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Implementation of the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act In July and August of 1977, under strong political pressure, Congress passed and President Carter signed the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act (YEDPA). The law (P.L. 95-93), initiated by Congress, substantially increased authorizations for two existing youth employment programs that were part of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), the Job Corps and the Summer Youth Employment Program (SYEP), and created four new programs, the Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Projects (YCCIP), the Youth Employment and Training Program (YETP), the Young Adult Conservation Corps (YACC), and the Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects (YIEPP), a national demonstration program designed to encourage dropouts to return and potential dropouts to remain in school using guaranteed work as an incentive. The broad purpose of the legislation as a whole was to provide employment, training, and demonstration programs aimed at the struc- tural unemployment problems of youths. The more specific purpose of the demonstration programs was "to test the relative efficacy of different ways of dealing with these problems in different local contexts." This charge was backed by substantial discretionary authority and money, granted to the Secretary of Labor and delegated to the Office of Youth Programs, to conduct research, demonstration, and evaluation activities. In addition to the substantial funds for YIEPP, both YCCIP and YETP included discretionary funds for demonstration programs. This demonstration purpose, however, was not to preclude the provision of employment and training programs aimed at the immediate employment needs of youths. Under YEDPA annual outlays for youth programs were double what they had been in previous years. In fiscal 1977, the year before YEDPA began operations, federal outlays for youth employment programs totaled $955 million and served 1.2 million youths. Beginning in 1978 1 these were programs serving youths only e Additional expenditures of $827 million served another 0.8 million youths in adult programs under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act; these programs continued during the YEDPA years. 69

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70 annual outlays for youth programs averaged $2 billion and served an average of 1.5 million youths per year. Over the next 4 fiscal years, from 1978 through 1981, YEDPA outlays totaled $8 billion and served 6.1 million youths. Although large compared to previous efforts, on a per-participant basis annual expenditures averaged only $1,311. Of the total $8 billion, $628 million was spent for discretionary and demonstration projects, including both the operation of the youth programs (which accounted for most of the expenditures) and the accompanying research and evaluation activities. This outlay is one of the largest short-term investments in social research and demonstration ever undertaken by the federal government. The scale and complexity of its research activities, imposed on a massive service delivery system, created competing functions that had major consequences for both the research effort and program operations. The research program, designed to provide a "knowledge base for improving youth employment policies," is the basis of this report's review of program effectiveness. This chapter provides a context for interpreting the results of YEDPA programs and research in terms of the conditions under which the act was legislated and implemented. This context is considered in four sections: the legislative background of the act; the national imple- mentation of YEDPA programs; the local implementation of YEDPA programs and research activities; and the implementation of the knowledge development research effort. This chapter relies heavily on the background paper by Richard Elmore, "Knowledge Development under the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act" (in this volume). LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND OF YEDPA Shortly after the inauguration of President Jimmy Carter in 1977, at the instigation of several senior Senators of both parties, dis- cussions were held with new administration appointees regarding a new youth employment bill, several proposals for which had been circulating in the Senate. With the cooperation of presidential appointees in the Department of Labor, a joint Senate-administration proposal was drafted and introduced. The proposed legislation contained several key elements, representing the interests of its various Senate sponsors: a focus on school dropouts and those at risk of dropping out of school; improved cooperation between schools and the employment and training system; and job training and work opportunities that would prepare youths for work in ''the real world" and provide them access to jobs. Despite its involvement in the youth employment bill, the Carter administration's real domestic priority at that time was elsewhere, on controlling inflation and rising unemployment. To deal with the latter, the $20 billion emergency economic stimulus package that the President introduced immediately after his inauguration created $8 billion in additional public service jobs as part of the CETA program. One result of this approach was to increase the emphasis in the Employment and Training Administration (ETA) of the Department of Labor on public employment. The burden of this massive public jobs program at the local level and the public image it created of CETA were to

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71 become issues in both the local operation of YEDPA and its reauthoriza- tion as a part of CETA. With its attention elsewhere and without a specific youth proposal of its own, the administration accepted the Senate version of the youth employment bill. The joint Senate-administration proposal requested authorization for the establishment of three new youth programs, the Young Adult Conservation Corps, the Youth Community Conservation Improvement Program, and the Youth Employment and Training Program; it provided for joint projects by schools and CETA prime sponsors; and it provided for a large discretionary budget (50 percent of YETP), as a mechanism to adjust the formula-funded allocations to the needs of various constituencies. The House of Representatives, having been left out of the early negotiations, introduced the Senate-administration bill and then immediately proceeded to write its own alternate youth proposal. Common to both Senate and House proposals was an initial 1-year authorization. With the entire CETA legislation due to expire in 1978, the plan was to integrate the youth programs into CETA in a 1978 reauthorization bill. The House proposal, like the Senate one, also included discretionary demonstration activity, but as a mechanism to learn what programs work best and to apply that knowledge in later youth program legislation. The House bill's emphasis on research and demonstration was its hallmark, indicating uncertainty about what types of programs would most effectively address the problems of youth unemployment and a commitment to research and experimentation as a basis for future program planning. One of the purposes of the demonstration approach was to prevent funds from being locked into certain programs that research might suggest were not effective. This approach was in marked contrast to the Senate proposal, which would more firmly establish new youth programs. Another key difference between the House and Senate proposals was the House~s Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Project (YIEPP), a program designed to bring dropouts back into school and prevent others from dropping out by guaranteeing a job on the con- ditions of school and job performance. Despite a lack of clarity about the demonstration programs, the Senate conceded to the House's approach. The Conference Report, which stated the terms of compromise between the House and Senate versions of the bill, used the House language in stating that the purpose of the law was the "establishment of pilot, demonstration and experimental programs to test the efficacy of different ways of dealing with the problem of youth unemployment;" however, the report also stipulated that the statement of purpose contain language "specifying that a variety of employment and training programs, as well as demonstration programs, are authorized" (U.S. Congress, 1977:35~. Thus, Congress avoided conflict between the two fairly distinct approaches by adopting both, i.e., research and demonstration together with new and large- scale service programs. Several less contentious issues, representing the interests of both the Senate and the House, were addressed in the compromise bill: increased cooperation, through the YIEPP (entitlement program) and a

