Infrastructure Protection in the United States: A Norwegian Perspective

Arnfinn Jenssen

Norwegian Defence Construction Service

Mr. Jenssen addressed the use of underground facilities (UGFs) for the protection of critical infrastructures from a Norwegian perspective. He presented Norway's extensive experience with UGFs, including 200 hydropower stations, thousands of diesel generators, and one nuclear power station. He encouraged the primarily American audience to think in larger terms, challenging people to consider a crisis situation where 10, 100, or 1,000 buildings are at risk. The Oklahoma City bombing involved only one building.

He addressed several important issues:

  • Needs and requirements. Food, clothing, and shelter were described as primary human needs, which must take first priority.

  • Legislation, protection, and organization. Make participation in a total defense system compulsory where a condition for businesses is to protect their critical assets and keep a certain amount of goods and spare parts in stock (e.g., 10 to 30 percent).

  • Hardening. Look at hardening in the broadest possible sense, to include standoff, disbursement, supply from abroad, and so forth.

  • Force protection. Armed forces must be kept at standoff distances from potential terrorists. Trucks and cars must not be permitted to come close to a building that houses critical assets.

  • Use a generic, future threat. Use a generic threat for planning purposes, not the current or approved threat. The approved threat is always old and lags behind the future threat. Changing an approved threat can be difficult, especially in NATO.

  • Design facilities for multipurpose use. Design UGFs for many purposes. This means they may have to be large.

  • Use manual backup systems rather than computer-controlled backupsystems. Newer computer-controlled systems are more vulnerable than older manual systems. Knowledge of the architectural and engineering design of a UGF can facilitate an attack, thus making a facility more vulnerable. The most vulnerable part of an underground system is the air duct/air conditioning system.

  • Design UGFs that use water for internal climate control. If climate control is maintained by a forced-air system instead of water, this is a built-in mechanism that can transport chemical and biological agents and other hazardous and toxic substances throughout the facility.

  • Keep control of personnel and vehicles. Have daily checks and searches.

  • Role of the private sector. Do not tell the private sector how to run its business but make use of it in time of crisis and war, without changing company



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OCR for page 13
Use of Underground Facilities to Protect Critical Infrastructures: Summary of a Workshop Infrastructure Protection in the United States: A Norwegian Perspective Arnfinn Jenssen Norwegian Defence Construction Service Mr. Jenssen addressed the use of underground facilities (UGFs) for the protection of critical infrastructures from a Norwegian perspective. He presented Norway's extensive experience with UGFs, including 200 hydropower stations, thousands of diesel generators, and one nuclear power station. He encouraged the primarily American audience to think in larger terms, challenging people to consider a crisis situation where 10, 100, or 1,000 buildings are at risk. The Oklahoma City bombing involved only one building. He addressed several important issues: Needs and requirements. Food, clothing, and shelter were described as primary human needs, which must take first priority. Legislation, protection, and organization. Make participation in a total defense system compulsory where a condition for businesses is to protect their critical assets and keep a certain amount of goods and spare parts in stock (e.g., 10 to 30 percent). Hardening. Look at hardening in the broadest possible sense, to include standoff, disbursement, supply from abroad, and so forth. Force protection. Armed forces must be kept at standoff distances from potential terrorists. Trucks and cars must not be permitted to come close to a building that houses critical assets. Use a generic, future threat. Use a generic threat for planning purposes, not the current or approved threat. The approved threat is always old and lags behind the future threat. Changing an approved threat can be difficult, especially in NATO. Design facilities for multipurpose use. Design UGFs for many purposes. This means they may have to be large. Use manual backup systems rather than computer-controlled backupsystems. Newer computer-controlled systems are more vulnerable than older manual systems. Knowledge of the architectural and engineering design of a UGF can facilitate an attack, thus making a facility more vulnerable. The most vulnerable part of an underground system is the air duct/air conditioning system. Design UGFs that use water for internal climate control. If climate control is maintained by a forced-air system instead of water, this is a built-in mechanism that can transport chemical and biological agents and other hazardous and toxic substances throughout the facility. Keep control of personnel and vehicles. Have daily checks and searches. Role of the private sector. Do not tell the private sector how to run its business but make use of it in time of crisis and war, without changing company

OCR for page 13
Use of Underground Facilities to Protect Critical Infrastructures: Summary of a Workshop organizations. Give private-sector companies specific tasks that must be fulfilled if they want to stay in business. This has been done through legislation in Norway. The question-and-answer session emphasized that infrastructure assurance requires diligence and, perhaps, elements of a program similar to that in Norway to cover these problems. Mr. Jenssen noted that going underground is not the only solution to infrastructure assurance and that it must be looked at from a much broader perspective. Since industry does not want more regulation, one option would be a simple declaration that, if judged to be a critical infrastructure element, there must be an alternative or a protected system. The government could conceivably subsidize that portion—whether it be underground, mobile, or disbursed. Mr. Cicolani observed that AT&T's program involves a mobile backup system for their switching centers. Mr. Jenssen agreed that a government policy is absolutely necessary and must start from the top. The nation must be made aware that protection of its critical infrastructures is necessary.