APPENDIX B
Air Force Hypersonic Technology Program

The description that follows was provided by the Air Force HyTech office at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, and is reproduced verbatim. An overview of the HyTech Program and a road map for the development of hydrocarbon scramjet missile propulsion, both provided to the committee by the HyTech office, follow (see Figures B-1 and B-2).

HISTORY OF HYTECH CHARTER, OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAM CONTENT

Background

The HyTech Program was established in Jan 1995 to provide a continuing AF hypersonic development activity after the cancellation of the NASP program. This point paper describes the evolution of the overall direction and current technical content of the HyTech Program as it has changed from its inception to the present. It references two documents included as attachments: Attachment 1–AFMC/ST letter directing refocusing of HyTech to concentrate exclusively on propulsion technology, and Attachment 2–Programmatic history of HyTech. It concludes with an assessment of the current state of the program and the probability of meeting its goals.

Program Objectives and Technical Content
  • After the decision to terminate the NASP/HySTP program, effective in Jan 1995, the Secretary of the Air Force decided to initiate a follow-on generic hypersonic technology program to be funded at $20M/year

  • In response, HyTech was established as a Wright Laboratory program and a planning team was formed in Jan 1995 to determine the direction and content of the program. The team consisted of individuals from the various WL directorates, together with representatives of other organizations, including ASC/EN, ASC/XR, Phillips Laboratory, NASA, Navy, the NASP program office and industry. The team reported to an Executive Steering Group consisting initially of the directors of the WL Flight Dynamics, Materials, and Aero-propulsion & Power Directorates. Later in 1995, the steering group was expanded to include representation from the WL Armament Directorate, Phillips Laboratory and ASC/EN

  • In spring 1995, the Steering Group approved a program that adopted a stepping-stone approach to hypersonic technology development that focused initially on the technologies needed for hydrocarbon-fueled scramjet missiles that could fly at speeds of up to Mach 8. The choice of Mach 8 was driven by several factors, including the results of studies that indicated it could have a significant payoff for projected AF mission requirements

    • ASC/XR studies showed that hypersonics has the potential to impact a large number of warfighter deficiencies across the board. The identified attributes of high speed included survivability, lethality, timeliness and range—basically the result of the high speed and the efficiency of ramjet/scramjet powered vehicles

    • The benefits also were documented in studies undertaken by the AF/XOM Revolutionary Planning Office in 1995. The payoffs of a scramjet-powered Mach 8 missile were stated in terms of its ability to travel 750 nm in 15 minutes while remaining nearly invulnerable to countermeasures because of the high speed. As an example, it indicated that such a missile could be launched from a fighter aircraft outside a heavily defended target area and yet reach time critical targets such as mobile launchers before they could move any significant distance

    • Further endorsement of a Mach 8, 750 nm weapon is evidenced in the Air-to-Surface Development Plan prepared by the ASC Air-to-Surface Integrated



