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1 Introduction The movement and sustainment of military forces, otherwise known as logistics, are central to success on the battlefield. From the World War IT "Arsenal of Democracy" to the strategic positioning of superior technology that guaranteed success in the Persian Gulf, the Army has always counted on practically unlimited logistical support. However, the need for the rapid deployment of power at any point on the globe, and post-Cold War reductions in strength are forcing the Army to change the way it will fight future battles. These changes will require that the traditional logistics burdens-such as fuel, ammunition, food and water, spare parts, and electric power be accommodated in new ways. Besides reducing demand, requirements for logistics infrastructure (personnel and equipment) to perform maintenance, transportation, medical, and other combat service support functions will also have to be minimized. The Army envisions that by 2025 it should be capable of rapidly deploying a highly effective battle force practically anywhere in the world, and, if necessary, follow up the entry force with heavier, less strategically mobile forces. The rapid projection of an initial battle force will require that its logistics support requirements be substantially smaller than for present forces. Meeting the logistical needs of the Army in 2025, the so- called Army After Next (AAN), will require long-term investments in science and technology (S&T) that significantly reduce logistics demand. Logistics considerations-weight, volume, transport modes and distances, fre- quency of resupply, etc. are essential to the evaluation of prospective systems and research initiatives. The intelligent design of systems can improve logistics efficiency, and research dollars invested up front for the development of the design tools, materials, or software would be returned many times over if they reduce requirements for expen- sive items such as heavy lifters, spare parts, and fuel. Because much of the necessary research and development can be just as readily funded by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) or commercial sources, the Anny should determine the research and technology development objectives that are most worthy of relatively scarce Army research dollars. In September 1996, the National Research Council (NRC) Board on Army Science and Technology conducted a roundtable discussion of the AAN with members of the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the Headquarters, Army Materiel Command (AMC), including key members of the Al y Research Laboratory (ARL) and Army Research Office (ARO). The discussion was part of an early attempt to identify Army requirements for S&T in 2025, and it led to an extended process now under way to refine these requirements. 15

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16 REDUCING THE LOGISTICS BURDEN FOR THE ARMYAFTER NEXT The planning and development for combat systems, such as the future combat system (FCS), future scout and cavalry system (FSCS), soldier as a system, and Army tactical missile system (ATACMS), among others, has already influenced long-term research objectives in competition for defense dollars. An assessment of technologies focused on possible reductions in logistics support for future systems would provide the Army with crucial information for deciding on future research and technology development. Subsequent studies and workshops have concentrated on advantages in combat effectiveness. in these studies, mobility, survivability, and lethality were considered with little regard for logistical impact. Future technologies for the Army have been the subject of several NRC reports, STAR 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty- First Century (NRC, 1992, 1993a), Commercial Multimedia Technologies for Twenty- First Century Army Battlefields (NRC, 1995a), and Energy-Efficient Technologies for the Dismounted Soldier (NRC, 1997a). Technologies reviewed and recommended for research in these studies have all had a potential impact on logistics, but this is the first NBC study in which logistics is the principle criterion for evaluating and recommending research and technology development. STATEMENT OF TASK The Committee to Perform a Technology Assessment Focused on Logistics Support Requirements for Future Army Combat Systems, referred to as the Briny After Next Logistics Committee, was formed in August 1997 to conduct a multidisciplinary study of Tong-term Army S&T investments that are likely to have the biggest impact on reducing logistics demand for the AAN. See Appendix A for the complete Statement of Task. The Army requested that the NRC perform the following major tasks: Understand the importance of logistical considerations to successful battlefield operations and the likely impact of different enabling technologies on logistics support. Review concepts under consideration for soldier and battlefield systems for the AAN time frame. Analyze enabling technologies on which capabilities contemplated for the AAN will depend, and propose alternative technologies that would reduce the need for logistics support. Identify and evaluate areas of research that would reduce the logistics , (~ . . . . . . . requirements tor systems and operational concepts In the 2()Z5 time frame of the AAN. Develop specific recommendations for the Army's S&T investment strategy, including research objectives and a road map for achieving them. CONCEPT FOR ARMY AFTER NEXT OPERATIONS In the last decade, the Army's modernization efforts have focused on achieving "information dominance" of the battlefield by making full use of information

