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OCR for page 269
19.
The Antarctic Treaty System as a
Resource Management Mechanism
Nonliving Resources
Christopher D. Beeby
Antarctica generates powerful myths.
Antarctic minerals
and the negotiations under way concerning them have not
been immune from the myth-making process. In its devel-
oped form, to be found, notably but not exclusively, in
unresearched press articles, the mythology is that
Antarctica is a vast reservoir of wealth, a cornucopia of
riches for which a race is on, regardless of the risks to
a unique environment. The discussions initiated by the
Antarctic Treaty consultative parties about a regime for
antarctic minerals are designed to allow that race to be
won.
Exactly why such a popular view should have developed
is not entirely clear to me. It may have something to
do, as one commentator has suggested, with the inevitabil-
ity of speculation about the last wilderness. Publication
some years ago of figures, of a wholly theoretical kind,
suggesting that X barrels of oil and Y barrels of gas
will be found in Antarctica, may also have been a con-
tributing factor. In all fairness, there should probably
be added to this catalog the fact that when the consulta-
tive parties began to talk in 1981, in earnest and as a
matter of urgency, about a regime for antarctic minerals,
they did not do as good a job as they might have in
explaining to the rest of the world why they were tackling
this issue.
I do not intend to investigate every aspect of the
myth that I have outlined. Others, to whose views I
shall refer, are much better equipped than I am to inform
us in detail of the current state of knowledge about
minerals in Antarctica. What I can attempt, as somebody
who works for the government that first drew attention to
a potential problem about minerals in Antarctica, is to
say something about the origins and purpose of the current
269
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270
minerals regime negotiations. Since I have been fairly
closely involved in those negotiations, I shall also
assay an account of their progress to date.
The common perception of those countries that are
parties to the Antarctic Treaty--a perception that I
think is now more widely shared following two debates in
the U.N. about Antarctica--is that the major achievement
of the treaty was to put a lid on the large potential for
tension, rivalry, dispute and even conflict that was
inherent in the preexisting situation. Those who initi-
ated the Antarctic Treaty in 1959 had to confront a
massive dispute about sovereignty in Antarctica. It is
hard to imagine a setup that had a larger potential for
governments to display their worst side. Here were seven
countries that, over a rather long period, had claimed to
exercise sovereignty in Antarctica, and the claims of
three of them overlapped in the Antarctic Peninsula. As
if this were not enough, five additional countries neither
made claims themselves, nor recognized the claims of
others (although two of them had asserted that their
activities had established a basis of claim).
Early on in the 1959 conference that produced the
Antarctic Treaty, it became quite clear that there was no
possibility of resolving the claims conflict either
through the claimant states' or the nonclaimant states'
giving away their basic positions. But a means was
found--and enshrined in Article IV of the treaty--to put
disputes about sovereignty to one side. The treaty
founded on that article was, then, a very significant
measure in favor of stability and security in Antarctica.
It represented, and it still represents, that Antarctica
will remain peaceful and stable--will not become, in the
words of the treaty, The scene or object of inter-
national discord. n
The examination, within the Antarctic Treaty System,
of the question of antarctic minerals had its origins
there. It was a concern to preserve the stabilizing
regime of the Antarctic Treaty (coupled with a worry
about the impact on the environment if mining ever
occurred on the continent) that led New Zealand, as far
back as 1970 at the consultative meeting held in that
year, to raise the question of antarctic minerals and to
urge its treaty partners to consider the need for a
comprehensive regime governing them.
The treaty does not deal with resources of any kind,
whether living or mineral. The New Zealand fear was
that, if at some stage important resources were found, an
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271
unregulated scramble could develop in relation, in par-
ticular, to minerals. A scramble of that kind could
obviously have the most damaging effect on a very special
environment. But it could also bring back to center
stage the conflicting positions about sovereignty that
the treaty had put to one side. This is so because, in
the absence of agreed rules, states that claim sovereignty
and states that neither make claims to sovereignty nor
recognize the claims of others would give totally con-
flicting answers to a whole series of obvious questions
arising if a minerals deposit of economic significance
were ever found in Antarctica: "Who has title to the
deposit? Who should license its exploitation? Who would
regulate it? Who would get the taxes and royalties?"