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Review and Evaluation of the Air Force Hypersonic Technology Program APPENDIX B Air Force Hypersonic Technology Program The description that follows was provided by the Air Force HyTech office at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, and is reproduced verbatim. An overview of the HyTech Program and a road map for the development of hydrocarbon scramjet missile propulsion, both provided to the committee by the HyTech office, follow (see Figures B-1 and B-2). HISTORY OF HYTECH CHARTER, OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAM CONTENT Background The HyTech Program was established in Jan 1995 to provide a continuing AF hypersonic development activity after the cancellation of the NASP program. This point paper describes the evolution of the overall direction and current technical content of the HyTech Program as it has changed from its inception to the present. It references two documents included as attachments: Attachment 1–AFMC/ST letter directing refocusing of HyTech to concentrate exclusively on propulsion technology, and Attachment 2–Programmatic history of HyTech. It concludes with an assessment of the current state of the program and the probability of meeting its goals. Program Objectives and Technical Content After the decision to terminate the NASP/HySTP program, effective in Jan 1995, the Secretary of the Air Force decided to initiate a follow-on generic hypersonic technology program to be funded at $20M/year In response, HyTech was established as a Wright Laboratory program and a planning team was formed in Jan 1995 to determine the direction and content of the program. The team consisted of individuals from the various WL directorates, together with representatives of other organizations, including ASC/EN, ASC/XR, Phillips Laboratory, NASA, Navy, the NASP program office and industry. The team reported to an Executive Steering Group consisting initially of the directors of the WL Flight Dynamics, Materials, and Aero-propulsion & Power Directorates. Later in 1995, the steering group was expanded to include representation from the WL Armament Directorate, Phillips Laboratory and ASC/EN In spring 1995, the Steering Group approved a program that adopted a stepping-stone approach to hypersonic technology development that focused initially on the technologies needed for hydrocarbon-fueled scramjet missiles that could fly at speeds of up to Mach 8. The choice of Mach 8 was driven by several factors, including the results of studies that indicated it could have a significant payoff for projected AF mission requirements ASC/XR studies showed that hypersonics has the potential to impact a large number of warfighter deficiencies across the board. The identified attributes of high speed included survivability, lethality, timeliness and range—basically the result of the high speed and the efficiency of ramjet/scramjet powered vehicles The benefits also were documented in studies undertaken by the AF/XOM Revolutionary Planning Office in 1995. The payoffs of a scramjet-powered Mach 8 missile were stated in terms of its ability to travel 750 nm in 15 minutes while remaining nearly invulnerable to countermeasures because of the high speed. As an example, it indicated that such a missile could be launched from a fighter aircraft outside a heavily defended target area and yet reach time critical targets such as mobile launchers before they could move any significant distance Further endorsement of a Mach 8, 750 nm weapon is evidenced in the Air-to-Surface Development Plan prepared by the ASC Air-to-Surface Integrated

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Review and Evaluation of the Air Force Hypersonic Technology Program FIGURE B-1 Overview of HyTech Program. Note: DARPA = Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Product Team and endorsed by ACC. Such a system conceptually is beneficial in that it addresses user deficiencies related to defeating hard and deeply buried targets and time-critical targets The approved HyTech Program was implemented when initial funds were received in the summer of 1995. It addressed primarily engine technology but at that time it also included a significant effort in airframe technology. However, following AFMC/ST reviews of the program plan in late 1995 and subsequent formal direction in Feb 1996 (Attachment 1), the program was restructured to concentrate its limited funds exclusively on engine technology development. The program technical content and associated tasks were revised in accordance with this direction The Mach 8 hydrocarbon-fueled engine development critical path was made the focus of the program and it was set up to be a moderate (or lower) risk program managed by WL and executed by industry In addition to the primary activity in engine design, the program included engine-related materials, structures, analysis and test facilities tasks In parallel, the WL Directorates, using their own resources and funding lines, were encouraged by AFMC/ST to investigate the other promising high-payoff, but possibly higher risk technologies for both the scramjet engine and for overall vehicle needs This included technologies for airframe structures, antenna and sensor window materials, long-term test facility development, etc., as well as engine risk-reduction activities The HyTech Program was also directed to coordinate with, and leverage technology investments in other Services, DARPA, NASA, the national laboratories, academia, industry, and other nations if doing so could accelerate the scramjet engine development and/or further extend and deepen the US’s hypersonics technology base The revised HyTech plan was implemented early in 1996 and is underway. A more detailed history of the whole planning process, the refocusing, and the impact of various funding changes that have occurred is given in Attachment 2 The activity is now centered around two prime engine contractors, representing two engine concepts that were selected from several evaluated in the first year of the program This activity is the core of the technical program and will culminate in the design, building and