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72 joint CETA-education set-aside between the CETA and educational systems as a means of addressing the dropout problem; involvement of labor organizations in youth programs, in particular in developing and restructuring job classifications, as a means of preventing wage and job displacement of adult workers by youth programs; involvement of community-based organizations (CBOs) and other local, state, and nationally organized groups in the planning and delivery of YEDPA programs, as a means of maintaining constituency support in the CETA system; and involvement of other federal agencies in the administration of YEDPA programs as a means of coordinating diverse federal activities around the youth employment issue. In its final form the YEDPA legislation was an assemblage of the many and somewhat divergent congressional interests from which it originated. It charged the Department of Labor with two functions: conduct research and demonstration projects in coordination with diverse federal, state, and local organizations, in order to find out what methods work best for youths; and, at the same time, to mount large-scale new programs to meet the immediate employment needs of youths. YEDPA provided substantial resources and discretionary authority; specification of whom to serve, but little guidance as to how; and a one-year time limit. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF YEDPA NATIONALLY Several conditions that characterized the CETA system during the period of YEDPA implementation and early operations strained the capability of the system nationally and locally to both administer regular CETA programs and mount the new YEDPA programs. These con- ditions also limited what could reasonably be expected from YEDPA's rather ambitious research and demonstration agenda. The passage of YEDPA in 1977 represented a reversal of the control of employment and training programs granted to local prime sponsors 4 years earlier. With the enactment of CETA in 1973, Congress had effectively turned federal employment and training programs over to local control by changing from categorical to block-grant funding. This grant of authority to states and localities was reinforced in other federal programs as categorical programs were switched to block grants. The YEDPA legislation, with its increased program requirements and target group specifications, challenged this (relatively new) control of local prime sponsors over which parts of the youth population to serve and how. It also significantly increased their workload as new reporting requirements for these programs were imposed on a system geared to different requirements. In addition to the YEDPA mandate to serve specific target groups of youths, which many considered a recategorization of youth services, YEDPA required that prime sponsors also maintain services to youth participants in regular CETA programs at their previously established levels. Many state and local administrators perceived this effective increase in services to youths as disproportionate when other subgroups were also in need of services. Although YEDPA substantially increased

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73 resources at the local level, it also increased federal management, through program and reporting requirements, and reduced local flexibil- ity in determining the allocation of services to various target groups. The net effects at the local level were increased competition between YEDPA and regular CETA resources and a burdening of the system as it tried to manage two types of programs with different administrative and operating requirements. At the same time that YEDPA was being implemented, CETA prime spon- sors were facing another new demand. As noted above, the President's emergency economic stimulus package had substantially increased CETA's Public Service Employment {PSE) Program, more than doubling the number of public service jobs. Locally, the management demands of PSE competed with YEDPA and regular CETA for limited staff time and resources. Nationally, PSE created an image of CETA as a public jobs program, dwarfing the less visible training programs, and subsequently, because of various reports of fraud and abuse in the PSE program, damaged support for CETA in general. These conditions prevailed through the first year of YEDPA operations and as the 1978 CETA reauthorization proceedings began in Congress. At the same time, the administration's focus on the PSE program and welfare reform had effectively pushed YEDPA into the background at the Department of Labor. It was not until late 1978, after the demise of the Carter welfare reform proposal and the public outcries over misuse of PSE funds, that youth employment came into public focus. Then, with YEDPA already under way, the President created the Vice President's Task Force on Youth Employment, giving the issue top domestic priority for the 1980 election. This dramatic shift in the administration's focus on youth employment was to have signifi- cant effects on the administration of YEDPA, particularly on the research and demonstration activities, which were expected to inform the Vice President's Task Force in its 1980 report to Congress. YEDPA Expenditures and Participation YEDPA mandated four new programs and expansion of the two existing CETA youth programs, the Job Corps and Summer Youth Employment Program. In 1978, three of the four new programs, the Youth Employment and Training Programs, the Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Projects, and the Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects were reauthorized as an amendment to Title IV of CETA, along with the Job Corps and SYEP. Under the Office of Youth Programs, which had been created in the Employment and Training Administration to administer youth programs, the Job Corps and SYEP were incorporated in the YEDPA effort. The Young Adult Conservation Corps, which was reauthorized under Title VIIT because it was not directed principally at disadvantaged youths and because of its operation by other federal agencies, remained separate from the larger YEDPA effort. Each of these youth programs represented a different approach to the problem of youth employment and included programs and services designed to meet the needs of the particular youth groups. Table 3.1