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INTRODUCTION 17 technologies. The evolving "digitized" force, known as Army XXT, will be realized in 2010. Beyond Army 2010, TRADOC has been charged by the Chief of Staff to investi- gate revolutionary capabilities achievable for an AAN in the year 2025. The AAN will depend on accelerated changes, even revolutions, in mobility, lethality, survivability, and sustainability that will dramatically increase the Army's capabilities to achieve full- spectrum dominance of the battlefield. Requirements for the systems that will be added to Arrny XX] to make up the AAN have not yet been determined. In fact, at the time of this study, the AAN concept is becoming a cyclical process involving war games, analyses, and evaluations by the Army. This process was described to the committee as a concept exploration to define characteristics of a future Army capable of deploying a highly lethal battle force anywhere in the world on short notice. With technological superiority, the AAN battle force wounds collapse an opponent's center of gravity before opposing forces have had time to "set," that is, to "dig in" following an act of aggression. The self-sustained battle force would be capable of delivering a devastating surgical blow in 14 days or less. Then denendin~ on the mission, the battle force would be followed by Army XXI forces. , ~ The AAN tactical concepts and technologies are still notional but are considered possible in the 2025 time frame. Army 2010 is a major milepost on the road to the AAN along with operational concepts promulgated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Joint Vision 2010 (DoD, 1996~. To ensure its success, the AAN must project forces with superior tactical and operational mobility, highly lethal and survivable weapons, and systems that exhibit new standards of reliability and sustainability. Key ingredients will be superior intelligence capabilities (information dominance) and operational airlift capability to transport armaments, vehicles, and soldiers fully prepared to engage in immediate battle over long distances. The AAN concept proposes an Arrny made up of the AAN battle force (up to 20 percent) and Arrny XXT forces (80 percent). The rapidly deployable battle force will re- spond to contingencies from the continental United States within 48 hours, and, if neces- sary, be followed by the heavier Army XXT forces. The battle force would consist of units of up to 8,000 soldiers equipped with highly sophisticated weapons and vehicles capable of engaging and defeating a heavily armored enemy force. Compared to conventional operations, which averaged 40 km/in in the Gulf War, the battle force would move from a staging area and engage the enemy at speeds averaging 200 km/in (Scales, 1997~. The battle force would normally be part of a joint (multiservice) or combined (multinational) combat operation and would be capable of operating in densely populated urban areas when necessary. Operational emphasis will be on the vertical dimension for the inherent advantages of owning the "high ground." The vertical battle space will enable other forces to focus essential capabilities in general support (GS) of the AAN battle force, including ground and air platforms to deliver supporting fire, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) for information dominance provided by Tow-, mid-, and high-orbit satellites. Figure 1-1 illustrates how the vertical battle space of the future compares to the linear battlefield of the past along with elements of the anticipated AAN operating environment. This study focuses on logistics support requirements for systems used by the AAN battle force. These include highly mobile, lethal, and survivable combat vehicles

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18 REDUCING THE LOGISTICS BURDEN FOR THE ARMYAFTER NEXT ~ / Support Su: / A_ | fires ~ 14)~ / ~-.-....................... Highly mobile, Distantly supported ANN battle force. - - Extended urban I conditions "complex terrain" In / FIGURE 1-1 Illustration of the Army After Next operating environment. Source: Scales, 1997. and other weapons platforms. The battle force will also have sophisticated communications capabilities that will enable soldiers to maintain full situational awareness (SA), including near real-time damage assessment. The battle force will usually be augmented by supporting firepower and transport provided by the Air Force and Navy. All vehicles and equipment will necessarily be designed to require minimal logistics support because battle force units will have to be self-sustaining (i.e., require no support from logistics organizations external to the battle force) for up to 14 days.