The answers to questions of this kind are entirely
dependent on the view taken as to the location of
sovereignty, if any, over the area in which the deposit
is located.
As Arthur Watts has pointed out (Chapter 6), Article
IV does not resolve the issue of sovereignty in AntarC-
tica or remove entirely the possibility of serious dis-
agreement arising from conflicting positions on sover-
eignty. The effective operation of the whole Antarctic
Treaty System depends on restraint, on a willingness on
the part of the parties to the treaty not to press their
views about sovereignty to a logical conclusion. In the
absence of agreed rules, discovery of significant mineral
deposits in Antarctica would place maximum pressure on
the willingness of all to continue to exercise that
restraint.
What motivated New Zealand in 1970 was a belief that
the unregulated exploitation of antarctic minerals, if it
ever occurred, would present a threat to the Antarctic
Treaty. In the worst case, the result could be a break-
down of the treaty, the loss of the disarmament regime
that it contains, and, more generally, of the stabilizing
effect that it has had on the entire area south of 60°S
latitude.
The origins of discussions about antarctic minerals
are therefore essentially political rather than economic
in nature.
That this continues to be so is confirmed by what the
experts tell us 14 years later about the mineral resources
of Antarctica. The mythology, they say, is just that:
there is no evidence at all that antarctic minerals ~epre-
sent an economic treasure house ready for the taking in
the foreseeable future. Despite many years of research,
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272
a limited amount is known about antarctic minerals. A
great deal more work has to be done to make other than
speculative assessments. There are minerals onshore, but
none of proven economic significance. What is more, 97
or 98 percent of the continent is covered by a mile or
more of ice; nobody is going to have an economic interest
in penetrating that for many years. Offshore, the
prospects look a little more interesting. There may be
oil and gas, but whether there is and, if so, where and
in what quantities, is simply not known. There seems
little doubt that it will be well into the next century
before the extraction of oil or gas, if they exist,
becomes an attractive economic nossibilitv. That uredic-
_
coon Is not merely a result of the current oil-supply
situation. It is also a function of the extremely
adverse conditions in Antarctica, logistical and
marketing problems, and the huge costs that would be
involved at any time in mining in the region. We are
told, again by the experts, that a giant or perhaps a
super-giant oil field would need to be found in Antarctica
before there would be an economic justification for pro-
ceeding to exploit it. There is no evidence that such a
field or fields exist.
Summing up the studies that had been undertaken in
1982, James Zumberge, who is one of the experts whom we
are fortunate to have as a contributor to this workshop,
said: "All who have dealt with this matter have come to
the same conclusion: no mineral deposits likely to be of
economic value in the foreseeable future are known in
Antarctica. This statement is not to say that Antarctica
has no mineral resources, but rather, if they exist, they
have no economic significance today or in the near-term
future. (Zumberge goes on to point out that of course
economic circumstances can change rapidly.) Another
expert, Franze Tessensohn, writing a year later, said,
after surveying the geophysical work that has been under-
taken with respect to offshore areas frequently regarded
as likely to be of economic interest before onshore
areas, said: waif one tries to draw a conclusion based on
all these investigations it can be stated that several
interesting sedimentary basins exist on the antarctic
shelves, but that we do not know much about their extent,
about [the] nature and age of the sedimentary infill,
about the thermal history they have undergone, and about
possible source and reservoir rocks. So I thank we are
still much in the phase of guessing."2
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273
I return now to the history of the discussions about
antarctic minerals within the Antarctic Treaty System.
After the topic had been broached at the sixth consulta-
tive meeting, in Tokyo, the 1970s saw a progressively
more intensive discussion about minerals, both inside and
outside the regular meetings of the consultative parties.
The help of the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research
was asked for; other groups of experts were set to work.
