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25.
The Interaction Between the Antarctic
Treaty System and the
United Nations System
Richard A. Wooicoft
When in 1773 the great navigator Captain James Cook became
the first known person to force a small vessel beyond the
Antarctic Circle, he recorded in his journal that "I can
be bold enough to say that no man will ever venture fur-
ther than I have done and that the land which may lie to
the south will never be explored. n
Well, here just over 200 years later, we have actually
conducted a seminar on the Beardmore Glacier of the con-
tinent that Cook predicted would never be explored.
Hobson's theory of imperialism suggested that the trader
followed the missionary and the flag followed the trader.
In Antarctica it has been different; the scientists fol-
lowed the explorers and seminar attendees have followed
the scientists.
For me, personally, this visit fulfills a lifelong
ambition. For Australia and Australians, Antarctica is a
neighboring continent of great importance. Indeed, the
earliest maps of the Southern Hemisphere show a gigantic
mass, usually called Terra Australis (the southern land)
and, in those maps, Australia and Antarctica were con-
nected. While physically they are separated by sea, they
remain connected by a tradition of proximity, interest,
exploration, and research.
So I am very glad to have had the opportunity to par-
ticipate in the Workshop on the Antarctic Treaty in three
capacities: in my personal capacity, as the chairman of
the New York group of the Antarctica Treaty consultative
parties, and as the representative of Australia at the
United Nations.
As I am sure
i
Us well known, the United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA) considered "the question of Antarctica"
in 1983 and again in 1984. At the conclusion of the
debate in 1984, it was agreed to inscribe the item again
375
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376
on the provisional agenda for the fortieth session of the
UNGA in 1985.
This is not, of course, the first time that considera-
tion has been given to the United Nations' playing some
role in antarctic affairs. In the years before the
signature of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959, a number of
individuals and organizations, and even some states, made
suggestions for some relationship between the United
Nations and Antarctica. As long ago as 1956, India,
whose scientists are now conducting research at a new
antarctic station on the other side of this continent,
proposed that the question of Antarctica be included on
the agenda of the UNGA. In the event, that did not
happen, and it was not until 1983 that Antarctica became
a subject of discussion in the General Assembly.
To some this might suggest that there has been little
interaction between the United Nations system and the
Antarctic Treaty System. Some might even see this lack
of discussion of Antarctica in the United Nations as
evidence of what has been alleged to be "secrecy" or
"exclusivity on the part of the Antarctic Treaty con-
sultative parties. It would be a serious mistake to
reach such conclusions.
The fact that states have not, until recently, dis-
cussed the subject of Antarctica in the General Assembly
indicates to me a lack of interest among the majority of
countries not involved in the continent as well as a
measure of acquiescence on the part of the world community
in the system of management established by the Antarctic
Treaty. This has occurred both because the practical
framework of cooperation operating under the treaty
system has promoted the principles and purposes of the
U.N. system and because, in appropriate areas, there has
been practical cooperation between the two systems.
PROMOTION OF PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES
OF UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
The United Nations Charter defines a number of important
purposes of that organization, including the development
of friendly relations between nations, the achievement of
cooperation between nations in solving international prob-
lems, and, most importantly, the maintenance of peace and
security. The United Nations Charter also emphasizes a
number of principles governing the actions of states,
including respect of the sovereign equality of states,
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encouragement of the peaceful settlement of international
disputes, the avoidance of the threat or use of force,
and the promotion of economic and social advancement of
all peoples.
I should like to concentrate, first, on the ways in
which the Antarctic Treaty has given practical effect to
these important principles and purposes of the U.N. system
and, in particular, how it has encouraged international
cooperation in Antarctica and how it has insulated the
continent from international conflict and rivalries over
the last quarter of a century.
In order to measure the achievements of the Antarctic
Treaty System and to relate them to U.N. principles, we
should reflect briefly on the situation in Antarctica
before the signature of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959.
Territorial claims, and nonrecognition of these claims by
other nations active in Antarctica, had led to political
tensions. Rivalry among certain of the claimants had led
to incidents and protests. One country took steps to
bring its claim before the International Court of Justice,
and the other countries involved declined to accept the
jurisdiction of the court. In short, a difficult inter-
national situation had developed that posed a potentially
serious threat to peace in the region.
