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OCR for page 50
4
The Effect of Welfare on
Marriage and Fertility
Robert A. Moffitt
The research literature on the effects of welfare on marriage and fertility
contains a large number of studies over the last 30 years. The studies use a
variety of methodologies, employ several different datasets with different types
of individuals, and cover different time periods. Several studies were conducted
in the 1970s and early 1980s, but there has been a second wave of studies begin-
ning in the mid-1980s and still under way. Based on the early studies, a consen-
sus among researchers developed a decade or so ago that the welfare system had
no effect on these demographic outcomes. However, a majority of the newer
studies show that welfare has a significantly negative effect on marriage or a
positive effect on fertility rather than none at all. Because of this shift in findings,
the current consensus is that the welfare system probably has some effect on these
demographic outcomes.
However, there is considerable uncertainty surrounding this consensus be-
cause a significant minority of the studies finds no effect at all, because the
magnitudes of the estimated effects vary widely, and because there are puzzling
and unexplained differences across the studies by race and methodological ap-
proach. For example, the findings show considerably stronger effects for white
women than for black or nonwhite women, despite the greater participation rates
of the latter group in the welfare system. Also, the findings often differ when
demographic outcomes are correlated with welfare generosity in different ways-
variation in welfare benefits across states in a particular year, for example, versus
variation in welfare benefits over time. Whether the differences in study findings
are the result of inherent differences in different datasets or differences in the way
the data are analyzed for example, in estimating techniques, definitions of vari
50
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ROBERTA. MOFFIIT
51
ables, characteristics of the individuals examined, other influences controlled for,
and so on is difficult to determine because most authors do not systematically
attempt to determine why their findings differ from those of other studies.
This chapter summarizes the literature and discusses these differences across
studies. Because of the diversity of findings, methodological considerations nec-
essarily must be a major focus of the discussion. The first section provides
background on the U.S. welfare system and those aspects of its structure relevant
to marriage and fertility, and discusses the context of social science theories of
marriage and fertility in which the welfare system plays a role. The second
section outlines the different questions of interest and discusses those questions
that have been addressed in the research literature. The third section discusses
the methodological approach taken in the research literature toward the question
and contrasts the method of experimentation with the nonexperimental method of
using natural program variation. Broad trends in the United States on demo-
graphic outcomes and the welfare system are presented in the following section;
these trends establish a set of basic patterns in the data. The next section reviews
the multivariate research studies on the question, compares and contrasts their
approaches, and discusses possible reasons for the diversity of findings. Finally,
suggestions for future research are outlined in the last section.
BACKGROUND
The U.S. welfare system is currently undergoing major change as the result
of 1996 legislation, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Recon-
ciliation Act. However, because the research whose review is the main focus of
this chapter entirely concerns the welfare system prior to this legislation, only the
old system is described here. The relevance of this research to the future welfare
system is discussed in the last section.
Chapter 3 contains a discussion of the welfare system that provides a general
background. In this chapter, only the features of the system specific to marriage
and fertility are outlined.
The most well-known aspect of the welfare system bearing on marriage and
fertility is the set of of eligibility rules in the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) program that result in a high concentration of single mothers
among recipients, a relatively tiny fraction of married couples on the rolls, and no
families or individuals without children (single mothers are defined as women
with children under 18 in the household but no spouse or cohabiting partner
present). This feature is a result of the basic eligibility requirement, laid out in
the 1935 Social Security Act, which created the AFDC program, that the program
is intended to provide cash support only to children living without at least one of
their biological parents. Thus children for whom one parent has died are eligible,
but so are children whose parents never married but are living apart or whose
parents are divorced or separated. The mother, or other caretaker relative, is also
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52
THE EFFECT OF WELFARE ON MARRIAGE AND FERTILII Y
supported by the grant. Children who are living with both parents are eligible,
along with their parents, only for the AFDC-UP (unemployed parent) program,
but eligibility for those benefits has additional conditions requiring that at least
one parent be unemployed, that this parent have a significant history of employ-
ment, and that the family meet the same stringent income and asset requirements
as a single-parent family. As a result, AFDC-UP families constitute only a small
fraction of the AFDC caseload.]
