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20. Pane] Discussion on Nonliving Resources The panel consisted of Robert H. Rutford (Moderator), Roger Wilson, Geoffrey F. Larminie, and Adriaan Bos. REMARKS BY ROGER WILSON Wilson indicated that he would take a political per- spective on Beeby's presentation (Chapter 19). He shared Beeby's view that the "gap" in the Atlantic Treaty System (ATS) on the subject of minerals requires filling but disagreed with the treaty consultative parties' belief that that gap should be filled with a regime that under certain circumstances would permit minerals development. In his opinion, once a regime or a mechanism to govern minerals development existed, minerals development would sooner or later take place. He questioned the lack of serious consideration given to the nondevelopment option and believed that the reason for this is that antarctic policy is fashioned primarily by civil servants in the foreign affairs ministries of states parties to the Antarctic Treaty who are not directly answerable to the public. mis means that no express public mandate, which might challenge conven- tional wisdom, is sought or derived from discussions within and between political parties. He asked, rhetorically, how many governments had ever made antarctic policy a part of their political platforms, or sought a mandate on antarctic policy, and expressed surprise that few have done so given the serious regard accorded by governments to Antarctica. He referred specifically to the 1975 New Zealand world park proposal, recalled by Beeby, which received little support from other treaty nations. The 1975 New Zealand government was a Labour Party government, yet today the same party has chosen to continue along the path leading to minerals development. Wilson did not know why this policy change had occurred, but he noted that the New 285

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286 Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a significant investment in the existing policy and would have diffi- culty reversing it ~ tally different policy direction, taken in the absence of a public mandate, most likely on the advice of civil servants who do not have to answer to the public. On another point, he noted the acknowledgment by BeebY that perhaps the consultative parties to the Antarctic Treaty had not adequately explained their efforts to negotiate a minerals regime to the rest of the world, which implied that, had they explained, no one would have challenged their efforts. In Wilson's view, the problem is a more fundamental one. To illustrate his point, he quoted the provision of Recommendation XI-1 specifying that one of the principles on which a minerals regime should be based is that "the Consultative Parties, in dealing with the question of mineral resources in Antarctica, should not prejudice the interests of all mankind in Antarctica. n He questioned the presumption of the Antarctic Treaty states in appointing themselves to determine what the "interests of mankind" are. Wilson doubted whether the primary way Beeby had described in which the minerals regime would take account of the interests of the international community at large was indeed sufficient: maintaining good relations with other international organizations having competence south of 60S latitude. In his view, the fundamental n interests of all mankind" in Antarctica lie in the maintenance of peace in the area and in the results of the science conducted there. The question is then whether these interests are better served by a proexploitation regime or by a protection-oriented regime; Wilson believed humankind's interests could not be guaranteed if minerals exploitation--at best marginal and/or subsidized--were to take place. Nor, clearly, could protection of wildlife or wilderness values be guaranteed. Wilson raised questions about whether two recent seismic research projects complied with the policy of "voluntary restraint" quoted by Beeby from Recommendation XI-1. He named the Japanese government program carried out with the Hakurei Maru and the 1983-1984 vovaae of the once more. one result is a fundamen- u.~. government research vessel, S.P. Lee, noting that once initial investments are made, it would be difficult to halt the momentum toward minerals development. The S.P. Lee program had received early promises of funding from the Circum-Pacific Council for Minerals and Energy Research, a private-industry body whose chairman is an