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75 TABLE 3.2 YEDPA Expenditures and Participants Year Expenditures Participants (in millions) (in thousands) 1978 1979 980 1981 Total $1,465 2,048 2,330 2,294 $8,137 1,558 1,546 1,551 1,389 6,043 SOURCE: Data from U.S. Department of Labor (1979, 1980, 1981, 1982~. describes the target group, program approach, and administration of each of these youth programs. Table 3.2 shows YEDPA expenditures and the number of youths served from fiscal 1978 through the termination of YEDPA in 1981. As shown in Table 3.2, outlays increased substantially every year, peaking in 1980, while enrollments were steady until 1981 when YEDPA programs were being terminated. By themselves, the YEDPA outlays and participant levels describe a rise and fall in activity level as expected over the lifetime of a program. When measured against the CETA totals for the same period, however, it is apparent that over its lifetime YEDPA accounted for an increasing share of employment and training activities. Table 3.3 compares federal outlays for all CETA titles with those for YEDPA during the same years. As total CETA expenditures declined, YEDPA outlays increased, from 16 percent of the total in 1978 to 30 percent TABLE 3.3 YEDPA Expenditures Compared With Total CETA Expenditures Year CETA (billions) YEDPA Billions Percentage 1978 $9.5 $1.5 16 1979 9.4 2.0 21 1980 8.9 2.3 26 1981 7.7 2.3 30 SOURCE: Data from U.S. Department of Labor (1979, 1980, 1981, 1982~.

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76 TABLE 3.4 Comparison of Total and Youth Participants in Employment and Training Programs Participants Total Youths Year (millions) Millions Percentage 1978 4.3 2.2 51.2 1979 4.0 2.5 62.5 1980 3.6 2.3 63.9 1981 2.9 2.0 69.0 SOURCE: Data from U.S. Department of Labor (1979, 1980, 1981, 1982). in 1981. Similarly, YEDPA participants accounted for an increasing share of program participants, from 37 percent in 1978 to 48 percent in 1981. When the number of youths served in adult-oriented CETA programs is added to the totals for the youth-only programs (the four YEDPA programs, Job Corps, and the Summer Youth Employment Program), the percentage of employment and training slots allocated to youths becomes even larger. Table 3.4 compares the total number of participants (adults and youths) in all titles with the total number of youths in all titles. During the YEDPA period, the number of youths as a Percentage of total participants increased from 51 percent in 1978 to 69 percent in 1981; the majority of these youths, 60-70 percent, were enrolled in YEDPA programs. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show expenditure and participant levels, respectively, for each of the six youth programs for fiscal 1978 through fiscal 1981. In the four new YEDPA programs, outlays almost doubled from 1978 to 1979 and peaked in 1979 and 1980. Participation in the same programs increased more gradually, but also peaked in 1979 and 1980, except for YACC, which had increased participation through 1981 (even though it had been scheduled in 1980 for a 1982 termination due to problems in implementation and placement). Increased outlays for the Job Corps under YEDPA were aimed at doubling the enrollment by fiscal 1978 to 88,000. This objective was achieved in fiscal 1979, with continued expansion of services through 1981. The summer program, which had served 1 million youths in fiscal 1977 with additional economic stimulus package funds, reached its all-time peak of more than 1 million in 1978. In the same year, educational enrichment of the summer program began, funded with discretionary money and governors' grants. , _ _ _ , _ _ _ , _ _ _ ~-

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77 TABLE 3 . 5 Outlays for Federal Youth Employment Programs, Fiscal 1978-1981 (in millions) Fiscal YearYETPYCCIPYIEPPYACC Job Corps SYEP 1978 $ 294 $ 61 $ 32 $ 719$ 280$ 670 1979 556 103 77 273380660 1980 695 122 88 234470721 1981 719 a a 174465769 Total $2,264 $4l0b $24ob $1,400$1,595$2,820 aExpenditures for YCCIP and YIEPP were reported jointly for 1981 at $167 million. bThe totals for YCCIP and YIEPP assume that $43 million of the $167 million from 1981 went to YIEPP and the remaining $124 million to YCCIP This assumption is based on separate budget sources stating that total outlays for YIEPP for all fiscal years were $240 million (Gueron, 1984) SOURCE: Data from U.S. Department of Labor (1979, 1980, 1981, 19821. Discretionary and Demonstration Projects The Office of Youth Programs (GYP) emphasized research and demonstration as an integral part of YEDPA program operations as a means of exploring various program approaches and testing their relative effectiveness. The amounts of money to be allocated to the entitlement demonstration and to other discretionary research and demonstration activity was specified in rather complicated formulas in the YEDPA legislation (Elmore, in this volume). Based on these formulas the Office of Youth Programs structured its knowledge development plans. In fiscal 1978 and 1979, $437.3 million was allocated to discretionary demonstration and research activities, $222.2 million to the entitlement project, and $215.1 million to other discretionary projects (YETP , YCCIP , and SYEP) and research (U.S. Department of Labor, 1980a). Although the discretionary projects emphasized research and evaluation, according to GYP most of the discretionary money was spent for the direct provision of programs and services to youths (U.S. Department of Labor, 1980a). In 1979 and 1980, 78 percent of the discretionary money was for programs and services; 6 percent was for technical assistance and linkages to support those programs; 1 percent was for the evaluation of regular youth programs (i.e., Job Corps and SYEP); 7 percent was for the evaluation of the demonstration projects; and 7 percent was for basic research on youth employment problems.