The Food Stamp program provides food coupons to low-income families
regardless of family structure and hence does not have the same "bias" toward
single-parent families as does AFDC. Eligibility and benefits for the program are
based on the income and resources of a group of people who eat together, regard-
less of their relationship to each other. Thus two-parent as well as single-parent
families are eligible, although the fixed upper income and asset limits knock
more two-parent families than single-parent families out of eligibility.2 Single
individuals and childless families are also eligible.
The Medicaid program provides subsidized medical care assistance to poor
families. Historically it has been made available primarily to AFDC recipients
and therefore has the same bias toward single-parent families. However, in the
last decade, eligibility for Medicaid benefits has been greatly broadened to in-
clude children in poor families even if both parents are present and the family is
off AFDC. However, despite the growth of Medicaid recipients under these new
eligibility rules, the program is still disproportionately composed of single-parent
families.
Housing programs come in several different forms public housing as well
as subsidized private housing, for example and provide housing at below-mar-
ket rents to families with low income and assets. However, these programs are
distinguished from the other programs so far discussed by their nonentitlement
status. Expenditure allocations to local public housing authorities limit the
amount of funds available and therefore limit the number of recipients that can be
served. Eligible families who apply and are accepted but cannot be supported are
put on waiting lists that can be quite long (e.g., several years). To choose from
among the pool of eligibles, local housing authorities are required to give certain
groups priority over others (called "preferences". One of the preferred groups is
AFDC recipients. This, along with the fact that family income (per family
member) is lower among the single-parent population than the two-parent popu-
lation, results in a high fraction of single-parent families receiving housing ben-
efits. However, the preference is not absolute, and there have been been times in
1 The eligibility rules have many other important facets which space does not permit discussing,
especially rules governing eligibility of children living with cohabiting adults and whose caretaker
parent has remarried. For details on these rules, see Moffitt et al. (1998).
2AFDC recipient families are automatically eligible for Food Stamp benefits, so this also results in
a disproportionate number of single-parent families actually on the Food Stamp rolls.
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ROBERTA. MOFFITT
53
the history of the program when middle-income families were preferred, so there
are sizable representations of two-parent families in the housing program.
In summary, therefore, the conventional perception of the U.S. welfare sys-
tem as largely favoring single-parent families over two-parent families and child-
less couples and individuals is essentially correct.3 This favored treatment affects
incentives to marry as well as incentives to have children. Fertility incentives are
present in one additional way, however, which arises simply because benefits are
based on the number of children present in the family unit. Hence the monetary
cost of having an additional child is smaller in the presence of these welfare
programs than it would be in their absence.
That these marriage and fertility incentives may have an effect on behavior
can be understood both with common sense and from a variety of theoretical
perspectives. The most natural modern conceptual framework is the economic
theory of marriage and fertility as developed by Becker (1981) because that
model emphasizes the economic gains to marriage and the economic benefits and
costs of having children. However, one could easily understand incentives in-
duced by the welfare system without the formalization of the Beckerian theory,
for almost any framework in which economic factors play a role will predict that,
if all else is held fixed, a welfare system biased against marriage and toward
childbearing will change behavior in that direction (although the magnitude of
the effect can, of course, be large or small).
Although more complex theories can give different predictions, the only
simple economic theory that does so is that which conceptualizes single parent-
hood as an unlucky outcome of an attempt at marriage (or union formation in
general) and in which benefits play the role of insurance against that outcome.
Standard economic theories imply that government provision of such insurance-
welfare benefits would induce more individuals to attempt marriage in the same
way that providing insurance to protect checking accounts against bank failure
encourages individuals to put their money in banks. The difficulty with this way
of viewing the problem is that it ignores what is called the "moral hazard"
problem in insurance terminology the simple fact that individuals who are given
insurance have an incentive to put themselves more at risk or even to cause the
insured-against event to happen; this means, in the case of welfare and family
structure, simply that individuals have an incentive to take actions that lead,
directly or indirectly, to single motherhood as an outcome.
lit is worth noting, however, that any program that provides benefits on the basis of the income of
a family unit rather than the income of individuals will necessarily, and inherently, have at least a
minimal amount of bias toward single-parent families. If bias is defined as occurring when the
income gain to marrying, for example, is less in the presence of a government program than in its
complete absence, then a welfare program will be nonbiasing only if benefits are completely unaf-
fected if a single parent marries. But this violates the definition of a targeted transfer program,
namely, one that concentrates its benefits on those with lower income. This is an example of the
equity-efficiency economic principle.