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Review and Evaluation of the Air Force Hypersonic Technology Program eventual freejet ground testing of one of the engine concepts. The downselect to one engine concept will be made at the end of 1997 and it will be tested in the 2001–2003 timeframe The goals are fully coordinated with Navy, NASA, DARPA, etc., and complement their activities At this point, the WL Directorates have not specifically established additional research or development activities aimed specifically at hypersonic needs, although parts of their core programs would have application to hypersonics, even though directed primarily toward other requirements Overall, the HyTech program is addressing solid, realistic, appropriate goals—in the sense that the near-term application clearly would be a hypersonic missile and the engines under development would be suitable as a starting point for such an application. Unfortunately, before and after the refocusing occurred, the program content and schedule was revised several times to take account of a series of funding cuts received over the last two years. These reductions in funding necessarily have resulted in a significant accumulated schedule slip of more than two years and have diluted the technical depth of the program The longer schedule for completion of the integrated engine testing moves the program outside the window of opportunity for flight testing on near-term programs planned by other organizations The DARPA Low Cost Missile program—recognizing that a flight-type engine will not be available from HyTech in time to meet its schedule— plans to flight test a fixed-Mach heavyweight engine; the NASA Hyper-X program, designed to perform limited-duration flight testing of scramjet engines at discrete Mach numbers, also is incompatible with the present HyTech schedule In a related issue, the extended schedule also makes HyTech more vulnerable to further cuts if it becomes regarded as a long-term technology program with no apparent event-driven end-point—in other words, a classical “lab program” instead of an intensive, focused, visibly milestone-centered project that must meet time-critical goals if it is to satisfy user requirements in a timely manner HyTech is an opportunity to build off the many years of work accomplished on scramjet technology and to bring it to fruition with a real, flight-type engine demonstration. It would be unfortunate if history is repeated and this momentum is allowed to dissipate yet again FIGURE B-2 Road map for the development of hydrocarbon-fueled scramjet missile propulsion. Note: PRDA = Program Research and Development Announcement; DTO = defense technology objective; ηc = combustion efficiency

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Review and Evaluation of the Air Force Hypersonic Technology Program In terms of programmatics, the reduced and stretched-out funding profile does not allow HyTech to follow the original intention of supporting two engine contractors for Phase 2. The initial plan was to fully fund one contractor to proceed full-bore to design, build and test an engine—to act as the prime contractor for the core of the program. In parallel, a second one would have been funded at a lower level to draw on the experience gained from the investment in their approach. In this way, work could have continued work on selected, promising, alternative approaches to some of the technological requirements that are known to be especially challenging and for which a solution may not be successfully achieved using only the primary engine designer’s approach (e.g., fuel injector concepts, fuel ignition techniques, etc.) This tactic would have served a double purpose: it would have continued work on selected key technical issues that may prove to be needed for successful engine development; it also would have maintained a broader core of industry involvement in air-breathing hypersonic technology—an especially important consideration for the US when many personnel experienced in hypersonics are reaching retirement age The reduced funding level also has resulted in the loss of other tasks working parallel risk-reduction and alternative approaches, although—to the maximum extent possible—the program preserves the inhouse work on high-risk, high payoff combustor component items that includes evaluations of alternative combustor subcomponent designs. Also retained are small-scale activities that are examining emerging materials and structures and developing advanced endothermic fuel technology Attachments: Gen Paul Letter Directing Refocusing of HyTech Programmatic History of HyTech