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287 independent U.S. oil company executive, Michael T. Halbouty, but this did not work out in the long run. On the subject of prospecting, he questioned why prospecting in Antarctica should not be subject to specific authorization under the regime, particularly when many of the consultative parties to the treaty required prior authorization within their own territories. He ventured that Beeby was optimistic in assuming that countries would not ignore the principles of the regime, including the environmental principles, as he felt had occurred under the CCAMLR, or that political pressures might not ultimately preempt them. _ He expressed doubts that the advisory committee described in Beeby's presen- tation would be able to fulfill its task, because the scientists appointed would have numerous commitments on their time, might be appointed on political grounds or to carry out the political aims of their governments, and might not be expert in the disciplines required, or, conversely, to meet the requirement of technical com- petence they might be those most interested in developing antarctic minerals. He believed that the nonpolitical antarctic environmental protection agency proposed by Greenpeace (see Chapter 14), staffed with full-time professionals, deserves serious consideration. Wilson also criticized the decision making institutions of the minerals regime as being biased in favor of devel- opment, since only those states actually engaged in minerals development activities, during such time as they are engaged in them, can join the consultative parties to the Antarctic Treaty as decision making members in the institutions of the regime; states in favor of environ- mental protection would not have the same sort of say at the decision making level as those interested in exploit- ing mineral resources in Antarctica. Clearly the decision making institutions promote minerals activities by giving decision making power to the exploiters. Wilson cautioned against possible failures to comply with the rules established by the regime and wondered whether members of the decision making commission under the regime would accept the responsibility to discipline one another once a possible disagreement over compliance arose. His lack of confidence stemmed from the difficulty Greenpeace had encountered in seeking consideration during Antarctic Treaty meetings of possible noncompliance by the French government with the Antarctic Treaty Agreed Measures with respect to its construction of an airstrip to serve the French claim in Antarctica.

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288 In conclusion, Wilson advocated a more open system for the minerals regime and that all options be considered, including the possibility of forgoing minerals develop- ment completely. REMARKS BY GEOFFREY F. LARMINIE Larminie suggested that perhaps a definition of "all mankind" was in order, and noted that by his calculations more than 80 percent of the world's population is already represented within the ATS. REMARKS BY ADRIAAN BOS Bos commented that Beeby's presentation dealt mainly with the politics within the ATS. However, the minerals regime negotiations have recently attracted the attention of the wider international community, and for that reason the establishment of the minerals regime has become a global political concern, raising issues new to the ATS frame- work. He agreed that the consultative parties might have done a better job in explaining their activities to the world at large, but like Wilson he doubted whether this would have prevented questions and tensions arising today about the system. He cited the language in Recommendation XI-1, which refers to a minerals regime "elaborated by the Consulta- tive Parties," to illustrate how quickly things have changed since 1981; in 1984 the decision was taken to invite the nonconsultative parties to the Antarctic Treaty to take part in these negotiations. He added that it remains to be seen whether the involvement of the outside world can be further enhanced. He questioned the meaning of the Recommendation XI-1 stipulation that The Antarctic Treaty must be maintained in its entirety, for, while the achievements of the treaty are admirable and should be maintained, it might be difficult to ask states party to the minerals regime that are not party to the Antarctic Treaty to accept this. He suggested that they might be asked to respect the achievements of the Antarctic Treaty without being asked to maintain the treaty in its entirety. Bos found the phraseology of Recommendation XI-1, where it refers to "not prejudicing] the interests of all mankind," too negative. He stressed the need to find

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289 ways to guarantee that the regime be in "the interests of mankind," since this will be the test for acceptance of the regime by the international community. Moreover, he noted that one should not think only in terms of economic benefit; a continuing moratorium on minerals development activities for the time being might also be seen to be in The interests of all mankind." SUMMARY The discussion elaborated on a number of points raised by Beeby (Chapter 19) and by the panelists. Many of these addressed the role of states and organizations currently not involved in the antarctic minerals regime negotiations: Their involvement in policy formulation at the negotiation stage; Their involvement in the implementation of the minerals regime once completed, and specifically in its decision making processes; and Their involvement in potential minerals development activities and benefits therefrom. (The questions of how the minerals regime will take account of international interests at large and the relationship of the ATS to the United Nations system are discussed further in the next section.) Other points referred to the earlier technical dis- cussion and the relationship between the timing for possible antarctic minerals development activities and political considerations of urgency in completing the regime. The proposal for a moratorium on antarctic minerals development was also debated. Several questions produced more detailed descriptions of how the minerals regime, as now contemplated, would operate in practice. Among the points covered were the following: area of application; the framework of the regime; institutions; environmental protection and safety; effects on scientific research; prospecting; environmental protection and confidentiality of data; and enforcement and reporting requirements.

