stantial. Instead, the committee tries to explore how choices among options are affected by these undefined key features of OMFTS.

In the context of defining the future capabilities and logistics requirements of naval expeditionary forces, however, these issues cannot be left unresolved. Because logistics could be such a major challenge in implementing OMFTS, the time has come for the Navy and Marine Corps to define the desired end states and planning horizons in sufficient detail to enable reasoned and consistent assessment of logistics requirements and capabilities. A defined OMFTS operational concept is needed, a concept that integrates tactical, logistical, and operational considerations. Such a concept should include definite statements regarding the following features: (1) required combat capability, including the size and composition of the tactical and logistical forces ashore; (2) use of naval fire support in relation to organic artillery ashore; (3) characteristics of the sea basing ships, aircraft, and surface craft; (4) sea base standoff distances and duration; (5) operating distances ashore; and (6) use of overseas facilities, staging bases, and resupply points. This concept of operations and common baseline would provide the basis for studies, analyses, war games, and exercises to determine the limits of currently programmed capabilities and the relative costs and values of new investments in meeting future goals. Without such specificity, different interpretations of OMFTS concepts risk underestimating the logistics implications of OMFTS or rationalizing investments that may not be essential.

RECOMMENDATION: The Navy and Marine Corps, using an iterative, strategic planning process, should create an OMFTS concept of operations that integrates tactical and logistical considerations. Key factors to be addressed in defining such a concept should include (1) required combat capability, in terms of the tactical and logistics forces ashore; (2) use of naval fire support; (3) capabilities of the sea basing ships, aircraft, and surface craft; (4) ranges of sea base standoff distances and duration; (5) operating distances ashore; and (6) use of overseas facilities as staging bases and resupply points.



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