Consequently, in the United States, any interest in individual quotas was probably stymied by widespread resistance to limited entry, as noted above. The surf clam fishery of the Mid-Atlantic region was the first federal fishery to have limited entry, beginning in 1978; it remained an exception for most of the next decade.10 The principle of open access remained dominant. Management bodies such as the regional councils concentrated on Americanizing fisheries that had been dominated by foreign vessels prior to the establishment of the EEZ. In some regions, particularly the northeastern United States, there was also strong resistance to the use of TACs in fisheries management after their brief and contentious use in New England groundfish management (Miller and van Maanen, 1979). TACs are still not being used in this region, although a moratorium on entry to the groundfish fishery was established in 1992 and effort is controlled through allocation of days-at-sea limits to individual vessels.

From the late 1970s and particularly the 1980s, leading scientists and officials in NMFS favored limited entry and IFQs. However, the only case of limited entry in federal waters into the early 1980s was the surf clam fishery, which was managed with a moratorium on entry as well as TACs and time limitations. The surf clam fishery quickly became a model of how a limited entry program could create an exclusive group engaged in rampant overcapitalization (see Chapter 3). In Canada, the limited entry salmon and halibut fisheries had shown similar problems (Fraser, 1979; Pinkerton, 1987), and the transferable vessel allocation program for the herring fishery created in 1976 in Atlantic Canada seemed doomed because of inadequate enforcement (Stephenson et al., 1993). In the early 1980s—like many other nations in the context of expanding fishing jurisdictions—the fishing industries and ministries of Australia and New Zealand held exchanges of fishery managers and economists who were developing the idea of IFQs. Similar exchanges among managers, industry people, and economists helped shape the early IFQ programs of Iceland, Norway, and Canada. Chapter 3 and Appendix G provide additional details about the development and characteristics of IFQ programs in the United States and abroad.

Certainly, the design of IFQ programs has been an experimental process. For example, lessons about the costly risks of allocating pounds of fish rather than a percentage of a quota share came from the New Zealand IFQ program. The Canadian experiments, starting with Bay of Fundy herring, showed the critical importance of investing in monitoring and enforcement, as well as the potential for industry involvement in "co-management" and cost sharing. The U.S. surf clam/ocean quahog (SCOQ) IFQ program, as well as the wreckfish system, the first two in U.S. federal waters, both benefited from these experiences. The

10  

Limited entry within state waters was much more common, used not only by Alaska and the Pacific states but also by the Great Lakes states and New Jersey. During the early period of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, there was concern about states rights being swamped by federal authority, which may have played a role in the lack of federal limited licensing programs.



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