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78 TABLE 3.6 Participation in Federal Youth Employment Programs (in thousands) Fiscal Year YETP YCCIP YIEPPa YACC Job Corps SYEP 1978359.228.736.8 51.9 72.01,009.3 1979413.638.553.4 67.2 85.0888.0 1980463.043.050.0 66.5 103.8825.0 1981393.7bb 68.0 114.4774.0 Total1,629.5125.6C163.0C 253.6 375.23,496.3 NOTE: Participation is defined as the total number served in each fiscal year, not new enrollees served; figures include participants carried over from the previous year. aA total of 76,000 youths were served in YIEPP between March 1978 and August 1980. Figures shown above include carry-overs. bParticipation for YCCIP and YIEPP was reported jointly for 1981 at 38,400. CTotals for YCCIP and YIEPP assume that 23,000 of the 38,400 participants enrolled in 1981 were enrolled in YIEPP, and the remaining 15,400 in YCCIP. The 23,000 figure is based on Gueron (1984). SOURCE: Data from U.S. Department of Labor (1979, 1980, 1981, 1982). A 1985 accounting of actual expenditures for YEDPA activities indicates that the total for discretionary program operations and research was $628 million. Table 3.7 shows these expenditures by fiscal year. Overall, nearly 15 percent ($92.2 million) was for research activities, and 85 percent was for program operations (including technical assistance); these proportions are the same as those reported by GYP in 1980. In 1978, when the majority of discretionary projects were initiated, more than 60 major demonstrations were funded in about 300 sites. The continued funding of these same projects accounted for the majority of discretionary activity through the next 3 years. YIEPP alone accounted for $240 million of the $628 million in discretionary and demonstration expenditures. In fiscal 1978 and 1979 the planned budget for YETP demonstrations totaled $135 million. The major YETP demonstration projects included an exemplary in-school youth demonstration, several career exploration and development projects, two planned variations of program approaches and service mixes, two major private sector projects, and a community service project as an alternative to regular work experience. The YCCIP budget plan for demonstrations during the same period totaled $47 million. Major projects included three conservation and community improvement projects operated through various local community organizations, two housing projects, and four projects focused on improvements in railroads, dams, -

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79 TABLE 3.7 YEDPA Expenditures for Discretionary Program Operations and Research by Fiscal Year (in millions) Fiscal Year Operations ResearchTotal 1977-1978 $ 56.456 $ 0.418$56.874 1979 60.386 11.32371.709 1980 84.205 18.563102.768 1981 81.198 46.002127.200 1982 28.864 028.864 YIEPPa 1978-1981 $224.3 $15.9$240.2 Total $535.409 $92.206$627.615 aExpenditures for YIEPP provided by Gueron (1984~. SOURCE: Data provided by the Office of Information Resources Management, Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, April 1985. and agriculture e Discretionary funds were also used for the SYEP enrichment projects. In 1978 and 1979 planned budgets for these totaled $34 million and supported career orientation and educational activities for summer youths .2 Of the 60 major demonstrations initiated in 1978 and 1979, 22 were operated through agreements with six other federal agencies: ACTION, the Community Services Agency, the National Institute of Education, and the Departments of Energy; Health, Education, and Welfare (now Health and Human Services); and Housing and Urban Development. Budgets for these projects totaled $48.8 million (see Table 3.8~. The major interagency agreement in terms of total budget was YACC, operated jointly by the Departments of Interior and Agriculture and totaling $820 million. Because of its operational independence from the 2 The figures presented here are based on the planned expenditures for these activities as described in the youth knowledge development report, Knowledge Development Activities for Fiscal Years 1978 and 1979 (U.S. Department of Labor, 1980~. With the exception of YIEPP and total fiscal year expenditures as presented in Table 3.7, a precise accounting of actual expenditures for individual discretionary projects is not available.

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88 youth programs. Even these agencies, however, have had difficulties in recruiting dropouts; and even when they have been successful in recruit- ment, they have had difficulties in actually enrolling and then serving dropouts. Many CBOs, by tradition, have provided specialized services (e.g., skills training, career exploration, and basic education) for certain target groups (e.g., women, refugees, and ethnic minorities) and were used in reaching those target populations. Like the schools, however, the goals of the CBOs at times diverged from those of the YEDPA programs, causing similar implementation problems. The CBO-run Career Intern Program, for instance, found few dropouts willing to participate in their alternative education program; many youths indicating their preference for a faster Graduate Equivalency Diploma (GED) program. The involvement of other federal agencies in youth employment, as mandated by YEDPA, did not occur at the local level to the same degree that collaboration with schools and CBOs did. With the exception of demonstration projects funded under interagency agreements, about which little is known due to lack of evaluations of program impact, there were only scattered examples of efforts to involve other units of local government (e.g., welfare and juvenile service agencies) in youth programs. The role of another part of the Department of Labor, the Employment Service, for instance, was limited. With the exception of Project STEADY, which was designed and operated by the Employment Service to provide assessment services to youths, the local offices did little more than refer job seekers to CETA programs and verify the eligibility of CETA applicants. The Employment Service has traditionally been viewed as a means of recruiting out-of-school youths, but its role or overall effectiveness in providing this service for YEDPA is not known. The repeated failures of programs to reach the dropout population explains the general tendency of programs designed to serve dropouts to redirect their efforts to more easily recruited in-school youths identified as potential dropouts. Although this approach may prevent some youths from dropping out, it does not address the needs of those who already have. The emphasis on in-school youths also fits the historical trend of employment and training programs to serve this more reachable target group and to orient its programs to them. The Economic and Racial Isolation of Youth Employment Programs Another problem faced by prime sponsors in the recruitment of YEDPA participants was the strict income eligibility requirement and the image it created of YEDPA as a poverty program, and by association in many urban areas, a black program. One consequence, particularly in areas where school integration had created friction, was the difficulty of recruiting white youths. The participation patterns in the entitlement program illustrate

