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2 Military Logistics and the Army After Next Requirements [T7he modern ground army has become shackled to its base, unable to venture far af eld because it can not risk severance of its line of communications. Despite all its vehicles, the modern field army's mobility is actually extremely limited, for its knapsack is relatively small in terms of the days of supply it can carry. Roland G. Ruppenthal Logistical Support of the Armies USArmyin World WarII, Vol.II We have a clear vision for 21st century global military logistics. It is a system based on efficiently distributing resources, rather than stockpiling supplies, providing the right support, at the right time, in the right place - any place on earth. General Dennis Reimer Chief of Staff of the Army 1 February 1998 In the new style of war, superior logistics becomes the engine that allows American military forces to reach an enemy from all points of the globe and arrive ready to fght...logistics has always assumed a degree of importance far beyond that of merely sustaining the force in the field...the strength of the logistics engine determines the pace at which an intervening force makes itself secure...the length of a [military commander-in-chief's] CINC's operational reach will be determined largely by his logisticians. MG Robert J. Scales Commandant, U.S. Army War College The annals of military history are filled with discussions of combat operations, but much less has been written about the support required to transport and sustain combat forces on the battlefield. Yet no commander can operate long without logistical support. Alexander, Hannibal, Napoleon, Bismarck, and Hitler all encountered the challenges of moving and sustaining military forces. The first three overcame the challenge, but the other two did not. 21
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22 REDUCING THE LOGISTICS BURDEN FOR THE ARMYAFTER NEXT MILITARY LOGISTICS Logistics is the process of planning and executing the movement and sustainment of operating forces in the execution of a military strategy and operations. Joint Publication 4.0 Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations, January 27, 1995 (DoD, 1995y Military logistics systems provide the resources for mobilizing, deploying, sustaining, reconstituting, and withdrawing operational forces from combat or other military operations. Logistics systems include the materiel, services, and equipment, as well as the organizations needed to transport, supply, maintain, and care for operational forces. Because logistics forces do not normally engage the enemy and must be supported themselves, every effort is made to keep the ratio of logistics forces to combat forces ("tail-to-tooth" ratio) to a minimum. On the modern battlefield, the Amity must not only support itself but, under cross-servicing agreements and executive agency responsibilities, must also provide certain types of supplies to the other services and, under some circumstances, to coalition partners. Some logistics functions are carried out for the Army by joint organizations and the DoD, as well as by the other services. The Defense Logistics Agency provides a variety of supplies, including fuels, directly to operational forces. Depending on the geographic area, naval and air forces provide construction, medical support, and other logistics services. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Logistics Logistics activities in the past have been conducted on three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. Technological advances in information systems and global transportation have blurred, if not eliminated, the distinction between these levels. Strategic logistics activities are conducted at the national and international levels and include everything from defining requirements to the acquisition of materiel to the distribution of materiel to operational forces. Strategic logistics includes planning for and deploying personnel, equipment, and supplies to the theaters of operations and returning them to the United States. Operational logistics take place within the theater of operations but are not directly related to combat operations. Operational logistics includes the reception, storage, and distribution of supplies and personnel. It also includes processing casualties, maintaining equipment, and providing and maintaining in-theater transportation systems. Tactical logistics are conducted by units in combat, usually at the division level or Tower. Some units engaged in direct combat have minimal logistics components, but most rely on separate Togistics-oriented units to provide support. The purpose of tactical logistics is to enable combat units to conduct continuous military operations.