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Review and Evaluation of the Air Force Hypersonic Technology Program ATTACHMENT 1 MEMORANDUM FOR WL/CC 1 Feb ‘96 FROM: HQ AFMC/ST SUBJECT: Hypersonic Technology (HyTech) Program Restructure Thank you for the recent meetings regarding HyTech. The program strategy options briefed and discussed at those meetings were very useful in establishing the direction of hypersonic technology development in the Air Force. This letter summarizes the results of the discussions, provides program guidance to Wright Laboratory and documents my commitment to support the restructured HyTech program. Expendable Mach 8 scramjet engines offer the potential for very high payoff for the Air Force’s future warfighting capability. Specifically, they give us the potential for the development of near-term, very high-speed, long-range missiles, and they allow the longer-term possibility of fielding reusable hypersonic weapon systems. Therefore, I fully support the consensus reached at our strategy meetings as described below: Concentrate the entire HyTech budget on technology development for expendable, Mach 8 hydrocarbon scramjet engines, including the materials, structures, analysis and test facilities required exclusively for this near-term scramjet effort. The engine development critical path-the major focus of the overall program— should be moderate (or lower) risk program managed by Wright Laboratory and executed by industry. In parallel, Wright Laboratory should investigate other promising high-payoff, but possible higher-risk, scramjet engine approaches that complement the primary effort and provide risk mitigation. The major milestone of the program should be a freejet test of a flight-type scramjet engine in FY01–02. The HyTech Program should be consistent with the FYDP’s current funding profile, as noted below. The HyTech Program will not be excluded from normal burdens that are levied on all 6.2 PEs; therefore, the HyTech Program must include planning allowances for its share of these burdens. Fiscal Year FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 PE62269F $19.9M $7.6M $19.2M $17.4M $17.5M $18.9M Because HyTech is now focused exclusively on the scramjet engine, I encourage Wright Laboratory to develop other technologies in the areas of airframes, materials, avionics, munitions, and other propulsion systems, etc., that complement the HyTech-funded efforts by contributing to the technology base for sustained hypersonic flight. Optimally, these technologies will also contribute to other high temperature and/or high-speed air vehicle applications. The HyTech office should maintain cognizance of these related efforts in order to create a broad hypersonics technology base efficiently and effectively. The HyTech Program should also coordinate with, and leverage technology investments in, other services, ARPA, NASA, the national laboratories, academia, industry, and other nations. This would be appropriate when it could accelerate the scramjet engine development and/or further extend and deepen the US’s hypersonics technology base. In order to maximize the effectiveness of the HyTech Program, I will take several steps. First I will continue to support HyTech’s outyear budgets at the level described above, and for one additional year (FY02) at approximately $20M. Second, I will continue to encourage science and technology investments in other technologies that contribute to the hypersonics technology base. Third, in my discussions with warfighters and with other Air Force and congressional decision makers, I will encourage the appropriate transition of hypersonic technologies. Fourth, I will assist in the rapid approval of the acquisition plan required for HyTech’s primary scramjet development contract(s). As Mr. James Mattice (SAF/AQ) testified to Congress on 15 Mar 94, “Hypersonic technology, which yields an optimum combination of speed, range, precision, lethality, and flexibility, is one of the three highest priority technologies to enable future warfighting capabilities identified by senior Air Force leadership.” Similarly, in its 15 Dec 95 New World Vistas report, the Scientific Advisory Board recommended the Air Force develop the scramjet and materials technologies required for hypersonic airbreathing flight. Given the recognized potential of hypersonics, and the corresponding foundational requirements for a US capability to build operational scramjet engines, I expect Wright Laboratory to lead the nation in the development of a hypersonic technology base. Please let me know if I can provide further assistance in meeting the objectives outlined in this letter. [Signed by Richard R.Paul] RICHARD R.PAUL Major General, USAF Director, Science and Technology cc: SAF/AQR ASC/XR

