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11 Conclusions and Recommendations This chapter presents the general conclusions and recommendations that follow from the study. Conclusion 1. The Arrny can reduce logistics demand for Army After Next combat systems. Fuel and ammunition will continue to be the dominant logistics burdens of an AAN battle force. Investments in research and technology development can achieve specific burden reduction goals. Reducing or eliminating the demand for fuel, ammunition, and spare parts will have a ripple effect by reducing the need for separate logistics units and personnel to support the battle force. The primary ways to reduce logistics demand for fuel and ammunition include research and technology developments in modeling and simulation, lightweight vehicles and systems, and improved precision guidance systems. The demand for spare parts and maintenance support can be reduced by including reliability as a performance require- ment at all levels of system design. Recommendation I. The Army should invest in the research and technology development areas listed in the last two columns of Table 10-! to reduce logistics demand for Anny After Next systems. Conclusion 2. Technologies for improving situational awareness (SA) are critical to reducing logistics demands for AAN systems. SA is essential for fuel-efficient, high- speed mobility and for engaging targets efficiently and effectively, thereby reducing battlefield requirements for both fuel and ammunition. AAN systems will be even more dependent on SA technologies than those developed for Arrny XXI. Recommendation 2. The Army should assume that currently contemplated standards of command, control, communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance, and recon- naissance (C4ISR) will not be adequate to support the near-perfect situational awareness requirements of an Army After Next battle force. The Army should ensure adequate funding for research and development of secure, robust, and supportable C4ISR systems and should adapt new information technologies to meet Army After Next requirements as they are identified. 159
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160 REDUCING THE LOGISTICS BURDEN FOR THE ARMY AFTER NEXT Conclusion 3. The development of joint-service capabilities will affect the Army's ability to reduce AAN logistics burdens. Because future operational concepts for the Army and the other services will be derived from the DoD Joint Vision 2010, the AAN should be planned to take full advantage of research and technology developments sponsored by DoD and the other services. Promising commercial programs are under way in both heavy-Tift aircraft and high-speed ships that might provide the AAN with unprecedented strategic mobility from the continental United States to forward staging areas and, by 2025, perhaps even into the battle area. if the Air Force and Navy adopt new aircraft and ships, strategic lift capabilities provided to the AAN battle force and follow-on forces would be significantly improved. Prospective enhancements in C4ISR and weapons systems developed by the other services can be integrated into AAN planning, thereby reducing the need for deploying parallel capabilities. Technologies developed to support SA and force projection for the other services might also be used for AAN systems. Recommendation 3a. The Army should work to influence commercial developments in strategic mobility to ensure that new capabilities include military add-one to the commercial designs. The Army should participate in design reviews with commercial developers to ensure that battle force requirements are met. (A similar approach was recommended in STAR 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century.) Recommendation 3b. The Army should integrate the situational awareness and fire support capabilities of the other services into the Army After Next concept. Conclusion 4. Revolutionary changes in battlefield mobility for an AAN battle force are unlikely to be attained before 2025. The committee found no combination of technolo- gies that would be capable of simultaneously meeting hypothesized requirements for speed, weight, fuel consumption, survivability, and lethality for AAN fighting vehicles. Current concepts for meeting AAN operational and tactical mobility goals do not provide for the desired increases in mobility or reductions in fuel consumption. The committee estimates that a future 15-ton wheeled combat vehicle able to attain cross- country speeds of up to 130 km/in over moderate terrain is technically feasible. Air carriers capable of meeting operational lift requirements for a force of 15-ton vehicles are also technically feasible, but these carriers may not be affordable and would add significantly to the overall fuel burden. Recommendation 4a. If the Army After Next battle force requires a capability for cross- country mobility at speeds of more than 130 km/in, the Army will have to develop novel mobility alternatives. Research in novel technology areas, such as surface ground effects, will only be undertaken at the Army's insistence and should begin immediately. Recommendation 4b. If 130-krn/h cross-country mobility is adequate for Army After Next operations, the Army should develop requirements for a family of minimally crewed wheeled vehicles to perform battlefield functions.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDS TIONS 161 Recommendation 4c. The Army should define its Tong-term requirements for operational and tactical mobility and work with the U.S. Department of Defense to clarify joint-service responsibilities. Research and technology development should be pursued on a department-wide basis to fulfill] overlapping objectives of the Army and other services for the AAN time frame. Conclusion 5. Reliability considerations (including reliability, availability, maintain- ability, and durability) have been routinely sacrificed for other performance characteris- tics. To reduce logistics demand for AAN systems, reliability must be treated on an equal basis with lethality, survivability, and mobility in the design process. Recommendation 5. The Army should revise its design and source selection criteria for battle force systems so that reliability is considered on an equal basis with other mission- specific goals. Conclusion 6. Logistics support for soldiers requires special attention because the individual soldier will be the most essential combat system in the Army After Next. Advances that extend human physical capacity and reduce the need for medical succors could lead to quantum improvements in soldier combat performance. Reducing ~ ~ ~ A ~ ~ the soldier s logistics support requirements would have a multiplier ettect by Increasing combat effectiveness and reducing logistics demand for medical support, water, food, and life support. Recommendation 6. She Army should focus on the "soldier as a system" by ensuring adequate funding for research and technology developments to reduce the weight and bulk of the soldier's combat Toad and to extend the soldier's physiological and psychological capacities. Conclusion 7. Technology solutions to reduce the logistics demands of Army After Next systems will not be simple. She committee does not foresee breakthroughs in technology that will alter fundamental logistical considerations by 2025 for an AAN battle force. Wherefore, the Army should apply technology directly toward achieving specific burden reduction goals rather than anticipating that a magic substitute for fuel or ammunition will be found. She AAN shift away from heavy direct-engagement systems toward smaller, more versatile platforms capable of operating in diverse environments, including urban centers, will reduce the Anny's traditional dependence on a "supply line" to meet fuel and ammunition requirements and will reduce the numbers of both combat and logistics personnel in the battle area. The dramatic improvements in mobility, survivability, lethality, and reliability necessary to ensure the success of a battle force will require that the Army focus now on ways of reducing the logistics support requirements of future combat systems. Analyzing logistics trade-offs during the planning and implementation of systems will be critical. Of all advanced technologies considered in STAR 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century, computer simulation and visualization technology was recognized as the most relevant to the development of
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162 REDUCING THE LOGISTICS BURDEN FOR THE ARMYAFTER NEXT new Army systems. With improved modeling and simulation tools, the Army can identify, analyze, and evaluate alternatives and determine optimum system characteristics for reducing logistics demands at minimum expense. State-of-the-art modeling and simulation tools could also be used to test operational tactics and procedures, train soldiers, and verify doctrinal precepts. Recommendation 7a. The Army should develop the necessary modeling and simulation tools for conducting logistics trade-off analyses at all levels of design, from small-scare components to fully integrated systems. Recommendation 7b. To facilitate mode! development, logistical data from past military operations must be compiled and maintained in useful formats. Recommendation 7c. Logistics trade-off analyses should be included in the Army's system acquisition and integrated logistics support processes.