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MILITARY LOGISTICS AND THE ARMY AFTER NEXT REQUIREMENTS Historical Analysis of the Impact of Logistics on Modern Warfare 23 World War T was a low-mobility war. Trench warfare involved limited penetra- tions of the opponent's lines. Although logistics support was important in World War I, it did not have to cover great distances. Once mechanized armored vehicles were intro- duced, the logistics requirements for fuel, ammunition, and battlefield maintenance became apparent. U.S. combat forces deployed to Europe relied heavily on logistics support from the Allies because U.S. industries had been unable to gear up for the conflict. The distance between Europe and the U.S. and a limited sealift capability to transport supplies restricted support from home. World War IT was in many ways a contest of strategic logistics systems. When the United States declared war on the Axis powers, the country did not have the capability to field, deploy, or equip a substantial fighting force. Over a period of two years, "the Arsenal of Democracy" grew in size and gave the United States and its allies a war-fighting capability never before seen. By 1944, personnel, supplies, and equipment were flowing to both the Pacific and European theaters of operation. Even with the massive buildup before the Normandy invasion, however, the campaigns on the continent were soon restrained by the inability of the Allies to move adequate supplies from logistics bases in England to advancing armies. Patton's Third Army ran out of fuel and had to interrupt its thrust into Germany. (Earlier in the war, at the tactical level, General Rommel's efforts to defeat the British had been hampered by the lengthy supply lines and the logistics required to support the units moving supplies.) In many respects, the Korean Conflict mirrored the experience of World War IT. Because the war was not expected, the United States was unable to deploy adequate forces immediately to the battle area and required time to build up its strategic logistics system. After the Tnchon invasion, the challenge became one of operational and tactical logistics as U.S. forces raced north to the Yalu River. The U.S. involvement in Vietnam changed over time from an advisory role with limited logistics requirements to a full-scale commitment of combat units in conven- tional warfare. However, prior to the initial movement of forces to the theater and throughout the buildup phase, U.S. logistics forces had been developing an infrastructure in Vietnam to support offloading and handling supplies and equipment. Even though new ports were constructed at several locations, the deployment of forces was con- strained by the overall paucity of facilities. In Vietnam, logistics support at the tactical level was made easier by the new-found capability to use fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft to move supplies from base camps to forces in the field. When the Persian Gulf War began, the United States was fortunate that Saudi Arabia possessed a significant port and airfield infrastructure (developed over the pre- ceding 20 years by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for the Saudis), but the bases were not equipped to support extended military operations. Although troops could be moved to the theater quickly by air, the strategic transport of their equipment by sea was slow. Even after the troops were reunited with their equipment, General Schwarzkopf, contrary to the advice of his staff, insisted on having a 60-day supply of provisions on hand be- fore initiating any operations (Scares, 1993~. The logistics requirements were enormous. The Saudis provided U.S. forces with 21 million gallons of fuel each day, and more than 350,000 tons of ammunition were transported from the United States to the theater. Medical personnel constituted 5 percent of the total force. A combined contractor and military transportation organization worked around the clock to move supplies and equipment from the ports to positions near the battle areas.
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24 REDUCING THE LOGISTICS BURDEN FOR THE ARMYAFTER NEXT Partly because the war was over so quickly, but also because of overstated requirements and poor information flow, large amounts of supplies were returned from the theater untouched. About 25,000 containers with unidentified contents were returned. More than 300,000 rounds of artillery, tank, and aircraft ammunition were returned, in large part because outdated consumption rate estimates were used. In World War lI, an average of 14 rounds were required to kill an enemy tank in tank-on-tank engagements. With the advent of the Abrams tank, the average in the Persian Gulf War dropped to 1.2 rounds per kill. Between aircraft and ground ammunition, the United States had 40 rounds available to kill each Iraqi tank (DoD, ~ 994~. Military interventions and operations in Bosnia, Rwanda, and post-Gulf War Kuwait have been characterized by ad hoc organizations, buildups, and the use of stocks of materiel propositioned in depots at forward locations or ships in the United States or at sea. Nevertheless, the United States was unable to move equipment rapidly to the mission areas. In the case of Rwanda, the ability to respond was severely hampered by the total lack of infrastructure in the mission area and by the distance between Rwanda and previously used U.S. and allied forward staging areas. Fortunately, the tactical logistics problems were solvable because of the short duration of these operations. CONCEPTS OF WARFARE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY The military community agrees that warfare in the twenty-first century will be considerably different from warfare in the twentieth century. In Joint Vision 2010, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the senior military officer in the defense structure, has defined a vision of warfare in the first decades of the twenty-first century (see Figure 2-11. This planning document describes a military that will have total SA of the battle space in which it will operate; the ability to protect its forces from enemy attack on the ground, from the air, or from space; and the ability to provide focused logistics support (DoD, 1996~. According to the ICS, focused logistics represents ". . . the fusion of logistics, information, and transportation technologies for rapid crisis response; deployment and sustainment; the ability to track and shift units, equipment and supplies even while enroute, and delivery of tailored logistics packages and sustainment directly to the warfighter" (DoD, 1997a). Focused logistics will provide forces in the battlefield area with command-and- control systems that closely link operations with logistics, enabling logisticians to provide combat commanders with whatever they need, whenever and wherever they need it. Focused logistics will be truly "joint" logistics: wherever feasible, logistics functions of the services will be combined or one of the services will be assigned as the lead agent for a function or supply item. U.S. forces will also rely more on support from host nations and allies. Information will give the logistician "total asset visibility," the ability to determine seamiessly what equipment and supplies are available in the operational theater or in the United States and where they are. During the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. military operated with 26 separate logistics data systems that had few interconnections (Fontaine, 1997~. The logistics force of the future is expected to operate with an "agile infrastructure" that will permit combat forces to take with them only what they are sure to need right-sized, "just-enough" inventories and enable logisticians to supplement this support whenever and wherever necessary.