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Review and Evaluation of the Air Force Hypersonic Technology Program ATTACHMENT 2 Programmatic History of the Hypersonics Technology (HyTech) Program January 1995–December 1996 Richard M.Moore, Lt Col, USAF (Chief, HyTech Program, May 1995–Jul 1996) Background: For nearly a decade this nation’s investment in hypersonics was focused on the National Aero-Space Plane (NASP) Program. NASP was expected to produce two single stage to orbit experimental vehicles. The technical challenges of this joint Air Force—NASA program were enormous. The high temperature materials, the hybrid propulsion system that could take off from a dead stop and efficiently produce thrust up to Mach 25, the very restrictive structural weight fraction limits, and many more challenges made the X-30 seem impossible to all but a few visionary people. Unfortunately, the political challenges proved to be even greater. In FY94 the program was de-scoped to a flight test program named the Hypersonic Systems Technology Program, HySTP. Then, in response to FY95 Congressional language, the Secretary of the Air Force canceled HySTP on 3 Jan 1995. However, not wanting to kill the technology, the Secretary turned to Wright Laboratory to initiate a new, more conservative hypersonic technology program. Specifically, it was to be a $20M per year program to develop a technology base to enable future hypersonic weapon systems. The new program was to have more reasonable technical goals and it was expected to succeed. Wright Laboratory named the new effort the Hypersonic Technology (HyTech) Program. HyTech continued to use the HySTP program element, PE62269F. In the meantime, NASA Langley Research Center’s (LaRC) hypersonics community was regrouping after the Air Force’s withdrawal from NASP. NASA chose to develop a smaller unmanned hydrogen-fueled hypersonic X-plane. They were also struggling through the quagmire of enormous budget and personnel cuts, along with reorganizations. These administrative hurdles kept LaRC from developing their X-plane plans as quickly as HyTech was planned. Program Development: Many of the challenges facing HyTech were similar to those that most new programs face. The organization, goals, processes, networks, etc. had to be established. In addition, as of 3 Jan 95, this program had not even been conceptualized, thirty percent of the fiscal year was already gone, and HyTech was expected to spend an unspecified amount of FY95 funds on a well planned technology program, with funds to arrive after program approval by SAF/AQ in late February. Also, the industry stakeholders were more numerous than the HyTech Program could support, yet with NASA’s delays, if HyTech didn’t support them they could be gone within the calendar year. Further, once the NASA program was in place it would have to be complementary to HyTech, rather than duplicative, if both were to survive Congress’ scrutiny. These issues, compounded by the pessimistic attitude that some Congressmen and concerned Pentagon personnel had regarding NASP, left HyTech with an uphill battle from the start. Wright Laboratory built a team consisting of Air Force engineers, managers and financial personnel, together with a Navy technical manager and a NASA representative. With half of these people having been assigned to the NASP program, the team expected to transition some NASP technology as appropriate, but would also have fresh perspectives, precluding a simple NASP continuation. The vision of the new program was to “Enable Sustained Hypersonic Flight.” Unlike NASP, HyTech adopted a stepping stone approach by focusing initially on technologies required for expendable (unmanned and single use) missiles, with the understanding that they could spin-off these relatively low cost and low risk applications soon after the turn of the century and extend the US technology base to higher Mach, reusable and/or manned vehicles. Through an exhaustive process the HyTech team and colleagues throughout Wright Lab and across the nation reached a solid consensus that the technical long poles in the tent were the air breathing propulsion system and the engine’s materials and structures. On a smaller scale, other potential technical show-stoppers included the airframe materials and structures, sensor windows and radio antennas that could survive and operate in the severe hypersonic flight environment. Because the propulsion development is the most important and expensive technology, and the projected funding would only allow an acceptable rate of progress in this area if the vast majority of the funds were directed there, Wright Laboratory chose to focus on a supersonic combustion ramjet (scramjet) engine development, combined with relatively small related efforts in engine materials, airframe design and structures, and hypersonic wind tunnel concepts. Fortunately, NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) was initiating the X-33 and X-34 programs to demonstrate advanced space launch technologies. These programs would not develop the airbreathing propulsion technologies or some of the materials and structures specifically required for hypersonic missiles, but their investment in technology development for airframe materials and structures, avionics antennas and sensor windows would keep the industry alive and progressing in these areas. HyTech briefed the program strategy and plan to the AFMC chain of command, the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, SAF/AQ, DDR&E’s staff, and the Senate staffer responsible for this portion of the defense budget, Mr. John Young. All reviews were very well received.