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89 the influence of several other factors on program participation and reinforce the findings of other YEDPA programs that participation is higher among in-school than out-of-school youths and higher among blacks and Hispanics than among whites. These patterns appear to be influenced by the job and program alternatives available to those youths, the amount and type of recruitment, and the image of the programs in those communities. The higher participation of blacks than Hispanics in part reflects the alternatives available to these two groups in their local com- munities. In the entitlement program areas, eligible Hispanics had higher employment rates and lower school enrollment rates than did blacks; in-school blacks, who had fewer employment opportunities, tended to enroll in the entitlement program, while out-of-school Hispanics had more alternatives for employment outside the program. The low participation of white youths, and the difficulty of some programs in recruiting them, is a function of the coincidence of race and eligibility criteria. . . . . . . . The fact that the entitlement program had stricter Income el~g'n~ty requirements (i.e., generally required lower family income) than other YEDPA programs resulted in a large concentration of minorities in the eligible population. In addition, in those sites where the entire city was not the focus of the entitlement program, existing residential segregation combined with the requirement of residency in the entitlement area to increase the minority racial and ethnic character of the eligible pool. Thus, even if the programs were as attractive to white as to black or Hispanic youths, the latter groups would have represented a substantial share of participants in many areas and a majority in some (e.g., Baltimore and Detroit). These situations were exacerbated by the image of these programs as black poverty programs. Attempts to test the effects on these programs of economic isolation by mixing participants of various income levels, as in the Mixed Income Demonstration, were frustrated by difficulties in recruiting sufficient numbers of nondisadvantaged youths. In summary, several general points emerge from the evidence on targeting and recruitment. First, the criterion of economic disad- vantage is increasingly difficult to implement at the increasingly disadvantaged levels. Second, many of these programs tend to recruit and enroll more in-school than out-of-school, particularly dropout, youths, partly because dropouts are outside the established education and social service network and therefore are difficult to reach, and partly because many youth program operators have historically geared their services to in-school youths and resist adjusting to other groups. Those programs that did enroll large numbers of dropouts generally experienced higher turnover of participants and underspent their funds, indicating that a workable approach to serving the dropout population had not been found. Third, it appears that targeting programs to economically disadvantaged youths tends to isolate those programs socially, racially, and economically, perhaps limiting their effectiveness.

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go Task 3: Staffing and Organizing Program Activities Staffing The quality and stability of program staff are important factors in the operation of youth programs. Numerous program evaluations cite staff characteristics as contributing to program success and program failure. Although quantitative data are not abundant, conventional wisdom and the observations of program personnel and evaluators alike suggest the important role played by the staff in programs in which personal motivation and morale are critical to participants' success. The summer program is an example of improvement in program quality when the quality of the work-site supervision is enhanced. The staffing of youth programs has been constrained by the instabil- ity of funding and the isolation of the programs from mainstream social institutions. Staff positions in employment and training programs have characteristically been low paying and offer limited opportunity for advancement. Given such conditions, it has been difficult to recruit and retain quality staff. These characteristics, plus the limited duration of many youth projects, have created high turnover in both prime sponsor and program operator staff, which in turn create a program environment of discontinuity and impermanence. Several case studies cite staff turnover in excess of 50 percent and others note the complete turnover of top administrative staff (Taggart, 1980~. Program Activities The formula-funded programs operated under YEDPA, YETP, and YCCIP were organized and implemented much as they had been under regular CETA youth programs. The time pressure under which programs were started and the YEDPA requirement that funds be given to programs with "demonstrated effectiveness" reinforced prime sponsors' reliance on established programs and providers, a reliance that case study reports suggest was warranted (National Council on Employment Policy, 1980b, 1980c). Other, more basic problems with these program operations, however, included the restriction of work activities imposed by the Davis-Bacon Act. This law, written to prevent the displacement of unionized workers by nonunion workers, requires that construction workers employed under federally funded projects be paid union wage rates even if they are not union members. This provision effectively limited the activities allowed in work programs, sometimes adversely affecting their quality. Restrictions on the allowable use of employment and training funds created another limitation. YCCIP projects, for instance, were supposed to employ youths in community improvement and conservation projects, but there were no funds for supplies or equipment so programs had to obtain supplemental funds from other local sources. Placement of youths in private businesses was not to involve any work that would contribute to the profit of the firm, which made it difficult to provide youths with meaningful work. The requirement that YACC projects not contribute