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54
THE EFFECT OF WELFARE ON MARRIAGE AND FERTILITY
Welfare effects on marital and fertility behavior occur necessarily through
one of a fixed set of routes. An unmarried childless woman entering adulthood
may have an child out of wedlock, for example, and welfare may affect the
probability of this outcome. She may later marry and possibly have additional
children within marriage, but then separate or divorce, returning to a state of
single motherhood; welfare may also affect the likelihood of this outcome. Alter-
natively, she may have married and begun childbearing within marriage but then
divorce or separate, which is a different path to the same eventual outcome. Once
divorced or separated, she may have additional children out of wedlock; and she
may or may not remarry. Both of these behaviors may be affected by the pres-
ence of welfare and the level of benefits.
Whether welfare is more likely to influence some of these behaviors than
others is an empirical matter, but it is often argued on intuitive grounds that some
"routes" to single motherhood are more likely to be affected than others. For
example, it is often argued that an unmarried woman's second and subsequent
out-of-wedlock births may be more influenced by welfare benefits, especially if
the woman is already on welfare, than the first birth because the latter is more
likely to be "unintended" and because awareness of welfare is less acute before a
woman has been on welfare. It is also often argued that divorce and separation
are likely to be less affected by welfare than remarriage probabilities, because
divorce and separation are heavily influenced by other factors most notably,
whether the marital "match" is a good one while remarriage is (so it is argued)
more subject to rational calculation. These notions are useful as a starting point
in thinking about differential motivations for women in different positions, but
they should be regarded initially only as hypotheses to be tested.
When other determinants of marriage and fertility are considered, a rich
set of conceptual models developed over decades of research is available.
Some of the more important factors posited to affect marriage propensities and
fertility rates are economic opportunities for women; economic opportunities
for men (often hypothesized to have the opposite effects of those of women);
sex and sex-employment ratios in the population; neighborhood effects; and
the influence of education, family background, and other factors on social
norms and values. Although enumerating these factors in detail would take us
too far afield from the review exercise, it is important to emphasize that there
are many influences on marriage and fertility other than welfare benefits, a
point that is often Reemphasized in studies whose sole focus is a single-minded
search for welfare effects. Moreover, even if these other factors are not exam-
ined in detail when testing for the effects of the welfare system, it is always
necessary either implicitly or explicitly to parcel out their influence relative to
that of welfare, which means in most cases controlling for these other factors
statistically, a point to be discussed further in the next section. Since a single
mother does, after all, have alternatives to welfare, it is only the influence of
the welfare benefit relative to the alternatives that should affect her choices.
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ROBERTA. MOFFITT
55
Unfortunately, the large number and diversity of these alternative factors make
it difficult empirically to control for them all and often leave the door open to
doubts as to whether it is welfare that is affecting behavior or some other
omitted factor, as discussed below in the review of the empirical research
literature.
DIFFERENT QUESTIONS OF INTEREST
In turning from theories of welfare effects to the more specific issue of what
empirical questions are of interest, an important distinction necessary to make at
the outset is between what may properly be called a "time-series" question and a
"cross-sectional" question. An important time-series question is why marriage
rates have declined and nonmarital childbearing rates have increased in the United
States. The corresponding welfare-related question is whether the welfare sys-
tem has contributed to these trends. An important cross-sectional question, on
the other hand, is whether welfare, if eliminated or reduced in generosity (for
example), would raise marriage rates and lower nonmarital fertility rates, if all
else is held fixed.
The answers to these questions need not be the same. One may simulta-
neously conclude, for example, that welfare is not a major contributor to the time-
series trends in marriage and fertility but also that welfare, if reduced in generos-
ity, would have the effects mentioned above, if all else is held fixed. Differing
answers to these two questions are not necessarily inconsistent because all else is
not held fixed in time series; many other factors are changing at the same time,
most notably, changes in the economic and social environment and in social
norms. These other factors could have been primarily responsible for the mar-
riage and fertility trends, and could have outweighed any welfare effect. How-
ever, if it is concluded that welfare would have had an effect if nothing else had
changed, one must also conclude that the time-series trend would have been
different if welfare had not trended the way it did.