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Review and Evaluation of the Air Force Hypersonic Technology Program Program Approval and Funding History: Initially, the FY95 funding level was expected to be between $10M and $30M, with the following years funded at a level $20M per year. In Feb 95, the FY95 funding level was definitized at $10M. This was in addition to $8M to be used for NASP and HySTP termination. Unfortunately, $5M of these termination funds became, and are still tied up in litigation, keeping the FY95 expenditure rate for HyTech’s PE very low. The briefing, coordination and approval process described above was originally scheduled for Feb 95, but scheduling conflicts with these busy executive’s schedules stretched the briefing schedule through late Spring. When some of these schedule delays became apparent in March, SAF/AQT determined HyTech would not be able to spend all $10M in FY95 so they reduced the planned FY95 funding to $3M. Therefore, the HyTech team restructured the program to accommodate this reduction and prepared the contractual mechanisms for rapid initiation. At the end of the briefing to Mr. Young, he asked many questions and then stated that he “would like nothing better than to see this program go!” Mr. Young asked why the Air Staff had moved $7M of FY95 funds from this program. He reminded them that the law states that they can move up to $4M without Congressional approval, but no more. Unfortunately, the ensuing dialog regarding this subject lasted three months, so it was not until Aug 95 that SAF/AQ informed the HyTech Program office that the FY95 funds were available and that HyTech would receive the full $10M! Under some circumstances, additional funding is good; however, in this case it was very late in the fiscal year and HyTech had prepared to spend only $3M in FY95. Nevertheless, HyTech rapidly re-expanded the structure of the program and began to obligate the funds as rapidly as possible. During the early days of planning and advocacy, a new organization called the Air Force Revolutionary Planning Office (RPO), located within AF/XOM at the Pentagon, was chartered to find leapfrog approaches to warfighting. RPO took notice of HyTech’s missile concept and proposed a hypersonic missile ACTD to the Air Force four-star generals at their semi-annual ‘Corona’ meeting on 28 Feb 95. AF/CC said the concept looked interesting and asked the office to study it and report back at the next Corona meeting on 30 Aug 95. Through the Spring and Summer, HyTech provided technical consultation to the RPO. Then, during the month of August, in preparation for the upcoming Corona meeting, AFMC/CC, ACC/CC, and AFMC/ST requested several point papers and white papers to help them understand hypersonics and potential missile applications. While this effort provided excellent visibility for HyTech, it also compounded the busyness created by the change in FY95 funding described above. At the August Corona meeting, AF/CC concurred that the concept offered high payoff, but wouldn’t consent to a fast paced ACTD due to the $330+M price tag and the lack of the propulsion system technology maturity. Nevertheless, the visibility afforded the concept left very favorable impressions in the minds of many Air Force generals. In addition, AFMC/CC and AFMC/ST came away intending to insure that Wright Laboratory was indeed developing the needed propulsion technologies. Therefore, just after the FY95 funds arrived, AFMC/ST (Maj Gen Paul) asked HyTech to put the program execution on hold until he could review it. That review cycle was completed 21 Dec 95 with AFMC/ST’s formal go-ahead and direction to focus exclusively on propulsion and related materials technologies, dropping the airframe and wind tunnel technology activities. These decisions were documented in a 1 Feb 96 letter from AFMC/ST. Unfortunately, the AFMC/ST review processes delayed HyTech’s full implementation and funds obligation until well past the end of the fiscal year. Therefore, based on HyTech’s 30 Sep 95 obligation statistics, the DoD comptroller stated his intention to cut PE62269F’s funds. Since the Pentagon was working the FY97 POM at that time, making FY97 funds the easiest to change; since the FY95 funds couldn’t be withdrawn without Congressional approval; and because the FY95 funds were already somewhat stale, the DoD removed $9M of HyTech’s FY97 funds via PBD-203. In the PBD language, the comptroller stated that HyTech would spend its FY95 funds in FY96 and a similar amount of FY96 funds in FY97, and therefore HyTech’s funding bow wave would fill-in this new FY97 deficit. This set HyTech on a path that could keep it behind in obligation and expenditure rates for two years—a very dangerous position! At this point HyTech restructured the program, yet again, and prepared for the meeting with AFMC/ST which was described above. Once AFMC/ST approved the program plan, rapid funds obligation began. Since the program is a technology base program with many elements, it could not be accomplished on a single contract. In fact, over fifty FY95 and FY96 obligation actions were required to initiate the program. In order to obligate funds on all of these efforts rapidly, the vast majority were accomplished through modifications to existing contracts or by establishing new tasks on existing task order contracts. HyTech obligated nearly 100 percent of FY95 funds, including recording them on the DoD comptroller’s data base, during the months of Jan through Mar 95. Then the team obligated most FY96 funds between March and June. Thus, after six months, nearly two years of funds were obligated and, for both years, the program was ahead of AFMC and OSD obligation rate goals. In addition, FY95 expenditures were beginning to roll in. The cornerstone of HyTech is a $62M contracted engine development effort consisting of a competitive first phase, with a downselect to one contractor for the second and third phases which consist of a full engine development and freejet ground demonstration. Because of its funding level, this effort required an approved acquisition plan and a new contract for each of the two prime contractors. Unfortunately, the acquisition plan approval process couldn’t be initiated

