelson, ea., Government and Technical Progress: A Cross-lndusmy Analysis. New York: Pergamon Press. Gregory, Gene. 1982. Japan: New center for innovation, evolving from imitator to inventor. Speaking of Japan 3(18):~-9. Tokyo: Keizai Koho Center, Japan Institute of Social and Economic Affairs. Gregory, William H. 1982. Editorial, Landsat: Public orprivate?Aviation Week & Space Technology, April 5:11. Gnliches, Zvi. 1985. Producav`ry, R&D, and Basic Research at the Firm L - el in the 1970's. Harvard Institute of Economic Research. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Handler, Philip, ed. 1970. The Life Sciences. Committee on Research in the Life Sciences of the Committee on Science and Public Policy. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences. Hollomon, J. Herbert, and Alan E. Harger. 1971. America's technological dilemma. Technology Review 31 (July/August).

OCR for page 119
NATIONAL SCIENCE POLICY ACID TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 165 Husen. Torsten. 1983. Are standards in U.S. schools really lagging behind those in other countries? Phi Delta Kappan Journal 64(7):455-461. Imp, K., and A. Sakuma. 1983. An analysis of Japan-U.S. semiconductor friction. Economic Eye, A Quarterly Digest of Views from Japan 4 (June): pp. 13-18. Tokyo: Keith Koho Center, Japan Institute for Social and Economic Affairs, June. Katz, James E. 1982. Planning and legislating technical services: The American experience. Tech- nology in Sociery 4:51-66 Keizai Koho Center. 1983. Japan 1983: An international Comparison. Tokyo: Japan Institute for Social and Economic Affairs. Lawrence, Robert Z. 1983. Changes in U.S. industrial structure: The role of global forces, secular trends, and transitory cycles. Paper prepared for Symposium on Industrial Change and Public Policy, organized by the Federal Reserve Banic of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wy. August 25- 26, 1983. Layton, Edwin T., Jr. 1971. The Revolt of the Engineers: Social Responsibility and the American Engineering Profession. Cleveland, Ohio: Case Westem Reserve University Press. Lester, Richard K. 1985. National policy options for advanced nuclear power reactor development. Pp. 4~491 in Richard K. Lester et al., eds., National Strategies for Nuclear Power Reactor Development. MITNPI-PA-002, Program on Nuclear Power Plant Innovation, Department of Nuclear Engineenng. Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Lewis. Jordan D. 1975. Incentives for Technological Change, A Progress Report, Experimental Technology Incentives Program. March 26. Memorandum. Lewis, Jordan D. 1976. Director, Expenmental Technology incentives Program, National Bureau of Standards, Statement Before the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Scientific Plan- ning and Analysis, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, May 4. Mansfield, Edwin. 1985a. Public policy toward industrial innovation: An international study of R&D tax credits, in Robert H. Hayes, Kim B. Clark, and Christopher Lorenz, eds., The Uneasy Alliance: Managing Ike Producnviry-Tecknology Dilemma, Harvard Business School Press, forthcoming. Mansfield, Edwin. 1985b. Technological change and economic growth. Pp. 1-18 in U.S.-China Conference on Science Policy, January 9-12, 1983. Washington, D.C.: Naiional Academy Press. Me:Tifield, D. Bruce. 1982. Summary of the use of the R&D limited partnership: A means to enhance our international competitive position. Unpublished draft paper. Washington, D.C.: U.S. De- p~ment of Commerce. Monson, Elting. 1974. From Know-How to Nowhere: The Development of American Technology. New York:.Basic Books. Mowery, David C., and Nathan Rosenberg. 1982. The commercial aire~ft industry. Chapter 3, pp. 101-161, in Richard R. Nelson, ea., Government and Technical Progress: A Cross-Industry Analysis. New York: Pergamon Press. Musgrave, Richard A. 1914. On social goods and social bade. Pp. 251-293 in Robin Mams, ea., The Corporate Society. London: Macmillan. National Academy of Engineenng. 1984. Guidelinesfor Engineering Research Centers. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. National Academy of Sciences. 1969. Technology: Processes of Assessment and Choice. Report lo the Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. Naiional Research Council. 1976. An Evaluative Report on the E~perimen~l Technology Incentives Program. Evaluative Panel for the National Bureau of Standards, FY 1976. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences. Naiional Research Council. 1983, 1984. The Race for the New Frontier, International Competition in Advanced TechnologyDecisions for America. Panel on Advanced Technology Competition. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press; New York: Simon & Schuster. .