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MILITARYLOGISTICS AND THE ARMY AFTER NEXT REQUIREMENTS FIGURE 2-1 Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts. Source: DoD, 1996. 25 Building on the concept of focused logistics, the Army has postulated a revolution in military logistics (RML) to leverage advances in information systems technology and fuse operational concepts with logistics systems. The RAIL will involve a shift towards distribution-based systems (rather than the accumulation of supplies), real-time situational understanding, new organizational designs, and proven commercial business practices. The goal of the RAIL is to reduce sustainment requirements and logistics infrastructure by focusing on a high velocity, agile, responsive logistics system based in the continental United States (DA, 1997~. In developing the logistics structure for Army XXI, logistics planners are incorporating the RML concepts into force structures and reducing the need for forward logistics units. Logistics Concepts for the Army After Next Although few specifics have been defined for the AAN, the committee was able to derive logistics support requirements for an ideal AAN battle force from the operational concept described in Arrny briefings. The characteristics of the ideal battle force are listed below: . · The AAN force will be deployed to a staging area near the operational area via strategic air and sea transport provided by the other services. The battle force will establish a logistics support base (battle unit support element) at the forward staging area. The battle force will use Army resources to move to the battle area. The average speed of movements from the staging area to contact with the enemy on the battlefield will be 200 km/in.
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26 REDUCING THE LOGISTICS BURDEN FOR THE ARMY AFTER NEXT The battle force will carry adequate supplies, including fuel and ammunition, to sustain itself for 14 days, a two-week combat pulse. · The battle force will only depend on support from external logistics organizations between combat pulses. . Once its mission has been accomplished, the battle force will be rapidly withdrawn. Logistics Burdens for the Battle Force Combat commanders have long understood that their operational flexibility is limited by logistics and that plans for combat operations must be matched to the availability of logistics support. Any materiels or organization that does not contribute directly to combat effectiveness is considered a logistics burden. This study focuses on reducing logistics demand by reducing logistics burdens. The principal logistics burdens are the fuel, ammunition, food, water, and spare parts necessary to sustain the force during operations. But the logistics burdens also include logistics personnel and equipment in combat support and combat service support organizations (providing supplies, maintenance, transportation, medical services, and other support for the combat units) and the supplies and support required to keep these logistics organizations in operation. Reductions in the logistics demand for fuel, ammunition, water, food, and spare parts consumed during an operation can lead to even greater reductions in logistics burdens. Therefore, one significant way to reduce the logistics burden of a battle force is to reduce the number of logistics units (both personnel and equipment). Because of the considerable uncertainties about the logistics requirements of combat forces and whether this support will in fact be available when needed, the military has always planned to have "more than enough, just in case." As a result, large stores of supplies and large numbers of specialized logistics troops are usually transported to the combat zone and moved along behind the fighting forces. A light infantry division of 11,520 troops, for example, is deployed with a weight of 18,122 tonsil This includes the weight of the soldiers, their personal gear, and all equipment. It also includes one day of ammunition; five days of rations, construction materials, and personal items; and 15 days of clothing, petroleum products, medical supplies, and spare parts. Although the deployment weight includes combat and support units in the division organization, it does not include the weight of the combat and support units external to the division that are needed to support the division. This so- called "light division" deploys with 3,841 vehicles and 83 aircraft. To move this force requires 816 C-141 sorties or 61 C-17 sorties. A "heavy" armor division, by contrast, weighs out at 102,052 tons for 17,186 troops and 8,125 vehicles (1,249 of which are tracked vehicles). It therefore generates a considerably larger transportation requirement than the light division (DoD, ~ 997b). These estimates are based on a table of organization and equipment (TOE) for an existing Army organization. Although the Army has not yet developed a TOE for an AAN battle force, the Army's experience with planning for the deployment and . 1''Materiel'' refers to equipment, apparatus, or supplies for a military force. 2Unless otherwise indicated, tonnage is measured in short tons.
