Panel 3: Experiences with Underground Facilities: Capabilities, Limitationsand Applications

Moderator: Angelo Cicolani,

Springfield Research Facility, Defense Special Weapons Agency

Angelo Cicolani

Springfield Research Facility

Mr. Cicolani presented a history of UGF use for defense purposes in which they were likened to DoD structures built for protection against an acute threat, such as conventional weapons, nerve gas, or nuclear weapons. The idea that UGFs could be used for infrastructure protection against terrorist threats is now beginning to get more attention. The threat against infrastructures is pervasive and it is difficult to know where it will originate. However, UGFs are useful for nonprotective reasons as well.

Mr. Cicolani gave several examples of how hardened UGFs have been used throughout history and explained that an attacker will go to extraordinary lengths to destroy, capture, undermine, or neutralize a hardened facility. The history of underground and hardened facilities is represented by centuries of conflict between the defender and the attacker. Examples include:

  • Massada. In ancient times, a group of 900 Palestinians protected themselves from the Roman army on a plateau called Madder, a facility that still exists today. The men, women, and children—not all of whom were fighters—held off 15,000 Legionaries. The Romans developed a special battering ram to attack the structure.

  • Middle Ages. Fortresses played a significant role in protecting their masters in the Middle Ages and often included underground tunnels.

  • World War II defensive structures. There are several examples of World War Il-era underground defensive facilities. The French constructed the 235-kilometer Maginot Line to stop any possible German invasions. It included defensive bunkers that were six or seven levels deep and stored ammunition, bunking, messing, emergency supplies, electric generators, and other essentials. A very large defensive structure was built on Gibraltar from which the allies could control the entrance to the Mediterranean Sea. It also provided a platform to mount attacks against Nazis in the area. It included miles of tunnels and hospitals, ammunition storage, ship supplies, repair shops, workshops, and headquarters space.

  • World War II industries. During the war, the Germans began to use worked-out mines to relocate some of their military industries because of intense allied bombing. They were also trying to build weapons of mass destruction underground. The V-2 missile was assembled and launched from an underground facility with a hardened concrete dome 5-meters thick. In addition



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Use of Underground Facilities to Protect Critical Infrastructures: Summary of a Workshop Panel 3: Experiences with Underground Facilities: Capabilities, Limitationsand Applications Moderator: Angelo Cicolani, Springfield Research Facility, Defense Special Weapons Agency Angelo Cicolani Springfield Research Facility Mr. Cicolani presented a history of UGF use for defense purposes in which they were likened to DoD structures built for protection against an acute threat, such as conventional weapons, nerve gas, or nuclear weapons. The idea that UGFs could be used for infrastructure protection against terrorist threats is now beginning to get more attention. The threat against infrastructures is pervasive and it is difficult to know where it will originate. However, UGFs are useful for nonprotective reasons as well. Mr. Cicolani gave several examples of how hardened UGFs have been used throughout history and explained that an attacker will go to extraordinary lengths to destroy, capture, undermine, or neutralize a hardened facility. The history of underground and hardened facilities is represented by centuries of conflict between the defender and the attacker. Examples include: Massada. In ancient times, a group of 900 Palestinians protected themselves from the Roman army on a plateau called Madder, a facility that still exists today. The men, women, and children—not all of whom were fighters—held off 15,000 Legionaries. The Romans developed a special battering ram to attack the structure. Middle Ages. Fortresses played a significant role in protecting their masters in the Middle Ages and often included underground tunnels. World War II defensive structures. There are several examples of World War Il-era underground defensive facilities. The French constructed the 235-kilometer Maginot Line to stop any possible German invasions. It included defensive bunkers that were six or seven levels deep and stored ammunition, bunking, messing, emergency supplies, electric generators, and other essentials. A very large defensive structure was built on Gibraltar from which the allies could control the entrance to the Mediterranean Sea. It also provided a platform to mount attacks against Nazis in the area. It included miles of tunnels and hospitals, ammunition storage, ship supplies, repair shops, workshops, and headquarters space. World War II industries. During the war, the Germans began to use worked-out mines to relocate some of their military industries because of intense allied bombing. They were also trying to build weapons of mass destruction underground. The V-2 missile was assembled and launched from an underground facility with a hardened concrete dome 5-meters thick. In addition

