. "H Potential Economic Costs and Benefits of Individual Fishing Quotas to the Nation." Sharing the Fish: Toward a National Policy on Individual Fishing Quotas. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 1999.
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Comparison of Potential Revenue and Anticipated Expenditures
Without detailed information about the amount of capital gains revenue or changes in corporate or business tax revenues, it is not possible to precisely quantify the potential fiscal revenue from the Alaskan IFQ programs. Although the total revenue from the Alaskan halibut and sablefish IFQ fisheries cannot be precisely quantified given the existing data, the program does have the potential to generate revenue through a variety of taxes and fees. The cost of management conducted prior to implementation of the program did not have cost recovery fees specifically associated with it.
No attempt was made to determine whether the revenues generated from the SCOQ and wreckfish IFQ fisheries were sufficient to cover the additional administrative costs that have been incurred in managing these fisheries because clearly definable costs attributable to the IFQ management of these programs and accurate price data were not available. It does appear, based on testimony and our analyses, that IFQ management is likely to be more costly than traditional forms of management. However, it is likely that IFQ-managed fisheries could provide a positive net revenue flow to the nation if the capital gains revenue and changes in corporate and business tax revenues are sufficiently high and if the 3% exvessel fee and 0.5% registration and transfer fee are implemented. Again, the calculations used here assume the maximum fee provided for under the Magnuson-Stevens Act; higher or lower fees will affect the revenue generated.
It should be noted that the Magnuson-Stevens Act authorizes up to 25% of the fees collected under the mandated 3% exvessel fee in existing IFQ programs to be used to aid in financing the purchase of IFQs by fishermen who fish from small vessels or who are the first-time purchasers of quota (Sec. 304[d]). In the North Pacific region, these fees are mandated to be used to finance small-vessel (Classes B, C, and D) and entry-level fishermen (fishermen who do not own halibut and sablefish IFQ, who harvest less than 8,000 pounds in a given year, and who participate aboard a vessel) in the Alaskan halibut and sablefish IFQ programs (Sec. 108[g]). Additionally, fees collected under the assessment of the 0.5% transfer fee must be used for the implementation of a central registry system for limited access system permits and for administering and implementing the Magnuson-Stevens Act provisions for the fishery in which the fee is assessed (Sec. 305[h]). The specific use of the fee is determined by the Secretary of Commerce (Sec. 305[h]). These reallocations of funds could reduce the total amount of revenue that could be used for the general management of an IFQ program.
Although it is difficult to predict the costs of implementing other IFQ programs, it is possible that if more programs were implemented, costs would be reduced based on experiences with previous programs. In addition, facilities developed for monitoring existing IFQ programs might be extended to additional programs with little additional costs. For example, the computerized transaction