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MILITARY LOGISTICS AND THE ARMYAFTER NEXT REQUIREMENTS 27 sustainment of existing units can be used as a basis for estimating the logistics burdens of an AAN battle force. Army estimates for the number of troops in the AAN battle force units varied over the course of the study. The initial estimate of the force was 8,000 soldiers. The Summer 1998 AAN Wargame assumed a mechanized air assault unit of 5,284 soldiers and 1,998 vehicles (air and ground). If one assumes a hypothetical AAN battle force of 8,000 soldiers and estimates the deployment weight to be on the same order as a current light infantry division, the deployment weight for the AAN battle force would be 12,585 tons. An increase in the ratio of vehicles to soldiers would add to this. Assuming there was no replenishment for the first combat pulse, the deployment weight would be increased by the additional supplies needed to bring all categories of supply up to a 14-day level. BURDEN REDUCTION GOALS After reviewing logistics burdens in past military operations and Army concepts and plans for the future, the committee determined that the logistics burdens, especially fuel and ammunition, could be readily translated into logistics burden reduction goals to reduce logistics demand. The committee concentrated on the following logistics burden reduction goals: reducing fuel demand increasing fuel energy by weight managing fuel and energy reducing lethal system weight reducing the number of rounds of ammunition required per target reducing weight per round of ammunition increasing system reliability lightening soldier systems increasing soldier effectiveness optimizing system designs providing "just right" logistics In the initial Army briefing to the committee in September 1997, the AAN concept was based on a self-deployment capability for AAN vehicles. Both the Army and the committee later concluded, however, that vehicles would have to be airlifted to the mission site from a forward base and would require near-vertical insertion and extraction (or very short landing and takeoff). This airlift requirement is an additional logistics support requirement for transporting the force to and from the battle area. Considering how few airlift alternatives are available, the committee concluded that the Army would have to consider airlift capabilities as part of the battle force requirement. The operational requirement for highly mobile vehicles that can be easily and rapidly transported to the mission area in large numbers prompted the committee (and Anny planners and developers) to focus on relatively lightweight combat vehicles (15 tons or less). Once inserted by air, these combat vehicles must be prepared to accomplish any or all of a variety of combat missions, operating for up to 14 days without logistics support from outside the battle area.
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28 REDUCING THE LOGISTICS BURDEN FOR THE ARMYAFTER NEXT Because these vehicles must operate under very tight constraints, every function and every capability must be considered against every other function and capability. For instance, given a fixed weight limit far Tower than the weight of existing armored vehicles, increasing protective capability may require a reduction in weapons system capability. Increasing the capability of a vehicle to negotiate obstacles may increase weight and reduce fuel-carrying capacity. Thus, trade-off analyses will be required at all levels among systems, among components, and among competing technologies and materials. The committee considered technologies for the AAN battle force in the context of functional requirements for mobility, engagement, and sustainment systems. The committee then evaluated technology application areas3 for systems needed in each category to determine technologies most likely to affect AAN logistics demands. It should be noted that the committee did not have access to classified material and information on relevant development programs, in particular, armor, C4ISR (com- mand, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais- sance), and signature reduction, was not available to the committee. in addition, the committee was told that the Army expects to complete development of its C4ISR struc- ture by 2010 and that the committee should assume that the planned structure would be adequate to support future Army systems. Because of the critical relation between C4ISR and logistics demand, the committee rejected this assumption and provided recommendations on several C4ISR issues based on the expertise of committee members. Thus, given background information on logistics and the AAN, the committee investigated technology developments necessary to reduce logistics burdens while meeting AAN performance goals. 3These included: armor; lightweight materials; command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR); global positioning; energy storage, management, and conversion; hydrogen storage; lightweight nuclear power; modeling and simulation; ordnance (gun systems, small rockets, lasers, energetics); reliability (prognostics, on-site repair and manufacturing, physics of failure); robotics; sensors and guidance; signature reduction; soldier sustainment; and tactical mobility systems.
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