2. Incentives to cheat should be identified, and IFQ programs should be designed to reduce these incentives.

Program design can have a great effect on the enforcement burden. For example, rather than placing the entire burden for bycatch reduction on enforcement, it is possible to provide alternatives to court-imposed sanctions. Concrete examples are provided by the New Zealand approach, which includes “as-needed" quota transfers and the Alaskan "underage and overage" system and graduated penalties. Sanctions should take the principle of marginal deterrence into account, because it is important to consider the likely effect of a set of penalties on the incentive to commit more serious crimes. In fisheries, one application of this principle would ensure that the penalties for bycatch were not so severe that they would make discarding the catch, rather than landing it, the preferred option. Unobserved discarded catch not only is wasted, but causes data fouling.

In practice, applying the principle of marginal deterrence implies establishing a set of graduated sanctions. Administratively imposed sanctions should be established for minor violations with specified increases in penalties for each additional offense. Criminal penalties (jail sentences and/or seizure of catch, vessel, and equipment and forfeiture of quota) should be reserved for serious offenders and for intentional falsification of reports.

3. Adequate funding should be provided for monitoring and enforcement, and it should be obtained from fees assessed on quota or harvest.

Research, Monitoring, Evaluation, and Evolution

Improve Adequacy of Research

Finding: The data needed to manage a fishery become more extensive as management becomes more complex. Different management approaches require different types of data. IFQs require enough biologic data to set a reasonably accurate TAC and enough socioeconomic data to anticipate some of the effects of proposed systems on individuals and communities.

In general, labor statistics for the fishing industry are not as complete as for other industries. Assessing the effects of proposed limited entry programs requires information on the range of fishing activities, and other activities in which they are embedded, especially for communities in which fishing is important. Such information makes it possible to estimate the probable effects of different proposals for implementing IFQs or other limited access programs, in much the same way that systems analysis enables assessing the effects of proposed changes in manufacturing procedures and the way an industry is organized (Goodenough, 1963; Lieber, 1994).



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