Both questions are of importance. Some analysts argue that the only impor-
tant question is the time-series question. That question does receive much of the
attention of the public. However, the cross-sectional question is also important
because it bears on what would happen in the future if the welfare system were
altered, regardless of what might have caused marriage and fertility trends in the
past. If welfare has undesirable effects, for example, it could be used as a tool to
increase marriage rates and reduce nonmarital fertility rates in the future. In any
case, as the review below shows, virtually the entire research literature on the
effect of welfare on demographic outcomes has focused on the cross-sectional
question, not the time-series question. The majority of analyses have attempted
to hold everything else fixed in a cross-sectional sense. Indeed, those studies that
have utilized data over multiple time periods, which could conceivably examine
time-series questions, have, by and large, deliberately eliminated the influence of
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56
THE EFFECT OF WELFARE ON MARRIAGE AND FERTILII Y
time trends in the data and have based their welfare results on the cross-sectional
variation in the data instead.4
METHODOLOGIES USED IN ESTIMATING WELFARE EFFECTS
Experimental Versus Nonexperimental Analysis
Although nonexperimental analysis is the norm in the social science research
literature, experimental analysis is more familiar today to policy analysts in-
volved in evaluations of welfare reforms. The most well-known experimental
evaluations have examined the effects of various interventions on the employ-
ment, earnings, and welfare participation outcomes of welfare recipients (e.g.,
see the studies reviewed in Gueron and Pauly, 1991~. However, experimental
methods have not been widely applied to the study of welfare effects on fertility
and marriage.5 Because much of the discussion of reasons for differences in
study findings turns on differences in nonexperimental methodologies or, in the
language of evaluation, the use of different nonexperimental comparison groups-
a brief discussion of the reason that experimental methodologies have not been
applied in this area is warranted.
The method of experimentation, wherein a randomly chosen experimental
group of individuals is given a "treatment" and a randomly chosen control group is
not, is a general methodology for inferring causal effects of a program or an
alteration in a program. One can imagine experimenting with the level of welfare
benefits, for example, giving the treatment group a higher level than the control
group (or possibly giving the control group none, if it is the total effect of welfare
that is of interest). Clearly the methodology cannot be applied in time series
because the rest of society cannot be frozen in place and held fixed when the
welfare system is altered. However, experimental methods are not always easily
applied in cross section either, for a number of reasons. One is that the outcomes of
interest under discussion here marriage and fertility-do not respond quickly to
changes in the welfare and socioeconomic environment, so any experiment to
measure welfare effects might have to last several years for a credible estimate to be
obtained. A second problem is that many welfare reforms are intended to have
"community" effects that is, effects that percolate through the community and
affect general norms. Experiments cannot capture such outcomes unless the ex
4In a regression framework, ``eliminating the influence of time trends in the data,, is meant to
imply, for example, entering dummies for year or other time intervals into the equation.
5There are exceptions, and more experimental evaluations examining demographic outcomes are
under way at this writing. see Chapter 6 for a discussion of state-level experiments on demographic
outcomes. Also, the negative income tax (NIT) experiments of the 1980s were used to examine the
effect of an NIT on marital stability (Hannan and Tuma, 1990; Cain and Wissoker, 1990) but, aside
from being troubled by small sample sizes and design problems in the experiments, their results
cannot be generalized to the AFDC program.