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290 PARTICIPATION Various approaches to widening international participa- tion with respect to antarctic minerals were considered In lieu of basing a minerals regime on any one of the four different "theologies that arise in antarctic minerals debates--world park, claimant, nonclai~nant, or common heritage of humankind--it was argued that the ATS should remain ' ecumenical ' . The contentious issue, how- ever, was: Who should reconcile these theologies and how? Some participants believed that those appointed to define the Interests of all mankind" should not have a material interest in their trust and that they should be responsible to a higher authority. Equally important was the question of right: Who should appoint those under- taking the definition? Others asked whether a basis for management other than the ATS would likely represent more effectively and equitably "the interests of all mankindn; they stated that "right" derived, among other things, from the fact that the ATS worked; and that the rights and obligations generated by the Antarctic Treaty were exclusive only as between states parties and neither granted rights to nor obligated third parties without their consent. CO+ON HERITAGE OF MANKIND Beeby's comments on the applicability of the common heritage of mankind concept to Antarctica provoked opposing views from those who believed that Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty suspends the applicability of the claims as long as it is in effect; they did not accept, as debated earlier in the workshop (Section II) , that the claims are still very much alive, nor did they neces- sar fly believe that these claims will ~ emain alive in perpetuity (citing histor ical examples of reversals of territorial claims and the fact that in the Law of the Sea negotiations a number of states had in effect reduced their claims to offshore rights). Others repeated that there is a distinction between the deep seabed and outer space, where the common heritage concept has been applied, and Antarctica. Several speakers criticized Beeby's characterization of the common heritage as having a strong exploitation orientation; they noted that it encompasses concepts of peaceful use, environmental protection and management,

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291 and rational use of resources for present and future generations--all of which are fully consistent with the objectives of the ATS. Nor did they agree with Larminie's percentage-of-world population" definition of mankind, because the political meaning of the concept is widely understood to refer to all countries, whether rich or poor, developed or developing, technologically advantaged or disadvantaged. Others shared Beeby's view that the environmental provisions developed through a global conference, such as those governing deep seabed mining in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, would be far worse than those contemplated in the antarctic mineral regime. PARTICIPATION IN THE MINERALS REGIME NEGOTIATIONS Beeby's point that the motivation for the minerals regime talks is essentially political rather than economic in nature led one participant to conclude that this is all the more reason to involve more states than the consulta- tive parties in these talks Moreover, discussions in the United Nations would not necessarily mean that the common heritage concept would be applied; the U.N. could simply provide the forum that would lead to agreement on how to design a minerals regime acceptable to the wider international community. Another point of view preferred that the minerals negotiations take place within the Antarctic Treaty framework in order to strengthen the system currently working effectively in Antarctica. Within this context, however, numerous speakers supported opening the negotia- tions to a broader circle than the small group demon- strating substantial interest in antarctic science. This would avoid the negative ramifications of presenting to the world at large, at some point in the future, a fait accompli. These participants noted that the invitation to the nonconsultative parties to take part, for the first time, in the fifth meeting in these negotiations, February 26-March 8, 1985, in Rio de Janeiro, meant that any country that acceded to the treaty could take part in the negotiations: the negotiations are no longer closed. Nevertheless, they encouraged making the role of the nonconsultative parties an attractive one, so that additional states will accede to the Antarctic Treaty. For this reason, it would be important to involve the wider group of states fully in these forums and to avoid

