Hazards: Technology and Fairness (1986)

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THREE MILE ISLAND AND BHOPAL: LESSONS LEARNED AND NOT LEARNED 205 original typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the retained, and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. yourself you know what is "the right answer." But if you want to argue that the right answer is, for example, that nuclear power is good or is bad, you probably have gone beyond your area of expertise and have become a public policy advocate. You have the right to do so, but you should be aware that even if you try to retain your cloak of technical objectivity, the public will not accept it. Instead, the public may transfer its skepticism of you to other scientists and engineers, which then opens the arena to those who knowingly play upon ignorance. And, as Clark (1980, p. 11) pointed out, this leads to the "society's attitudes toward risks such as cancer and nuclear reactors [being] not readily distinguishable from its earlier fears of the evil eye." References Ahearne, J. F. 1981. Concurring Views. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Memorandum and Order in the Matter of Federal Tort Claim of General Public Utilities Corporation et al., June 8, 1981. Ahearne, J. E 1983 Prospects for the U.S. nuclear regulatory industry. Annual Review of Energy 8:355–384. Bok, D. C. 1983. The President's Report, 1981–82. Harvard University, March. Brooks, H. 1975. Expertise and politics: Problems and tensions. Proceedings of American Philosophical Society 119:259. Clark, W. C. 1980. Witches, floods, and wonder drugs: Historical perspectives on risk management. Paper R-22, Institute of Resource Ecology, University of British Columbia, January. Morgan, M. G. 1978. Bad science and good policy analysis. Science 201:971. President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island. 1979. The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. Rickover, H. G. 1979. Management in government. Management September: 16–19. Ruckelshaus, W. D. 1985. Risk, science, and democracy. Issues in Science and Technology 1:19–38. Sun, M. 1985a. Regulatory structure for biotechnology proposed. Science 227:274. Sun, M. 1985b. Rifkin and NIH win in court ruling. Science 227:1321. Sun, M. 1985c. Biotech policy draws flood of comments. Science 228:1296. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 1975. Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Plants. WASH-1400, NUREG 75/014. Washington, D.C. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 1978. Risk Assessment Review Group Report to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. NUREG/CR-0400. Washington, D.C. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 1980a. 1979 Annual Report. Washington, D.C. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 1980b. Three Mile Island: A Report to the Commissioners and to the Public. NUREG/CR-1250. Washington, D.C.