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Review and Evaluation of the Air Force Hypersonic Technology Program until AFMC/ST approved the new program structure in Dec 95. Despite the administrative delay, the HyTech team set an aggressive goal to have the contracting actions completed, the funds obligated and the engine developments initiated by 30 Aug 96, one month prior to the end of the fiscal year. After program go-ahead, this goal allowed only half the time normally required for a solicitation and source selection of this magnitude. Final acquisition plan approval arrived in Apr 96 and the HyTech office promptly released the scramjet engine development solicitation in the Commerce Business Daily. After receiving the proposals in June, the source selection team completed their efforts in July and handed the results to Wright Laboratory’s contracting personnel. The contracting team also moved out at full speed and the contracts were awarded four days ahead of the goal! This was only possible because every individual involved took ownership of the process and worked together creatively and enthusiastically. HyTech took another major step to preclude additional cuts. Wright Laboratory’s PE62203F is the home of the Integrated High Performance Turbine Engine Technology (IHPTET) program, which needed $3M as soon as possible for an important task but was waiting for FY97 funds. With the help of the Air Force Comptroller and AFMC/STX, Wright Laboratory transferred $3M of HyTech’s FY96 funds to IHPTET and is currently in the process of transferring $3M of IHPTET’s FY97 funds to HyTech. This resulted in the IHPTET achieving results sooner, HyTech’s funding profile being more appropriate for the work planned, and led to better HyTech execution statistics in both FY96 and FY97. The effort was formally initiated through a 4 Apr 96 meeting involving SAF/AQT, AFMC/STX, WL/XP and HyTech personnel. Then the FY96 funds were moved on 16 July 96 and the FY97 payback will be completed in early Jan 97. (Note from HyTech, 15 Aug 97: This was completed and the funding is included in the FY97 total for PE62229F). Despite excellent programmatic recovery from a very difficult situation and expressed support for hypersonics technology development at all levels in the Air Force and DoD, HyTech’s FY96–FY03 budgets were cut repeatedly and extensively. In FY96 the Air Force cut HyTech’s budget 13 times for a total of $4M. Six of these cuts were to provide funds for the US’s peacekeeping effort in Bosnia. The remainder of the cuts were for a variety of other needs. As described above, in late CY95, PBD-203 removed $9M from HyTech’s FY97 budget based upon poor FY95 obligation rates, leaving $7.5M in the PE for that year. Fortunately, the zero-sum reprogramming swap with IHPTET described above moved $3M from HyTech’s FY96 budget, precluding some further cuts, and will increase the FY97 budget back to $10.5M. During the FY96 POM/BES process, HyTech’s budget over the FYDP (FY98–03) was adjusted downward from the original $20M per year. Then, based on the combined FY95–96 expenditure rates, the Air Force and the DoD Comptrollers cut the FY98 budget by $12.6M; however, the DoD Comptroller agreed to restore $4M of those funds because the Air Force has no control over the speed with which the NASP/HySTP termination litigation is being conducted. This left HyTech with only $9.9M in FY98. Then, in Nov 96, AFMC/ST was required to cut another $210M from its FYDP budget. AFMC/ST directed approximately 22 percent of that budget cut to HyTech’s PE! Specifically, HyTech was cut another $3.6M in FY98, leaving the FY98 total at $6.3M and cutting the following years to an even $10M per year! On 5 Dec 96, Gen Paul called Dr. Curran to request WL/ PO provide a hypersonics briefing to the Air Force Science and Technology Board (AFSTB) on Monday, 9 Dec 96. Gen Paul stated that