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292 excessive heads-of-delegation meetings that would be restricted to representatives of consultative parties. Another suggestion to broaden the dialogue on an antarctic minerals regime returned to the idea of a strategy for environmental management in Antarctica, along the lines of the antarctic conservation strategy suggested by Heap and Holdgate in Chapter 13. A series of sessions on this topic could include scientists, diplomats, and individuals knowledgeable about resource management issues. These sessions could also develop a research agenda that would respond to the needs of those with management and decision-making responsibilities. Improving the information policies with respect to the minerals negotiations would also help to dispel feelings of exclusion. One participant saw no reason why the basic text of the minerals regime should not be available both to help inform interested outside parties and to allow the negotiations to benefit from relevant comments and criticisms. PARTICIPATION IN THE ADOPTION OF THE MINERALS REGIME Returning to the question of who has the right to deter- mine the future of Antarctica, one participant questioned whether, if not in the negotiations, then at the stage when the final product of the minerals negotiations would be formalized, a wider circle might then be involved. He suggested, however, that the final diplomatic conference would also be dominated by those who had negotiated the agreement and that the invitations and rules of proce- dures would be controlled by them. Others acknowledged that such a diplomatic conference is likely to be held and indicated that at a minimum it will include all those who had participated in the negotiations. PARTICIPATION IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MINERALS REGIME Participation in the implementation and decision making processes of the completed minerals regime was distin- guished from participation in the negotiation of the regime. The ongoing talks clearly contemplated accession by states other than the consultative parties, as noted in Beeby's presentation of the areas of agreement in Recommendation XI-1, so the regime would not be a closed one. It was also noted that majority participation by

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293 international community members in the regime would be a factor in avoiding the possibility that minerals operators would seek sponsorship from a state not party to the min- erals regime and operate outside its regulatory framework. The feasibility of broadening participation beyond governments and potential operators in the institutions of the regime produced the comment that further effort is required to determine how to institutionalize the con- cerned public in debates under the regime in a fruitful manner. There was support for the idea that should problems arise, in one way or another decisions taken on them should be accepted not only by Antarctic Treaty states but also by the outside world. The problem is how to put this into practice. Participation by observers from international organizations in the institutions of the minerals regime was clearly contemplated in the nego- tiations, and it was pointed out that these organizations have constructive contributions to make. PARTICIPATION IN ACTIVITIES AND BENEFITS Several speakers addressed possibilities for wider involvement in potential minerals activities and benefits therefrom. It is critical that the regime reflect principles of justice and effectiveness, which does not necessarily mean application of the common heritage concept. Justice in the minerals regime would mean that it must provide ab initio opportunities for all countries concerned with future resources exploitation to partici- pate, including interested developing states. But justice and effectiveness would also mean taking account of the experience of the ATS. Moreover, while the 1982 Law of The Sea Convention is a good source of principles and norms that could be applied in Antarctica, care should be taken not to fall into the excessive detail found in that convention. Various options for breathing life into the concept of humankind's interest in Antarctica have been considered in the minerals regime negotiations and these will receive further attention in forthcoming meetings. These options include joint ventures, particularly if they encourage participants from developing counties, and revenue shar- ing, although lack of knowledge about the economics of antarctic minerals development would make it difficult to develop the kind of precise formula for revenue sharing found in Article 82 of the Law of the Sea Convention.

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294 Caution was expressed about providing encouragement or incentives for minerals activities that might actually stimulate such activities and imply benefits where none in fact exist. Finally, the establishment of a fund for scientific research was proposed, to help interested countries lacking financial resources and appropriate organizations to take part in scientific activities in Antarctica. Although numerous details remain to be worked out, the funds could be drawn from fees on minerals activities and they would be available only to countries within the ATS, because those countries would have demonstrated some commitment to the treaty. (See Chapter 27 for further comments on the fund.) URGENCY AND TIMING OF MINERALS ACTIVITIES Debate over the reasons for urgency in negotiating the minerals regime revealed additional views to that of the preventive approach ("plugging a gap,n Filling a vacuum," Putting out a fire") as a means to avoid renewed con- flicts over territorial sovereignty should prospects for minerals development improve. One such justification for the effort to conclude a minerals regime at this time was that the regime should be balanced between environmental protection and develop- ment considerations and that it would be easier to accomplish this before the identification of concrete minerals interests in Antarctica. Some speakers disagree with an earlier remark that the urgency came about as a move to preempt possible pressure for a universalist regime and U.N. involvement. Others questioned how the evident lack of immediacy with respect to potential minerals activities could be reconciled on the one hand, with the adoption of the policy of Voluntary restraint" quoted by Beeby from Recommendation IX-1, and, on the other hand, with the ongoing seismic research projects named by panelist Wilson. They wondered if characterizations of lack of immediacy were not tailored to allay the concerns of states not party to the Antarctic Treaty. They also challenged the durability of the preventive approach, which once faced with the motivation and technology to conduct minerals activity in Antarctica might not be able to withstand the pressures.