A landmark was reached at the ninth consultative meeting,
in London in 1977, with the adoption of Recommendation
IX-1, which looked forward to a regime for antarctic
minerals and, in doing so, endorsed a number of principles
about such a regime, which had been adopted at a special
preparatory meeting held in Paris the previous year. The
same recommendation made more specific an idea emerging
from the previous consultative meeting, namely, that the
nationals of consultative parties and other states should
be urged to refrain from all exploration and exploitation
of antarctic mineral resources "while making progress
towards the timely adoption of an agreed regime concerning
antarctic mineral resource activities. They will thus
endeavor to ensure that, pending the timely adoption of
agreed solutions pertaining to exploration and exploita-
tion of mineral resources, no activity shall be conducted
to explore or exploit such resources. n This contingent
measure of restraint has been confirmed at subsequent
meetings and is still extant.
Recommendation X-1, adopted by the consultative par-
ties' meeting in Washington in 1979, represented a further
accretion of consensus on the contents of a minerals
regime; and an informal meeting held in Washington in the
following year made further progress in the same
direction.
The formal decision to begin detailed negotiations on
a minerals regime was taken in Buenos Aires in 1981 at
the eleventh consultative meeting. That decision was
recorded in Recommendation XI-1, which, once again,
picked up and enlarged areas of agreement reached at
previous meetings.
Recommendation XI-1 determined that a minerals regime
should be concluded "as a matter of urgency. That
determination needs to be viewed against the origins of
the discussion on minerals. The most important reason
for deciding to do the job quickly was that, for so long
as a minerals question remained unresolved, it presented
a potential threat to the Antarctic Treaty and the Antarc-
tic Treaty System. It was, I believe, recognized in
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274
Buenos Aires in 1981, that to postpone the negotiations
until such time as a significant mineral deposit was
found in Antarctica and there was a serious economic
interest in exploiting it would very greatly complicate,
if not make entirely unmanageable, the task of producing
agreed answers to the complex issues raised.
Since Recommendation XI-1 constitutes the basis for
the negotiations now under way, it is worth noting the
main areas of agreement that it recorded:
The minerals regime should be negotiated by the
consultative parties, and they should continue to play
an active and responsible role in dealing with the
question;
The Antarctic Treaty must be maintained in its
entirety;
· The protection of the unique antarctic environ-
ment and of its dependent ecosystems should be a basic
consideration;
· The consultative parties, in dealing with the
question of mineral resources in Antarctica, should
not prejudice the interests of all humankind in
Antarctica;
The delicate balance contained in Article IV of
the Antarctic Treaty should not be affected by the
regime, and the principles embodied in that article
should be safeguarded;
· The regime should include means for assessing the
possible impact of mineral resource activities on the
antarctic environment, determining whether such
activities will be acceptable, and, if they are,
regulating them;
· The area of the regime should encompass the
continent of Antarctica and its adjacent offshore
areas but without encroachment on the deep seabed
· The regime should cover all mineral resource
activities at every stage;
· The regime should be open in the sense that it
should include provisions for adherence by states
other than the consultative parties on the
understanding that adhering states would be bound by
the basic provisions of the Antarctic Treaty;
· The regime should include provision for
cooperative arrangements with other relevant
international organizations;
· The regime should protect the special
responsibilities of the consultative parties with
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respect to the environment of the whole Antarctic
Treaty area, taking into account responsibilities that
may be exercised in that area by other international
organizations; and
· The regime should promote the conduct of research
necessary to make the environmental and resource
management decisions that will be required.
Additionally--and this is a central issue to which I
shall return--Recommendation XI-1 stated that any agree-
ment that may be reached on a regime should be acceptable
and without prejudice to those states that claim
sovereignty in Antarctica as well as to states that
neither claim sovereignty nor recognize such claims.
The negotiations foreshadowed by Recommendation XI-1
began in Wellington, New Zealand, in mid-1982. Since
then there have been further negotiating sessions held in
Wellington (January 1983), Bonn (July 1983), Washington
(January 1984) and Tokyo (May 1984). The meeting, at
which, for the first time, all the parties to the
Antarctic Treaty and not just the consultative parties
participated, was held in Rio de Janeiro in February/
March 1985 and a further meeting is scheduled in Paris
September/October 1985.
There are several issues, of uneven importance, which
still have to be sorted out. Substantial progress has,
however, been made to the point where some predictions
about the main features of the agreement that is likely
to emerge can be made. I need to stress that these are
predictions only. Given that the negotiations are taking
place under a rule of consensus, no solution on any point
will be reached if it does not attract the support of all
those participating in the decision-making.