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91 to tasks that the federal agency would have done at its own expense meant that those tasks were, like the tasks in private businesses, of low priority. These requirements presented challenges that were met with varying degrees of success. Some of the demonstration projects provide examples of the effects of restrictions on program operations. In one YCCIP demonstration project, Ventures in Community Improvement (VICI), funds for supplies and equipment were obtained from local sources, with such success that five of the eight VICI sites continued operations with local support after YEDPA funds were gone. A study of the involvement of private business in the entitlement program (YIEPP) found that the higher the quality of work, the higher the displacement of nonsubsidized workers, suggesting the inconsistency between the provision that jobs not be make-work and the Davis-Bacon no-displacement requirement. The involvement of private businesses in youth programs met with mixed success. The entitlement program (YTEPP) recruited nearly 6,000 businesses as work sponsors, representing 55 percent of all work spon- sors (public and private) participating and 20 percent of youth job hours. However, even when offered a full subsidy at the minimum wage and relieved of overhead costs, only 18 percent of the employers sampled in a survey of private businesses (Ball et al., 1981) would agree to accept an entitlement program youth. At a 75 percent wage subsidy, the agree-to-participate rate dropped to 10 percent, and at a 50 percent subsidy it dropped to 5 percent. On the whole, however, the employers in the entitlement program reported satisfaction with the youths placed with them, and one in five hired that person after the subsidy ended. The Corporate Career Demonstration Project, on the other hand, which was to train youths in corporate careers through placement in entry-level positions in participating businesses, could not recruit youths of the appropriate skill level for the program. The private employers were unwilling to participate when the participants' lack of basic skills became apparent. Task 4: Assessing Participant Needs and Matching Them to Program Services There are two basic ways of assessing needs and prescribing services for youths: according to their membership in broadly defined groups or as particular individuals. The first method considers such characteristics as age, school status, or family status (e.g., motherhood). These categories may then be connected to broad categories of program components suited in general to members of the group--providing skills training, for example, to groups of older youths, with or without particular services, such as child care. Distinctions among these groups of people can be made on the basis of objective characteristics and appropriate assignment can be made routinely. This was perhaps the predominant method of assessing needs in YEDPA, particularly in the formula-funded programs. The second method, based on individual needs, considers such issues as educational deficiencies, career aptitudes and interests, and social, family, or

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92 legal problems. Obviously, mechanisms to assess such individual needs require more resources. Because of planning and funding schedules in CETA, target-group needs were assessed prior to recruitment and enrollment of participants. Individual needs assessment, when available, was provided after enroll- ment and usually by a smaller program operator subcontracted for this service. There is little evidence that prime sponsors designed services to meet the individually assessed needs of participants, probably because initial funding decisions tended to lock in specific services prior to such assessments. It was possible, however, to use individual needs assessments to assign participants to available program and service options. Under YEDPA the assessment of individual participant needs was generally restricted to demonstration programs, there being little provision for such services in formula-funded programs. Some of the Project STEADY sites, Project Redirection, and the Consolidated Youth Employment Demonstration Project are examples of YEDPA demonstration projects that offered such services. In these cases the individual assessments took the form of "employability development plans" and prescriptions for various programs and support services tailored to the individual. One source reports that in the Consolidated Youth Employment Project the more complete assessment practices did not affect how services were provided or who was given what services (Hahn and Lerman, 1983~. There is a general lack of evidence as to the effectiveness of individual needs assessment in terms of participant outcomes. For in-school youths, individual needs are probably most closely related to their educational situation and best handled by the schools themselves. Attempts at assessing individual career interests of in-school youths for the purpose of placement in work experience, for instance, is probably premature for this age group (Osterman, 1980b), and it is costly to operate beyond a limited scale. For out-of-school youths, however, individual assessments of educa- tional and employment needs appear to be more important and potentially have more payoff. With the exception of the Job Corps, however, there were no major efforts under YEDPA to provide such individual services. YCCIP, for instance, which served largely out-of-school youths, was an unadorned work program with no provision for such extra services. Task 5: Monitoring Quality of Programs and Services The Department of Labor continually exhorted prime sponsors to be attentive to the quality of programs, in particular as indicated by project size and number of supervisors. Case study reports of the formula-funded programs (National Council on Employment Policy, 1980b, 1980c) suggest that the overall quality of work experience under YEDPA was better than it had been in earlier youth programs. Evaluations of the entitlement program also indicated that the quality of work experi- ences in the opinion of evaluators, supervisors, and participants was generally good.

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93 This general improvement in work quality during YEDPA in comparison with earlier CETA programs was due largely to a 1979 report (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1979) on the summer youth program and the extensive monitoring of programs that followed. The report cited numerous problems in the summer program, notably the poor quality of program and the report cited the summer program, notably the poor quality of supervision, the meaningless make-work jobs to which the youths were assigned, and the failure of work site supervisors to require attendance as a condition of payment. The public outcries caused by this report prompted the creation of an extensive monitoring system involving national and regional offices, prime sponsors and program operators, and the establishment of standards for work site supervision, quality of work assignment, and time and attendance procedures. The sustained pressure from the national office on local programs to establish and enforce standards of quality in program operations and the capacity for self-evaluation that it created were important contributions to the youth employment and training system. YEDPA RESEARCH: THE YOUTH KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT PLAN The YEDPA research agenda, known as the youth knowledge development plan, was designed and administered by the national Office of Youth Programs and implemented through agreements with local CETA prime sponsors and contracts with various public and private research agents and ~intermediaries." This effort consisted of various demonstration projects and of research and evaluation studies of them and of some formula-funded programs. Two major factors constrained the design and conduct of YEDPA research activities: first, the competing demand, both nationally and locally, to mount four new youth programs, at roughly double the level of previous funding, within the extremely short time limits imposed by the initial 1-year congressional authorization; and then, second, the demands of the Vice President's Task Force on Youth Employment for the results of the YEDPA research. This section describes how, operating under these constraints, GYP first designed the knowledge development plan and then implemented it. Design of the Plan The YEDPA legislation provided the Department of Labor and its new Office of Youth Programs with a mandate to test the relative efficacy of different methods of dealing with the employment problems of young Americans. The legislative concern with learning what works for whom was consistent with the frequently stated contention that decades of federal funding for similar programs had not yielded much in the way of reliable knowledge. The YEDPA research plan was designed as a sys- tematic exploration and assessment of alternatives for meeting the goal of knowledge development. The 1978 Employment and Training Report of the President (U.S. _ Department of Labor, 1978:77) noted that despite nnumerous public