The unprecedented cooperation that underlay research
activities in Antarctica in the fields of geophysics and
geography during the International Geophysical Year (IGY)
of 1957-1958 marked a turning point in relations between
countries with interests in the continent. Because of
the lack of basic data on Antarctica and the extremely
difficult operating conditions there, it was imperative
that there be maximum cooperation among scientists engaged
in common research programs, including the free exchange
of views and personnel and free access to stations and
installations. There was also a strong sense, on the
part of the scientists involved, that their studies in
Antarctica were important to the entire world community
and that the results of their efforts should be freely
available to all who were interested.
This cooperative spirit led the 12 nations that had
conducted research in Antarctica during the IGY to reflect
on the earlier unsatisfactory situation and to consider a
more permanent framework for continuing their joint
efforts, in a way that would allow all nations wishing to
be active on the continent to do so without threatening
the interests of others or destabilizing the area.
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The result was the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. This was
the starting point; and today it is still the core of
what is known as the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). The
latter comprises a cooperative framework and a wide range
of carefully considered recommendations and legally
binding instruments that address living and working in
Antarctica, exchanging information, protecting the
environment, and conserving and making rational use of
resources. In this regard, I should refer in particular
to the 1964 Agreed Measures for the Conservation of
Antarctic Fauna and Flora, the 1972 Convention for the
Conservation of Antarctic Seals, the 1980 Convention on
the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources,
and the current negotiations toward an Antarctic minerals
regime.
Let us now look more closely at how the Antarctic
Treaty, in its language and in its practical application,
relates to the fundamental purpose of the United Nations
Charter: the maintenance of international peace and
security.
The preamble of the treaty states that n it is in the
interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue
forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and
shall not become the scene or object of international
discord." It continues that "a treaty ensuring the use
of Antarctica for peaceful purposes and the continuance
of international harmony in Antarctica will further the
purposes and principles embodied in the Charter of the
United Nations."
What could be a more forthright commitment to the aims
of the United Nations with respect to peace and security?
The treaty also goes beyond this general commitment by
including a number of specific provisions designed to
ensure that this commitment is upheld.
Article I of the treaty prominently and firmly estab-
lishes the position of the treaty partners that "Antarc-
tica shall be used for peaceful purposes only." It
prohibits "any measures of a military nature, such as the
establishment of military bases and fortifications, the
carrying out of military manoeuvres, as well as the
testing of any type of weapons."
Other provisions relating to the demilitarization of
Antarctica include Article V, which prohibits nuclear
explosions; Article VII, which provides full access for
purposes of inspection by consultative party observers to
promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the
provisions of the treaty; and Article IX (la), which
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permits consultative parties to adopt measures regarding
the "use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only."
Special mention should also be made of the ingenious
device contained in Article IV of the treaty, which puts
to one side the question of territorial sovereignty, the
source of earlier tensions, as an obstacle to peaceful
cooperation.
Article IV represents the practical application of
specific exhortations of the United Nations, including
respect for the sovereign equality of states and the
encouragement of peaceful settlement of disputes. The
"freezing"--no pun is intended--of positions with respect
to claims removed the basis for the earlier contention
between countries active in Antarctica.
Collectively these provisions, and the fact that they
have worked in practice over a long period, establish the
Antarctic Treaty as the only effective post-World War II
international agreement ensuring the demilitarization of
a large geographic region. The treaty has also provided
a precedent for numerous subsequent initiatives and
proposals for regional disarmament measures, including
nuclear-weapons-free zones. In this way, as in others,
the treaty has made an important contribution in fur-
thering the principles and purposes of the United Nations
Charter.
With the advantages of hindsight and knowledge of the
extreme difficulty of negotiating measures to limit con-
ventional or nuclear weapons today, the achievement of
the Antarctic Treaty in this area must be seen both as
impressive and of great value to all states--particularly,
may I say, to states such as those of Australasia, of the
South Pacific, of South America, and of southern Africa,
which are within close geographic proximity to Antarctica.
