One approach that attempts to address the inevitable tension between the need for administrative flexibility in managing an IFQ program and the need to provide sufficient security to IFQ holders so they can make efficient investments in the fishery involves a cascade of fixed-term entitlements. One variation of this approach has been proposed for the New South Wales fishery (Young, 1995). Under this scheme, initial entitlements of quota share (call them Series A entitlements) would be defined for a finite period, but one long enough to encourage investments (e.g., 30 years; see Figure 5.1). Periodically (e.g., every 10 years), a comprehensive review would be undertaken that would result in a new set of entitlements (Series B), each of which would also have a 30-year duration. These entitlements would confer a similar, but not necessarily identical, set of rights and obligations. Fishermen holding Series A entitlements could have the option to switch to the new set of entitlements at any time earlier than the expiration of their Series A entitlements. Once they switched, they would be able to hold Series B entitlements for the remaining life of the entitlement. This process would continue until it appeared that no more modifications were necessary.

Although many changes in an IFQ program could be directly implemented by changing the governing regulations, in some cases it might enhance political feasibility to introduce changes of a more fundamental nature over a transition period. The definition of each new series offers the control authority the opportunity to phase in new requirements while attempting to provide adequate, if not complete, security for the holder's quota share. It also offers the possibility of combining new obligations with new privileges in such a way as to enhance the political feasibility of the changes. Finally, it provides an opportunity for offering positive incentives to individuals who engage in exemplary fishing (e.g., unusually low bycatch rates) or negative incentives to those who have compliance rates that are low, but not so low as to trigger quota seizure provisions.