The regime will be expressed in the form of a legally
binding international agreement, which, since its prin-
cipal purpose is to preserve and strengthen the Antarctic
Treaty, will, by one means or another, be closely linked
with that treaty. Following the precedent of the Antarc-
tic Treaty itself and also that of the Convention on the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
(CCAMLR), the agreement will be open for accession by all
interested states.
The agreement will not be a complete and comprehensive
mining code containing a detailed resolution of all the
issues that may arise in future. A code of this kind,
which is common in the national legislation of many
countries, is ruled out for a number of reasons. The
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276
most obvious one is that we are negotiating in a state of
considerable ignorance, which has both the advantage that
I have referred to (i.e., the absence of pressure result-
ing from economic interest in an identified resource J ana
disadvantages. The fact is that it is simply not possible
to foresee now the whole range of mineral resource activi-
ties that might one day be undertaken in Antarctica.
Moreover, our present knowledge of the sensitivities of
the antarctic environment is incomplete. The regime
must, therefore, constitute a framework within which, as
our knowledge increases, the details can be filled in as
may be required. That framework will, however, have to
be of a kind that will provide all concerned with a clear
picture of the way in which decisions will be taken under
the regime and the standards against which those decisions
will be made. It will also need to ensure that, if mining
does take place in Antarctica, those who undertake it
have security of title, have their investments protected,
and are not subject to the arbitrary disruption of author-
ized activity.
The regime will create new institutions, in some
respects similar to, and other respects differing from,
those established by the CCAMLR. There will be a central
body or commission with authority relating to the whole
area covered by the regime and the regulatory powers
necessary to fill in the framework created by it. There
will be a subordinate advisory committee, responsible for
tendering scientific, technical and environmental advice.
m ere will be a secretariat.
And, by way of departure
from the CCAMLR precedent, there will be a series of
smaller so-called "regulatory committees, n with respon-
sibility for certain aspects of the regulation of mining
that may take place in an area identified by the commis-
sion. Representation on regulatory committees will
include, inter alla, the state or states, if any, claiming
sovereignty in the identified area and the state wishing
to undertake mineral resource activities or to sponsor
such activities by its nationals. It will be within these
bodies that, consistently with the principles established
by the regime and further measures laid down by the com-
mission, many of the detailed rules and regulations
governing individual mining projects that might be deemed
acceptable would be negotiated and adopted.
The precise composition and functions of the institu-
tions to be created and their method of taking decisions
is still under negotiation. But there is, I think, by
now, a rather generally shared view that the key to the
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277
problem of finding an accommodation between states claim-
ing sovereignty in Antarctica and states neither making
nor recognizing such claims will be found largely within
the institutional structure of the regime.
As was anticipated in Buenos Aires, it became evident
early on that the search for this accommodation between
claimants and non-claimants was the single most intrac-
table issue that had to be dealt with. It was also
apparent that neither claimants nor non-claimants would
be satisfied with a regime heavily loaded in one direction
or another but accompanied by a disclaimer based on
Article IV of the treaty (although a parallel to that
article, as in the CCAMLR, will undoubtedly have its
place in the regime). Both claimants and non-claimants
demanded, with good reason, that, as foreshadowed in
Recommendation XI-1, any minerals regime as a whole would
have to be acceptable to them and without prejudice to
their conflicting positions on the sovereignty question.
At the first two negotiating sessions, much of the
debate about this aspect arose from an examination of the
broad question of where the powers required to regulate
antarctic minerals should be located. The initial
nonclaimant answer to that question was that, for the
most part, regulation would have to be undertaken by the
parties to the regime, acting collectively and without
distinctions of any kind, through its institutions. The
initial claimant response was that, for the most part,
regulation would have to be undertaken by states acting
individually, even if in a manner envisaged by and con-
sistent with the regime or possibly, in certain instances,
pursuant to authority delegated by institutions of the
regime. With respect to areas of Antarctica subject to
claims to sovereignty, the individual states having the
major regulatory role would be those claiming sovereignty.