In spite of other differences, the importance of main-
taining Antarctica demilitarized, free of nuclear weapons
and strategic competition, and a zone of peaceful coopera-
tion was clearly recognized by most delegations that
spoke on the antarctic item at both the 38th and the 39th
UNGA sessions.
LINKS WITH THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIALIZED AGENCIES
I shall turn now to links between the treaty system and
the specialized agencies of the United Nations.
Article III(2) of the Antarctic treaty makes specific
provision for the establishment of cooperative working
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relations with the U.N. specialized agencies and other
international organizations with a scientific or technical
interest in Antarctica. The anticipated increased
international interest in the continent and the need for
cooperation and the sharing of the results of antarctic
research with the whole world community, including those
states that lack the desire or the means to become
actively involved in antarctic research.
Although existing links are not highly formalized,
practical working relations have already been developed
with U.N. family organizations, such as the World
Meteorological Organization (WMO), the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU), the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), the United Nations Environment
Program (UNEP), and the Intergovernmental Oceanographic
Commission (IOC) of the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), as well as
with organizations outside the U.N. system, such as the
Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) and the
Scientific Committee on Oceanic Research (SCOR) of the
International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), the
International Union for the Conservation of Nature and
Natural Resources, and the International Whaling
Commission.
At their very first meeting the consultative parties
adopted a recommendation making it an obligation of
governments to encourage the work of relevant inter-
national organizations, including the U.N. specialized
agencies, and to promote on a bilateral basis the develop-
ment of cooperative relations with those organizations
(Recommendation I-V). In considering the degree of
cooperation already established with U.N. bodies,
particular mention should be made of links established
with WMO, ITU, IOC and FAO.
Antarctica has a crucial effect on the atmosphere of
the whole Southern Hemisphere, and meteorological data
from Antarctica play an important role in predicting
global weather and climate. Hence the great value of
cooperation between nations active scientifically in
Antarctica and the WMO. An important element in this
cooperation is the provision of daily antarctic meteoro-
logical data via the Global Telecommunications System in
the WMO's World Weather Watch program, which has been
continuing since the IGY in 1957-1958. The system also
involves the cooperation of the ITU.
The WMO has an executive committee working group on
Antarctic meteorology, through which antarctic treaty
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consultative nations regularly contribute expertise to
the coordination and development of antarctic meteorol-
ogy. The consultative parties are also making substantial
contributions to the World Climate Research Program
(WCRP), which is coordinated jointly by the WHO and the
ICSU. They were closely involved also in the very suc-
cessful Global Atmospheric Research Program, which ran
from 1967 to 1982 and which was the forerunner of the
WCRP.
Cooperation with the IOC has included contributions by
the consultative parties to the Program Group on the
Southern Ocean, a coordinating body for marine biology
research. The IOC also has permanent observer status at
meetings of the commission of the Convention for the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
(CCAMLR).
The FAO also has observer status at CCAMLR meetings.
It is working with the CCAMLR secretariat to develop
fishing data for the Southern Ocean area. The FAO,
together with SCAR and other committees of the ICSU, is
also sponsoring the 10-year Biological Investigation of
Marine Antarctic Systems and Stocks program, the aim of
which is to gain a deeper understanding of the structure
and functioning of the antarctic marine ecosystem as a
basis for the future management of antarctic living
resources. This program also relates to the work of the
IOC.
I should also refer to the close links between the
consultative parties and SCAR. This is in keeping with
the facts that the ICSU played a prominent part in
developing the cooperation that occurred during the IGY~
and that cooperation among the consultative parties has
traditionally been most extensive in the field of scien-
tific research. There are also close links with SCOR and
with the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environ-
ment of ICSU. ICSU, whose charter provides for the
encouragement of international scientific activity for
the benefit of humankind as a way of contributing to the
cause of peace and international security, has consulta-
tive status with UNESCO, the Economic and Social Council
of the U.N. (ECOSOC), the FAO, and the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and working relations with
the ITU, the World Health Organization (WHO), the United
Nations Disaster Relief Organization, and the United
Nations Research Institute for Social Development.
Membership of ICSU consists of science academies,
research councils, and associations or institutions from
some 65 countries.
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One can see from this that a wide range of practical
interaction already exists among the members of the
Antarctic Treaty, the United Nations system, and other
relevant scientific bodies.