the program should be briefed at the 1 Feb 96 budget level (as Gen Paul committed to on 21 Dec 95) and that he would be restoring the budget to that level. On 9 Dec 96, Lt Gen Muellner (SAF/AQ) briefed the AFSTB on the Air Force’s modernization plans and acquisition reform, Maj Gen Paul briefed them on the Air Force S&T program and Lt Col Moore briefed HyTech and other hypersonics activities at DARPA, NASA and internationally. The AFSTB was very receptive and is initiating the study. The AFMC/ST staff informed all four AF Laboratory XP directorates that Gen Paul had been “asked to” restore HyTech’s funding and that they were to use other sources for the major budget cut. In the table below, the 1 Feb 96 budget is contrasted to the 4 Dec 96 and the 20 Dec 96 budgets. Obviously, as of 20 Dec 96, the budget has not been fully restored to the 1 Feb 96 level. The AFMC/ST staff has agreed to restore the FY99–FY03 funding levels to the 1 Feb 96 budget levels during the APOM update in the Spring of 1997. However, HyTech’s major concern is the FY98 funding level which is about to be incorporated into the President’s Budget and submitted to Congress. Once that is done, the Air Force cannot request additional funds until after congressional appropriation, and then with near zero probability of receiving the extra funds. Therefore, HyTech is appealing to AFMC/ST for assistance to raise the FY98 budget to at least $15M prior to incorporation into the President’s Budget. With DARPA expecting scramjet technology from HyTech, the current FY98 budget level will make HyTech unresponsive. In addition, the FY98 to FY99 funding ramp will be viewed unfavorably by the Air Force and DoD Comptrollers, who will probably flatten it in the out-years, with the result that the HyTech budget for the remainder of the current FYDP will likely return to a level similar to the 4 Dec 96 level shown in the table. PE62269F Budget: FY95–03   FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 1 Feb 96 $10.5M $20M $7.6M $19.2M $17.4M $17.5M $18.9M $20M   4 Dec 96 $10.5M $12.6M* $10.3M* $6.3M $10M $10M $10M $10M $10M 21 Dec 95 $10.5M $12.6M* $10.3M* $9.9M $16.1M $16.1M $17M $16M $16.1M *Includes $3M reprogrammed from FY96 to FY97 to alleviate bow wave.

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Review and Evaluation of the Air Force Hypersonic Technology Program Lessons Learned: The HyTech team learned many lessons during this adventure, including the following: Receiving significantly more money than a program is prepared to spend and receiving it late in the fiscal year can hurt a program much more than it helps. Good communications between the program management, financial and contracting personnel; and insuring they each take ownership in the program can make a seemingly impossible requirement achievable, as was the case for HyTech. Even when the comptroller states that a program will forward finance its funds, it doesn’t mean he is going to let the program get away with it. Keeping a program as simple as possible can make reaction times quicker. HyTech’s 50+ tasks took months to obligate, even though the skids were greased. However, not all programs can be technically effective if over-simplified. If a program has a dedicated PE, as opposed to being part of a “basket PE,” it will gain more visibility and it will be safe from its funds being easily transferred to other related programs. If the program is healthy or needs assistance this can be very good. However, the same visibility will bring obligation or expenditure rate problems to the attention of headquarters personnel and the lack of flexibility will restrict the program manager’s options for resolving these problems at the local level. Never give-up. Sometimes budgets are restored when the leadership recognizes the potential in revolutionary technology, even during periods of major budget reductions.