At the meeting in Bonn in July 1983 the consultative
parties accepted as a starting point for further negotia-
tions a text that attempted to break this deadlock by
switching attention from the question of location of the
necessary regulatory powers and focusing, instead, on the
institutions of the regime, their composition, and the
method by which they would take decisions. The basic
assumption underlying this approach was that it was not
necessary and almost certainly not possible either to
attempt to spell out in detail all the elements of an
accommodation on the sovereignty question in the text of
the agreement to be adopted or, in particular, to try, in
the text itself, to reconcile strongly conflicting views
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278
about the substantive powers of claimant and nonclaimant
states. The alternative--also in part determined by the
lack of knowledge of all the issues that would require
regulation--was to leave a significant number of important
decisions to be hammered out after the regime had been
adopted, through a continuing process of negotiation on a
case-by-case basis. Power to take those decisions would
be given to the institutions of the regime, but the
regime would endeavor to ensure that the composition of
those institutions and their method of taking decisions
were such as to give claimants and nonclaimants alike a
reasonable assurance that their divergent interests would
be protected. As in the case of the Antarctic Treaty
itself, and consistently with the spirit of forbearance
that it embodied and that has informed all the work
undertaken since its adoption, the sovereignty issue will
not be confronted but stepped around.
The regime will cover the area, offshore as well as
onshore, referred to in Recommendation XI-1, and it will
cover every stage of mineral resource activities within
that area. A distinction will, however, be drawn between,
on the one hand, prospecting, defined narrowly to include
only activities presenting a minimum ~f risk to the
environment and, on the other, exploration and develop-
ment. Prospecting, which will not confer title on the
prospector, will not require prior authorization. It
will, however, be subject to environmental controls
applicable to all stages of mineral resource activity.
There will be power vested in the commission to impose
additional constraints on prospecting, that could have
the effect of preventing or limiting any category of
prospecting found to present hazards. Provision is also
likely to be made to allow for review of prospecting
-
activity that, for example, because of the concentration
of prospecting activity in a particular region or because
of conflict with other legitimate uses of Antarctica, is
thought to present a special problem.
By contrast, in recognition of the very much larger
environmental hazards that could be involved, exploration
and development will be expressly prohibited until such
time as they are authorized by the institutions of the
regime. Initially this will require a decision by the
commission, acting on the advice of the advisory commit-
tee, as to whether or not it should authorize the sub-
mission of applications for exploration and development
of an identified area. That determination would consti-
tute a critical but not a final decision. A positive
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279
determination by the commission would still require that
individual applications for exploration and development
be scrutinized by the advisory committee and the relevant
regulatory committee. Positive results there would still,
in turn, require a final approval by the commission before
either form of activity could begin.
It is of some importance to note that if the regime is
structured in this way with respect to exploration and
development, it will stand in sharp contrast to the marine
living resources regime established by the CCAMLR. The
basic proposition underlying the CCAMLR--that activity is
permitted until restrained--will be reversed: the only
mineral resource activities that would confer title on
the operator and might confer economic benefit will be
prohibited unless specifically authorized.
The regime will implement the requirement set out in
Recommendation XI-1 that the protection of the antarctic
environment and of its dependent ecosystems must be a
basic consideration. This will be done in several ways.
There will, first, be a set of environmental principles
set out near the beginning of the agreement. These
principles will cover every phase of activity, including
prospecting, and they will be applicable to both operators
and institutions created by the regime. They will be
relevant at every point to test the acceptability of
proposed activity; neither states nor the institutions of
the regime will be free to ignore them. Among the prin-
ciples that it will embody are the following: that no
mineral resource activity may take place until adequate
information is available to assess its possible impact
and it can be judged that such activity will meet rigorous
criteria; and that no such activity shall take place until
the technology and procedures (including contingency
plans in the event of accidents) are available to ensure
compliance with these criteria and there exists the
capacity to monitor key environmental and ecosystem
components. Judgments about the acceptability of
proposed activities will be required to take account,
inter alla, of the cumulative impact of mineral resource
activities and other uses of Antarctica.
A second environmentally important aspect of the
regime will involve setting aside, as off limits to all
mineral resource activities, existing Specially Protected
Areas, Sites of Special Scientific Interest, and any
further area that for historic, ecological, environ-
mental, scientific, or other reasons the commission has
designated a prohibited area.