THE FUTURE
In the light of growing international interest in
Antarctica in recent years, reflected in the consideration
of it within the United Nations, it is worthwhile to
speculate on how future interaction between the ATS and
the U.N. system might develop and on what other steps
might be taken to accommodate this wider international
interest in the affairs of the Southern continent.
In this connection, I am speaking not as the chairman
of the Antarctic treaty consultative party coordination
group in New York, nor as a representative of the
Australian government, but rather on the same basis as
all the speakers at the Workshop on the Antarctic Treaty--
that is, in my personal capacity.
I would begin by recalling the maxim, Diplomacy is
the art of accommodation and compromise," and, in this
context, I shall attempt to balance the concerns of those
who have argued that there is a need substantially to
revise, or even to replace, the existing system of manage-
ment in Antarctica against the views of those who want to
see the ATS maintained because of its value and importance
but who are prepared to acknowledge that there may be
scope for further evolution within the present system.
To do this, it is necessary to address some of the main
criticisms of the treaty system.
A major concern has been with the decision-making
process, which has been criticized as being exclusive,
undemocratic, and discriminatory against small states.
It is suggested instead that a universal framework based
on equality, for example within the United Nations, would
be more appropriate. While this latter obviously has
appeal for countries that have not previously been
involved but now have an interest in Antarctica, I would
suggest that, in fact, the existing two-tier system has
several important advantages.
The present system is based on the notion that those
countries that are directly engaged in antarctic activi-
ties are, through their experience in Antarctica, best
placed to take decisions affecting such matters as
scientific programs and environmental protection in the
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continent. Moreover, it is they who will be bound by the
obligations that arise from those decisions, which are
taken continuously by means of consensus. Hence, giving
consultative parties a special role is both logical and
workable from a management viewpoint.
This is not dissimilar to the practice in many other
international bodies, including a number in the U.N.
system. Furthermore, consultative party status is not,
as has sometimes been suggested, effectively restricted
to wealthy countries. The present list of consultative
parties demonstrates that there are no ideological or
economic divisions on north/south or east/west lines
within the treaty framework. The present arrangement
permits practical cooperation in an atmosphere free of
the political rhetoric or posturing that often infects
much of the United Nations system.
Beyond this, I should emphasize that the Antarctic
Treaty--which has now been acceded to by 32 states,
including 6 new signatories in the past two years, is
open to all member states of the United Nations. In 1983
it was decided that all parties to the Antarctic Treaty
may attend consultative meetings and, subsequently, also
future meetings of the minerals negotiations as observers.
Thus any country that is interested in antarctic affairs
may now, by simply acceding to the Antarctic Treaty,
which involves no cost, have the opportunity to partici-
pate in and influence decisions taken in these meetings.
Acceding states may speak and circulate papers. Further-
more, as decisions are taken by consensus, their influence
on the decis ion-male ina Process would in Practice be
. .
significant. The distinction between Antarctic Treaty
consultative parties and nonconsultative parties Is
therefore likely to become less marked in the future.
This represents an important change from the past. It
shows the capacity and the will of the consultative
parties to adapt the treaty system to changing circum-
stances and interests. Small states, which do not main-
tain antarctic programs and which perhaps never intend to
do so, can nevertheless, through acceding to the treaty,
become fully informed about antarctic affairs and bring
considerable influence to bear when decisions are made,
thus ensuring that their interests are taken into account.
I would advocate strongly that such countries consider
carefully the benefits this opportunity provides.
It has also been suggested that access to information
under the present system is poor. It is true that, in
the past, exchanges of information on antarctic matters
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occurred largely among those countries directly engaged
in Antarctica. This was not the result of any desire to
withhold information from the rest of the world. Far
from it; the results of scientific research in Antarctica
have always been made freely available to the inter-
national community. Rather, it was the consequence of
the relatively limited interest shown by other countries
in antarctic affairs until recent times.
Recognizing the growth of international interest, the
consultative parties, at their twelfth meeting in 1983,
decided to take steps to disseminate more widely informa-
tion on antarctic activities, to study further steps, and
to consider them in 1985 (Recommendation XII-6). To this
end, in the period since, they passed to the United
Nations Secretary-General for circulation to all member
states the report of their twelfth meeting and, individu-
ally, they made substantial contributions toward the
United Nations Secretary-General's study of Antarctica.