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295 There was some discussion about the deterrent effects of the long lead time, referred to in Croasdale's presen- tation (Chapter 17), needed to develop the requisite technology for antarctic operation, in the face of a jump in the price of oil or government incentives for investors. It was pointed out that, while there is no current interest in commercial minerals activities in Antarctica, there is some interest today in prospecting, and this is another factor behind the urgency of completing a minerals regime; the regime would have to be in place in order to regulate prospecting and to provide mechanisms and pro- cedures to deal with the eventuality of a discovery by a prospector. With respect to the long lead time, a minerals expert described present technological systems as fairly coarse. There is no direct sensing mechanism to find oil and gas in Antarctica, and the search for hydrocarbons is long, slow, expensive and extremely uncertain. AS was noted earlier, the logistics of antarctic operations are formidable: First, a base of operations with a suitable communications system would have to be established. Then it would be necessary to ferry rig crews in and out, since the average driller is used to two weeks on and two weeks off duty and would not be attracted by a three month stay offshore Antarctica. In addition, there would have to be a logistic/supply base with an airstrip on land, and some idea of the size and cost of such a facility could be gained by a quick comparison with, for example, the existing U.S. base at McMurdo Sound for the support of scientific study in Antarctica. On the other hand, there is no doubt that Arctic offshore minerals exploitation technology will continue to be advanced and that the economics of minerals development will depend on factors outside humanity's control, such as the size of deposits eventually dis- covered, the cost of money, and minerals markets. For these reasons, one should not assume that antarctic minerals exploitation will be uneconomic for many years to come. In fact, the minerals regime negotiations should presume that antarctic minerals development will be economic and to establish a regime to effectively govern commercial operations. There was some consideration of Wilson's nondevelopment option and whether it was practical, realistic or politi- cally feasible--given the range of nations involved in Antarctica--to set aside minerals development until one

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296 is faced with the possibility some time in the future of, say, discovery of gold in Antarctica. The alternative of a binding moratorium on minerals development for a specified period of years was contrasted with the current policy of voluntary restraint adopted in Recommendation IX-1, which is a tenuous one, contingent on progress in the minerals regime negotiations. The moratorium option would permit time to learn more about the antarctic environment and the nature and effects of possible minerals operations, so that sounder judgments could be made. This possibility, however, is in effect what those negotiating the regime are contemplating, with the difference that there would be no specific term in years. It was suggested that if a formal moratorium on minerals activities were adopted, it should be reviewed halfway through. Government officials participating disagreed with Wilson's challenge to the bona fides of governments' decisions to proceed with the minerals regime negotia- tions and noted that their governments had in fact sought and received support for these policies. THE REGIME Area of Application That the area of application of the International Seabed Authority contemplated in the 1982 Law of the Sea Conven- tion might overlap with that of the antarctic minerals regime, as noted in Section II, brought the response that there is a reason for the vague language in the minerals regime with respect to the area of application of the regime; nevertheless, in the end, the antarctic minerals regime will not extend beyond the continental shelf as defined by the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. Moreover, the minerals regime will have to coordinate with the International Seabed Authority in the future with respect to environmental protection south of 60S latitude. The Framework Provision of additional details about the framework nature of the regime described by Beeby's pre$entation-- which because of the present lack of knowledge about the area and possible operations there would avoid including