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ROBERTA. MOFFIIT
57
periments are "saturation site" in nature that is, unless entire communities are
made the unit of observation and all individuals within a community are either
given the "treatment" or all are not. Saturation site experiments are rare and have
never been very successful when tried. A third problem is that experiments can at
best determine the effects of only one "bundle" of welfare reforms at a time,
making it difficult to isolate the effects of any one piece of a welfare reform
program from others that are part of the same reform package. This problem
afflicts many of the welfare experiments undertaken in the last decade or so in the
United States. Fourth, and relatedly, it is often difficult to extrapolate and general-
ize from experimental results, since experiments by and large test only one reform,
or one bundle of welfare reforms, at a time. Fifth, for ethical reasons, experiments
are limited in the types of reforms that can be tested (e.g., eliminating benefits
entirely for the experimental group has, thus far, not been thought ethical).6
For these reasons, almost all of the research studies on the effects of welfare
on marriage and fertility have utilized nonexperimental methods. Nonexperi-
mental methods identify the effects of welfare by using natural variation in the
welfare system, variation that generally arises through the political process, and
by determining the existence and magnitude of correlations of such variation with
variation in fertility and marital outcomes. Variations in benefits across states,
across individuals within states, and over time across states have all been used for
this purpose. Unfortunately, it is possible that different sources of welfare varia-
tion may have different empirical associations with marriage and fertility behav-
ior even though they should not "in theory" and it is possible that this will
lead to conflicting results across methods. Reconciling those differences requires
determining why they yield different results and what confounding factors might
be present in each.
Most of the research in this area has examined the effects and correlates of
variation in the level of welfare benefits, rather than of variation in other features
of welfare programs (e.g., earnings disregards, training programs, child support
reform). While this may seem limiting from the point of view of a policy maker,
for whom more specific programmatic reforms are generally of greater interest,
much can be learned from the basic issue of whether welfare-eligible women
alter their behavior in response to benefit levels. If they do so, it is not unreason-
able to assume that they will respond as well to changes in other characteristics of
the program that have, either directly or indirectly, monetary implications.
Types of Natural Variation Used in the Research Literature
Aside from time-series variation, three types of natural variation in the wel-
fare system have been utilized in most studies. These are cross-state comparisons
6Even the 1996 welfare legislation does not eliminate welfare entirely for anyone, because some
minimum number of years of receipt is guaranteed.
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58
THE EFFECT OF WELFARE ON MARRIAGE AND FERTILITY
of levels, cross-state comparisons of changes over time, and within-state com-
parisons. The differences are important because welfare-effect estimates often
differ depending on which is used.
A cross-state comparison of levels is the most common method in the litera-
ture and involves a determination of whether levels of welfare benefits are corre-
lated with marriage and fertility behavior across states. Such comparisons need
not literally be conducted at the state level, but rather can be conducted at the
individual level so long as the data include individuals in multiple states. The
widespread use of this technique is based upon the recognition that AFDC ben-
efits are set at the state level and hence are generally the same within states, at
least for families of the same size and with the same income and other character-
istics. Consequently, when holding these family characteristics constant, ben-
efits vary only across states. Using individual-level data, one can control for
other confounding factors at the individual level (age, education, and the other
factors referred to previously) and therefore get closer to determining the effect
of welfare when all else is held fixed.
Cross-state comparisons of changes are less common but have recently
gained popularity in the research literature, where they are often called "state
fixed effects" models. In this case, changes over time in benefit levels across
states are compared to changes over time in outcome variables such as marriage
and fertility. A case can be made that such comparisons are superior to those
using cross-state comparisons of levels, inasmuch as the levels of benefits and
levels of marriage-fertility behavior may covary across states not only because of
some true relationship but also for some other, spurious reason. For example, the
low AFDC benefit levels and high marriage rates in most southern states may not
be a reflection of a true welfare effect but may instead reflect the fact that the
South is socially a relatively conservative region where social and cultural norms
encourage marriage, as well as being a relatively conservative region politically
where elected representatives do not legislate generous welfare benefits.7 In this
latter interpretation, a positive correlation between benefit levels and marriage
(for example) would arise because there is a third variable social, cultural, and
political norms that leads to them both, not because benefits affect marriage. In
the method of cross-state comparisons of changes, changes in benefits over time
are inspected instead of differences in levels. For example, as it turns out, benefit
levels have been falling in the South more slowly than they have been falling in
the Midwest over the last two decades; if there is a true effect of welfare on
marriage, then marriage rates should fall less (or rise more) in the South than in
the Midwest, even if the two regions started off at very different levels that is,
even if marriage levels were higher to begin with in the South for other reasons.