An improved and expanded Handbook of the Antarctic Treaty
is being prepared.
This is not to suggest that more cannot be done. I am
aware that many countries still believe that information
flows could be improved further. An important way of
improving their access to information would be for them
to accede to the treaty and attend meetings. Another
would be for consultative parties to circulate copies of
information regularly exchanged among themselves and
through SCAR to the U.N. secretariat for information.
Means of ensuring effective dissemination of information
on Antarctica will be considered at the Brussels meeting
in October, 1985, and any ideas others may have will be
welcome.
It has been argued that links between the ATS and U.N.
specialized agencies and other relevant nongovernmental
bodies have not been adequately developed. I have already
canvassed the range of links that currently exist. These
links are not perhaps so extensive as they might be, and
there may well be benefit in seeking to extend them in
future in the cases of organizations that have relevant
expertise. I believe that the consultative parties might
carefully consider the scope for intensifying their
existing links with U.N. agencies and nongovernmental
bodies and the opening up of new links with other
relevant bodies. Where appropriate, such organizations
might attend consultative meetings in an observer
capacity, as they do meetings of CCAMLR. Also, U.N.
specialized agencies and other relevant nongovernmental
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bodies might be encouraged to consider giving Antarctica
higher priority in terms of allocation of resources
within their total programs than they have done to date.
Close links with such bodies would also assist the process
of improving the dissemination of information on Antarc-
tica to the international community.
Judging from statements made at the last two UNGAs, it
seems to me that the interests and concerns of nontreaty
countries relate mainly to the question of possible min-
eral resources. This is especially true of the
negotiations taking place through special Antarctic
Treaty consultative meetings to develop an antarctic
minerals regime. It is suggested that the rich,
developed countries are seeking to exploit the resource
potential of Antarctica for their own benefit, at the
expense of others, and that wider international
involvement in the negotiation of any minerals regime is
necessary. It is also suggested that Antarctica is the
"common heritage of mankind" and that any revenues
derived from the exploitation of its resources should be
shared equitably. In the same context, it is argued that
territorial claims in Antarctica are outmoded and that
the prospect of future resource exploitation contains the
seeds for potential conflict there.
There are many complex issues involved here. First,
let me deal with the concept of Common heritage." While
many states, including Australia, accept the validity of
the concept for the international seabed and outer space,
there is no international consensus that it is applicable
to Antarctica. Moreover, in the U.N. context, analogies
with the Outer Space Convention and the Law of the Sea
Convention do not really work. The oceans are global.
Outer space surrounds us all. Antarctica, on the other
hand, has fixed dimensions and neighbors such as my own
country, Australia, with a sustained and serious interest
in the continent.
A most important reason why "common heritage" is not
applicable to Antarctica is the fact of the existence of
long-standing territorial claims in Antarctica. While
such claims might not be recognized by the international
community, they remain a fact of international life.
Differences over claims have been usefully put to one
side under the Antarctic Treaty in favor of international
cooperation e In my view, to reopen this question will
only provoke an unnecessary renewal of tensions, which
have been successfully avoided for the past 25 years.
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Common heritage also has an exploitive connotation,
and it is important to emphasize that the principal
purpose of the minerals negotiations is not, as is some-
times suggested, to carve un the resources of Antarctica
It IS tO ensure that unregulated minerals activity does
not take place in future that could prove environmentally
harmful, adversely affect other uses of the continent,
and lead to renewed contention. The consultative parties
are seeking to negotiate an agreement that will lay down
the broad rules for future activity and establish arrange-
ments with the objectives of ensuring that the fragile
antarctic environment is fully safeguarded and that poten-
tial conflict is avoided. It is important to negotiate
such a regime now, in the absence of pressures to exploit.
On the question of wider involvement in the antarctic
minerals negotiations and the need to ensure that the
interests of all countries are adequately taken into
account, I mentioned earlier the decision by the consul-
tative parties to open future meetings of the minerals
negotiations to all parties to the Antarctic Treaty.
