should be trained, and what doctrine or rules of engagement should be employed.

In the face of an increasing number of military contingency missions, military planners must develop a better understanding of a broader range of force employment and potential battle outcomes for which the military services have no solid basis in experience. All of these factors lead to the conclusion that in the future, models and simulations used to train military forces, develop force structures, and design and develop weapon systems must be able to create more realistic representations of the command and control process and the impact of command decisions on battle outcomes. The representations needed are ones that more accurately reflect the impact of human behavior and the decision process of friendly and enemy leaders at multiple levels of command within real-time constraints.

In constructive simulation, it is no longer sufficient simply to use the relative strength of opposing forces, together with their fire power, to represent battle outcomes. As suggested in the Annual Report of Army-After-Next (U.S. Army, 1997)—a forward look at the implications of the Army of 2025—future battles, fought with the benefit of all the information technology now under development, will not necessarily be won by the side with the greatest fire power. To model and predict the outcomes of future wars, it will be necessary to consider information warfare as well. This implies a need for much greater emphasis on realistic modeling of the human element in battle because the human battle participants are the focus of information utilization.

The armed services are also increasingly using distributed simulation in support of technology design and evaluation, military planning, and training goals. As suggested above, in such simulations individuals participate in war games involving multiple players, each at a simulated workstation, each acting as if he or she were taking part in a real battle with views of the other participants not unlike those that would exist on a real battlefield. In this domain, human behavior representation is used to simulate the behavior of enemy forces or collateral friendly forces when there are not enough individuals available to represent all the needed players. There is also an interest in simulating the behavior of higher echelons in the command structure regarding their orders and reactions to the progress of the battlefield operations.

The rapidly changing state of the technology poses an additional challenge. Improvements in military technology—new kinds of decision aids and automation—will change the nature of the tasks to be modeled. Not only is the state of modeling technology changing, but the behavior that is to be modeled and reflected on the battlefield will change as well.

Two primary critics will view the outputs of human behavior representation and judge how successful they are. First, players in non-real-time constructive battlefield war games will observe only the resulting movements of troops and units, attrition results, and battle outcomes. Second, participants in real-time

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