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280
The fact that exploration and development will be
forbidden until they are determined to be acceptable on
environmental grounds will be a significant bar to haz-
ardous activity--the more
provision is made for the
consensus.
The advisory committee will play a key role in decision
making under the regime. All the views expressed by it
so if, as seems likely,
determination to be made by
_ _ _ _
on a particular proposal, i.e., not merely majority views,
will be made known to the bodies to which it gives advice.
Provision is likely to be made for the advisory committee
to give public notice of its meetings, to receive submis-
sions from concerned international organizations, and to
make public its views. Further consideration will be
given, in the ongoing negotiations, to alternative tech-
niques for ensuring that environmental considerations and
advice are given proper weight and are not overridden by
an interest in promoting and deriving benefit from
mineral resource activities.
Finally, there will be provision for the suspension,
modification, or cancellation of authorized exploration
and development if a determination is made that there has
been a failure to comply with the rules applicable to it
or that new and unforeseen risks to the environment have
arisen.
m e regime will require the states parties to take
measures to ensure compliance with it.
liability in the event of accident.
It will deal with
It will make pro-
vlslon for the secelemenc or alspuces concerning the
interpretation or application of the regime. These are
among the matters that require further attention in the
negotiations.
Finally, the regime will, in several ways, take account
of the interests in Antarctica of the international com-
munity at large. A general point needs, first, to be
made. The regime is intended to, and will, preserve and
strengthen the Antarctic Treaty. The benefits to all
_
countries trom a guarantee that one sixth or the world
will continue to be demilitarized, that scientific
research in that region will continue to be conducted
under conditions of unique freedom and cooperation, and
that a globally important environment will continue to
receive protection are considerable. That point has been
spelled out at some length in the U.N. debates; I do not
need to elaborate on it further here.
The specifics are also important. The consultative
parties have not lost sight of the fact that other inter-
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281
national agreements extend to Antarctica and other inter-
national organizations have, or will have, competence
south of 60°S latitude. As I have indicated, the regime
will implement that part of Recommendation XI-1 that says
the definition of the area will be such as to involve no
encroachment on the deep seabed. As also foreshadowed in
Recommendation XI-1, the regime will protect the special
responsibilities of the consultative parties with respect
to the environment throughout the whole of the Antarctic
Treaty area. But, in this respect as well, the respon-
sibilities of other international organizations will not
be ignored. The regime is likely, in fact, to contain an
all-embracing provision requiring the commission to
cooperate with all interested international organizations
and, more specifically, to develop a cooperative working
relationship with any international organization having
competence in mineral resources in areas adjacent to
those covered by the regime.
Then, of course, there is the basic point that the
regime under consideration is not a closed system.
Subject only to a willingness to subscribe to the
Antarctic Treaty or to its basic provisions (the final
choice has yet to be made between these alternatives),
every state will be able to adhere to the agreement
setting up the regime.
to participate in mining found to be acceptable in
Antarctica. If it decides to exercise that right, it
will participate in all the decision-making relating to
its actual or proposed activity.
Are there other elements that might be included in a
regime and that would enhance its status vis-a-vis coun-
tries not participating in negotiations? Participation
by the nonconsultative parties to the treaty in the min-
erals regime negotiations should provide further insight
into this aspect of the regime. So should this workshop.
I shall not discuss the question further here except to
note, in conclusion, one avenue that I believe to be
closed.
Suggestions have been made, in the U.N. debates and in
the literature, that Antarctica or its resources or some
part of them should be regarded as part of "the common
heritage of mankind." The concept of the common heritage
of mankind could be applied to outer space and the deep
seabed because of a consensus on the status of those
areas. Each had been the subject of extremely limited
human activity, and neither had been the subject of any
claim of sovereignty. It is quite another matter to
Every state party will be entitled
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282
attempt to apply this notion to an area that, by now, has
generated substantial history of human activity, that has
been subject to claims of sovereignty dating back more
than 75 years, and that is the subject of a preexisting
legal regime among the states most directly concerned.