This goes a long way toward meeting such concerns. Any
country interested in antarctic minerals may now attend
minerals negotiating meetings if it first accedes to the
Antarctic Treaty. By this means it can exert an influence
on the proceedings.
Furthermore, in developing a minerals regime, negotia-
tors have been conscious of the need to ensure that it
serves the interests of all humankind in Antarctica that
· , ~
z~ Is open to accession by all states, and that there is
fair opportunity for all states to narEicinnh" in firm
minerals activities. The negotiations have been based
from the outset on the principle of nondiscrimination
among states. It is also widely recognized by those
engaged in the minerals negotiations that in order to
arrive at an internationally accepted minerals agreement
there will be a need, among other things, to accommodate
the interests of the wider international community,
including the many countries that may not become engaged
in any possible future mining activity in Antarctica.
This leads me to a third and related point, the aues-
tion of revenue sharing from antarctic resource activity
on an equitable basis. This is a difficult area to
address, largely because so little is known about the
resource potential of the Antarctic continent, much less
how it might be exploited. Many exaggerated notions of
the resource wealth of Antarctica have been expressed.
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The reality is that most of the information available
is speculative and based largely on geological hypothesis
The few known, low-grade, on-shore deposits that are
.
accessible in the two percent of the continent not covered
by deep moving ice will not be exploited for a very long
time indeed. Much prospecting and exploration would need
to be done before it could be determined whether exploita-
tion is feasible or economic. Although prospecting might
commence in the next decade or so, minerals exploitation,
if it ever takes place in Antarctica, even on its con-
tinental shelf, will not occur until well into the next
century. The higher costs that would be involved in
operating in Antarctica, as well as the long distances
and inhospitable climate, make it likely that developers
will concentrate on other areas of the world that remain
to be exploited before turning their attention toward
Antarctica. Thus, in my view, notions of taxation and
revenue sharing in the Antarctic context seem very
premature and uncertain indeed.
Nevertheless, it seems to me inconceivable that an
antarctic minerals regime that ignored notions of equity
could be successfully negotiated and find international
acceptance in the current political climate. That would
be politically naive. Accordingly, in the longer term,
if exploitation were to take place in Antarctica, it
seems only reasonable to expect that all states would
have rights of access to antarctic mineral resources and
that they should not be excluded from the economic bene-
fits derived from them, after the costs of recovery and
of the minerals regime's institutions have been covered.
How these concepts find expression in the minerals regime
will be a matter for discussion and negotiation. Realis-
tically, the details are likely to be left to the institu-
tions created by the minerals agreement to sort out in
the future.
In the same context, I believe that there is scope for
those already engaged in antarctic activities to offer
greater cooperation to developing countries interested in
antarctic scientific research within their national pro-
grams. In particular, they might share their antarctic
experience with scientists of other countries, undertake
joint research where appropriate, and advise countries
interested in conducting their own Antarctic programs on
scientific and logistic support matters. They might also
extend opportunities, within the limits of their own
national programs, for scientists from interested cOun-
tries, especially developing countries, to conduct
research in Antarctica.
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RELATIONSHIP TO THE UNITED NATIONS
SYSTEl!4 I N THE FUTURE
I would note that during discussion on the antarctic item
at the 1984 U.N. General Assembly, most speakers--even
the critics of the present treaty system--paid tribute to
the virtues of the treaty, particularly its provisions
for demilitarization, denuclearization, scientific
cooperation, and environmental protection. Their
criticisms were aimed at a number of other areas, which I
have addressed. The various suggestions that I have made
in response to these concerns amount to saying that T
believe there is scope within the treaty system to
address many of these concerns. Some can be resolved by
encouraging closer interaction between the ATS and the
U.N. system; others will need to be resolved by different
means. Such matters will need to be addressed at the
1985 thirteenth Antarctic Treaty consultative meeting as
well as at the fortieth UNGA session, where Antarctica
will again be on the agenda.
I return to my earlier reference to diplomacy as the
art of accommodation and compromise. If we are to avoid
dispute and confrontation, there is a responsibility on
the part of all concerned to show realism and flexibility.
