with IFQs. Generally, however, the concentration of IFQs will depend on the economies of scale available for a specific fishery.

Impacts Within Communities. Transferability may have far-reaching repercussions on the internal dynamics of fishing communities. The social distribution of quota shares is one variable to consider. It is difficult to predict general effects, due to the existence of confounding factors. In some cases, for instance in the Mid-Atlantic SCOQ fishery (McCay et al., 1995), some of the large firms have broken up since the implementation of IFQs, countering the otherwise strong tendency for concentrated ownership in this industry. However, even in that case quota shares tended to concentrate in the hands of those with the largest shares at the initial allocation (McCay and Creed, 1994; Weisman, 1997). In the Icelandic case, those individuals or firms that own more than 1% of the total quota have increased their share from a quarter to about a half of the total in just over a decade, and in the SCOQ case, those with the largest allocations in 1990 had significantly increased their share of the quota by 1994 (see Appendix G).

Such concentration may make the issues of equity and social distribution pressing concerns, important features in the moral landscape of the affected fishing communities. In some extreme cases, resistance to conservation measures in the fishery may reduce or invalidate potential economic and ecological benefits of an IFQ program, resulting in fishermen's strikes and increased highgrading and bycatch.

Not only can transferability increase conflicts among quota holders, it also can alter relations of power between vessel owner and crew, with the latter increasingly losing power to quota-owning vessel owners. Iceland and Alaska provide some examples of this process. Again, however, the social impact of transferability will depend partly on the design features of the specific program, particularly the ways in which shares are initially allocated and the degree to which rents are returned to fishing communities.

One relevant community concern relates to the ways in which IFQs affect the prospects of marginal participants in fisheries, including “native" groups and women (regarding gender, see, for instance, Macinko, 1993, on Alaska and Skaptadóttir, 1996, on Iceland). As quotas tend to be concentrated and rights to the resource are removed from the communal frameworks to which fishing has been subjected, they tend to freeze or exaggerate existing patterns of occupational participation, making it more difficult for marginal participants to advance. In the New Zealand case, tribal claims were not anticipated and, when exercised, resulted in costly changes to the system (Cheater and Hopa, 1997).

Leasing of Quota Shares

Some of the opposition to IFQs centers on leasing. The reactions to leasing vary from one context to another. In the Icelandic case, fishermen have gone on strike three times in four years to protest against what they see as unfair "quota



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