It is neither reasonable nor realistic to suppose that
the common heritage concept can make headway with respect
to Antarctica. There is no consensus on the legal status
of the continent that would permit that.
There is another comment that needs to be made about
the common heritage concept.
As it has developed in the
U.N., that concept has a strong exploitation orientation
It looks, essentially, to the development of resources
for the benefit of all, especially of the developing
countries, rather than to the protection of the environ-
ment in which those resources are located. It is, I
believe, significant that in the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention the environmental controls on deep seabed
mining in the common heritage area are notably weak.
Against this background, those who advocate, on the one
hand, stringent environmental controls in Antarctica and,
on the other hand, the adoption within the U.N. of a
common heritage minerals regime are pursuing incompatible
goals.
I should like to elaborate on my prepared remarks about
the origin of the antarctic minerals regime negotiations
by drawing a hypothetical analogy to the discovery of a
mountain of gold in the area of Antarctica claimed by New
Zealand. Once the gold were discovered there would be
considerable pressure on the New Zealand government to
develop rules to regulate its exploitation and to treat
the deposit as any other deposit of gold located in New
Zealand. This would provoke reactions from non-claimant
countries, rejecting New Zealand's contention that its
rules should govern exploitation, which would in turn
create the possibility of unregulated development and
destabilization of Antarctica similar to that which
existed before the Antarctic Treaty and led to its
negotiation.
I should also like to respond to several comments made
during the workshop. First, in 1975 the government of
New Zealand proposed to prohibit minerals development in
Antarctica and declare it a world park. But it did not
then make the statement that it would abandon its claim
to Antarctica. The reaction from other Antarctic Treaty
consultative parties at that time indicated that they
were not willing to forgo minerals development in
.
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Antarctica for all time, so the New Zealand proposal was
not pursued.
Second, the decision not to reject the possibility of
antarctic minerals exploitation does not necessarily
indicate that the regime under negotiation must be a
~prodevelopment" regime as it is characterized by some
nongovernmental organizations.
sibility, which is currently being pursued:
constructed objectively to address the question, once it
arises, of whether specific types of mineral development
activity should be permitted in specific areas of
Antarctica, subject to stringent safeguards for safety,
conservation, and protection of the environment.
Third, the rationale for the provision in Antarctic
Treaty Recommendation XI-1, that HA regime on antarctic
mineral resources should be concluded as a matter of
_
urgency (emphasis added) is not directly related to
recent interest in Antarctica. The recommendation was
concluded in 1981, two Years before U.N. interest was
expressed.
·
There is a third pos-
. a regime
_
At that time, the experts were saying that
minerals Development in Antarctica was not commercially
viable. While there are different reasons for the need
for urgency, I favor the "gap" theory; that is, that as
long as the regime for minerals development remains
unresolved, it will pose a threat to the Antarctic Treaty
System and cooperation within that system.
With respect to the negotiations themselves, there are
four differences among states involved in the
negotiations that complicate these negotiations and must
be taken into account:
(1) Countries claiming territory in Antarctica and
those that do not recognize such claims,
(2) Countries with centrally planned economies and
those without,
(3)
and those without, and
(4) Countries close to Antarctica whose ecosystems
might be affected by antarctic minerals development
and those farther away, whose ecosystems are unlikely
to be directly affected by such activities.
Countries with access to the requisite technology
Finally, the primary matters yet to be settled in the
negotiations are the exact methods and procedures by
which decisions will be taken e Inspection will be an
important element in the minerals regime.
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NOTES
1. Zumberge, J.H., 1982. Potential Mineral Resource
Availability and Possible Environment Problems in
Antarctica. In J.I. Charney, ed. New Nationalism and
the Use of Common Spaces, Allenheld, Osmund and
Company (Totowa, N.J.); pp. 115-154.
2. Tessensohn, F. 1983. Present Knowledge of Nonliving
Resource in the Antarctic, Possibilities for Their
Exploitation and Scientific Perspectives. In R.
Wolfrum, ed. Antarctic Challenge: Conflicting
Interests, Cooperation, Environmental Protection,
Economic Development: Proceedings of an
Interdisciplinary Symposium, Duncker & Humblot
(Berlin); pp. 189-210.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
antarctic minerals