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297 detailed terms and conditions until they are required-- was prompted by one participant's statement that as soon as the first contract is concluded, it would in fact specify detailed terms and conditions that will serve as a precedent for future contracts. In response, it was noted that a contract concluded for the development of one type of mineral resource in Antarctica would not likely be relevant to the development of another mineral resource in another part of Antarctica. It is more probable that certain areas in Antarctica--as elsewhere in the world--because of their physical, envi- ronmental, and geological nature and characteristics, should be treated as units. It would simply not be pos- sible to write detailed regulations applicable to all or even some of these potential resource management provinces. In addition, at this point it would be impossible to predict whether interest would emerge in mineral resource exploration and development in Antarc- tica, and, if so, where, when, and for what specific resource(s). For these reasons, it is not possible at this stage to seek to elaborate detailed mining codes for Antarctica. What is needed is to construct a framework that would identify the decisions that will be necessary to deter- mine the acceptability of possible mineral resource activities and the basic criteria against which such decisions will be made and to provide for the establish- ment of the institutions necessary to make these decisions and oversee any activities that might be permitted. More specifically, such a framework regime would Prohibit mineral resource exploration and development unless specifically authorized through the institutions of the regime; Provide as general criteria that no mineral resource activity take place unless (1) there is sufficient information to judge its possible impacts, (2) assessment of its possible impacts indicates that it would not pose unreasonable risk to the environment, and (3) technology and procedures exist to permit safe operations;

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298 Provide for the establishment of decision making machinery, along with an advisory body to provide expert scientific, technical, and environmental advice, to apply the general criteria to all decisions about possible mineral resource activities; Provide, if and when there were sufficient information to define a resource province in which exploration and development activities could be considered, that the machinery would establish the general terms and conditions to which such activities must conform, including exclusion of such activities in any areas that had been or should be protected; and Provide for the consideration of specific proposals for exploration and development activities at specific sites and for elaboration by the machinery of the detailed conditions that would govern any proposals that were approved. Such a framework regime would involve no presumption about whether mineral resource activities should or should not take place in Antarctica and would allow the necessary specific regulations to be developed if and when necessary. Institutions Because the more precise details of the regime would be developed only following the adoption of the regime, the machinery and procedures for taking these decisions would be very important. This would stimulate states' interest in becoming parties to the future minerals regime so that they could take part in the decision making process. Various speakers stressed that to achieve balance in the decision making institutions of the regime, both kinds of states should be represented, those active in research or minerals activities and those merely inter- ested in the regime without being primarily concerned with benefits from exploitation. This recalled the dis- cussion of the International Whaling Commission member- ship on the basis of Gulland's contribution to the workshop (Chapters 15 and 16). The smaller regulatory committees described by Beeby's paper would not be composed solely of the state or states claiming sovereignty in an identified resource province of Antarctica and the state wishing to undertake or sponsor minerals activities in that area; there would be

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. 299 additional representatives on these committees. Thus, there is no possibility that if, say, an Australian were to apply to conduct operations in the Australian claimed sector, Australia could sit alone on the regulatory committee. Environmental Protection and Safety Many speakers noted that concern for environmental and safety aspects of the minerals regime is being given paramount importance by those negotiating the minerals regime as well as by those outside. The work of the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) in assessing the potential environmental implications of minerals activities was referred to (SCAR groups of specialists produced the 1977 Preliminary Assessment of the Environmental Impact of Mineral Exploration/ Exploitation in Antarctica and the 1981 and 1983 reports on Antarctic Environmental Implications of Possible Minerals Exploration and Exploitation), as was the 1984 report of the SCAR Working Group on Logistics, which states with respect to the proposed minerals regime: The group discussed the possible impact on scientific support services of those activities likely to be involved in any commercial activities related to exploration for or exploitation of mineral resources. It was agreed that there is a need to ensure that within the documentation of a minerals regime there should be included a state- ment that all planned commercial activities in Antarctica should give special attention to all aspects of safety and have appropriate search and rescue resources adequate to meet any emergency. No commercial activity should rely to any extent on those services maintained by operations agencies in support of national antarctic research programs. There were suggestions that the SCAR/International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources seminar (Bonn, April 1985), discussed in Chapters 10-14, could contribute to the definition of areas that should be protected from minerals activities in Antarctica as well as to the definition of the resource provinces that