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94 policy initiatives over the decade from 1963 to 1973, youth unemploy.- ment remained at the same high levels that had led to the creation of programs for youths in the early 1960s. Among the factors cited as possible explanations was that The rapid expansion of program initiatives hampered program planning, smooth implementation, and thorough evaluation. n The commentary on the research conducted prior to YEDPA was quite specific in its catalog of shortcomings {U.S. Department of Labor, 1978:79~: Researchers are not unanimous in their conclusions about the effectiveness of employment and training programs because many evaluations have been imperfectly designed, lacked sufficient followup data, or were unsuccessful in isolating program effects from other factors. The failure to find a suitably matched control group, whose earnings and job success could be compared with those of enrollees . . . flawed at least one major cost-benefit study. A major review (Perry et al., 1975) of 252 evaluations of employ- ment and training programs conducted under the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 and the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 indicated that the problems associated with evaluation research were not unique to youth programs. This review found that the majority of employment evaluation studies were little more than descriptive analyses of program operations and of the characteristics of enrollees, with little postprogram follow-up data. Moreover, fewer than 1 in 10 of the evaluation reports used a control group and "in almost every case in which a control group was used there were valid reasons to question the comparability of the controls and the treatment group" {Perry et al., 1975:139~. These authors concluded that although there were a large number of evaluations of government employment programs in the 1960s and early 1970s, "few [were] very useful as a reliable base of information from which to draw firm conclusions regarding [their] economic impact. . . ." (p. 138~. Familiar with these shortcomings, the designers of the first OYP knowledge development plan identified the potential snares and basic limitations of the planes efforts (U.S. Department of Labor, 1980c:5-7~: First, new programs take time to jell. . . . What initial studies can do is identify who is enrolled, the services they receive, the immediate outcome on termination, and the "correctable" operational problems. . . . They can indicate the practicality of some designs. . . . [But] they cannot efforts to track _ considerable time. is with even ten vears for determine long-run impacts. Second ~ postprogram effects on participants require . . . Particularly for youth, the concern longer-run impacts. It takes from five to ten years for the "lasting" effects to surface, as youths mature into adult workers. Third, estimation of the impacts on participants requires a comparison group to indicate what would have happened otherwise. . . . Development and tracking of a

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95 comparison group is technically difficult, costly, and often has not yielded reliable results. . . . Fourth, cost-benefit analyses to determine if benefits of programs expressed in monetary terms exceed the costs, are attractive in principle but difficult in practice. This premonition of the snares awaiting such research enterprises was, as the following chapters document, fully borne out. YEDPA's initial research plan was based on eight questions, posed by GYP in response to the structure of the YEDPA legislation and its funding formula (U.S. Department of Labor, 1980c): . Does subsidized employment help youths complete their schooling and does increased schooling increase the employability of potential dropouts and the disadvantaged? Can the school-to-work transition process be improved? What work experiences are worthwhile and meaningful for youths? Does structured, disciplined work experience have a different impact on the employment prospects of youths than other types of employment services? Are there better ways of delivering employment and training services to youths than those now in use? To what extent do short-term interventions yield longer term results (e.g., on employment in adulthood)? What works best for whom? What are the costs of fully employing youths? Though revised and expanded over time (see Elmore, in this volume) these eight questions, vague and imprecise as they are, remained as the essential issues of the YEDPA research effort. A later plan describes how specific demonstration projects were designed in response to these basic questions, but it provides no overall framework specifying research design, methodology, standards, or procedures for drawing together the rather disparate pieces of research to address the major research issues. The YEDPA research strategy was criticized from the beginning as overly complex and ambitious; over time, rather than evolving toward a clarification of major problems and solutions, it became even more complex, with changing program designs, research issues and methods, and expectations of results. The knowledge development plan was based on a developmental management view of research and evaluation--as a tool for instituting new programs and then shaping and monitoring them as they developed. Early studies were to focus primarily on process and project imple- mentation data. As weaknesses in program design or procedures were discovered, adaptations were to be made to improve the programs. As programs evolved, their objectives, expected outcomes, and evaluations were to be changed. This developmental approach to research and program operations, although it complicated the research agenda and tended to make interpretation of results more difficult, served an important management function for GYP as it undertook the administra- tion of the enormous youth employment program. Unfortunately, in many