Attempts to replace the ATS, or to set up new institu-
tional arrangements for the management of antarctic
affairs within the United Nations, will be neither
practicable nor productive; on the other hand, Antarctic
Treaty consultative parties should continue to find ways
of overcoming the reasonable concerns of other countries
by improving the operation of the treaty system.
An increase in public interest, or the launching of a
particular initiative in the UNGA by one or two countries,
should not lead us to the conclusion that a new set of
arrangements should be developed to replace the ATS. As
Evan Luard wrote in an article on Antarctica in the Summer
1984 issue of Foreign Affairs, "as long as the Treaty is
progressively opened to new members, as their scientific
capacities increase, there would seem to be little advan-
tage in replacing it with new mechanisms.... n In my own
view, there would be no advantage in seeking "new
mechanisms."
I am not opposed to U.N. interest in Antarctica or to
the discussion of Antarctica in the United Nations.
There is already a measure of constructive interaction
between the treaty partners and the U.N. system, which I
have noted. What I am opposed to is pressure--to a large
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extent artificially stimulated--for some institutionalized
U.N. political involvement in an area in which there are
no threats to the peace nor any substantial political,
economic, or social problems. What I would oppose, for
example, would be attempts to establish yet another U.N.
committee, which is not needed, which would not be
effective, and which could lead to attempts to undermine
or replace an existing, sound, flexible, and open
instrument in the Antarctic Treaty.
When I became Australia's ambassador at the United
Nations and, then, chairman of the New York group of the
Antarctic Treaty consultative parties, I knew little
about the inner workings of the U.N. system and less
about the processes of the ATS--although I had, of course,
been interested in a general way in both matters.
In earlier days--in the 1960s and 1970s--I was
attracted to international approaches to questions such
as that of Antarctica and to the concept of the "common
heritage of mankind. My personal experience in New
York, over the last two and a half years, and in
Antarctica itself, however, has demonstrated to me that
one system--the U.N. system--works less effectively than
I had hoped, while the other system--the ATS--works more
effectively than I had expected. This experience has
turned me away both from attempts to apply the common
heritage principle to Antarctica and from efforts to
institutionalize U.N. involvement in Antarctica, however
well intentioned these attempts may be.
In the Antarctic Treaty we have something of value.
It is a sound and proven basis on which to build in the
future. I am confident of that. AS is well known, I am
a strong supporter of the United Nations and of the multi-
lateral process, but in this particular case I cannot
perceive a useful role for the United Nations beyond the
production of the Secretary-General's study on Antarctica
and the dissemination of information about Antarctica to
interested countries.
The fundamental issue is this. Could the United
Nations provide a practical alternative to the treaty or
a more effective framework to regulate future activities
in Antarctica? On the basis of my own experience I would
have to answer, no.
The United Nations does have the potential to pass
resolutions promoted by Third World countries, because of
the majority that these countries can normally command on
certain political and economic issues. However, the
passage of some such resolutions, without consideration
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390
of whether a resolution can or will be implemented, or of
its practicability, can have the result of undermining
the credibility of the United Nations itself. While, as
I have said, I personally am a strong supporter of the
multilateral diplomatic process, I do not wish to see the
United Nations drawn into areas in which it is bound to
prove unable to act effectively, thereby risking the
further erosion of its international credibility.
In conclusion, I believe that the ATS is an evolving
and continuing experiment that has served the
international community well. As Philip Quigg wrote in
his recent book, A Pole APart,1 nJuSt as Antarctica's
unique environment must be protected trom exploiters, so
must its political and economic future be protected from
ideologues. The treaty, he continued, "deserves the
opportunity to prove again its adaptability and the
capacity of its members for adjustment and compromise,
not only among themselves but with the rest of the world. n
I should like to finish my remarks by quoting an old
American adage which goes, "If it ain't broke, don't fix
it." Well, in my opinion the Antarctic Treaty is not a
broken instrument. It is a successful, open, and
effective instrument. So I would urge its critics not to
try to dismantle it but to accept it and to build on the
flexible framework it provides. This would be--to use
the language of the treaty--"in the interests of all
mankind.
NOTE
1. New Press. A Twentieth Century Fund Report,
McGraw-Hill Book Company (New York), 1983.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
consultative parties