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300 would be identified under the regime were interest in actual minerals activities to develop. Representatives of environmental organizations argued that they do not deserve to be characterized as single- issue constituencies because they work on a wide range of long-term issues and questions that affect the inter- national community and have followed antarctic matters for nearly 15 years. In the context of the antarctic minerals regime, they have supported freedom of scientific investigation and the free exchange of results from Antarctica, the maintenance of the demilitarized status of Antarctica, and the importance of protecting wilderness values and wildlife there. Members of these organizations feared that the threat of minerals activities in Antarc- tica could jeopardize these values. Members of the scientific community also expressed con- cern about the impacts of minerals activities on scien- tific research programs and the scientific value of Antarctica, and they raised again the question of the long-term value of scientific activities in relation to the short-term value of potential minerals activities noted in Section III. They were worried in addition that funds would be diverted to research related to possible minerals activities and away from scientific research, but they differed on the extent to which they believed this has already occurred in different countries. Prospecting Two subjects arose with respect to prospecting: environ- mental considerations and confidentiality of data. Several participants echoed Roger Wilson's comment that prospecting should be subject to regulation, but it was pointed out that there would be controls over prospecting in the minerals regime described by Beeby. Any pros- pecting would have to comply with the environmental principles set forth in the regime and would thus be subject to a judgment that prospecting was taking place in accordance with them. In addition, a notification of prospecting would have to include an environmental impact assessment. Moreover, it appears likely that in the final regime the decision making commission will be given power to formulate and apply controls with respect to prospecting activities, and it is also possible that a form of review of prospecting activities could be initiated. On the other hand, it is unlikely that the

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301 final regime will require prior authorization of pros- pecting, not least because prospecting would be indis- tinguishable from scientific research under the Antarctic Treaty. This discussion led to one on the importance of ensuring that preminerals development activities do not jeopardize that openness of results guaranteed under the Antarctic Treaty; that is, free exchange of scientific results should not be obstructed by efforts to retain prospecting data as proprietary data, for this information would be of value to the whole international community. One participant suggested that in order to find out what resources exist in Antarctica, governments could adopt a noncommercial approach and pool efforts and results, enhancing the Antarctic Treaty's emphasis on scientific cooperation. Others warned that the prospector should not be required to compromise his investment by turning over data of a proprietary nature and insisted that the rules for data collection in the minerals regime should be clear. The distinction between prospecting and the subsequent stage of exploration would be based on the concept of right; prospecting does not convey exclusive rights to an area, whereas exploration does. One technical expert ventured that the concept of confidentiality might be being introduced too early in Antarctica. Many more surface geological data would be required, as will results from several stratigraphic information holes. The early introduction of confiden- tiality could mean that the only entities that would undertake this work would be commercial organizations. He also stressed that current Antarctic Treaty practices should be improved with respect to seismic data exchange; that is, that the seismic tapes, not just summaries of work done, should be made freely available. He noted that the important element is not the data tapes them- selves but the interpretation of the raw data. He cited the example of the North Sea, where jurisdictional lines were drawn before 1959 and there are now voluminous bibliographies of freely available data. In fact, industry has made its data available more quickly than is common among the community of academic scientists. ENFORCEMENT AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS As discussed in Chapters 5, 7 and 11, the absence of agreed national jurisdiction in Antarctica requires a strong alternative enforcement mechanism.

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302 On the other hand, referring to the doubts expressed by Gulland (Chapter 15) about the effectiveness of the CCAMLR enforcement system, one participant maintained that the site-specific nature of an oil operation would make that activity far easier to monitor over time than would be the case with fishing activities. One would also need to carry out an environmental impact assessment and collect the baseline data required to complete it, because this would not have been done in Antarctica, and it would be necessary to make provision for monitoring during and after the operation as well as for remedial measures required or contemplated as a result of the operation. Reporting requirements were also seen as an important part of the future regime, and several speakers expressed interest in further discussion of inspection under the minerals regime. (See Chapter 14 for additional comments on inspection.)