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Use of Underground Facilities to Protect Critical Infrastructures: Summary of a Workshop to the V-2 launch sites, many of the German submarine pens also were hardened. The allies developed 12,000-to 22,000-pound bombs to attack such hardened facilities. Cold War era. In the Cold War era, the Swedes deployed soldiers underground—a Scandinavian response to the probable exchange of nuclear weapons between the Soviet Union and the United States. These facilities were similar in design to fallout shelters. Sweden publicized its reasons for going underground, and Scandinavia in general developed a defense-oriented underground construction industry. Consequently, there was a great deal of momentum for this program and an infrastructure for underground construction. After having met defense requirements, the Scandinavians had an industry in place that could work for two purposes. Consequently, there are many UGFs in Scandinavia that have nothing to do with defense. Some were built in response to aesthetic, environmental, or space utilization issues. Specific examples include UGFs for air traffic control; telephone exchange; sewage and wastewater treatment; and storage of solar-heated water, archived material, oil, food, and radioactive waste. Mr. Cicolani stated that the only countries that have significantly utilized UGFs beyond defense purposes to include critical infrastructures have been Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. These countries have significant UGF programs and are eager to share their expertise and experience. Should the United States find compelling reasons for using UGFs to protect critical infrastructures, there are lessons to be learned from the experts in these countries. Paul Ryall, ENSCO, Inc. Mr. Ryall opened by noting that he had recently retired from the Air Force as a civil engineer. He spent four years as the director of Public Works for Base Civil Engineering inside the Cheyenne Mountain Complex (CMC) and was instrumental in implementing the Cheyenne Mountain upgrade, which consisted of replacing the Integrated Tactical Warning and Assessment System. It began as a $1.8 billion program, which grew to $2.1 billion by project end, and took 13 years to complete. Mr. Ryall discussed the CMU in significant detail. The assessment of missile, air, space, space control, intelligence, and all the other systems, including drug interdiction, had to continue while Cheyenne Mountain computers were upgraded from early 1970s technology to late 1980s technology. Additionally, the CMC complex has various commercial customers, making it a dual-purpose facility. Key considerations taken into account during the CMC upgrade included:

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Use of Underground Facilities to Protect Critical Infrastructures: Summary of a Workshop Utilities. Ensuring that the utilities and support remained operational throughout the mission and that those putting in new systems, utilities, and HVAC were allowed to test their systems to bring them up on schedule. Planning. Making certain that initiating a new mission was well planned through constant interaction and communication with all members involved. Meetings were sometimes held on a daily basis. Security. Assuring adequate security for both workers and visitors. Environment. Understanding the environmental processes that a new mission produces. Government-customer interface. Maintaining contact between government officials and customer representatives is imperative. If a customer is in the middle of a very critical operation and the power is turned off, it can cost millions of dollars. Space requirements. Never underestimate the amount of storage space needed by a customer. Make sure storage space requirements are known in advance. Utility Load and interference. When customers reduced their utility loads and required uninterruptible power, CMC had 7.3 megawatts of it and was able to meet the customers' needs. It must be clear where critical utilities are to be located. Classified versus unclassified operations. Red and black systems should not be mixed. Other Support. In a facility housing 800 people, the dining facility must maintain a close relationship with the food service contractor. Modifications to an existing layout. Rearranging walls is not as easy as it is in a soft facility. The customer may not understand all requirements, such as the need to maintain walls that have been hardened against electromagnetic pulse. Resources. An operator of a hardened facility must invest considerable resources to ensure that a new customer does not upset the existing operation. Government design review. Make sure there is an accounting for all possible drains on the operating budget; assure that contract termination expenses are considered. Execution. Coordinate on such items as schedule, safety, fire protection, security, notifications, daily shutdown, and after-hours notification. Other issues include escort for workers, waste removal, asbestos removal, and utility outages. Daily operations. Know the schedule; there will be changes, and flexibility will be needed. Consideration must be given to housekeeping, food supply, and appliances. Special Periods. Exercises will occur on a predictable basis. Coordination is important because a new customer may not participate in exercises. With respect to higher defense conditions, contracts should very plainly state that at a certain defense condition (DEFCON) level a contractor's operation ceases and the contractor must depart the facility.