OCR for page 119
166 HARVEY BROOKS National Science Board. 1983. Science Indicators 1982. Washington, D.C.: National Science Foun- dation. National Science Board. 1985. Science Indicators 1984. Washington, D.C.: National Science Foun- dation. National Science Foundation. 1983a. Company and federal support produce 17% industrial R&D spending increase In 1981. NSF Science Resources Highlights. NSF 83-313, August 8. Wash- ir~gton, D.C. National Science Foundation. 1983b. Manufactunug employment becomes increasingly technolog- ical. NSF Science Resources Highlights. NSF 83-303, March 10. Washington, D.C. National Science Foundation. 1984a. Academic Research Equipment in the Physical Sciences and Engineering. Prepared for Universities and Non-Profit Institute Studies Group, Division of Science Resources Studies, National Science Foundation. Rock~ille, Md.: Westat. National Science Foundation. 1984b. Nanonal Patterns of Science and Technology Resources 1984. NSF 8~311. Washington, D.C.- National Science Foundation. 1984c. Science and Technology Data Book. NSF 84-331, October. Washington, D.C. Nellcin, Dorothy. 1971. The Politics of Housing Innovation, The Fate of the Civilian Industrial Technology Program. Ithaca: Comell University Press. Nelson, Richard R. 1977. The Moon and the Ghetto: An Essay on Public Policy Analysis. New YorI;: W.W. Norton. Nelson, Richard R. 1982. Government stimulus of technological progress: Lessons from American history. Chapter 9, pp. 451 482, in Richard R. Nelson, ea., Government and Technical Progress: A Cross-I~s~y Analysis. New York: Perga~s~on Press. Nelson, Richard R. 1984. High Technology Policies: A Five-Nation Comparison. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. New York Times. November 21, 1984. The chemical lobby's "Tumaround." Quotation of Louis Fernandez, Monsanto Company. P. 16. Norman, Colin. 1983. How to win buildings and influence Congress. News and Comment, Science 222 (December 16):1211-1213. Nuclear News. 1984. Report proposes future nuclear strategy for France. 27(9):66 67. Nuclear News. 1985. Vibration problems at ~ix. 28(5):85-86. Office of hlanagement and Budget. 1981. FY 1982 Budget Revisions. Washington, D.C. Office of Science and Technology Policy. 1982. Aeronauncal Researc}: and Technology Policy: Volume 1, Surname Report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. Pavitt, Keith, and Luc Soete. 1979. Innovative activities and export shares: Some comparisons between industries and counuies. Pp. 38-66 in Keith Pavitt, ea., Technical Innovation and Boyish Economic Performance. London: Macmillan. Parsons, C., R. Scott, P. Crazier, and B. Guile. 1984. The Development of Programmable Auto- mation Systems in Discrete Parts Manufacturing Ind~stnes: Agricultural Machinery; Auto Parts, and Pumps and Compressors. Draft report to Be Office of Technology Assessment by the Berkeley Roundtable on Intemaional Economy (BRIE). University of California, Berkeley. Pear, Robert. 1983. States fostering high technology. New York Times, August 16:A1, A21 President's Commission on IIIdustnal Competitiveness. 1985. Global Compenizon: The New Reality. Vol. 2. John A. Yotmg, chainnan. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. Public Law 92~4. 1972. Technology Assessment Act of 1972. October. Public Law 95-217. 1977. Clean Water Act of 1977. December 27. Public Law 9~515. 1980. Patent and Trademark Laws, Amendment. December 12. Public Law 98-622. 1984. The Patent Law Improvement Act. November 8. Ramo, Simon. 1985. The international race for technological supenonty. Bulletin, The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 38(4) Stated Meeting report.

OCR for page 119
NATlON'AL SCIENCE POLICY AN'D TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 167 Rose, Mark H. 1979. Interstate: Express Highway Politics, 1941-1956. Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas. Rosenberg, Nathan. 1976. Perspectives on Technology. New York: Cambridge University Press. Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. 1965. A Thousand Days, John F. Kennedy in the White House. Cam- bndge, Mass.: Riverside Press. Skinner, Wickham. 1983. Wanted: Managers for the factory of the future. Pp. 102-114 in R.J. Miller, ed. Robotics: Future Factories, Future Workers. Special issue of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications Smith, Bruce L.R., and Joseph J. Karlesky. 1977. The State of Academic Science: The Universities in the National Research Effort. Vol. I. New York: Change Magazine Press. Stockman, David. 1977. The Market Case Against the Clinch River Breeder Project. Washington, D.C. Memorandum, U.S. Congress, September 17. Stnckland, Stephen P. 1972. Politics, Science, and Dread Disease. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Ibornassen, K. I. 1984. Progress and directions in magnetic fusion energy. Arsenal Review of Energy 9:281-319. Palo Alto, Calif.: Annual Reviews. U.S. Congress, House. 1984. Japanese Technological Advances and Possible United States Re- sponses Using Research Joint Ventures. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight and the Subcommittee on Science, Research and Technology of the Commuttee on Science and Technology. 98~ Cong., 1st seas. [No. 45], June 29-30, 1983. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. 1971. National Program for the Conquest of Cancer. Report of the National Panel of Consultants on the Conquest of Cancer. Senate Document 92-99. April 14. U.S. Department of Commerce. International Trade Administration. 1983. An Assessment of U.S. Cornpentiveness in High Technology Industries. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Goverrunent Printing Office. U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Science and Technology. 1979. Domestic Policy Review of Ir~strial Innovation. PB-290403, PB-290404, PB-290407, PB-29~, PB-290413, P13-290415, PB-290417. Springfield, Va.: National Technical Info,~lation Service. Also, We White House. 1979. White House fact sheet: The President's industrial innovation initiatives. October 31. Reprinted, pp. 155-173 in U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Technology. 1980. Analyses of President Carter's Initiatives in Industrial Innovation and Economic Revitalization. U.S.Departmentof3ustice.1980. Antitrust Guide Concerning Research Joint Ventures. Washington, D.C. Vemon, Raymond. 1982. Technology's effects on international trade: A look ahead. Pp. 145-170 in Herbert Giersch, ea., Emerging Technologies: Consequences for Economic Growth, St~uctwal Change, and Employment. Symposium 1981, Insiitut fur Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel. Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Waldrop, M. Mitchell. 1982. Imaging the earth (If): The politics of LANDSAT. Science 216 (April 2): 4~41. Wallerstein, Mitchel B. 1984. Scientific commurucation and national security in 1984. Science 224 (May 4): 4~466. .

OCR for page 119