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96 projects the formative evaluation process was not completed before YEDPA was terminated. Implementation of the Plan One of the major problems in implementing the knowledge development plan was the sheer magnitude of the effort in relation to the size of the OYP staff. The demands of mounting expanded and new service programs for youths along with the design and implementation of a complex research program necessitated a tradeoff between careful research design and rapid project implementation to maximize economic impact. This pressure was intensified by the expectation that some results would be available in time for the CETA reauthorization proceedings in late 1978. The subsequent and equally unrealistic expectation of more detailed research results by the fall of 1979 to inform the Vice President's Task Force on Youth Employment served to maintain the time pressure throughout the course of YEDPA operations. The feasibility of the research effort was perhaps doubtful from the outset even under the most generous assumptions of staff time and capability: however, the OYP staff was small in relation to the size of the effort and also for the most part inexperienced in research and research management a These constraints, together with the legislative charge to involve other federal agencies and community-based organiza- tions in YEDPA programs, led OYP to delegate the management of large pieces of YEDPA activity to organizations outside the Department of Labor. This strategy of indirect management involved five different types of negotiated agreements: with "intermediaries," other federal agencies, other parts of the Department of Labor, other organizations for staff support, and other organizations for constituency support. In addition to increasing OYP's staff capability in administering YEDPA, these arrangements were designed to expand the institutional capacity of the youth employment system for future programs. The background and functions of each of these organizational arrangements are described in detail in Elmore (in this volume) and summarized herein. Table 3.8 presents data on the program budgets and tasks administered through each arrangement. The intermediary agreements with four private nonprofit corpora- tions were negotiated for the design, management, and evaluation of various demonstration projects. The agreement with the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, a previously established firm, to manage the entitlement demonstration program, served as the model. Three other intermediaries were created to manage the private sector youth employment demonstrations, the exemplary programs to link school and work, and, through an interagency agreement with the Community Services Agency (CSA), demonstrations of youth-run enterprises. Interagency agreements were negotiated with several federal agencies to meet congressional expectations of broader government involvement in solving youth employment problems. Projects funded through ACTION; CSA; and the Departments of Housing and Urban Development; Health,

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97 Education, and Welfare; Agriculture; Energy; and Interior were designed to meet youth employment objectives through means compatible with each agency. Intraagency projects managed by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy, Evaluation, and Research (ASPER) and by the Office of Policy Evaluation and Research (OPER) brought the expertise of established Department of Labor research units into the YEDPA effort and incorporated a YEDPA sample into the established Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey and a youth sample into the National Longitudinal Survey (see Chapter 9 and Appendix D). External staff support was provided primarily through the Brandeis University Center for Employment and Income Studies (CEIS), which was responsible for the analysis, dissemination, and policy utilization of the research findings. (CEIS subsequently became part of the uni- versity's Center for Human Resources.) In responding to its first charge, CEIS criticized the knowledge development plan for its complex- ity and lack of coherent framework, criticisms that the results of YEDPA research suggest were warranted, but which unfortunately were unheeded. Their role in the retrieval, synthesis, and dissemination of YEDPA research was more effectively executed and became critical in the closing days of YEDPA when OYP was disbanded before the research was complete. Another important external support function was to have been provided by the Educational Testing Service, for the design and analysis of a national YEDPA data base. The data were generated by application of the Standard Assessment System, a battery of instruments administered to participants and program operators to measure the effectiveness of YEDPA across sites and programs (see Chapter 9 and Appendix A). Results of many of the youth projects funded through agreements with outside agencies are unknown. Only two of the four intermediaries produced reports on program effectiveness that this committee could use in its review. The vast majority of projects funded under interagency agreements were not evaluated. The intraagency projects, particularly those that supported national data bases, were among the most successful of the knowledge development activities in terms of their methodological rigor. Overall, this management structure, although effective in quickly initiating programs and research activities on a large scale, was too decentralized to manage the direction of the programs effectively or to analyze the research activities in a coherent way. Given the level of responsibility and authority delegated to the various parties, it is not surprising that they became almost immune to centralized control of their operations. And, given the overload at the center, it is not surprising that OYP could not maintain control in response to problems arising in various parts of the structure. Toward the end of YEDPA, but prior to the completion of many projects and their research reports, the central control literally fell apart, first with the resignation of the director of OYP and later with the disbanding of OYP under the new Reagan administration. It was at that point, with many project reports

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98 outstanding, that CEIS assumed its critical role in retrieving, synthesizing, and disseminating the research. SUGARY The conditions under which YEDPA was implemented, in terms of its legislative mandates, its time schedules, and the program and policy environment in which it operated, were significant in determining the course of YEDPA programs and the outcomes of its research. From its legislative beginnings, YEDPA was constrained by two competing demands: to mount four new, large-scale jobs programs and, at the same time and through the same delivery system, to design and conduct a comprehensive research and demonstration effort aimed at ameliorating the structural employment problems of youths. ~ it_ _ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ 4 ! ~ ~ ~ Tne Imposition or one research ana aemonscraclon act Ul1 C11= already burdened service delivery system taxed the resources available for both the national management and local operation of YEDPA. The additional pressure to launch these programs and obtain research results within 1 and 2 years, respectively, of the passage of YEDPA further increased the pressures of implementation. consequences of all of these conditions for YEDPA program operations and research, though not quantifiable, were readily apparent in the numerous reports reviewed by this committee in its task of assessing _ The conditions characterizing the implementa- tion of YEDPA from its start in 1977 through its abrupt halt in 1981 were described here to provide readers with a context for better understanding the results of our review of the effectiveness of the YEDPA programs, which we present in the chapters that follow. The severe program effectiveness.