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Use of Underground Facilities to Protect Critical Infrastructures: Summary of a Workshop Mr. Ryall concluded that initiating a new mission is very complex. There will be problems that cannot be anticipated. Daily activities will be disrupted, but the mission cannot be shut down nor can excessive governmental resources be expended. The primary mission always comes first and everything else is secondary. Donald Woodard Underground Developers Association Mr. Woodard began by noting that underground development in the commercial sector is fairly routine compared to the military and that its main competitor is above-ground facilities. With a background in engineering, Mr. Woodard has spent 20 years as an urban planner in the public sector. His view is that underground space provides a new third dimension for land use and density. Mr. Woodard reviewed the history of commercial underground development in the Kansas City area. This region is ideal for underground development because of widespread limestone mines, and Kansas City has, in fact, pioneered commercial use of underground space. Initially, the real estate community in the area was not interested in underground development. There were no zoning ordinances, building codes, occupancy permits, or construction standards. There also were no taxation practices, government support, paved roads, power, or fire protection. Insurance was very expensive and virtually unavailable, and there was no bank financing. The few UGFs operating at the time were not built to consistent standards and leases were not marketable. Most important, there really were no clients of quality. Underground development was considered a novelty—an inexpensive place to use temporarily before moving onto the surface for a quality environment. In some places, above-and below-ground uses are only a few feet apart, so there are conflicts concerning land use. In Kansas City, residents and industry on the surface constituted a problem, since plats above ground dedicated public rights-of-way and easements as part of property sales. The mining below the surface did not recognize these plats because most plats flow to the center of the earth and the top of the sky. So it became a question of who owned the surface rights and how the surface was zoned. The legal descriptions included in the plat and titles to the land had to be worked out before underground development could continue to grow and flourish. As permits and clearances were obtained, the concerns of banks and lawyers were satisfied and development prospects improved. Much is really owed to those who kept investing in the underground, despite all of the problems. Underground development was a secondary use for them; they had paid for the space when it was mined and they made a profit. Now they are collecting dividends and are again making profits. Kansas City is now the most significant pioneer in the development and use of commercial underground space in the world, and people go there to study

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Use of Underground Facilities to Protect Critical Infrastructures: Summary of a Workshop the precedents established. These are the relevant facts about Kansas City's underground developments: Roughly 90 percent of the world's developed and leased commercial underground space is in the Kansas City area. Over 30 million square feet is leased at this time, and 2 million square feet is added each year. There is over 300 million square feet of mined space available there to develop. About 6 million square feet is added each year in new mining. There are 16 facilities around the metropolitan area, and 10 new underground developments are on the drawing board. There are about 50 businesses that operate underground in Kansas City now, with nearly 10,000 employees. Mr. Woodard described several commercial underground facilities in the Kansas City area and noted that underground operators have developed their own marketing expertise. The Kansas City underground is just starting to attract tenants from industrial parks because of reduced costs that are reflected in rental rates. Mr. Woodard described the benefits to relocating underground: Cost. Annual energy costs are about 15 percent of that for a building operating on the surface, a tremendous savings. Construction time. UGFs can be built out in three to five months. There is no concern about the weather. Construction can be done on three shifts a day, if need be. Location. In Kansas City this provides a cost advantage. The mines are, for the most part, in the corridor of intensive surface development. Because mined rock is very expensive to transport, the available space is in the development corridor. Mr. Woodard noted that an Underground Developers Association was established and organized mainly for mutual support. Forums were provided for surveys of underground space, publications, symposiums, and operating and development guidelines. Classes were held in underground developments. Construction guidelines were written in conjunction with the fire departments. Building codes were developed with the city, and Mr. Woodard personally wrote the zoning ordnance covering underground space for Kansas City. Issues were resolved with insurance companies and tax assessors, and UGFs were able to get favorable rates and financing. The jurisdictional authorities have promoted UGFs as a local resource. Environmental issues that have been raised have been well handled. The success of the underground development industry with respect to surface developers is directly related to its ability to provide: a higher degree of security and safety;

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Use of Underground Facilities to Protect Critical Infrastructures: Summary of a Workshop lower construction costs, lease rates, and operations and maintenance costs; faster delivery time; economy of operation; a better environment; innovative uses of underground space; and better locations relative to the market and psychological acceptance. Foreign countries, such as Norway, Sweden, Japan, and even China, have an advantage over the United States in terms of experience with highly technical geological underground applications. But their developments rarely compete in the free market or with surface activities. Mr. Woodard proposed that a Center for Underground Studies be created and funded to promote the use and occupancy of underground space and the identification of UGF needs. Its jurisdiction may be national or international, and he thought approximately $1 million a year would be a viable starting budget. Arnfinn Jenssen Norwegian Defence Construction Service Mr. Jenssen emphasized that the basic needs for the survival of human beings are food, clothing, and housing. To provide these basic needs, modern society has created an infrastructure problem because we depend more and more on transportation, communication, information, monetary, and energy systems. He stated that a first principle of civil engineering is to avoid problems. Norway learned this the hard way during World War II and managed to survive. Today, if important resources are lost or disrupted, it can result in a disaster. This was recognized by the Norwegian government and the Defence Commission, and in 1945 Norway began developing a total defense system that integrated military and civilian elements to prevent critical situations from developing into catastrophes. This was repeated from 1992 to 1993, but by then the program stressed cyber-attacks and disruptions to the banking system more strongly than physical defense. Norway has established emergency requirements and organizations to address them. Mr. Jenssen advanced the Norwegian model, which emphasizes that critical infrastructures be protected by hardening against enemy attack, shelters be provided for the public, bomb damage repair be organized, and preparations to receive supplies from abroad be made. Service should be compulsory in the overall defense system. The emergency preparedness organization should undergo a minimum of changes from peacetime to wartime. In response to the Berlin crisis in 1948, all of these programs were implemented by legislation. Six main preparedness categories are considered by the Norwegian parliament every year: emergency, information, economic, medical emergency, police, and civil defense. The Norwegian Ministry of Justice takes

