fare. From the perspective of this chapter, information warfare has to do with those processes that affect the commander's, staff's, opposing commander's, or civilians' decisions, ability to make decisions, and confidence in decisions by affecting what information is available and when.

This chapter focuses, then, on the human or social side of information warfare. Factors that affect the way people gather, disseminate, and process information are central to this discussion. These processes are so general that they apply regardless of whether one is concerned with command and control warfare, intelligence-based warfare, or psychological warfare. Thus rather than describing the various types of information warfare (which is done well by Libicki) this chapter addresses the social and psychological processes that cut across those types. Clearly, many of the factors discussed in earlier chapters, such as attention, memory, learning, and decision making, must be considered when modeling the impact of information warfare on individuals and units. In addition, several other aspects of human behavior—the structure of the unit (the way people are connected together), information diffusion, and belief formation—are relevant, and the discussion here concentrates on these three aspects. It is these aspects that will need to be integrated into existing models of information warfare and existing estimates of vulnerability if these models and estimates are to better reflect human behavior.

Consider the role played by these three aspects (structure, diffusion, and belief formation) in the area of information dominance. Information dominance has to do with maintaining superiority in the ability to collect, process, use, interpret, and disseminate information. Essentially, the way the commander acts in a particular situation, or indeed the way any individual acts, depends on the information characteristics of the situation, including what other individuals are present, what they know, what they believe, and how they interact. For example, in joint operations, commanders may have staffs with whom they have had only limited interactions. Vice Admiral Metcalf (1986) addresses this issue in discussing the Grenada Rescue Operation. He refers repeatedly to the importance of the Nelsonian principle—''know your commanders"—and of having a staff that has been trained to work together. He stresses the importance of understanding what others know and developing a sense of trust. In general, individuals are more likely to trust and/or act on information (including orders) if it comes from the "right" source. For example, Admiral Train notes that when he became the commander of the Sixth Fleet, he asked the incumbent, who believed the Beirut evacuation plans were inadequate, why he had not spoken up sooner. The incumbent replied that since he thought the evacuation order was from a valid authority, he was reluctant to object. Additionally, during missions, as crises come to the fore, the amount of information involved can escalate. The resulting information overload leads people to find ways of curtailing the information to which they attend. One means of doing so is to use one's interaction network (the web of trusted advisors) to decide what information is most important. All of these



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