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INTRODUCTION 19 in establishing a baseline for applicable AAN technologies, the committee assumed that between now and 2025 Army doctrine and culture will evolve in parallel with technology and that the Army XXT forces will evolve from the fully-digitized units now being formed. The committee also assumed that planned improvements in logistics support capabilities would enable coherent logistics support of both the AAN battle force and the follow-on Arrny XXT forces. STUDY CONCEPT The starting point for this study was a series of briefings by TRADOC, which is leading the AAN initiative. Major General Robert Scales, past TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, provided the background and description of the AAN concept as it had matured since 1996 (Scares, 1997~. TRADOC also provided a staff representative to assist the committee during the study. The committee focused on logistics burdens and systems associated with the tip of the AAN spear, the AAN battle force. To determine a relationship between logistics and the AAN, the committee had to establish a baseline AAN concept and to understand the traditional military logistics burdens. Characteristics of the systems that would be needed to implement the AAN concept could then be used to find ways to reduce or eliminate the logistics burdens through the selection and development of appropriate technologies. The committee was aided during the fact-finding phase of the study by representatives of Army and DoD organizations including the AMC, ARL, ARO, and various ARC research, development and engineering centers; the Army Logistics Integration Agency; the Army Combined Arms Support Command; the Army Corps of Engineers Waterways Experiment Station; the Arrny Science Board; the Air Force Office of Scientific Research; the Naval Research Laboratories; and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). See Appendix B for a complete list of the committee's fact-finding activities and briefers. It is clear that the Army alone cannot provide for all of the desired AAN capabilities with a fixed number of research dollars. Therefore, AAN systems will depend heavily on S&T breakthroughs made by DoD and commercially sponsored research, possibly in response to the requirements of other government and commercial customers. In determining applicable AAN technologies, the committee interpreted "requirements for Army research" in the broadest sense, that is, without regard to who might eventually sponsor the research. The committee assessed the likely impact of various technology developments on logistics demand and recommended that the most appropriate technologies be included in the Army-sponsored S&T program. The discussions and assessments of technologies were facilitated by the diverse expertise of committee members, but in some cases the discussions were limited because the committee did not have access to classified government requirements and research. REPORT ORGANIZATION This report documents the observations and findings, specific research and technology development objectives, and the general conclusions and recommendations

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20 REDUCING THE LOGISTICS BURDEN FOR THE ARMY AFTER NEXT of the study. it includes the committee's interpretation of Army requirements and assesses technologies that the committee judged to be both essential to the realization of the AAN vision and likely to reduce logistics demands. The committee approached its task by grouping technology areas likely to affect ANN logistics into three broad (and overlapping) categories of operational requirements: mobility, engagement, and sustainment. During the fact-finding phase of the study, the committee was divided into three panels focusing on these three categories. The broad functional categories of mobility and engagement remained useful throughout the study for analysis and discussion of logistics burden-reducing technologies. Technologies to reduce fuel and energy burdens and technologies to improve the reliability of combat systems emerged from the analysis of sustainment issues. A fifth technology category, modeling and simulation to support logistics trade- off analyses, emerged during the committee's investigation of mobility issues, and modeling and simulation (M&S) was seen to play an essential role in elevating logistical considerations to the same level as other performance factors in the design and acquisition of combat systems. Without the capabilities to module! logistics demands of systems while they are still in the concept stage and to quantify the impact of technological and design alternatives on logistics demands, the Army will probably not reduce logistics demands or even hold logistics demands at present-day levels. Chapter ~ (introduction) provides the background, Statement of Task, and overall concert for the AAN as well as the study concert and report organization Chapter 2 (Logistics and the Army After Next Requirements) discusses the role of military logistics, the AAN logistics burdens, and mechanisms for reducing the burdens. Chapters 3 through 7 assess the five functional technology categories described above. Chapter 3 (Logistics Trade-off Analysis) describes the key role of M&S technology. Chapter 4 (rue! and Energy) discusses reducing the fuel burden by focusing on technologies that would reduce energy demands. Chapter 5 (Operational and Tactical Mobility) and Chapter 6 (Engagement) discuss technologies to support Army mobility and engagement system requirements. Chapter 7 (Reliability Concepts) describes the considerations for reliability needed to reduce the logistics support requirements of AAN battle force missions. Chapter ~ (Soldier Sustainment) discusses the soldier as a combat system with special logistics requirements. Chapter 9 (Ioint Force Requirements) describes require- meets outside the Army's exclusive purview that bear on AAN requirements and on the determination of appropriate Army research and technology development. Chapter 10 (Investment Strategy for Research and Technology Development) provides a road map for reducing logistics demand for AAN systems by proposing specific objectives and recommending areas for research and technology development to achieve the objectives. Finally, Chapter ~ ~ (General Conclusions and Recommendations) enumerates the gen- eral conclusions and recommendations of this study.