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Use of Underground Facilities to Protect Critical Infrastructures: Summary of a Workshop the main lead in this national organization. Civil defense is very well organized at the national, county, and municipal levels. Preparedness includes the following major areas: food supply (up to a 12-month supply is required for some goods; sugar, for example); water; sewer; environmental warfare (e g , attacks on a dam); clothing; shipping; energy; industry and trade; communications; telecommunications; and coordination of civil defense, information, radio, news media, police, and construction. Mr. Jenssen provided significant details about Norway's use of UGFs. About 75 percent of the population has access to a proper shelter. Much of Norway's energy resources are stored underground. Norway has more than 200 underground hydropower stations, including transformer stations. Many petroleum, oil, and lubrication facilities, pumping stations, and gas stations also are located underground. In addition, water, fresh food, deep freeze, and cold storage supplies are stocked for several months, while telecommunications and air traffic control systems are protected underground as well. A few factories for ammunition and food are below the surface. The 5000-seat Norwegian Olympic underground ice hockey rink has a span of 62 meters. In time of war, Norwegian contractors do not change their organization; they just change their hats. Provision has been made for the use of UGFs for war headquarters of political bodies, civil defense authorities, communications control, and road and rail authorities. If military or civilian activities need communications, today's modern equipment extends the range for many miles to the antenna sites. In Norway, UGFs exist for the army, navy, air force, and coastal defense but also for some of the NATO allies, such as the United Kingdom, United States, Netherlands, and Germany. Coastal surveillance is provided through retractable underground antennas and cameras. Missiles can be located above ground and then can be moved below the surface in eight to 10 seconds. There are many dual-purpose underground installations in Norway. In peacetime, sports and swimming pools are used for recreation; in wartime they can be converted into a shelter or facilities for other purposes. In the city of Govik, a UGF houses an ice hockey rink, police and civil defense headquarters, and a telecommunications center. All of these facilities have sophisticated ventilation and heating systems. Finally, Norway's topography requires that it

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Use of Underground Facilities to Protect Critical Infrastructures: Summary of a Workshop make extensive use of tunneling technology. Norway has been constructing up to 75 kilometers of modern tunnels per year in the past 10 years. There is also extensive underground construction activity in the mountains. Questions and Answers Mr. Jenssen responded to several questions on the capital costs for above-ground versus below-ground structures. Using the average for all kinds of underground installations, the capital cost for a military facility underground is about 90 percent of that for an above-ground structure. There are at present about 3,000 military UGFs in Norway. On the civilian side, the difference can be greater. For a hydropower plant the cost is probably 50 to 60 percent of surface structures, while the operations cost is about 12 to 25 percent, much less for an underground than for an above-ground facility. A question was posed from the floor concerning experience with fires, evacuation, and ventilation. Mr. Woodard said that there had been some experience with fires in Kansas City UGFs. For those facilities that have sprinklers, fire is not a great threat. Americold Inland, one of the largest underground installations in the Kansas City metropolitan area, had a significant fire that burned for over two months. This was partly due to the lack of a sprinkler system, but there also were no backup plans for how to extinguish a fire in the structure. A room was breached where the fire occurred, and smoke contaminated the UGF. Even though Americold Inland was still operating in the facility while the fire was burning, the smoldering and smoke contamination caused other problems. The insurance settlement was the largest that ever resulted from a fire and totaled billions of dollars. Mr. Ryall noted that the Cheyenne Mountain Complex is classified by Colorado as a nonproducing mine. The code stipulates what type of vehicles can be used, how much explosives can be stored, and what type of airflow is needed. However, there is no code requirement for sprinklers, so the buildings did not have them. The computers were protected with Halon, but those systems have been removed due to the Montreal Accord on CFCs. Where applicable, carbon dioxide/water systems are now being installed each time a room is renovated in what may be a 20-year process. Mr. Cicolani commented that a number of people at the workshop are working with fire codes, particularly Bill Jacobs of the U.S. Fire Administration. The National Fire Protection Association has been working to develop a code for underground commercial operations.