The method of cross-state comparisons of changes has its own difficulties,
however. One important problem is the difficulty of measuring long-term re
7This notion appears to have first been explicitly discussed and emphasized by Ellwood and Bane (1985).
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ROBERTA. MOFFIIT
59
spouses to changes in welfare benefits. If marriage and fertility behaviors do not
respond quickly to benefit-level alterations, a fairly long time interval must be
examined to measure changes in behavior.8 If one attempts to examine long time
intervals, an additional problem arises because significant state in- and out-
migration may occur, which may change state-level average outcomes merely
because the composition of the population has changed, not because a fixed set of
individuals have changed their behavior. More generally, it has to be assumed
that over long time intervals the "omitted" influences for example, the social
and cultural norms referred to previously do not change and do not change
differentially across states. In addition, a comparison of cross-state changes in
welfare merely throws the bias problem back one stage because it then needs to
be determined why some states increase their benefits faster, or lower them less
rapidly, than other states, and whether omitted state-specific, time-varying influ-
ences might confound the welfare effect by being responsible both for benefit
trends and for marriage-fertility trends.
Within-state comparisons are the most difficult and the least used because
they rely on comparisons of outcomes for women within a state who are offered
different benefit levels or comparisons between women who are eligible and
women who are not eligible for welfare. The problem with this method is that,
because the eligibility and benefit determination rules are generally the same
statewide, benefit-level differences between women within a state are almost
always associated with a demographic characteristic (e.g., having children) that
by itself could have an impact on the outcomes of interest. A comparison of
eligibles with ineligibles is an extreme version of this method.
Time-series analysis is a fourth method that is fraught with the difficulty
already mentioned of controlling for alternative factors that are also changing
over time.
BASIC TIME-SERIES PATTERNS IN WELFARE AND
DEMOGRAPHIC OUTCOMES
Three of the methodologies cross-state comparison of levels, cross-state
comparison of changes, and time-series analysis can be studied by examining
trends over time in unadjusted state-level or national-level aggregates of demo-
graphic outcomes, on the one hand, and measures of welfare generosity, on the
other. It is useful to present the basic patterns of these correlations with unad-
justed aggregates before reviewing the multivariate analyses in the econometric
literature. As it turns out, the patterns that appear in this analysis capture, in large
8A related possibility is that the comparison-of-changes method measures a short-term response,
while the comparison-of-levels method measures a long-term response if it shows where marriage
and fertility levels have ended up after several years of adjustment. Thus it may be that the two
methods are simply not measuring the same thing.
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60
THE EFFECT OF WELFARE ON MARRIAGE AND FERTILII Y
degree, the patterns revealed by multivariate analyses. Consequently, much of
the basic story is understandable in relatively simple terms and does not need
recourse to controlling for additional variables or use of specialized statistical
methods.
The pure time-series method involves a simple comparison of trends in
welfare benefits and in demographic outcomes. Figure 4-1 shows the time trend
in welfare benefits of different types in the United States over the period 1970-
1993. It has been noted repeatedly that the time-series evidence for a welfare
effect on marriage and fertility is weak because welfare benefits declined in real
terms over the 1970s and 1980s while marriage rates declined and nonmarital
childbearing increased; both trends have been noted in the overviews in Chapters
2 and 3. Figure 4-1 provides further confirmation, because it indicates that real
AFDC benefits have fallen continuously since the early 1970s. Real Food Stamp
benefits have remained roughly constant, primarily because they are indexed to
inflation, while real Medicaid benefits were roughly fixed until the m~d-1980s,
when they began to rise. The sum of benefits therefore declined up to the late
1980s. It did begin to rise at that time, but this increase is too late to explain the
secular trends in marriage and fertility. In addition, Medicaid benefits began to
be available to many poor families off AFDC in the late 1980s, thereby weaken-
ing the link between welfare and the availability of medical care.
The inconsistency between benefit and demographic trends could mask the
presence of long lags (Murray, 1993~. The generosity of the transfer system
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
O
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1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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+ AFDC ~ Food Stamps ~ Medicaid
FIGURE 4-1 Trends in real monthly welfare benefits per person. SOURCE: U.S. House
of Representatives (1994:378, 782, 806~.
OCR for page 87
87
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Representative terms from entire chapter:
single motherhood
